History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization

General Editor D.P. Chattopadhyaya

Volume II Part 4

Origin and Development of the Vaiśeṣika System

ANANTALAL THAKUR

PHISPC

Centre for Studies in Civilizations

Origin and Development of the Vaiśeṣika System

Publications in PHISPC Series

HISTORY OF SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE IN INDIAN CIVILIZATION

General Editor & Project Director D.P. Chattopadhyaya

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History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization

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Volume II Part 4

Origin and Development of the Vaiśeṣika System

ANANTALAL THAKUR

Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture

CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN CIVILIZATIONS

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To
the memory of my teachers
Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa
(1876-1942)

Professor Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya
(1890-1957)

Professor Chintaharana Chakravarti
(1900-1972)

And To

Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya

this work is respectfully dedicated

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अ	a	आ	ā	इ	i	ई	ī		
उ	u	ऊ	ū	ऋ	ṛ	ॠ	ṝ		
ऌ	ḷ	ए	e	ऐ	ai	ओ	o		
औ	au	अं	aṁ	अः	aḥ				
क्	k	ख्	kh	ग्	g	घ्	gh	ङ्	ṅ
च्	c	छ्	ch	ज्	j	झ्	jh	ञ्	ñ
ट्	ṭ	ठ्	ṭh	ड्	ḍ	ढ्	ḍh	ण्	ṇ
त्	t	थ्	th	द्	d	ध्	dh	न्	n
प्	p	फ्	ph	ब्	b	भ्	bh	म्	m
य्	y	र्	r	ल्	l	व्	v		
श्	ś	ष्	ṣ	स्	s	ह्	h		
ळ्	l̤	क्ष्	kṣ	त्र्	tr	ज्ञ्	jñ		

General Introduction

I

It is understandable that man, shaped by Nature, would like to know Nature. The human ways of knowing Nature are evidently diverse, theoretical and practical, scientific and technological, artistic and spiritual. This diversity has, on scrutiny, been found to be neither exhaustive nor exclusive. The complexity of physical nature, life-world and, particularly, human mind is so enormous that it is futile to follow a single method for comprehending all the aspects of the world in which we are situated.

One need not feel bewildered by the variety and complexity of the worldly phenomena. After all, both from traditional wisdom and our daily experience, we know that our own nature is not quite alien to the structure of the world. Positively speaking, the elements and forces that are out there in the world are also present in our body-mind complex, enabling us to adjust ourselves to our environment. Not only the natural conditions but also the social conditions of life have instructive similarities between them. This is not to underrate in any way the difference between the human ways of life all over the world. It is partly due to the variation in climatic conditions and partly due to the distinctness of production-related tradition, history and culture.

Three broad approaches are discernible in the works on historiography of civilization, comprising science and technology, art and architecture, social sciences and institutions. Firstly, some writers are primarily interested in discovering the general laws which govern all civilizations spread over different continents. They tend to underplay what they call the noisy local events of the external world and peculiarities of different languages, literatures and histories. Their accent is on the unity of Nature, the unity of science and the unity of mankind. The second group of writers, unlike the generalist or transcendentalist ones, attach primary importance to the distinctiveness of every culture. To these writers human freedom and creativity are extremely important and basic in character. Social institutions and the cultural articulations of human consciousness, they argue, are bound to be expressive of the concerned people's consciousness. By implication they tend to reject concepts like archetypal consciousness, universal mind and providential history. There is a third group of writers who offer a composite picture of civilizations, drawing elements both from their local as well as common characteristics. Every culture has its local roots and peculiarities. At the same time, it is pointed out that due to demographic migration and immigration over the centuries an element of compositeness emerges almost in every culture. When, due to a natural calamity or political exigencies people move from one part of the world to another, they carry with them, among other things, their language, cultural inheritance and their ways of living.

In the light of the above facts, it is not at all surprising that comparative anthropologists and philologists are intrigued by the striking similarity between different language families and the rites, rituals and myths of different peoples. Speculative philosophers of history, heavily relying on the findings of epigraphy, ethnography, archaeology and theology, try to show in very general terms that the particulars and universals of culture are 'essentially' or 'secretly' interrelated. The spiritual aspects of culture like dance and music, beliefs pertaining to life, death and duties, on analysis, are found to be mediated by the material forms of life like weather forecasting, food production, urbanization and invention of script. The transition from the oral culture to the written one was made possible because of the mastery of symbols and rules of measurement. Speech precedes grammar, poetry prosody. All these show how the 'matters' and 'forms' of life are so subtly interwoven.

II

The PHISPC publications on History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, in spite of their unitary look, do recognize the differences between the areas of material civilization and those of ideational culture. It is not a work of a single author. Nor is it being executed by a group of thinkers and writers who are methodologically uniform or ideologically identical in their commitments. In conceiving the Project we have interacted with, and been influenced by, the writings and views of many Indian and non-Indian thinkers.

The attempted unity of this Project lies in its aim and inspiration. We have in India many scholarly works written by Indians on different aspects of our civilization and culture. Right from the pre-Christian era to our own time, India has drawn the attention of various countries of Asia, Europe and Africa. Some of these writings are objective and informative and many others are based on insufficient information and hearsay, and therefore not quite reliable, but they have their own value. Quality and view-points keep on changing not only because of the adequacy and inadequacy of evidence but also, and perhaps more so, because of the bias and prejudice, religious and political conviction, of the writers.

Besides, it is to be remembered that history, like Nature, is not an open book to be read alike by all. The past is mainly enclosed and only partially disclosed. History is, therefore, partly objective or 'real' and largely a matter of construction. This is one of the reasons why some historians themselves think that it is a form of literature or art. However, it does not mean that historical construction is 'anarchic' and arbitrary. Certainly, imagination plays an important role in it.

But its character is basically dependent upon the *questions* which the historian raises and wants to understand or answer in terms of the ideas and actions of human beings in the past ages. In a way, history, somewhat like the natural sciences, is engaged in answering questions and in exploring relationships of cause and effect between events and developments across time. While in the natural sciences, the scientist poses questions about nature in the form of hypotheses, expecting to elicit authoritative answers to such

questions, the historian studies the past, partly for the sake of understanding it for its own sake and partly also for the light which the past throws upon the present, and the possibilities which it opens up for moulding the future. But the difference between the two approaches must not be lost sight of. The scientist is primarily interested in discovering laws and framing theories, in terms of which, different events and processes can be connected and anticipated. His interest in the conditions or circumstances attending the concerned events is secondary. Therefore, scientific laws turn out to be basically abstract and easily expressible in terms of mathematical language. In contrast, the historian's main interest centres round the *specific* events, human ideas and actions, not *general* laws. So, the historian, unlike the scientist, is obliged to pay primary attention to the circumstances of the events he wants to study. Consequently, history, like most other humanistic disciplines, is concrete and particularist. This is not to deny the obvious truth that historical events and processes consisting of human ideas and actions show some trend or other and weave some pattern or other. If these trends and patterns were not there at all in history, the study of history as a branch of knowledge would not have been profitable or instructive. But one must recognize that historical trends and patterns, unlike scientific laws and theories, are not general or purported to be universal in their scope.

III

The aim of this Project is to discover the main aspects of Indian culture and present them in an interrelated way. Since our culture has influenced, and has been influenced by, the neighbouring cultures of West Asia, Central Asia, East Asia and South-East Asia, attempts have been made here to trace and study these influences in their mutuality. It is well known that during the last three centuries, European presence in India, both political and cultural, has been very widespread. In many volumes of the Project considerable attention has been paid to Europe and through Europe to other parts of the world. For the purpose of a comprehensive cultural study of India, the existing political boundaries of the South Asia of today are more of a hindrance than help. Cultures, like languages, often transcend the bounds of changing political territories.

If the inconstant political geography is not a reliable help to the understanding of the layered structure and spread of culture, a somewhat comparable problem is encountered in the area of historical periodization. Periodization or segmenting time is a very tricky affair. When exactly one period ends and another begins is not precisely ascertainable. The periods of history designated as ancient, medieval and modern are purely conventional and merely heuristic in character. The varying scopes of history, local, national and continental or universal, somewhat like the periods of history, are unavoidably fuzzy and shifting. Amidst all these difficulties, the volume-wise details have been planned and worked out by the editors in consultation with the Project Director and the General Editor. I believe that the editors of different volumes have also profited from the reactions and suggestions of the contributors of individual chapters in planning the volumes.

Another aspect of Indian history which the volume-editors and contributors of the

Project have carefully dealt with is the distinction and relation between civilization and culture. The material conditions which substantially shaped Indian civilization have been discussed in detail. From agriculture and industry to metallurgy and technology, from physics and chemical practices to the life sciences and different systems of medicines—all the branches of knowledge and skill which directly affect human life—form the heart of this Project. Since the periods covered by the PHISPC are extensive—prehistory, proto-history, early history, medieval history and modern history of India—we do not claim to have gone into all the relevant material conditions of human life. We had to be selective. Therefore, one should not be surprised if one finds that only some material aspects of Indian civilization have received our pointed attention, while the rest have been dealt with in principle or only alluded to.

One of the main aims of the Project has been to spell out the first principles of the philosophy of different schools, both pro-Vedic and anti-Vedic. The basic ideas of Buddhism, Jainism and Islam have been given their due importance. The special position accorded to philosophy is to be understood partly in terms of its proclaimed unifying character and partly to be explained in terms of the fact that different philosophical systems represent alternative world-views, cultural perspectives, their conflict and mutual assimilation.

Most of the volume-editors and at their instance the concerned contributors have followed a middle path between the extremes of narrativism and theoreticism. The underlying idea has been this: If in the process of working out a comprehensive Project like this every contributor attempts to narrate all those interesting things that he has in the back of his mind, the enterprise is likely to prove unmanageable. If, on the other hand, particular details are consciously forced into a fixed mould or pre-supposed theoretical structure, the details lose their particularity and interesting character. Therefore, depending on the nature of the problem of discourse, most of the writers have tried to reconcile in their presentation, the specificity of narrativism and the generality of theoretical orientation. This is a conscious editorial decision. Because, in the absence of a theory, however inarticulate it may be, the factual details tend to fall apart. Spiritual network or theoretical orientation makes historical details not only meaningful but also interesting and enjoyable.

Another editorial decision which deserves spelling out is the necessity or avoidability of duplication of the same theme in different volumes or even in the same volume. Certainly, this Project is not an assortment of several volumes. Nor is any volume intended to be a miscellany. This Project has been designed with a definite end in view and has a structure of its own. The character of the structure has admittedly been influenced by the variety of the themes accommodated within it. Again it must be understood that the complexity of structure is rooted in the aimed integrality of the Project itself.

IV

Long and in-depth editorial discussion has led us to several unanimous conclusions. Firstly, our Project is going to be *unique,* unrivalled and discursive in its attempt to

integrate different forms of science, technology, philosophy and culture. Its comprehensive scope, continuous character and accent on culture distinguish it from the works of such Indian authors as P.C. Ray, B.N. Seal, Binoy Kumar Sarkar and S.N. Sen and also from such Euro-American writers as Lynn Thorndike, George Sarton and Joseph Needham. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to suggest that it is for the first time that an endeavour of so comprehensive a character, in its exploration of the social, philosophical and cultural characteristics of a distinctive world civilization—that of India—has been attempted in the domain of scholarship.

Secondly, we try to show the linkages between different branches of learning as different modes of experience in an *organic* manner and without resorting to a kind of reductionism, materialistic or spiritualistic. The internal dialectics of organicism without reductionism allows fuzziness, discontinuity and discreteness within limits.

Thirdly, positively speaking, different modes of human experience—scientific, artistic, etc., have their own individuality, not necessarily autonomy. Since all these modes are modification and articulation of *human* experience, these are bound to have between them some finely graded commonness. At the same time, it has been recognized that reflection on different areas of experience and investigation brings to light new insights and findings. Growth of knowledge requires humans, in general, and scholars, in particular, to identify the distinctness of different branches of learning.

Fourthly, to follow simultaneously the twin principles of: (a) individuality of human experience as a whole, and (b) individuality of diverse disciplines, are not at all an easy task. Overlap of themes and duplication of the terms of discourse become unavoidable at times. For example, in the context of *Dharmaśāstra*, the writer is bound to discuss the concept of value. The same concept also figures in economic discourse and also occurs in a discussion on fine arts. The conscious editorial decision has been that, while duplication should be kept to its minimum, for the sake of intended clarity of the themes under discussion, their reiteration must not be avoided at high intellectual cost.

Fifthly, the scholars working on the Project are drawn from widely different disciplines. They have brought to our notice an important fact that has clear relevance to our work. Many of our contemporary disciplines like economics and sociology did not exist, at least not in their present form, just two centuries ago or so. For example, before the middle of nineteenth century, sociology as a distinct branch of knowledge was unknown. The term is said to have been coined first by the French philosopher Auguste Comte in 1838. Obviously, this does not mean that the issues discussed in sociology were not there. Similarly, Adam Smith's (1723–90) famous work *The Wealth of Nations* is often referred to as the first authoritative statement of the principles of (what we now call) economics. Interestingly enough, the author was equally interested in ethics and jurisprudence. It is clear from history that the nature and scope of different disciplines undergo change, at times very radically, over time. For example, in India '*Arthaśāstra*' does not mean the science of economics as understood today. Besides the principles of economics, the *Arthaśāstra* of ancient India discusses at length those of governance, diplomacy and military science.

Sixthly, this brings us to the next editorial policy followed in the Project. We have

tried to remain very conscious of what may be called indeterminacy or inexactness of translation. When a word or expression of one language is translated into another, some loss of meaning or exactitude seems to be unavoidable. This is true not only in the bilingual relations like Sanskrit-English and Sanskrit-Arabic, but also in those of Hindi-Tamil and Hindi-Bengali. In recognition of the importance of language-bound and context-relative character of meaning we have solicited from many learned scholars, contributions, written in vernacular languages. In order to minimize the miseffect of semantic inexactitude we have solicited translational help of that type of bilingual scholars who know both English and the concerned vernacular language, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Bengali or Marathi.

Seventhly and finally, perhaps the place of technology as a branch of knowledge in the composite universe of science and art merits some elucidation. Technology has been conceived in very many ways, e.g., as autonomous, as 'standing reserve', as liberating or enlargemental, and alienative or estrangemental force. The studies undertaken by the Project show that, in spite of its much emphasized mechanical and alienative characteristics, technology embodies a very useful mode of knowledge that is peculiar to man. The Greek root words of technology are *techne* (art) and *logos* (science). This is the basic justification of recognizing technology as closely related to both epistemology, the discipline of valid knowledge, and axiology, the discipline of freedom and values. It is in this context that we are reminded of the definition of man as *homo technikos*. In Sanskrit, the word closest to *techne* is *kalā* which means any practical art, any mechanical or fine art. In the Indian tradition, in *Śaivatantra*, for example, among the arts (*kalā*) are counted dance, drama, music, architecture, metallurgy, knowledge of dictionary, encyclopaedia and prosody. The closeness of the relation between arts and sciences, technology and other forms of knowledge are evident from these examples and was known to the ancient people. The human quest for knowledge involves the use of both head and hand. Without mind, the body is a corpse and the disembodied mind is a bare abstraction. Even for our appreciation of what is beautiful and the creation of what is valuable, we are required to exercise both our intellectual competence and physical capacity. In a manner of speaking, one might rightly affirm that our psychosomatic structure is a functional connector between what we are and what we could be, between the physical and the beyond. To suppose that there is a clear-cut distinction between the physical world and the psychosomatic one amounts to denial of the possible emergence of higher logico-mathematical, musical and other capacities. The very availability of aesthetic experience and creation proves that the supposed distinction is somehow overcome by what may be called the bodily self or embodied mind.

V

The ways of classification of arts and sciences are neither universal nor permanent. In the Indian tradition, in the *Ṛgveda*, for example, *vidyā* (or sciences) are said to be four in number: (i) *Trayī*, the triple Veda; (ii) *Ānvīkṣikī*, logic and metaphysics; (iii) *Daṇḍanīti,* science of governance; (iv) *Vārtta*, practical arts such as agriculture, commerce, medicine,

etc. Manu speaks of a fifth *vidyā*, viz., *Ātmavidyā*, knowledge of self or of spiritual truth. According to many others, *vidyā* has fourteen divisions, viz., the four Vedas, the six *Vedāṅgas*, the *Purāṇas*, the *Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya,* and *Dharma* or law. At times, the four *Upavedas* are also recognized by some as *vidyā*. *Kalās* are said to be 33 or even 64.

In the classical tradition of India, the word *śāstra* has at times been used as synonym of *vidyā*. *Vidyā* denotes instrument of teaching, manual or compendium of rules, religious or scientific treatise. The word *śāstra* is usually found after the word referring to the subject of the book, e.g., *Dharma-śāstra, Artha-śāstra, Alaṁkāra-śāstra* and *Mokṣa-śāstra*. Two other words which have been frequently used to denote different branches of knowledge are *jñāna* and *vijñāna*. While *jñāna* means knowing, knowledge, especially the higher form of it, *vijñāna* stands for the act of distinguishing or discerning, understanding, comprehending and recognizing. It means worldly or profane knowledge as distinguished from *jñāna*, knowledge of the divine.

It must be said here that the division of knowledge is partly conventional and partly administrative or practical. It keeps on changing from culture to culture, from age to age. It is difficult to claim that the distinction between *jñāna* and *vijñāna* or that between science and art is universal. It is true that even before the advent of modern age, both in the East and the West, two basic aspects of sciences started gaining recognition. One is the *specialized character* of what we call scientific knowledge. The other is the concept of *trained skill* which was brought close to scientific knowledge. In the medieval Europe, the expression 'the seven liberal sciences' has so often been used simultaneously with 'the seven liberal arts', meaning thereby, the group of studies by the *Trivium* (Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric) and *Quadrivium* (Arithmetic, Music, Geometry and Astronomy).

It may be observed here, as has already been alluded to earlier, that the division between different branches of knowledge, between theory and practice, was not pushed to an extreme extent in the early ages. *Praxis*, for example, was recognized as the prime *techne*. The Greek word, *technologia* stood for systematic treatment, for example, of Grammar. *Praxis* is not the mere application of *theoria*, unified vision or integral outlook, but it also stands for the active impetus and base of knowledge. In India, one often uses the terms *Prayukti-vidyā* and *Prayodyogika-vidyā* to emphasize the practical or applicative character of knowledge. *Prayoga* or application is both the test and base of knowledge. Doing is the best way of knowing and learning.

That one and the same word may mean different 'things' or concepts in different cultures and thus create confusion has already been stated before. Two such words which in the context of this Project under discussion deserve special mention are *dharma* and *itihāsa*. Ordinarily, *dharma* in Sanskrit-rooted languages is taken to be conceptual equivalent of the English word *religion*. But, while the meaning of religion is primarily theological, that of *dharma* seems to be manifold. Literally, *dharma* stands for that which is established or that which holds people steadfastly together. Its other meanings are law, rule, usage, practice, custom, ordinance and statute. Spiritual or moral merit, virtue, righteousness and good works are also denoted by it. Further, *dharma* stands for natural qualities like burning (of fire), liquidity (of water) and fragility (of glass). Thus one finds that meanings of *dharma* are of many types—legal, social, moral, religious or spiritual,

and even ontological or physical. All these meanings of *dharma* have received due attention of the writers in the relevant contexts of different volumes.

This Project, being primarily historical as it is, has naturally paid serious attention to the different concepts of history—epic-mythic, artistic-narrative, scientific-causal, theoretical and ideological. Perhaps the point that must be mentioned first about history is that it is not a correct translation of the Sanskrit word *itihāsa*. Etymologically, it means what really happened (*iti-ha-āsa*). But, as we know, in the Indian tradition *purāṇa* (legend, myth, tale, etc.), *gāthā* (ballad), *itivṛtta* (description of past occurrence, event, etc.), *ākhyāyikā* (short narrative) and *vaṃśa-carita* (genealogy) have been consciously accorded a very important place. Things started changing with the passage of time and particularly after the effective presence of Islamic culture in India. Islamic historians, because of their own cultural moorings and the influence of the Semitic and Graeco-Roman cultures on them, were more particular about their facts, figures and dates than their Indian predecessors. Their aim to bring history close to statecraft, social conditions and the lives and teachings of the religious leaders imparted a mundane character to this branch of learning. The Europeans whose political appearance on the Indian scene became quite perceptible only towards the end of the eighteenth century brought in with them their own view of historiography in their cultural baggage. The impact of the Newtonian Revolution in the field of history was very faithfully worked out, among others, by David Hume (1711–76) in *History of Great Britain from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688* (6 Vols., 1754–62) and Edward Gibbon (1737–94) in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (6 Vols., 1776–88). Their emphasis on the principles of causality, datability and continuity/linearity of historical events introduced the spirit of scientific revolution in European historiography. The introduction of English education in India and the exposure of the elites of the country to it largely account for the decline of the traditional concept of *itihāsa* and the rise of the post-Newtonian scientific historiography. Gradually, Indian writers of our own history and cultural heritage started using more and more European concepts and categories. This is not to suggest that the impact of the European historiography on Indian historians was entirely negative. On the contrary, it imparted an analytical and critical temper which motivated many Indian historians of the nineteenth century to try to discover and represent our heritage in a new way.

VI

The principles which have been followed for organizing the subjects of different volumes under this Project may be stated in this way. We have kept in view the main structures which are discernible in the decomposible composition of the world. The first structure may be described as physical and chemical. The second structure consists, broadly speaking, of biology, psychology and epistemology. The highest and the most abstract structure nests many substructures within it, for example, logic, mathematics and musical notes. It is well known that the substructures within each structure are interactive, i.e., not isolable. The more important point to be noted in this connection is that the basic

three structures of the world, viz., (a) physico-chemical, (b) bio-psychological, and (c) logico-mathematical are all simultaneously open to upward and downward causation. In other words, while the physico-chemical structure can causally influence the bio-psychological one and the latter can causally influence the most abstract logico-mathematical, the reverse process of causation is also operative in the world. In spite of its relative abstractness and durability, the logico-mathematical world has its downward causal impact on our bio-psychological and epistemological processes and products. And the latter can also bring about change in the structures of the physical world and its chemical composition. Applied physics and bio-technology make the last point abundantly clear.

Many philosophers, life-scientists, and social scientists highlight the point that nature loves hierarchies. Herbert Simon, the economist and the management scientist, speaks of four steps of partial ordering of our world, namely; (i) chemical substances, (ii) living organisms, tissues and organs, (iii) genes, chromosomes and DNA, and (iv) human beings, the social organizations, programmes and information process. All these views are in accord with the anti-reductionist character of our Project. Many biologists defend this approach by pointing out that certain characteristics of biological phenomena and process like unpredictability, randomness, uniqueness, magnitude of stochastic perturbations, complexity and emergence cannot be reduced without recourse to physical laws.

The main subjects dealt with in different volumes of the Project are connected not only conceptually and synchronically but also historically or diachronically. For pressing practical reasons, however, we did not aim at presenting the prehistorical, proto-historical and historical past of India in a continuous or chronological manner. Besides, it has been shown in the presentation of the PHISPC that the process of history is non-linear. And this process is to be understood in terms of human praxis and an absence of general laws in history. Another point which deserves special mention is that the editorial advisors have taken a conscious decision not to make this historical Project primarily political. We felt that this area of history has always been receiving extensive attention. Therefore, the customary discussion of dynastic rule and succession will not be found in a prominent way in this series. Instead, as said before, most of the available space has been given to social, scientific, philosophical and other cultural aspects of Indian civilization.

Having stated this, it must be admitted that our departure from conventional style of writing Indian history is not total. We have followed an inarticulate framework of time in organizing and presenting the results of our studies. The first volume, together with its parts, deals with the prehistorical period to AD 300. The next two volumes, together with their parts, deal with, among other things, the development of social and political institutions and philosophical and scientific ideas from AD 300 to the beginning of the eleventh century AD. The next period with which this Project is concerned spans from the twelfth century to the early part of the eighteenth century. The last three centuries constitute the fourth period covered by this Project. But, as said before, the definition of all these periods by their very nature are inexact and merely indicative.

Two other points must be mentioned before I conclude this General Introduction to the series. The history of some of the subjects like religion, language and literature,

philosophy, science and technology cannot for obvious reason be squeezed within the cramped space of the periodic moulds. Attempts to do so result in thematic distortion. Therefore, the reader will often see the overflow of some ideas from one period to another. I have already drawn attention to this tricky and fuzzy and also the misleading aspects of the periodization of history, if pressed beyond a point.

Secondly, strictly speaking, history knows no end. Every age rewrites its history. Every generation, beset with new issues, problems and questions, looks back to its history and reinterprets and renews its past. This shows why history is not only contemporaneous but also futural. Human life actually knows no separative wall between its past, present and future. Its cognitive enterprises, moral endeavours and practical activities are informed of the past, oriented by the present and addressed to the future. This process persists, consciously or unconsciously, wittingly or unwittingly. In the narrative of this Project, we have tried to represent this complex and fascinating story of Indian civilization.

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Abbreviations

BI	Bibliotheca Indica
DANC	*Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram*
EIP	*Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Ed. K. Potter)
HIP	*A History of Indian Philosophy* (S.N. Dasgupta)
HNNM	*History of Navya-nyāya in Mithila*
KN	*Kaṇādasūtranibandha* of Vādīndra (published under the title *Vaiśeṣikadarśana*)
KV	*Kiraṇāvalī* (BI)
KVP	*Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*
MBH	*Mahābhārata*
NAA	*Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*
NBh	*Nyāyabhāṣya*
NK	*Nyāyakandalī* (BORI ed.)
NM	*Nyāyamañjarī* (Sampurnananda ed.)
NS	*Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama
NV	*Nyāyavārttika*
NVTT	*Nyāyavārttika-tātparyaṭīkā*
NVV	*Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa*
PDS	*Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (alias *Praśastapādabhāṣya*)
PP	*Prakaraṇapañjikā*
PPB	*Praśastapādabhāṣya* [vide *NK* (BORI)]
PPB-Jha	*Praśastapādabhāṣya* (Durgadhar Jha ed.)
RP	*Ṛjuvimalāpañjikā*
SDS	*Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*
SVR	*Syādvādaratnākara*
TS	*Tattvasaṃgraha*
TSP	*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*
VNNC	*Vaṅge Navya-nyāya Carcā*
VD (Anonymous)	*Mithila vṛtti*
VS	*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* of Kaṇāda
Vyom	*Vyomavatī*
YD	*Yuktidīpikā*

Preface

The Vaiśeṣika philosophy of Kaṇāda and the grammar of Pāṇini have been acclaimed as aids to the study of all the systems of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika deals with the characteristics of entities. The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini teaches the correct use of the Sanskrit language, the language of Indian culture. The Vaiśeṣika is called the Padārthaśāstra, the science of the reals indicated by inflected words. And the grammar of Pāṇini is known as the Padaśāstra, the science regulating the use of language which is the sum-total of words. The knowledge of *pada* and *padārtha* ultimately helps us in the attainment of our knowledge of the different sciences, arts, philosophy, literature etc. The easy flow of human life depends upon these two entities, *pada* and *padārtha*. Sanskrit is the language of Indian culture through the ages. Pāṇini's grammar is an indispensable aid to cultivate it. To master any branch of Indian thought, the knowledge of the *padārthas* as dealt within the Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda is equally indispensable. The first and fullest delineation of the entities of the universe is available in the ten chapters of the Vaiśeṣikadarśana. All other branches of knowledge also deal with their specific *padārthas*, whereas the Vaiśeṣika deals with the science of *padārtha* in general. Thus the Vaiśeṣika philosophy along with the grammar of Pāṇini is equally helpful to the study of Indian culture as a whole.

The Vaiśeṣikadarśana is known as the Kāṇādadarśana on the basis of the name of its propounder. The name Kaṇāda raised some criticism among the non-Vaiśeṣikas. The term *kaṇa* literally stands for broken pieces of grains. Kaṇāda is so called as he lived upon collecting the unclaimed scattered grains from the fields or streets. This form of living is called *uñchavṛtti* and has been praised as *kāpotī vṛtti* (the livelihood of a pigeon) unharmful to others: e.g.

(i) *uñchavṛttir gṛhastho yaḥ svadharmācaraṇe ratah*
tyaktakāmasukhārambhaḥ svargas tasya na durlabhaḥ//(*MBH* XII.191.18)

(ii) *kaṇānāṃ bhakṣaṇe yuktaḥ piṇyākasya ca bhārata/*
snehānāṃ varjane yukto yogī balam avāpnuyāt// (*MBH* XII.131.43)

(iii) *kumbhīdhānyair uñchaśīlaiḥ kāpotīṃ cāsthitas tathā/*
yasmiṃs caite vasantyarhās tadrāṣṭram abhivardhate// (*MBH* XII. 243.24)

(iv) *aśvastano 'tha kāpotim āśrito vṛttim āharet//*(*MBH* XII.243.3)

Keeping this pure but modest living in view, Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī* adds that the name of the promulgator of the Vaiśeṣika śāstra is Kaṇāda. It is due to his special way of living that Kaṇabhakṣa and such other synonyms are also used. The Śāstra dawned upon the sage Kaṇāda. Lord Śiva appeared before him and taught the Śāstra after assuming the form of an owl (*ulūka*) and hence the epithet Aulūkya was attached with

the Śāstra. The name Kāśyapa comes from the *gotra* to which the sage belonged. The retort of the Vaiśeṣika to the above-mentioned criticism is given in the *Vyomavatī* of Vyomaśivācārya. And the complete verse is quoted in the *Tattvaprakāśa* of Śrīkumāra.

kaṇān vā bhakṣayatv anyo māhiṣāṇi dadhīni vā/
yuktiyukto nibandhaś cet tadd hi grāhyam manīṣibhiḥ//

The title Vaiśeṣikadarśana has been differently explained. *Viśeṣa* is the fifth one among the six categories admitted in the Darśana and the title Vaiśeṣika is derived from that *viśeṣa*. Udayana, the author of *Kiraṇāvali*, derives Vaiśeṣika from the term *viśeṣa* meaning *tattvaniścaya* (ascertainment of the characteristics of entities) or *vyavaccheda* (distinguishing). Some other sources of the term are also available.

Dr. H.Ui refers to a tradition placing the sage Kaṇāda eight hundred years before Lord Buddha. Thus it places Kaṇāda in the fourteenth century B.C. The modern scholars of course, hesitate to accept it. The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras evince special relation with the Vedic Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. The Vaiśeṣika accepts the validity of the entire Vedic literature as according to him each of them analyses the characteristics of the primary categories *dravya, guṇa* and *karma* (cf. *tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam* (*VS* 1.1.3), *tadvacanāt* meaning *padārthadharma-vacanāt*). Vedic institutions like sacrifices, sacraments and expiatory activities are referred to with regard in it. Udayana identifies *patatra* of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* III.3, in the sense of *paramāṇu* of the Vaiśeṣika (*Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Asutosh Sanskrit Series, No. IV. P. 336).

The *Mahābhārata* knows a sage named Ulūka. It also offers ideas parallel to the Vaiśeṣika views:

āpatsu vihitaṃ stainyaṃ viśiṣṭasamahīnataḥ/
vipreṇa prāṇarakṣārthaṃ kartavyam iti niścayaḥ//
hīnād ādeyam ādau syāt samānāt tadanantaram/
asambhave cādadīta viśiṣṭād api dhārmikāt// (*MBH* XII. 141.39-40)

Compare *etena hīnasamaviśiṣṭadhārmikebhyaḥ parasvādānam vyākhyātam* (VS 4.1.15).

Again, *vaktreṇotpalanālena yathordhvaṃ jalam ādadet/*
tathā pavanasaṃyuktaḥ pādaiḥ pivati pādapaḥ// (*MBH* XII. 184.16)

shows close relation with *nāḍyā vāyusaṃyogād ārohaṇam* (*VS* 5.2.6). Vaiśeṣika terms like *aṇu, paramāṇu, vaiśeṣika guṇa, niḥśreyasa, samavāya* etc. are found in the *Mahābhārata*. Questions about their difference in meaning may arise. But in the *Mahābhārata* II.5.3-4 the epithets of Nārada—aikyasaṃyoga-nānātva-samavāya-viśāradaḥ and parāpara-vibhāgajñaḥ deserve special consideration. We firmly believe that *ekatva, nānātva, saṃyoga, samavāya, paratva* and *aparatva* here have been used in the Vaiśeṣika sense. MM Kuppusvami Sastri holds that in the beginning the Vaiśeṣika was anti-Vedic in character. On the grounds submitted above we cannot agree with him.

The influence of Vaiśeṣika in the origin and development of the Indian schools of thought deserves special consideration. Nyāya is considered as the samānatantra of the Vaiśeṣika. Both of them accept *Asatkāryavāda* as the common basis. *Paramāṇukāraṇavāda* is equally followed by both. Vaiśeṣika sūtras and terms along with Vaiśeṣika teṇets have freely been utilised in the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā* and subsequent Nyāya literature.

Sometimes the same concept is used with different names *e.g. sāmānya* of the Vaiśeṣika is nothing but *jāti* of the Nyāya. The Nyāya syllogism appears in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. But its components *pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya* and *nigamana* are respectively called *pratijñā, apadeśa, nidarśana, anusandhāna* and *pratyāmnāya* in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda. The *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara, *Tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati and the *Tātparyapariśuddhi* of Udayana freely cite the Vaiśeṣika sūtras and Vaiśesika views in support of their own contentions. The Kashmiri logicians like Bhaṭṭa Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña, though not inclined to allow equal status to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, use the Vaiśeṣika sūtras and concepts just like their counterparts in the main Nyāya stream. The neo-logicians have replaced the Nyāya *prameya* by the six categories propounded by the Vaiśeṣikas.

The Brahmasūtra of Vādarāyaṇa, according to all its commentators, criticises the Vaiśeṣikas in its Tarkapāda. The commentators and sub-commentators quote specific Vaiśeṣika views and even sūtras to support Vādarāyaṇa. Śrīharṣa, Citsukha and other neo-Vedantins are all set to criticise the Vaiśeṣikas.

The older phases of Mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya may be earlier than the Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda. But in the subsequently developed Mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya the influence of Vaiśeṣika is very much felt. Some Vaiśeṣika views have influenced the *Śābarabhāṣya*. In the sub-schools of Kumārila and Prabhākara this influence is clearer. Ācārya Śālikanātha of the latter school was the first commentator on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda. This commentary has been refuted by Udayana and his commentator Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, touched by Cinnambhaṭṭa and quoted by Aparārkadeva. In his Mīmāṃsā works also Śālikanātha extensively utilises the Vaiśeṣika sūtras and the Vaiśeṣika views. The available Sāṃkhya Sūtras mention the *Ṣaṭpadārthavāda* of the Vaiśeṣika (*na vayaṃ ṣaṭpadārthavādino vaiśeṣikavat, Sāṃkhyasūtra* 1.1.25). The *Yuktidīpikā* of an anonymous author on the *Sāṃkhyasaptati* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa criticises the Vaiśeṣikas and asserts *kāṇādānām īśvaro 'stīti pāśupatopajñam etat* (*YD*, p. 88).

The treatment of Vaiśeṣika materials in the Buddhist and Jaina philosophical works deserves deeper attention. We believe that the old Buddhist masters according to their own standpoint criticised the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. But they followed the Nyāya views on *vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, hetvābhāsa, jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*. Serious changes are visible since the time of Dignāga who rejected the Nyāya infrastructure and accepted the Vaiśeṣika one. Dignāga accepted two *pramāṇa,* three characteristics of the *hetu* and three *hetvābhāsas*—just like the Vaiśeṣikas. There were historians who tried to prove Praśastapāda's indebtedness to Dignāga. The position is just the reverse. In fact, the Buddhist authors since the days of Nāgārjuna accepted the Vaiśeṣikas as their rivals, quoted and criticised them until they themselves were uprooted from the Indian soil. The recent discovery of original Buddhist texts in Tibet by Mahāpaṇḍita Rāhula throws welcome light on the relation between the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas. We hope more light will be thrown on this relation from the studies of the Tibetan versions of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, its commentaries and subsequent texts available only in Tibetan. The *Lalitavistara* and the *Milindapañho* assert that the Buddha and Milinda were well-versed

in the Vaiśeṣika-darśana. The Buddhist philosophers antagonistic towards the Vaiśeṣika views according to their religious creed were well-versed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts because of their training in Brāhmaṇical schools, before conversion to the new faith. They acquired thorough knowledge of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts. Their criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views affirms this and deserves special attention of the modern Vaiśeṣikas in particular.

The Jaina attitude of *anekānta* made them temperate enough to discover truth even in the views of non-Jaina opponents. Vaiśeṣika tenets have been discussed and Vaiśeṣika texts quoted in many Jaina texts. Some again hold that the Vaiśeṣika originated with Rohagupta, who is called nihnavavādin as well as Trairāśika. A small account of Rohagupta appears in the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* of Kṣamāśramaṇa Jinabhadra Gaṇi (489-593 A.D). It is to be considered that no Buddhist or Jaina influence on the Vaiśeṣika darśana is visible. On the other hand, the *Anuyogadvāra*, *Nandi*, *Laṇkāvatāra*, *Milindapañho* and the *Lalitavistāra* refer to the Vaiśeṣika śāstra. It suggests that the Vaiśeṣika is older than Rohagupta. In the earlier works of the Jainas, Vaiśeṣika works like the *Vākya*, *Bhāṣya* and *Kaṭandī* have been quoted and discussed. They are surely older than Praśastapāda as the present *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is a summary of the elaborate Vaiśeṣika commentary *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* by the same Praśasta. No authority except Jinabhadra and his commentators take Rohagupta as the promulgator of the Vaiśeṣika śāstra which has been claimed by some modern scholars. Rohagupta, propounder of the Nihnava theory must have accepted the Vaiśeṣika views current in his time and his personal elaboration of the same being rejected he with his innovation went into oblivion.

The inclusion of Vaiśeṣika materials in non-Vaiśeṣika works, though very difficult to trace and collect, shows the universal acceptance thereof and these references and quotations are highly important for the solution of textual, exegetical and historical problems of the śāstra in question, specially when the loss of earlier works of the system poses a serious challenge to the modern scholars.

Not only the Sanskrit texts, those in Pali and Prakrit along with the Chinese and Tibetan translations of Indian texts are yielding materials useful for the purpose. For example, the *Daśapadārthaśāstra* of Candramati was available in Chinese translation. It is now available in English and Sanskrit renderings also. The *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, its commentaries and commentaries on several works of the Dignāga school have partly been restored in Sanskrit. The commentaries of Ācārya Yamāri and Jina on the *Pramāṇavārttika* are available in Tibetan versions alone.

The available materials show that there was a *Vaiśeṣika-vārttika*, *Vākya* by name over and above the *Vaiśeṣika-vārttika*. The *Vaiśeṣikavārttika* by Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra has been published recently. Stray quotations from the *Vākya* are available in the extant philosophical literature. The *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* on the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* places it just after the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras. A Vaiśeṣika *Bhāṣya* by Rāvaṇa has been hinted at in the *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa* and the *Ratnaprabhā* on the Śārīraka Sūtras. According to Murārimiśra the *Vaiśeṣikakaṭandī* is a still more ancient Vaiśeṣika commentary. Jayantabhaṭṭa in the *Nyāyamañjarī* refers to its terseness that caused loss of intellect of scholars. Rājaśekhara attributes its loss to the feeble perseverance on the part of the

scholars (*śiṣyāḥ mandodyamā yataḥ*). The *Kaṭandī* has sometimes been called a bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣikadarśana. The *Syādvādaratnākara* and the *Nyāyaviniścaya-vivaraṇa* refer to and quote passages from the *Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya* of Ātreya. Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra based his modern *Vaiśeṣikavārttika* on this *Ātreyabhāṣya*. We have so far found no evidence to fix the exact chronology among the lost Bhāṣyas.

The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* has sometimes been called the Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya which is untenable as its author Praśastapāda himself refers to it as a *saṃgraha* which summarises the contents of the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*. cf. *vistareṇopadiṣṭānām arthānām. sūtra-bhāṣyayoḥ/ saṃgraho yaḥ samāsena saṃgrahaṃ taṃ vidur budhāḥ//* (*Viṣṇudharmottarapurnāṇa* and *Nāṭyaśāstra*).

Among the known sub-commentaries on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, the *Vyomavatī*, *Nyāyakandalī* and the *Kiraṇāvalī* are extant. Searches for manuscripts have recently unearthed the *Vṛtti* of Naracandra, *Pañjikā* of Rājaśekhara and the *Kusumodgama* of Brahmadeva. They are all sub-commentaries on the *Nyāyakandalī*. The *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayana was available up to the beginning of the end of the explanation of the *Pratijñā* of the Buddhi section. Our late lamented friend Dr. J.S. Jetly could salvage a big fragment extending upto the classification of *saṃskāra* of the Guṇa section. That Śālikanātha, a pre-Vācaspati Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka had a *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha ṭīkā* to his credit is attested by Cinnambhaṭṭa of the Vijayanagara court and Aparārkadeva, the celebrated Dharmaśāstra commentator. We may now safely assert that the criticism by Vardhamāna Upādhyāya of the Vaiśeṣika views of Śālikanātha is related to this lost work. A commentary on the Dravya section of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* by Gopīnātha has recently been traced.

Despite the recognition of the Vaiśeṣika as a basic system of philosophy of ancient India by the scholars, its history could not be written in an independent way obviously due to our inadequate knowledge about them as they were more or less jumbled up with the history of the Nyāya system. The newly discovered Vaiśeṣika texts and Vaiśeṣika information from other sources have inspired us to think of an independent history of the system with the literary activities of its pioneers and their followers. In the present volume we have tried to reach the goal according to our capacity. We have discussed the three problems regarding the Vaiśeṣika history—textual, exegetical and historical. Even after making our sincerest efforts thereon we fight shy to claim that we have utilised all the materials exhaustively. The vast Tibetan sources have almost remained untouched. Furthermore, the possibility of discovery of new manuscripts always remains. So it is a fact that the Vaiśeṣika history has still not been written in a full form. Anyway, we hope that the materials collected in the volume will facilitate the scholars to have a clear idea of the history of the Vaiśeṣika system so far revealed and inspire them to analyse the materials and start further research to light up those still in darkness.

I shall be failing in my duties if I do not put on record the valuable services I received from Dr. Sanjit Kumar Sadhukhan, my research associate. He has rendered scholarly help at every stage in bringing this volume to its final shape which would otherwise have been beyond my capacity at the present state of my health. He is now engaged in the reconstruction of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga and a critical edition of the *Prakāśa*

of Vardhamāna Upādhyāya on the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*. I wish him every success in life.

I owe a deep debt of gratitude to the authorities of PHISPC for their financial help and encouragement.

MAKARASAMKRĀNTI
ŚAKA 1921

ANANTALAL THAKUR

CHAPTER I

Vaiśeṣika Sūtras And Their Commentary Literature

VAIŚEṢIKA - WHAT DOES IT MEAN ?

The treatise composed by Kaṇāda is the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana*. But what does the term *Vaiśeṣika* mean? There are a number of interpretations by different authorities.

(a) We find *Viśeṣa* (particularity) recognised in *Vaiśeṣikadarśana* as the fifth category and this category is not accepted in any other school, obviously excepting the neological school. It has thus been the distinctive feature of the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana*. Hence it led to the philosophy being called *Vaiśeṣika*. The word *Vaiśeṣika* is constructed from the word *viśeṣa* with the suffix *ikaṇ* (in the same meaning). The scholars or readers of the *Vaiśeṣika śāstra* are also known by the word *Vaiśeṣika* according to a special derivation (the word *Vaiśeṣika* with the suffix *aṇ*). So the śāstra is called *Vaiśeṣika*. This explanation is given by Guṇaratna[1] and also by Devabhadra[2].

(b) Udayana derives the title *Vaiśeṣika* from the word *viśeṣa* meaning the ascertainment of the true nature of entities. According to him this meaning is significant as it goes against the theory of *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.[3] It thus means that the theory of *satkāryavāda* has no credibility and as such the theory of *asatkāryavāda* advocated by the Vaiśeṣika is dependable.

(c) H. Ui mentions a tradition from Ci-tsāṅ's commentary on the *śataśāstra* of Deva in Chinese: "Vaiśeṣika, the name of the *sūtra* means superior or excellent and distinguished (or different). The origin of the name is in fact that the system is distinguished from and superior to the Sāṃkhya."[4]

(d) Durvekamiśra gives yet another origin of the title *Vaiśeṣika*. According to him, substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence are the special categories referred to here. The *Śāstra* dealing with them is called *Vaiśeṣika* or the *Śāstra* is distinguished from the rest as it has the six categories for its subject-matter. Scholars or readers of this *śāstra* are also called *Vaiśeṣika*.[5]

It is curious to note that Ci-tsāṅ's commentary clearly indicates the fact that the ancient Vaiśeṣika had a rival in the Sāṃkhya.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *nityadravyavṛttayo 'ntyā [Viśeṣāḥ] viśeṣā eva vaiśeṣikam, vinayādibhyaḥ iti svārthe ikaṇ. tad vaiśeṣikaṃ vidanty adhīyate vā tad vetty adhīta ity aṇi vaiśeṣikāḥ. teṣām idaṃ vaiśeṣikam.- Tarkarahasyadīpikā* (Vide *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayaḥ, p.23).*
2. *Nyāyāvatāratippaṇa*. p. 9
3. *Viśeṣo vyavacchedaḥ, tattvaniścayaḥ, tena vyavaharati ityarthaḥ na ca satkāryavāde pramāṇaṃ niścāyakam asti ityarthaḥ.—Kiraṇāvalī* (BI), p. 613
4. *Vaiśeṣika philosophy,* Introduction, p. 4.
5. *dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyā-tmakaiḥ padārthaviśeṣair vyavaharanti iti vaiśeṣikāḥ. rūḍhaś ca abhyupagata-kaṇādaśāstrā evocyante. atha vā ṣaṭ-padārthapratipādakatayā viśiṣyate tadanyasmāc chāstrād iti viseṣaḥ kāṇādaṃ śāstraṃ vivakṣitam. tad vidanty adhīyate vā iti vaiśeṣikāḥ —Dharmottarapradīpa,* p. 240

KAṆĀDA—THE PROPOUNDER OF THE SYSTEM

The propounder of the Vaiśeṣika system as universally supported by the authors and commentators of Indian philosophy[1] and attested by modern scholars on the subject, is Kaṇāda. To refer to him a number of other names have also been used by the ancient authors and these are Kaṇabhuk, Kaṇabhakṣa, Kaṇāśin, Kaṇavrata and Kaṇacara.[2] All these terms indicate Kaṇāda's association with *Kaṇas* i.e. atoms or particles. *Ada, bhuk, bhakṣa* and *aśin* attached to the word *kaṇa* mean *to eat* and *cara* or *vrata* mean *to live upon.* Either way, the epithets mean that he lived upon particles of food.

Śrīdhara (the renowned commentator of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*), obviously following the tradition, has given a clarification of such names of the propounder. According to him Kaṇāda lived on the unclaimed scattered grains collected from the roads or fields after harvesting.[3]

The Vaiśeṣika philosophy is also called Aulūkyadarśana. The story of Kaṇāda's early life led to the philosophy being called by such a name. Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra informs us that there is a tradition according to which the highest god in the guise of an owl advised Kaṇāda to compose the Vaiśeṣika sūtras.[4]

Guṇaratna[5] and Rājaśekhara[6] followed the same tradition. All the above explain the epithet *aulūkya* given to the śāstra but not the name of the sage. It is to be noted that Guṇaratna also mentioned the tradition recorded by Śrīdhara.[7]

Ui has collected some accounts of the ascetic life of Kaṇāda from Chinese sources in his 'The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy'.[8] One such story says that he used to beg for his food at night. This seeking of one's livelihood at night resembled that of an owl and as such he himself was called Ulūka. This story was evidently invented to explain the name Ulūka by which he is referred to in several texts.

We hear in the *Mahābhārata* that a *ṛṣi* named Ulūka was present by the bed-side of Bhīṣma at the time of the latter's death.[9]

Kaṇāda is again called Kāśyapa[10], son or descendant of the sage Kaśyapa. This indicates that he probably belonged to the family of Kaśyapa (Kaśyapagotra).

That Kaṇāda was a śaiva worshipper was attested by a number of scholars. Udayana records a tradition saying that the sage on receiving the grace and appointment from the great lord (Śiva) composed the *śāstra*.[11] This reminds one of the concluding verse of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* in which Praśastapāda pays his obeisance to Kaṇabhuk who composed the Vaiśeṣika-śāstra after appearing the great lord (Śiva) through his superhuman power of meditation and practice.[12]

Kaṇāda is sometimes held to be a *nāstika*. Śaṅkarācārya brands the Vaiśeṣika philosophy as *ardhavaināśika* i.e. half-nihilist, because, according to the Ācārya, the Vaiśeṣika's arguments are crooked and antagonistic to the Vedic culture and is best avoided by cultured people.[13] Vācaspatimiśra explains the epithet *ardhavaināśika* in this way: the Vaiśeṣikas admit eternality of the categories like atoms, *ākāśa*, direction, time, soul, mind as well as generality, particularity, inherence and such other qualities but at the same time reject the eternality of the rest of the categories.[14]

Some modern distinguished Vedānta scholars also opine that the Vaiśeṣikas do not admit the validity of the Vedas, that they admit no other *pramāṇa* except perception and inference. *Artha* (wealth), *kāma* (sexual enjoyment) and *mokṣa* (salvation) are the *summum bonum* to them. They admit the existence of God, yet discard the validity of the Vedas. So they are considered to be *nāstika*.[15]

But Kaṇāda cannot be called a *nāstika*. Though the term *nāstika* has no fixed connotation,[16] one is generally called a *nāstika* when one does not accept (a) life after death, (b) the inevitability of the results of one's action, (c) existence of God as the creator of the universe or (d) authority of the Vedas. Kaṇāda and his followers, without doubt, accept life after death and the inevitable result of one's actions.[17] Kaṇāda accepts the authority of the Vedas.[18] Moreover, the tradition makes Kaṇāda a Pāśupata or Māheśvara (the worshipper of Paśupati or Maheśvara, synonyms of the lord Śiva).[19] It is interesting to note that though the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* nowhere mention God (Paramātman, Īśvara) and the same is the position in the case of *Daśapadārthaśāstra* of Candramati, all the commentators of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* are theists and present Kaṇāda as such. Some commentators even try to look for God in the Sūtras also.[20] But it is important to note that in spite of the attempt made by the commentators to prove Kaṇāda as a believer in God, Kaṇāda has ever remained as a non-believer in the eyes of some other important authorities. As for example, the Samkhya work *Yuktidīpikā*[21] criticises the induction of God in the Vaiśeṣika system. It is the result of the Pāśupata influence on post-Kaṇāda Vaiśeṣikas. However, there is no doubt that Praśastapāda was a theist, because according to him Maheśvara is solely responsible for the creation and destruction of all non-eternal things. We have no definite idea whether God was admitted or not in the Vaiśeṣika system before Praśastapāda, as we have no literature of that time in our hands. But Praśastapāda takes Kaṇāda as a devotee of Lord Śiva, the creator of the universe. *Dharma, adharma, mokṣa,* and *niḥśreyasa*[22] in the *sūtras* are the other proofs in support of Kaṇāda's position as an *āstika*.

It is difficult to ascertain Kaṇāda's time. Some speculation may be furnished in this matter. Of the different systems of Indian Philosophy, Kaṇāda's treatise presupposes only the Mīmāmsā and the Sāṃkhya systems[23] and no reference to the extant Mīmāṃsā and the Sāṃkhya texts can be found in Kaṇāda's work. Both the systems had a long history before their codification and hence no positive relation between them and the Vaiśeṣika can be established. No reference to Buddhism or the Buddha is found in Kaṇāda's treatise. On the other hand a Chinese tradition places Kaṇāda eight centuries before the Buddha.[24] The Buddha is said to have studied the Vaiśeṣikadarśana in his youth.

Modern scholars do not agree on placing Kaṇāda in pre-Buddhist times, on the ground that Kauṭilya does not count the Vaiśeṣikadarśana among the śāstras that he accepted as *ānvīkṣikī*. To him *ānvīkṣikī* consists of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata systems only. But the term *yoga* in Kauṭilya's *Arthasāstra* may refer to Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika or both of them.[25] The Jainas use the term *yoga* (or *yauga*) in the above sense.[26] Anyway, the recognition of the Vaiśeṣikadarśana as beneficial to the study of all other śāstras just like the grammar of Pāṇini,[27] has exalted its propounder Kaṇāda as an uncommon philosopher.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. (a) *praṇamya hetum īśvaram munim kaṇāda anvataḥ/- PDS*, 1st verse,
   (b) *upadiśanti hi [sāmpradāyikāḥ] kaṇādo .... vaiśeṣikasūtram asūtrayad iti.*—Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra (vide *KN*, p. 2).
   (c) *ataḥ padārthaṣaṭkam athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ ityādikāyāṃ daśalakṣaṇyāṃ kaṇabhakṣeṇa bhagavatā vyavasthāpitam.-SDS*, p. 211
2. Kaṇavrata-*NM*, p. 173
3. *kaṇādam iti tasya kāpotīṃ vṛttim anutiṣṭhato rathyānipatitāṃs taṇḍulakaṇān ādāya pratyahaṃ kṛtāhāranimittā saṃjñā. -NS* (Vide *PDS*, p. 4)
4. *upadiśanti hi [sāmpradāyikāḥ] kaṇādo munir ulūkaveśadhāriṇaḥ parameśvarād dharmādisākṣāktāradharmopadeśaniyogam āsādya vaiśeṣikasūtram asūtrayad iti.* - Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra (Vide *KN*, p. 2).
5. *tasya kaṇādasya muneḥ puraḥ śivena ulūkarūpeṇa matam etat prakāśitam. - Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, p. 266
6. *iha kila pūrvam ajihmabrahmābhyāsadūrīkṛta-pramādāya munaye kaṇādāya svayam īśvara ulūkarūpadhārī pratyakṣībhūya .... padārtha-ṣaṭkam upadideśa.*-Vide *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 2.
7. *muniviśeṣasya kāpotīṃ vṛttim anuṣṭhitavato rathyānipatitāṃs taṇḍulakaṇān ādāya kṛtāhārasya āhāranimittāt kaṇāda iti saṃjñā ajani. - Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*. p. 266.
8. The Vaisesika Philosophy. p.
9. *Ulūkaḥ paramo vipraḥ. MBH.* (Gita Press), XII.47.11
10. *nedam bhavatā kāśyapīyaṃ darśanaṃ vyajñāyi. NV*, p. 390; *kaṇādaḥ rūḍhivaśāccāyaṃ śabdaḥ kāśyape munau vartate. - Dharmottarapradīpa*, p. 228.
11. *Kaṇādo muniḥ maheśvaraniyogaprasādāvadhigamya śāstraṃ praṇītavān. - Kiraṇāvalī* (*BI*), p. 30
12. *Yogācāravibhūtyā yas toṣayitvā maheśvaram/*
    cakre vaiśeṣikaṃ śāstraṃ tasmai kaṇabhuje namaḥ//
13. *Vaiśeṣikarāddhānto duryuktiyogāt vedavirodhāt śiṣṭāparigrahāc ca nāpekṣitavyaḥ .... so'rdhavaināśikaḥ. - Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya* II.2.18
14. *Vaiśeṣikāḥ khalu ardhavaināśikāḥ. te hi paramāṇvākāśadikkālātmamanasāṃ ca sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṃ guṇānaṃ ca keṣāñcit nityatvam abhyupetya śeṣāṇāṃ niranvayavināśam upayanti, tena te'rdhavaināśikāḥ.- Bhāmatī*. II.2.18
15. Vide *Brahmasūtraśāṃkarabhāṣya* (Nirṇayasāgara), Introduction, p. 1.
16. The words *āstika* and *nāstika* are absent in the Vedic literature. Their exact definitions cannot be found in any general lexicography. Pāṇini in his *Aṣṭādhāyī* formulated the sūtra *astināsti-diṣṭaṃ matiḥ* (4.4.60) to construct three words *āstika*, *nāstika* and *daiṣṭika*. So a person may be called an *āstika* when he admits existence, a *nāstika* when he admits non-existence and a *daiṣṭika* when he admits *diṣṭa* or fate. Pāṇini did not clarify further the existence or non-existence—of what? Kātyāyana or Patañjali also did not indicate in this matter. Comparatively late grammarians like Kaiyaṭa or Vāmana say the reference is to 'the life after death'. (*paralokakartṛkā ca sattā vijñeyā. -Mahābhāṣyapradīpa*, 4.4.60; *paraloke'stīti yasya matir asti sa āstikaḥ. tadviparīto nāstikaḥ. - Kāśikā*, 4.4.60). *Amarakośa* defines *nāstikatā* 'the wrong observation' (*mithyādṛṣṭir nāstikatā*. Dhīvarga, *Amarakośa*). The *Mahābhārata* (Śānti 180. 47-49) calls a *nāstika* to be the despiser of the Vedas. *Āstikya* in the *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* verse No. 18.42 (*śamo damas tapaḥ śaucaṃ kṣāntir ārjavam eva ca/jñanaṃ vijñānam āstikyam brahmakarma svabhāvajam//*) has been explained differently. According to Śaṃkara, it is *astibhāva*, perhaps meant for belief in the Supreme; to Rāmānuja it is ascertainment of the truth; to Hanumān it is the knowledge of existence of the categories; to Śrīdhara it is ascertainment of the existence of life after death; to Madhusūdana it is *sāttvikī śraddhā* (reverence due to *sattva* quality); to Nīlakaṇṭha it is simply reverence; to Viśvanātha it is the strong confidence in the objects mentioned by the *śāstra*; and to Puruṣottama it is ascertainment in the results of one's actions which have been explained in the *Śāstras*.

17. *abhiṣecana-upavāsa-brahmacarya-gurukulavāsa-vānaprasthya-yajña-dāna-prokṣaṇa-diṅnakṣatramantrakālanigamāścādṛṣṭāya*. *VS* 6.2.2.
18. *VSs* 1.1.3, 4.2.9. 6.1.1.
    VSs 2.2.39 proves the validity of the Brāhmaṇas.
    VSs 6.2.2. and 6.2.3 testify the sage's faith in the Vedic culture.
19. The concluding verse of the *PDS*.
20. *(a)* Śankaramiśra on *tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam* (VS 1.1.3):
    tad ity anupakrāntam apit prasiddhisiddhatayā iśvaraṃ parāmṛśati. yad vā tad iti sannihitaṃ dharmam eva parāmṛśati. - *Upaskāra,* p. 8.
    (b) Candrānanda on the same *sūtra: tad iti hiraṇyagarbhaparāmarśaḥ; hiraṇyaṃ reto 'syeti kṛtvā bhagavān maheśvara eva ucyate .... īśvaraś ca sādhitaḥ, tanubhuvanādīnāṃ kāryatayā ghaṭādivad buddhimatkartṛkatvāt. Vṛtti* Vaiśeṣikadarśana. p. 2.
    (c) Udayana in the same context: *abhiprāyoktasya cāsamadviśiṣṭasya vaktuḥ prameśvarasya parāmarśaḥ tadvacanāt tena praṇayanād āmnāyasya vedasya prāmāṇyam.* - *Kiraṇāvalī (BI),* p. 578
21. *Kāṇādānām īśvaro 'stīti pāśupatopajñam etat.* - *Yuktidīpikā,* p. 88 same at p. 84-5.
22. *VSs* 6.2.17, 6.2.19, 1.1.2
23. Vide *HIP*(I), p. 280; *VS* 7.2.8; Bodas points out that Bādarāyaṇa's sūtras make allusion to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine. *HIP* (I) p. 279.
24. *EIP* (II), p. 211 Buddha's Nirvāṇa: 487 B.C.
25. Goldstücker (Pāṇini, p. 157) says that both Patañjali (?140 B.C.) and Kātyāyana (4th cen. B.C.) know the Nyāya sūtras. We know that Kauṭilya knew the Nyāya in some form as Ānvīkṣikī in 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say that the Nyāya existed in some form as early as the fourth century B.C. *HIP* (I), p. 279.
26. *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā*, pp. 122, 125, 306. 571, 574, 581, 677.
27. *kaṇādaṃ pāṇinīyaṃ ca sarvaśāstropakārakam.*

THEORY OF THE JAINA ORIGIN OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA

That the Vaiśeṣika tenets have been originated by the Jaina Rohagupta is the theory according to some scholars. The account available in the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* of Kṣamāśramaṇa Jinabhadragaṇi (A.D. 489-593) had led them to propound such a theory.[1] Anyway what has been found there is the following:

After 544 years of the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra, Rohagupta,[2] the disciple of ācārya Śrīgupta of the city named Antaranjika defeated a wandering monk names Poṭṭśāla in debate. Here Rohagupta placed a third category named *no-jīva* apart from *jīva* and *ajīva*, the well known categories in the Jaina śāstra. This third category was obviously innovated by Rohagupta and it is certain that this labelled him as Trairāśika (innovator of third category). Rohagupta narrated his victory to his preceptor Śrīgupta. But Śrīgupta did not admit the theory of *no-jīva* and advised Rohagupta to give up this newly adopted category. Rohagupta declined to act according to his preceptor's advice. At last a debate was arranged between the preceptor and the pupil. It continued for several days. The mediator king Balaśrī could not be present all the time. Hence according to Śrīgupta's proposal, it was decided that Kutrikāpaṇa is to be consulted to ascertain the validity of the newly-adopted third category. But there was no reference to such a category like *no-jīva*. It appears that Kutrikāpaṇa was an encyclopedia or a museum where any doubt about religion could be removed.

In order to end the dispute, four questions on each of the 26 sub-divisions of six categories (Substance, Quality, Action, Generality, Particularity and Inherence) were set. The four modes of questions were formed in this way, the basic category, and then the category by adding *a*-, *no*- and *a-no*. *Kutrikāpaṇa* supplied information about the thirty-six basic categories as well as negative categories with *a*-, but no information about things added with *no*- was found there. Rohagupta was defeated and was banished from the kingdom.

Now what are those thirty-six basic categories? Substances are nine, Qualities seventeen, actions five, Generalities three, Particularity one and Inherence one.[3] In all it will be thirty-six. However, Koṭyācārya, the disciple of Jinabhadra differed a little from the above. According to his account Generalities are two—*sattāsāmānya* and *sāmānya-viśeṣa*, and Particularities are also two—*Sāmānya-viśeṣa* and *antyaviśeṣa*. Anyway, we may set aside the peculiar account of Koṭyācārya.

The sub-division of the categories must be pre-Praśastapāda because the qualities have been divided into seventeen. This has been admitted before Praśastapāda and Praśastapāda speaks of twenty-four types of quality.

Though the thirty-six categories of Rohagupta's śāstra have total resemblance with those of the Vaiśeṣika śāstra it is not right to think that this Rohagupta innovated the Vaiśeṣika categories. If we see the events narrated there, we have hardly any doubt that the Vaiśeṣika categories were there long before. When the questions were set, the thirty-six categories were already there and so the questions could be set regarding them. Again

for the answers *kutrikāpaṇa* was consulted and it is found that already there were thirty-six categories.

So these thirty-six divisions were not innovated by Rohagupta. If otherwise, his preceptor would not agree with setting the questions with his pupil and there would be no question of their existence in *Kutrikāpaṇa*. So Śrīgupta and Rohagupta were well aware of the Vaiśeṣika categories, which were already current. And for that very reason Śrīgupta, out of curiosity might have given permission to set questions on the divisions of the Vaiśeṣika categories.

Moreover, two verses[4] of the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* are very important in this connection. They clearly say: A learned man named Rohagupta belonged to the Ulūka race. Due to his preaching six categories, substance etc. he was known as Ṣaḍulūka. Out of this own attention and erudition, he composed a treatise on the Vaiśeṣika śāstra which was enriched by others and became famous by the name of Ṣaḍulūka. In this connection the opinion of Dr. M. Winternitz may be cited. He remarks, "there is little doubt that Rohagupta adopted Vaiśeṣika theories of the purposes of his own systematical teachings."[5]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. According to the *Āvaśyaka-sūtra*, The Jaina teacher Rohagupta is supposed to have occasioned a schism in the year 18 A.D. and founded the Vaiśeṣika. *IL* (II). p. 576 fn. cf. Weber, Ind Std. 17, 121 ff.; Jacobi in SBE, Vol., 14, p xxxvii; Ui, I.C., p. 35 ff.
2. A.D. 17
3. *Āvaśyakasūtravṛtti* by Haribhadrasūri (Agamodayasamiti ed., Surat), pp. 320-21
   Uttarādhyānasūtrabṛhadvṛtti by Śāntisūri (L.D. Ed., Surat), p. 172a
   Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyavṛtti by Maladhāri Hemacandrasūri, p. 996.
4. *tanābhibibeśato samativikappita pattattham ataya/*
   vaisesiyam panitam phatikatamannamannehim//
   nāmena rohagutto guttena lappae sa coluo/
   devvai chappayatthovaesanac chaluu tti// 2508 - *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* with the commentary of Hemacandra (Yaśovijaya Jaina Granthamala, Kasi ed.)
5. *Jainas in the History of Indian Literature*, p. 26

THE PROBLEM OF THE *VAIŚEṢIKASŪTRAS* AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

The Vaiśeṣika system occupies a very prominent place among the schools of Indian philosophy. In course of time a considerable Vaiśeṣika literature grew in the form of commentaries, sub-commentaries and digests. But we have only a fraction thereof in print. Some works have been published. Some are in manuscripts and some are known from references and quotations alone. As a consequence, the picture of the Vaiśeṣika system in the known histories of Indian philosophy is inadequate. It has hardly been treated as an independent school of thought and is generally taken as a supplement to the Nyāya philosophy. We shall try here to have a peep at the early period of the history of the system through less-known materials which recently came to light.

Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra in his *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* refers to an ancient Vaiśeṣika sūtra work by Lord Śiva. There is a tradition that the Lord in the form of an owl taught the Vaiśeṣika tenets to Kaṇāda. It may be at the root of the conception of a Vaiśeṣika sūtra by the Lord. In fact, neither Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra nor any other scholar quotes from this work and we have no sufficient ground to accept such a sūtra work prior to that of Kaṇāda.

Kaṇāda's sūtras indirectly refer to the Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā tenets. And they show no acquaintance with the other known systems. In the case of the Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā also the current Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā works are not touched. The tenets referred to may very well belong to very ancient Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā masters.

According to a Chinese tradition Kaṇāda wrote the *Vaiśeṣikadarasana* eight hundred years before the Buddha. Whatever the value of this tradition may be, we can only say that no direct or indirect references to the Buddhist tenets are available in the Vaiśeṣika sūtras. On the other hand, Vaiśeṣika theories and even Vaiśeṣika sūtras have been utilised by the authors of other schools. And this points to its antiquity and influence on kindred systems.

The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* directly quotes the Vaiśeṣika darśana. The *Lalitavistara* and the *Milindapañho* refer to it as a subject of study. Rohagupta the eighteenth Sthavīra after Mahāvīra, is said to have had a Vaiśeṣika work to his credit. Rohagupta's list of the Vaiśeṣika categories and sub-categories closely resembles that of Praśastapāda's list as found in the *Padārtha-dharmasaṃgraha*.

The *Nandisūtra* and the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* enumerate the Vaiśeṣika darśana among the 'false-tenets' (micchā-suya). The *Carakasaṃhitā* shows acquaintance with the Vaiśeṣika. Again ancient works of the different systems quote Vaiśeṣika sūtras and tenets either in support for their own views or for refutation.

But it is difficult to say that the ancient Vaiśeṣika tenets as well as the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda are available in their original form. No ancient commentary on the sūtras is extant. Many problems discussed in the later Vaiśeṣika works like those of Praśastapāda and others have not even been touched in the sūtras. Problems of duality (*dvitva*) chemical action (*pākaja utpatti*), disjunction due to another disjunction (*vibhāgaja vibhāga*) and the theory of composition of the entities from *paramāṇus* may be cited as

instances. It may also be inferred that during the gap between Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda there was considerable growth in the śāstra. But the contribution of the intervening authors cannot be assessed as their works are all lost.

References to some of these authors and their works have been made in subsequent works. Sometimes quotations are also available. This may give a rough idea about the ancient Vaiśeṣika literature. Jaina Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji has reconstructed the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* of Mallavādin on the basis of the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇi* of Siṃhasūri. He has found some passages attributed to a Vaiśeṣika work called *Vākya*. Vyomaśiva has quoted many more terse sentences which also might have been taken from this *Vākya* or some other similar work. The term *vākya* has often been used in the sense of *Vārttika* in the grammatical literature. The *Vākya* in question resembles the sūtras just as in the case of the *Vārttika* of Kātyāyana on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini. We may infer that an ancient *Vārttika* on the Vaiśeṣika sūtras existed before any *bhāṣya* was written on them.

Śrī Jambuvijayaji has traced several quotations from another Vaiśeṣika work called *Kaṭandī*. Cakradhara in his *Granthibhaṅga* on the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa shows that the *Kaṭandī* was really a *bhāṣya* on the Vaiśeṣika sūtras.

A *Rāvaṇabhāṣya* on the sūtras of Kaṇāda has been referred to in the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa*. This work might have been attributed to king Rāvaṇa of Laṅkā due to similarity in name. Udayana in the beginning of his *Kiraṇāvalī* on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* remarks that the Vaiśeṣika sūtras are very laconic and the ancient *Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya* or *bhāṣyas* were highly elaborate. As such Praśastapāda had to write a digest, which as the term *saṃgraha* indicates, gives the summary of the contributions of the Sūtrakāra and the Bhāṣyakāra taken together. The commentators on the *Kiraṇāvalī* like Padmanābha identify the *Bhāṣya* mentioned by Udayana with that of Rāvaṇa.

The *Syādvādaratanākara* of Vādideva, *Nyāyaviṇiścaya-vivaraṇa* of Vādirāja and the *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* of Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra quote the *Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya* of Ātreya. Guṇaratna and Rājaśekhara count this Ātreya as a noteworthy Vaiśeṣika author. Vādīndra is found to have criticised the views of Ātreya almost on every sūtra in the extant portion of the *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* which he prefers to call the *Vaiśeṣikavārttika*.

Apart from the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha*, Praśastapāda had to his credit a *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* also. The *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* gained prominence among the later Vaiśeṣikas because of its systematic treatment of the Vaiśeṣika categories. It was the chief Vaiśeṣika text to be studied and commented upon throughout the length and breadth of the country. As the *bhāṣyas* mentioned above were long lost, the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* came to be known as the *Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya*, though it was not a running commentary which a *bhāṣya* must be. In fact, Praśastapāda himself calls it a *saṃgraha* and Śrīdhara and Udayana accept the position. Saṃgraha is a special class of technical work giving the gist of the *Sūtras* and the *Bhāṣya* in a nutshell. That the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* was a bhāṣya was seriously questioned during the last century. And MM Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra wrote his own *bhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*.

Due to the popularity of the work of Praśastapāda and the loss of ancient commentaries on the Vaiśeṣikadarśana, the sūtras maintained a precarious existence. The only commentary on the Sūtras available to us till the forties of the 20th century was the *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkaramiśra. Śaṅkara largely depends on the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha*

and refers to a *Vṛtti* to which he attached no importance. He says that he depended only on the sūtras and received no help from elsewhere. The sūtra text of Śaṅkara was accepted by the modern commentators like MM Candrakānta, Jayanārāyana Tarkapañcānana, MM Pañcānana Tarkaratna and Paṇḍita Hariprasāda. It was Vīrarāghavācārya who among the commentators questioned the authenticity of the sūtra text of Śaṅkaramiśra.

It may be mentioned here that neither Śaṅkaramiśra nor his successors could give the traditional sūtra-text or its interpretation and we find Śaṅkara, Jayanārāyana and Pañcānana explaining the sūtras according to the Neo-logical tenets. Candrakānta shows Vedānta leanings. Gaṇgādhara Vaidya evinces Sāṃkhya influence.

MM Dr. Gopinatha Kaviraja felt the necessity of reconstituting the Vaiśeṣika sūtra text and its exposition on the basis of available Vaiśeṣika texts and manuscripts.

The labours of about three decades presented some very important works and other important pre-Śaṅkaramiśra Vaiśeṣika materials for study. The publication of the *Vṛtti* of Candrānanda and that by Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra may be mentioned here. Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra must have consulted the *Ātreyabhāṣya*. The first two chapters of this *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* (of which the second *Vṛtti* is but an abridged version) and the last two chapters of another *Vṛtti* written under Ballalasena of Bengal have been discovered. A vast mass of materials regarding individual sūtras and their interpretation is available in ancient and medieval Vaidyaka, Buddhist, Jaina, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Sāṃkhya works. With the help of these materials it is now possible to ascertain the Vaiśeṣika sūtra text and their import with much more accuracy than what was possible four decades back.

The casual quotations along with their exposition are highly valuable to the student of the Vaiśeṣika system. But the quotations are sometimes inaccurate as they mostly come from memory and the same sūtra assumes different shapes in different works. We may take an example: *sāmānya-pratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣāsmṛteś ca saṃśayaḥ* (2.2.19) has been preserved in its original form in almost all our sources. Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* agrees here. But the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* reads *ubhayaviśeṣasmṛteś ca* and Jñānaśrīmitra's *Vyāpticarcā* replaces *pratyakṣāt* by *darśanāt*. Ancient authorities sometimes refer to the sūtra with the *pratīka* alone. Thus in *asyedam kāraṇaṃ kāryam saṃyogi virodhi samavāyi ceti laiṅgikam, the Nyāyakumudacandra* changes the order of the constituent words. The *Kiraṇāvali*, the *Syādvādaratnākara* and the *Nyāyaratnamālā* insert *sambandhyekārtha* between *virodhi* and *samavāyi*. The *Prakaraṇapañjikā* quotes *tasyedam kāryam. . . .* Again Jayanta reads the sūtra as *kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ saṃyogi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam*. According to Praśastapāda and Vācaspati *asyedam* is most important part of the sūtra.

Some passages called sūtras by eminent authorities are not sūtras at all. Devabhadra in his *Nyāyāvatāratippaṇaka* and Guṇaratna in the *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* accept *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ* as a Vaiśeṣika sūtra. But in fact, it is a line from the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha*.

In spite of these difficulties these indirect evidences help a great deal to ascertain the sūtrapāṭha. In many instances ancient interpretations of the Vaiśeṣika sūtras have also been quoted. Thus we get the authentic import of the sūtras from authorities like Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Śālikanātha and others, centuries older than that available in the extant Vaiśeṣika commentaries.

There are some sūtras in Śaṅkaramiśra's text not available in any other source. We may refer to *śabdaliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc ca* (2.1.30). Again Śaṅkara has omitted *tathā bhavatīti sāpekṣebhyo nirapekṣebhyaś ca* accepted as a Vaiśeṣika sūtra by Praśastapāda, Vyomaśiva,. Śrīdhara, Udayana, Candrānanda and Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra. Śaṅkara accepts *anityaś cāyam kāraṇataḥ* and *na cāsiddhaṃ vikārāt* (2.2.28-9) as two distinct sūtras. But Vādīndra takes one sūtra as *kāraṇavato vikārāt*. And the *Nyāyavārttika* reads *kāraṇato vikārāt*. It seems that some *vyākhyā* elements have intruded into the sūtra-pāṭha of Śaṅkara along with the sūtras. The possibility of some *Vṛtti* sentences being regarded as sūtras cannot also be ruled out.

Vādīndra and Candrānanda read *adravyavattvāt parāmānav anupalabdhiḥ* (a separate sūtra) between *mahatyanekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*(4.1.5) and *rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyor anupalabdhiḥ* (4.1.6). Uddyotakara accepts it as a Vaiśeṣika sūtra. He says *ayaṃ cārthaḥ sūtrakāreṇa sūtradvayenoktaḥ*: *adravyavattvāt paramānāv anupalabdhiḥ, rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyor anupalabdhiḥ.*[1] The second one is accepted by Śaṅkara and the first has escaped his notice. Kamalaśīla accepts all the three as Vaiśeṣika sūtras; *adravyavattvāt paramānāv anupalabdhiḥ* has been accepted as a Vaiśeṣika sūtra by the *Nyāyāvatāra*[2] and the *Vākyapadīyaṭīkā* of Puṇyarāja.[3]

M.R. Bodas expressed his doubt as to the authenticity of *dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇakarma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānām padārthānām sādhyarmya-vaidharmyābhyām tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ* as a Vaiśeṣika sūtra though Śaṅkara accepts it as such. Neither Candrānanda nor Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra agrees with Śaṅkara and thus proves the contention of Bodas. The sentence in question must have been an echo of a line of *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* : *dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānām ṣaṇṇāṃ padārthānām sādharmya-vaidhyarmyatattvajñānaṃ niḥśreyasahetuḥ.*

The editor of Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* takes *abhūtam abhūtasya* as a part of a bigger sūtra. Vādīndra takes it as an independent sūtra. Vādideva here agrees with Vādīndra.

Similarly *kāraṇaṃ kāraṇāntarasya* is a separate sūtra according to Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra. Cadrānanda takes it as a part of a bigger sūtra. Again *adravyavattvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ* has been taken as a sūtra by both Candrānanda and Vādīndra while Śaṅkara's text omits it. The *Nyāyavārttika* and the *Tattavasaṃgrahapañjikā* quote it. *na cāsmad-buddhibhyo liṅgam ṛṣeḥ* is a Vaiśeṣika sūtra according to Udayana, Śrīdhara, Vādīndra and Candrānanda. But Śaṅkara omits it. In the case of *sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu sāmānya-viśeṣabhāvāt tata eva jñānam* we find Śaṅkara to agree with Bhaṭṭa Jayarāśi, Uddyotakara and Candrānanda though Vādīndra does not seem to recognise it.

Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra's sūtra text generally agrees with that of Candrānanda. But the text available in the *Vṛtti* written in the Sena court shows closer relation with that of Śaṅkara. The text according to Candrānanda presents seven sūtras, the authenticity of which has not been corroborated by any other source known to us.

We have referred to some problems of the constitution of the Vaiśeṣika sūtra text. And the problem of its interpretation is much more difficult. No available commentary is earlier than the 12th century A.D. The sūtras are very old. Some commentators on the Vaiśeṣika and non-Vaiśeṣika texts have preserved the import of individual Vaiśeṣika sūtras in their own texts. The *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha-ṭīkā* by Śālikanātha is long lost. But his Mīmāṃsā works have preserved much valuable Vaiśeṣika material for us. The

interpretations of individual Vaiśeṣika sūtras in the *Vyomavatī*, *Nyāyakandalī* and the *Kiraṇāvalī* are well-known. The available *Vṛttis* sometimes disagree with each other. But the fragmentary quotations occasionally help us to understand the original position. We may take one example here. The authorities differ with reference to the exact meaning of the expression *Dharma* in the sūtra *athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ* (1.1.1). According to Śaṅkara it means *nivṛtttilakṣaṇa dharma*. But *nivṛtti-lakṣaṇa dharma* does not occupy any prominent position in the scheme of Kaṇāda. And the Buddhists have criticised those who take it as such. We may remember here the well-known verse:

dharmaṃ vyākhyātukāmasya ṣaṭpadārthopavarṇanam/
himavadgantukāmasya samudragamanopamam//

In fact, Praśastapāda takes *dharma* in the sense of *Padārthadharma* as the expression *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* clearly indicates. An impartial examination of the contents of Kaṇāda's text would convince that it gives a discourse of *padārthadharma* and thus Śaṅkara's interpretation does not seem justified. Again in the sūtra *tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam* (1.1.3), the expression *tat* refers to the supreme being according to Śaṅkaramiśra. Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra would interpret as *tayoḥ svargāpavargayoḥ vacanāt*. It is evident that according to him *tat* refers to *abhyudaya* and *niḥśeyasa* in the immediately preceding sūtra *yato'-bhyudayaniḥśreyasa-siddhi sa dharmaḥ* (1.1.2). Candrānanda is of the opinion that *tat* means Hiraṇyagarbha, the Creator of the universe. The acceptance of 'God' in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra is doubtful in spite of the assertions of Śaṅkara and Candrānanda. It seems that Praśastapāda's equation of *dharma* and *padārthadharma* in the present context is correct and *tat* refers to *padārthadharma*. We may remember the concluding remark of Udayana after the explanation of the expression *padārthadharma-saṃgraha* in the initial verse of Praśastapāda, *etena trisūtrī vyākhyātā*. And it is easy to understand that in the Vaiśeṣika view the Vedas deal with the characteristic of *dravyas* in the form of the different deities, sacrificial accessories and the self, the *guṇas* thereof and *karma* like offering the oblations etc. The Vaiśeṣika, therefore, may legitimately claim that the authenticity of the Vedas depend on their giving the characteristics of the entities which the Vaiśeṣika do in a systematic way.

In some cases the view of the Vaiśeṣika sūtra is corroborated by other ancient texts. Thus the sūtra *etena hīnasamaviśiṣṭa-dhārmikebhyaḥ parasvādānam vyākhyātam* (6.1.15) seem to be parallel in content with the *Mahābhārata* passage:

āpatsu vihitam stainyam viśiṣṭasamahīnataḥ/
vipreṇa prāṇarakṣārtham kartavyam iti niścayaḥ//
hīnād ādeyam ādau syāt samānāt tadanantaram/
asambhave vādadīta viśiṣṭād api dhārmikāt// (Śāntiparva 141.39-40)

We may again compare *nāḍyā vāyusaṃyogād ārohaṇam* (*VS* 5.2.6) with
vaktreṇotpalanālena yathordhvam jalam ādadet/
tathā pavanasaṃyuktaḥ pādaiḥ pivati pādapaḥ// (Śāntiparva 148.16)

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Vide *NV*. p. 220
2. *Nyāyāvatāra* (Varanasi ed.), p. 231
3. *Vākyapadīyaṭīkā*, II, p. 180.

DHARMA AND *ADṚṢṬA* IN THE VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY

A modern Vaiśeṣika would certainly equate *adṛṣṭa* with *dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit) and quote *dharmādharmāv adṛṣṭam syāt*[1] from Viśvanātha's *Bhāṣāpariccheda* in his support. This is not the view of Viśvanātha alone. Praśastapāda also is found to hold it. He adds seven qualities including *dharma* and *adharma* to the list of seventeen qualities as given in *VS* 1.1.5 (*rūpa-rasa* etc.) and he uses the term *adṛṣṭa* instead of *dharma* and *adharma*.[2] Vyomaśiva, Śrīdhara and Udayana follow Praśastapāda and there arose no doubt as regards the validity of the equation.

But a doubt does arise when one examines the sūtras of Kaṇāda. Praśastapāda wrote his digest to give the Vaiśeṣika tenets in a systematic form. But at times he adds new things also. Thus we find in his work a discussion on the creator of the universe. Again his detailed discussion on duality, chemical action and disjunction due to another disjunction etc. are not directly connected with the sūtras. He might have received them from the then available exegetical Vaiśeṣika literature no more available to us. The case of *adṛṣṭa* also might have been similar. It has not been explained in the sūtras. And Praśastapāda does not adduce any word *adṛṣṭa* meaning 'not seen', 'not observed' or 'not accounted for'. That it should exclusively mean merit and demerit and nothing else seem peculiar. One may, however, contend that the Vaiśeṣika has its *paribhāṣā* (technical phraseology) where he is not guided by the dictionary meanings. But a *paribhāṣā* is generally fixed by the propounders of the systems keeping the dictionary meaning in view. We may take an example. The term *artha* is used by Kaṇāda to mean *dravya* (substance). *guṇa* (quality) and *karma* (action) collectively. This is given in the Vaiśeṣika sūtra (8.14). *artha iti dravya-guṇa-karmasu*. A little reflection will show that nothing beyond these three are sought for (*arthyate*) and hence the term is suitable here also. But in the case of *adṛṣṭa* the author is silent. Again there are many more objects not accounted for or not observed over and above merit and demerit of the individual beings. Attempts to connect every event in the universe with merit and demerit seem to mean total sacrifice of the scientific spirit.

The terms *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* have been used several times in the Vaiśeṣika sūtras. They are derived from the root *dṛś* meaning to see. Every Vaiśeṣika accepts that Kaṇāda classified and examined the entities of the universe and made distinct contribution towards the advancement of human knowledge. He seems to divide the entities into known and unknown ones and to distinguish them by the terms *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* respectively. His attempt was to widen the horizon of knowledge by comparison and contrast between entities. In many cases he has succeeded to discover the truth. In others his conclusions have been challenged. But the method of investigation adopted by him is one of our richest heritages. Modern sciences also have adopted it. Nobody will deny the fact that Kaṇāda developed in the hoary past a scientific attitude which guided him and his followers to ascertain the truths about this mysterious universe.

Just like *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* the terms *darśana* and *dṛṣṭi* are also originally connected with the root *dṛś*. Thus Kaṇāda's *darśana* consists of the conclusions arrived at by him,

about the nature of the categories into which the universe is divided by him. These conclusions are his acquisitions in the intellectual field. Vātsyāyana is also found to use the word *darśana* in the sense of finding, acquisition or conclusions about the entities. This, of course, is preceded by adequate investigation on proper lines. Vātsyāyana says that the soul exists is the *darśana* of one philosopher while that it does not exist constitute the *darśana* of another.[3] In a separate context he remarks that non-acquisition of the truth is called *a-dṛṣṭa*.[4] It simply means that *adṛṣṭa* stands for *a-darśana*, the negation of *darśana*. The simple philosophical approach to the terms *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* seems to hold good in the ancient Vaiśeṣika context also.

Let us now see how and where Kaṇāda has actually used these two concepts. There are some cases where the attempt of the sage to give a causal explanation did not meet with the desired success and he is found to designate them as *adṛṣṭakārita*. Thus the movement of the consecrated stone etc. towards the thief, that of the needle towards the magnet and that of the earth at the time of an earthquake are called *adṛṣṭakārita* (caused due to unknown conditions). Water sprinkled at the root of a plant runs to all its branches and leaves and this is also called *adṛṣṭakārita*. The zigzag course of the wind and the very first movement of the *aṇus* to form a binary at the time of creation, the first movement of the mind, the association with the dissociation from the body in the case of the soul, the special contact of food and drink to nourish the body and the contact of the soul with the embryo in the womb are all similar instances.[5] It is clear that things occur and they occur due to certain conditions. But in the cases just mentioned the sage means to say that the conditions responsible to produce the effects could not be ascertained up to his time. It may be argued that by the expression *adṛṣṭakārita* he means 'caused by invisible conditions'. But we find him referring to supernatural powers of Vedic rites to produce effects and here he does not use this expression. Of course we find the use of the expression *adṛṣṭa* in the sense of 'not visually cognised' in *na ca dṛṣṭānām sparśa ityadṛṣṭaliṅgo vāyuḥ* (*VS* 2.1.10). But this meaning cannot hold good in the cases just cited as well as in cases like *dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaprayojanānām dṛṣṭābhāve prayojanam abhyudayāya* (*VS* 6.2.1), *abhiṣecanopavāsabrahmacarya-gurukulavāsa-vānaprasthaya-yajña-dāna-prokṣaṇadiṅnakṣatra-mantra-kāla-niyamāś cādṛṣṭāya* (*VS* 6.2.2), *adṛṣṭāc ca* (*VS* 6.2.15) and *dṛṣṭesu bhāvād adṛṣṭesu abhāvāt* (*VS* 8.13). In these *adṛṣṭa* suits better to mean *ajñāta*, *ananubhūta* or *anupalabdha*.

Kaṇāda evinces firm faith in the law of causation. The cause must precede the effect or the effect will not follow. The cause may not always be known, when the cause is not known, Kaṅāda uses the terms *adṛṣṭakārita* with regard to the effect.

One thing deserves consideration here. The causes of the so-called *adṛṣṭakārita* effects may be known at some subsequent time and in fact, modern scientists have causally accounted for the events like the upward motion of the flames and the zigzag courses of the wind. They should no more be regarded as *adṛṣṭakārita*. The spirit of the sage who seems to have firm faith in the gradual progress of human knowledge cannot be sacrificed.

We propose to refer to a famous saying of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the Nyāya scholar, in order to make the point clear. Jayanta asks if we suppose that the validity of the Vedas

depends upon the Nyāya-śāstra today, what was the means to establish it prior to the advent of Akṣapāda who first propounded the Nyāyaśāstra? Similarly, one may ask who settled the difficult points of Vedic, grammatical and metrical exigencies before Jamini, Pāṇini and Piṅgala were born? Jayanta himself suggests the answer also. He says that all these sciences in their embrionic state are there from time immemorial just like the Vedas and the people who treat them elaborately are designated as 'authors' to the respective subjects.[6] Here eternality goes hand in hand with gradual progress. And this progress is clear to the historians of thought in spite of the loss of authentic materials. One will have to sacrifice scientific spirit if he holds that the last word on the śāstra was said by the sage himself. We have already seen that the sage does not hesitate to term things unknown as unknown.

But unfortunately this spirit did not persist long and we find attempts to explain things with the preconceived notion of omniscience of the propounder of the śāstra. But we find Praśastapāda to distinguish people like himself from the yogin[7] and in *na cāsmad buddhibhyo liṅgam ṛṣeḥ* (*VS* 6.1.2) recognised as a Vaiśeṣika sūtra by authorities like Śrīdhara[8], Udayana[9], Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra and Candrānanda (but omitted by Śaṅkaramiśra). Kaṇāda distinguishes himself from a *ṛṣi*. A *ṛṣi* means a 'seer' and is generally taken to mean omniscient. Later ācāryas insist upon attributing omiscience to the authors of the different śāstras. Not only that, attributes like *tāyin* and *paramakāruṇika* originally used for the Buddha came to be used for the propounders of other śāstras also.[10] The attempt to use these for others seems to be actuated by a desire to have a counterpart of the Buddha in other schools as well. The same may be true with regard to the epithet *sarvajña* which replaced its ancient counterpart—*ṛṣi* in later works.

It may be added in this connection that the connotation of the term *sarvajña* is found to vary from one system to another. Still it is found to be used in the general sense. The Buddhist holds one as omniscient (*sarvajña*) when one knows the implications of the four noble truths. Dharmakīrti clearly shows that a *sarvajña*, according to the Buddhists, need not know the number of flies in the air. Nor does clear vision constitute omniscience. In the later case a vulture should deserve the worship offered to the sage.[11] The later Buddhist scholar Ratnakīrti echoes the assertion of Dharmakīrti when he says—*upayukta-sarvajñam eva prasādhayāmaḥ*. And to him *upayuktasarvajña* means nothing but the knower of the four noble truths.[12] It is interesting to note that some people who refute the omniscience of the propounders of other schools accept the same in the sage or sages of their own schools. A verse current among the philosophers raises the pertinent question—if you accept Kapila as omniscient, how is it that you deny the same attribute to the Buddha? And if both are equally taken as omniscient, how it is that they differ in their views?[13] It shows, that the term omniscient to be used in respect of both, requires to be restricted in its connotation.

The Mīmāṃsakas do not accept omniscience at all. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also seems to accept no human being as omniscient. Udayana[14] is clear on this point when he says—*tad anyasmin anāśvāsāt*. There is no faith in the omniscience of any other being except the Almighty. Of course, the Jaina conception of omniscience differs from that of others and the omniscient being according to the Jainas, knows everything under every circumstance

and everybody is potentially an omniscient being. Thus we find that the word *sarvajña* does not always signify the knowledge of everything. And omniscience in the case of human beings is not accepted by all. Thus Kaṇāda may be called a *ṛṣi* or *sarvajña* only in a secondary sense. It is not, therefore, impossible that some properties of some entities should remain unknown to him under certain circumstances.

We have no objection in accepting that in many cases *dharma* and *adharma* may remain unknown. But that does not ensure that the denotation and connotation of *dharma* and *adharma* taken together should be identical with those of *adṛṣṭa*. Things other than merit and demerit may also fall within the scope of *adṛṣṭa*. What is *adṛṣṭa* today, may be *dṛṣṭa* tomorrow and what is *adṛṣṭa* to X, may be *dṛṣṭa* to Y.

Again, there are cases where causal connection has been shown as due to *dharma* as distinguished from *adṛṣṭa*. Thus dream and dream within a dream may be due to *dharma* according to the sūtra *dharmāc ca* (*VS* 9.24). Here *dharma* has specifically been used. Similar is the case in *ārṣaṃ siddhadarśanam ca dharmebhyaḥ* (*VS* 9.28).

The term *dharma* is not always used in the sense of merit in the Vaiśeṣikadarśana. We may cite the two initial sūtras of Kaṇāda to prove our contention. In *athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyamaḥ* (*VS* 1.1.1) the sage fixes up the scope of his discourse saying that in the treatise he will explain *dharma*. In the second sūtra he defines *dharma*—*yato'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ* (1.1.2). According to some, in both the cases *dharma* means merit. But the whole treatise is found to discuss the characteristics of the categories and not merit alone, as suggested by Śaṅkaramiśra and others. They cannot explain why the sage should indulge in describing things which have not even a remote connection with merit when his starting assertion proposes to restrict the discussion on merit alone. Nobody would take a man seriously whose behaviour does not conform to his pronounced assertion. The Buddhists have actually pointed out that to describe the six categories by one desirous of describing merit is similar to a visit to the Himalayas with a view to going to the sea.[15] In fact many things discussed in the śāstras would be meaningless if merit becomes the sole object of discussion here.

The method of attaining a truth in this śāstra is the application of comparison and contrast for which *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* are the technical terms. Both of them are derived from *dharma*. It will be ridiculous in case we derive them from the word *dharma* which denotes 'merit' alone.

It is, therefore, proper to hold that in both the sūtras *dharma* denotes 'characteristics' and not 'merit'. The whole treatise discusses the characteristics of the categories (including of course merit and demerit which are nothing but characteristics of the soul). Characteristics form the basis of comparison and contrast. If this is accepted, there will be no contradiction between the initial assertion and actual practice of Kaṇāda.

It should be made clear that no commentary on the sūtras available today, accepts this meaning of the term *dharma*. The sūtras in question do not specifically assert whose characteristics they propose to discuss. Here we may turn our attention to the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* of Praśastapāda. It is the most authoritative Vaiśeṣika text, next of course, to the sūtras. A *saṃgraha* is a digest faithfully summarising the views of the sūtra and the Bhāsya.[16]

The present *Saṃgraha* in its initial verse proposes to deal with the characteristics of the categories.[17] Udayana at the conclusion of the expression adds *etena ... trisūtrī vyākhyātā*[18] meaning thereby that it explains the first three sūtras of Kaṇāda including the two quoted above. When the verse is read in the background of these sūtras it becomes clear that Praśastapāda equates *dharma* with *Padārthadharma* and Udayana lends his support to this view.

It should be added here that the above will warrant a substantial change in the import of the first three sūtras.

The first will then mean: Hereafter we shall explain the characteristics of the categories. The second sutra will assert: By *dharma* we mean that from the knowledge of which prosperity and salvation arise.[19] This definition of *dharma* requires a little clarification. It is well-known that proper application of proper objects produces desired results. One should first know the characteristics of the entities by comparison and contrast so that one may apply them properly. In *tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam* (1.1.3), the sage seems to assert that (to a Vaiśeṣika) the authority of the Vedas is derived from the delineation of these characteristics. The importance of the Vedas vary from school to school and man to man. To a Vaiśeṣika its importance lies in the fact that it gives him a knowledge of the characteristics of the deities, agents, sacrificial articles and actual offering which ultimately can be redistributed in *dravya, guṇa* and *karma*. Hence the Vedas serve a purpose which the Vaiśeṣika seeks to bring to perfection from the philosophical point of view. The Vaiśeṣika, therefore, supports the validity of the Vedas in unambiguous language.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, verse No. 161
2. *ca-śabdasamuccitāś ca gurutva-dravatva-sneha-saṃskārādṛṣṭa-śabdāḥ saptaiva, PDS* (Chowkhamba), p. 47
3. *asti ātmā ity ekaṃ darśanam, nāsti ātmā ity aparam. NM* 1.1.23
4. *adarśanam khalu adṛṣṭam ucyate. NB* 3.2.68. cf. *dṛṣṭatā* and *dṛṣṭi* (in *kudṛṣṭi—Manu* 12.95 and *Śivadṛṣṭi*, title of book) and *micchā diṭṭhi* in Pālī.
5. *manigamanam sūcyabhisarpaṇam ity adṛṣṭakāritāni. VS* 5.1.15
   tadviśeṣeṇādṛṣṭakāritam. VS 5.2.2.
   vṛkṣābhisarpaṇam ity adṛṣṭakāritam. VS 5.2.8
   agner ūrdhvajvalanam vāyoś ca tiryakpavanam aṇu-manasoś cādyam karmetyadṛṣṭakāritāni. VS 5.2.14
   apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam asitapītasaṃyogāḥ kāryāntarasaṃyogaś cety adṛṣṭakāritāni VS 5.2.19
6. *NM* (Chowkhamba), p.5
7. *PDS* (Chowkhamba), p. 533. Here *yogin* has been used in the sense of ṛṣi.
8. *NK*, p. 216
9. *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 115
10. Vide *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, 1.1, cf. *Pramāṇa-vārttika*, 1. 147-8 and 1.36
11. *Pramāṇa-vārttika*, 1.33
12. *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali*, p. 1
13. *kapilo yadi sarvajño sugato neti kā pramā/*

tou ubhau yadi sarvajñau matabhedas tayoḥ katham//

14. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. p. 2.1
15. *dharmaṃ vyākhyātukāmasya ṣaṭpadārthopavarṇanam/ samudraṃ gantukāmasya himavadgamanopamam//*
16. *vistareṇopadiṣṭānām arthānāṃ sūtrabhāṣyayoḥ// nibandho yaḥ samāsena saṃgrahaṃ taṃ vidur budhāḥ// Nāṭyaśāstram* 6.9
17. *padārthadharmasaṃgrahaḥ pravakṣyate.*
18. *Kiraṇāvalī* (BI), pp. 78-9
19. cf. *ko dharma ityapekṣāyām sādharmya-rūpa vaidharmyarūpa anuvṛttavyāvṛttapratyayarūpa ity-arthaḥ*. Ibid, p. 36

CONTENTS OF THE *VAIŚEṢIKA SŪTRAS*

When the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* with the *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkaramiśra was at one time the chief text of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy with us, we had been knowing for a long time that the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* are divided into ten chapters and each chapter again is split into two daily lessons (*āhnikas*). Quite surprisingly, we found in the Aulūkyadarśana of *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha* attributed to Mādhavācārya that the chapters VIII-X of the above sūtras have one *āhnika* each and not two. But at that time there was no way to decide on the nature of division of the work. When Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* on the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* was subsequently discovered we came across the same division in the work as told in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. The anonymous *Vṛttti* published by the Mithila Institute agrees with *Kaṇādasūtra-nibandha* in contents and language suggesting that it is nothing but summary of the elaborate *nibandha* of Vādīndra prepared by himself or some of his followers. That Vādīndra accepted two *āhnikas* at least in the eighth chapter of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* is attested by his statement *arthendriyavyākhyānārtham ayam āhnikārambhaḥ* (*Mithilā Vṛtti*, p. 78, l. 1). It may be added in this connection that Vādīndra adopted a new principle of dividing the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* in two *āhnikas*, quite different from the other two classifications so far known.

One peculiar thing to be noted here is that the *Nibandha* divides the traditional first *āhnika* of the first chapter into two *āhnikas* thus accepting three *āhnikas* in the first chapter itself.

Though the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* gives us a table of contents of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*, if we see the *Candrānanda vṛtti* or the *Upaskāra* or the *Mithilā vṛtti*, it appears to us that the topics of discussion or sections have not been tackled by them in a similar way and the commentators differ among themselves to determine the sections and give a suitable name to each of them. Anyway, below is the table of contents according to different authors or commentators.

1st Chapter	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Enumeration of the entire categories.	
	1st *āhnika*	: Categories endowed with generality	
	2nd *āhnika*	: Generality and Particularity	
			(*SDS*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)		(*Upaskāra*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)		(*Mithilā vṛtti*)
2nd Chapter	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Substances	
	1st *āhnika*	: Special material substances	
	2nd *āhnika*	: Direction and time	
			(*SDS*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	: External substances	
	1st *āhnika*	: Definition of nine substances. Three sections in this *āhnika* are (i) Definition of earth, water and fire; (ii) Existence of god; and (iii) Inference of *ākāśa*.	

	2nd *āhnika*	: Examination of smell etc. Some sections deal with Direction and Time.
		(*Upaskāra*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	(*Mithilā vṛtti*)

The 2nd chapter is designated as Guṇaviniveśādhikāra by Praśastapāda in his *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (Vide *NK*, p. 85). *Guṇaviniveśādhikāro dvitiyo 'dhyāyaḥ* (*NK*, p. 86).

3rd Chapter	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Soul and Mind
	1st *āhnika*	: Soul
	2nd *āhnika*	: Mind
		(*SDS*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	
	1st *āhnika*	: Soul, Probans and Pseudo-probans.
	2nd *āhnika*	: Mind. Some other sections deal with soul and multiplicity of it.
		(*Upaskāra*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	
	2nd *āhnika*	: Mind (*Mithilā vṛtti*)
4th Chapter	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Body and its related matters
	1st *āhnika*	: Matters related to body
	2nd *āhnika*	: Body
		(*SDS*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	
	1st *āhnika*	: Examination of atoms, being the prime cause of the earth etc.
	2nd *āhnika*	: Division of produced tangible objects
		(*Upaskāra*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Examination of substance (*Mithilā vṛtti*)
5th chapter	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Action
	1st *āhnika*	: Action related to body
	2nd *āhnika*	: Action related to mind.
		(*SDS*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Examination of action
	1st *āhnika*	: Examination of action, produced by effort. The sections in the *āhnika* are on Throwing upward, Throwing upward not due to effort, Action due to meritorious work, and Action neutral to merits and demerits.
	2nd *āhnika*	: The sections are (i) Examination of action, produced by soundless touch; (ii) Examination of action, inhered in liquid substance; (iii) Examination of action of mind; (iv) Darkness and (v) Immobility of some categories.
		(*Upaskāra*)

	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Examination of action (*Mithilā vṛtti*)
6th Chapter	(2 *āhnikas*)	: The Vedic religious rules
	1st *āhnika*	: Charity and acceptance of gifts
	2nd *āhnika*	: Religious rules relating to four āśramas (*SDS*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Examination of merits and demerits
	1st *āhnika*	: Meritorious actions recommended by the Vedas
	2nd *āhnika*	: Examination of merits, due to special activities. (*Upaskāra*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Examination of merits and demerits among qualities. (*Mithilā vṛtti*)
7th chapter	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Quality and Inherence
	1st *āhnika*	: Qualities independent of notional basis
	2nd *āhnika*	: Notional qualities and Inherence (*SDS*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Examination of qualities, endowed with qualityness
	1st *āhnika*	: Five sections: (i) Examination of quality as an eternal entity; (ii) Examination of quality as a non-eternal entity; (iii) Examination of quality due to chemical action; (iv) Examination of qualities like number, etc. residing in more than one substance, and (v) Examination of dimension.
	2nd *āhnika*	: Five sections: (i) Examination of qualities residing in one and more than one substance; (ii) Examination of qualities which reside only in more than one substance, (iii) Examination of relation between word and its meaning; (iv) Examination of qualities (other than special ones) which do not become non-inherent cause of the conjunction with ubiquitous substance and reside in one substance; and (v) Examination of inherence. (*Upaskāra*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Examination of qualities. (*Mithila vṛtti*)
8th chapter	(1 *āhnika*)	: Instrument of indeterminate and determinate perception (*SDS*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Examination of knowledge
	1st *āhnika*	: Determinate and Indeterminate perception
	2nd *āhnika*	: Perception of the entities, the existence of which depends on knowledge, and some other sections. (*Upaskāra*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Causes of knowledge of quality and action

	2nd *āhnika*	: Sense-organs and their objects (*Mithilā vṛtti*)
9th chapter	(1 *āhnika*)	: Some special types of knowledge (*SDS*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Ordinary and extraordinary perception due to contact other than conjunction and inherence.
	1st *āhnika*	: Yogic and non-yogic perception
	2nd *āhnika*	: Inference. Some other sections are (i) Inclusion of verbal testimony into inference; (ii) Remembrance, dream, etc. (*Upaskāra*)
10th chapter	(1 *āhnika*)	: Varieties of inference (*SDS*)
	(2 *āhnikas*)	: Difference of qualities of soul between themselves due to their causes.
	1st *āhnika*	: Pleasure and pain
	2nd *āhnika*	: Three types of causes related to the above. (*Upaskāra*)

Non-mention of subject-matter on behalf of any text mentioned indicates absence of clarity.

Candrānanda, in the matter of determining the subject-matter of each chapter and the constituting sections appears to be not so systematic and meticulous. According to him, the first four chapters grossly deal with Substance, the fifth one with Action, and the rest five with Quality. The 2nd *āhnika* of the first chapter deals with the two categories, Generality and Particularity which have been mentioned by Kaṇāda in course of discussing Substance, Quality and Action. And it is found that Inherence is discussed by three sūtras at the end of the remote 7th chapter (7.2.25-27). Candrānanda, however, comes out to explain the background of the individual sutras or a group of sūtras throughout his *Vṛtti*. We sometimes find the direct reference to sections or sometimes find hints to some sections in his writing.[1]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *nityākhye 'dhyāye. Candrānanda Vṛtti*, p. 53
   yasmin prakaraṇe dravyādīnāṃ kāraṇam samānam varṇitam refers to *VS* 1.1.17, *ibid.*, p.7.

THE *VAIŚEṢIKA SŪTRAS* OF KAṆĀDA

CHAPTER I: ĀHNIKA I

(The *āhnika* deals with Substance, Quality and Action and their common features and divergences)

1. Introduction

athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ (1.1.1).

Now, therefore, we shall explain the characteristic features (of the categories).

Notes:

Atha means *immediately after*. But after what?

Vyomavatī (p. 12) says that as there is no possibility of being any other thing so it will be after salutation (to the supreme lord). Sucaritamiśra in his *Kāśikā* (I, p. 8.) says that it is after the enquiry of the disciple, Kaṇabhuj wrote his *tantra*. *Ataḥ* is to mean 'cause'. The disciples having knowledge of Veda, come to know heaven and salvation, but do not find the means, hence they ask for those. Therefore, the sage will explain the characteristic features of the categories, as according to him the knowledge of those features is the means to salvation.

All the commentators explain *dharma* in the sense of merit but the word certainly means the very *characteristic features* of the categories (*padārthadharma*) as it is vouched by *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (*Padārthadharmasaṃgrahaḥ pravakṣyate mahodayaḥ*. *PDS*, benedictory verse). This meaning is in full conformity with this first sūtra of the Vaiśeṣikadarśana. However, the commentaries explain this in favour of merit. In spite of this general tendency of explanation, there is a different view also. The means of attaining heaven is *dharma*. Again *dharma* is attainable through inference dealt with in the Vaiśeṣika śāstra. As this cannot be known from the Vedas, the sage will explain this. And the categories substance etc. are taken into account as the parts of this.[1]

Candrānanda notes a situation of composing the sūtra (1.1.1) : A Brāhmaṇa even after removing the sins through the study of the Vedas has the doubt regarding the statement '*aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ priyāpriye na spṛśataḥ*' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* (8.12.1) He came to Kaṇabhakṣa and said that he understood. A being attains salvation when he gets rid of body but he wanted to know the means. The sage said, It is *dharma*. Then the Brāhmaṇa asked, what is *dharma*? What is its definition? What are its means? What is its necessity? Who will be benefitted? So, soon after these questions, the situation arises for explaining *dharma* by the sage. So *atha* is *immediately after* and *ataḥ* means the situation of a reason i.e. as the disciple Brāhmaṇa is endowed with required qualities, therefore, the sage can explain *dharma* to him.

yato'bhyudaya-niḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ (1.1.2)

The characteristic features (of the categories) are those from which (i.e. from whose knowledge) results the attainment of elevation and salvation.

Notes:

In answer to the question 'what then *dharma* is? the present sūtra is introduced.

Abhyudaya (elevation) means attainment of desired body in Brahmaloka etc. and cessation of undesired thing (*VS*- Candrānanda, p. 2). Or it means joy in paradise etc. (*VD*, anonymous, p. 2). Vardhamāna understands 'right knowledge' as its meaning (*KVP* -BI, p. 79).

Niḥśreyasa is salvation in the form of negation of specific qualities of the soul (*VS*-Candrānanda, p. 2). It may also be defined as absolute negation of the sorrows (*Kiraṇāvalī*-BI, p. 41).

Praśastapāda clearly states the means of *niḥśreyasa*, as being the right knowledge of the six categories, substance etc. However *Kandalī* apprehends the contradiction between the sūtras, *yato'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ* (*VS* 1.1.2) and *dravyaguṇa* etc. (the sentence of Praśasta). On the one hand Kaṇāda holds *dharma* to be the means of attainment of *niḥśreyasa* and on the other Praśasta holds 'right knowledge' to be the means of attainment of the same (*PPB*-Jha, p. 15). In this situation, *Kandalī* says that *taccesvaracodanā-bhivyaktād dharmād eva* (PPB-Jha, p. 18) solves the problem.

Candrānanda explains: as the sacrifice, the worshipping of deities, etc. by clarified butter, flowers, etc. are destroyed then and there, and are not be able to give results, so from this results the elevation and salvation. This is *dharma*.

tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam (1.1.3).

The authoritativeness of the Vedas and other śāstras (Smṛti) is to be admitted because those deal with the (very characteristic features of the categories).

Notes:

Though all the commentators explain *tat* as to be the god, following the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* we are in an advantageous position to accept *tat* for that very *padārthadharma*, the characteristic features of the categories. Moreover, in that case we feel no difficulty to explain the sūtra: The authoritativeness of the Vedas and other śāstras is to be admitted, as the *padārthadharma* is the most important there. Without the proper knowledge of the categories a person never becomes successful in performing the vedic rituals. And then a person having correct knowledge of the *padārthadharma* can easily attain elevation and salvation. It is more clear from the very statement of Praśastapāda, that the right knowledge of the six categories, substances, qualities, actions, generality, particularity and inherence, through the common features and divergences among them, is the cause of salvation.

Udayana tries to mark the above three sūtras as *Trisūtrī* making a separate section (*KV*-BI, p. 79).

2. *Enumeration of Substances*

pṛthivyāpas tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāṇi (1.1.4).

The substances are earth, water, fire, air, *ākāśa*, time, direction, soul and mind.

Notes:

It is to be noted here that Kaṇāda did not formulate any sūtra enumerating the seven categories. Anyway, Candrānanda introduces the sūtra as: "Kaṇāda has stated the nature and definition of *dharma*. Now I shall narrate the meanings of it—substance, quality and action. There the substance is of nine types, Earth, etc."

The particle *iti* is to indicate that there are exclusively nine substances, neither more nor less. On the occasion of enumerating nine substances, almost all the texts, like *Kandalī*, *Upaskāra*, *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, *Muktāvalī* etc. have discussed the chance of existing of a tenth substance, viz., darkness. Kaṇāda himself contends that darkness (5.2.21) is nothing but the absence of light. Hence it is included in the non-existence.

Vivṛti contends that the use of compound words is designed to show that all the substances, independently of one another, produce particular effects, or is intended to teach that they all equally produce effects which inhere in them. Among these nine substances, *ākāś*a, Time and Direction do not form any class since they have only a single existence, but the rest form classes.

Śaṅkaramiśra enumerates one more sūtra as a Vaiśeṣika sūtra before this sūtra (1.1.4). That sūtra runs as *dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyaṃ tattvajñānānniḥśreyasam.*

But long ago M.R. Bodas had doubt about its existence as a Vaiśeṣika sūtra. He wrote: "It is true that the aphorism *dharmaviśeṣa* ...... *niḥśreyasasiddhiḥ* enumerates the six categories, but this aphorism is most probably a later interpolation. It is inordinately long, unlike other aphorisms of Kaṇāda, and contains a number of distinct propositions that would have sufficed for half a dozen sūtras. Besides it is very awkwardly worded if not positively ungrammatical. A comparison of this aphorism with this opening passage of Praśastapāda's scholium leaves hardly any doubt about its spuriousness .... According to *Kiraṇāvalī* this passage (*dravyaguṇakarma* ... *tacceśvaracodanābhivyaktād dharmād eva*) of Praśastapāda explain only the first three sūtras of Kaṇāda, which implies that the fourth sūtra ... (as in the text of Śaṅkaramiśra) was unknown to the scholiast ... Śrīdhara, the author of *Nyāyakandalī*, speaks to the same effect."

After the discovery of the *Vṛtti* of Candrānanda and the anonymous *Vṛtti* published by the Mithilā Institute, together with the *Kaṇāda-sūtranibandha* of Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra, it has been found that the doubt was legitimate. Moreover, there is not a single text (of the Indian Philosophy) where the fourth sūtra (in Śaṅkaramiśra's text) is found quoted. So the sūtra is not at all a Vaiśeṣika sūtra.

3. Enumeration of Qualities

rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnāśca guṇāḥ (1.1.5).

Colour, taste, smell and touch, numbers, dimensions, separateness, conjunction and disjunction, distance and proximity (or priority and posteriority), knowledge, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion and efforts are the Qualities.

Notes:

We see that in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Śāstras twenty-four qualities have been enumerated. But Kaṇāda, in his own sūtra enumerates only seventeen. Then where are the other seven? Praśastapāda states that the sage mentions seventeen qualities in his own voice and other seven are to be admitted by the force of the particle *ca. PPB* (Jha), pp. 26-27. This very matter has been followed by all.

The seven other qualities are weight (*gurutva*), liquidity (*dravatva*), viscidity (sneha), tendency (*saṃskāra*), merit (*dharma*), demerit (adharma) and sound (*śabda*). Weight mentioned in *VS* 1.1.27, liquidity in *VS* 5.2.5, viscidity in *VS* 2.1.2, tendency in *VS* 5.1.18, merit and demerit in *VS* 6.2.17 and sound in *VS* 2.1.24.

The comparatively modern work *Bhāṣāpariccheda* also maintained the same order in enumerating the twenty-four qualities (17, at first and then the remaining other seven). However, it is well-known that the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (verses 3-5) is the versification of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.

4. Enumeration of Action

utkṣepaṇam avakṣepaṇam ākuñcanaṃ prasāraṇaṃ gamanam iti karmāṇi (1.1.6)

Throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding and moving are the (five) actions.

Notes:

Praśastapāda also mentions the same five actions. He adds that there are the actions like revolution, flowing, dripping, blazing upwards, zigzag motion, sending up and down etc, but those are not separate classes. Those are included in the class of 'moving' (*PPB*-Jha, p. 28).

COMMON FEATURES AND DIVERGENCES

5. Common features of Substance, Quality and Action

sadanityaṃ dravyavat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānya-viśeṣavad iti dravyaguṇa-karmaṇām aviśeṣaḥ (1.1.7).

The common features of substance, quality and action are that each of them is *sat* (i.e. being connected with the generality called *sattā*), non-eternal, inhered in substance, effect, cause and possessed with generality-cum-particularity.

Notes:

Candrānanda : Substance is *sat*, quality is *sat*, action is *sat*—in this way *sattā* (being) is the common feature of all the above three categories. Non-eternality is a common feature among the three, but *ākāśa* etc. do not have this common feature. Inherence in substance is a common feature of the three but ultimate atoms and *ākāśa* are to be excluded from this connection. 'To be the effect' means to be existent after non-existence. This feature is common to all the three but this is not applicable to the eternal substances. 'To be the cause' means to be the producer of an effect and this feature is common to all

the three. Earth etc. are the inherent causes of substances, qualities and actions. *Ākāśa* etc. are the inherent causes of qualities. Mind and final embodied substances are the inherent causes of qualities and actions. Qualities, viz. colour, taste, odour, cold touch, number, dimension, separateness, viscidity and sound are non-inherent causes. Knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit and impression are auxiliary causes. Conjunction, disjunction, hotness, weight, liquidity, and speed are both non-inherent and auxiliary causes. Distance and proximity (posteriority and priority in time), duality, separateness from two, atomicity etc, are no cause at all. The actions are non-inherent causes in conjunction and disjunction, substancehood etc. being generality and at the same time particularity are called generality-cum-particularity. So this kind of generality-cum-particularity is the common feature of all the three categories.

6. Divergence between the three—substance, quality and action

dravyāṇi dravyāntaram ārabhante (1.1.8)

Substances originate another substance.

Note:

Candrānanda: *dravyāṇi* is interpreted as *dravye* (two substances) and *dravyāṇi* (many substances). Hence a single substance cannot be productive of another substance. The substances being inherent causes originate the produced substance which is different from themselves. The final embodied substances like *ākāśa* etc. do not originate any substance. Two or more causes of similar characteristics and having finiteness, action, colour etc. can originate the effect. The *ākāśa* etc. are not like these (causes). The Mind, as it has no touch, cannot be the cause of a new substance and the final embodied substances also are found to be unable to originate a new substance because the case of origination in this connection is not seen.

guṇāś ca guṇāntaram (1.1.9).

Qualities originate another quality.

Notes:

The qualities colour etc. of the yarn produce colour etc. in the cloth which is inherent in their substratum. The qualities of the yarn are not the same with the qualities of the cloth. This is simply according to *Candrānandavṛtti*. But according to *Vyomavatī* (I, p. 81) *guṇāḥ* has specific implication in its plural ending and hence the sūtra will mean that a number of qualities and not a single quality has the capacity for producing a quality. But *Nyāyakandalī* does not support the above purport of the sūtra. According to it, if a single quality could not produce a quality, 'conjunction produced by conjunction' would be an absurd entity. (*PPB*-Jha, p. 352).

karma karmasādhyaṃ na vidyate (1.1.10)

It cannot be valid that Action originates another action.

Notes:

Action does not originate another action, as because action is found to cease. If

action would be the cause of the substance then no substance without action would be found. In this way, some substances can produce action (vide *Candrānanda-vritti* on *VS* 1.1.21) and some not. But Action can never produce action. This is the divergence between action and two other categories.

7. Divergence of Substance from Quality and Action

kāryāvirodhi dravyaṃ kāraṇāvirodhi ca (1.1.11)

The substance (in the form of a cause) cannot be contradictory to its effects (the substance etc. in the form of the effect). Moreover, this (substance in the form of an effect) cannot be contradictory to its cause (inherent or non-inherent).

Notes:

Candrānanda furnished the example of two individual fingers (substance) producing a unit (substance) of two fingers through conjunction where there is no contradiction between two substances. Some more examples have also been cited to show non-contradiction between effect and cause. We can simply observe the application of the rule in the following fact also : Cloth cannot be contradictory to its cause, yarns i.e. cloth cannot destroy its yarns, and yarns also cannot be contradictory to its effect, cloth i.e. yarns also cannot destroy the cloth.

ubhayathā guṇaḥ (1.1.12)

Quality is seen to have both types of features, i.e. it does not become contradictory to its effect or to its cause, and it also becomes contradictory to its effect or to its cause.

Notes:

The colour etc. of the constituent atoms are not contradictory to the colour etc. of dyad etc. Here colour etc. of the parts and the whole are in cause-effect relation. Where there is no cause-effect relation between the qualities, there also we see some qualities residing uncontradictorily. As for example, colour, taste, odour, touch in one substance are not in mutual contradiction. Again, there are the cases of contradiction also. The initial, middle and final sounds are contradictory to each other. Final sound is destroyed by the penultimate sound and the penultimate sound is destroyed by the final sound. The relation between these is cause-effect. Now, where there is no cause-effect relation, we see some qualities contradictory to each other, such as conjunction and disjunction, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, etc.

kāryavirodhi karma (1.1.13)

Action is contradictory to its effect.

Notes:

The clarified meaning of the sūtra is that, action is resisted when its effect comes into being. According to Candrānanda's explanation the matter is the following : The effects of action are conjunction, disjunction and tendency (*saṃskāra*). Among these three conjunction alone and not disjunction and tendency can contradict the action. If the action were contradicted by the other two, conjunction could not appear.

8. Characteristic feature of Substance

kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam (1.1.14)

The characteristic features of a substance are that it becomes the substratum of action and the substratum of quality and it becomes the inherent cause.

Notes:

Each of the three characteristics may separately be considered as a definition of a substance. Time, direction and soul can have no action. Qualities are existent in each and every substance according to their capacity. Earth etc. can be the inherent cause of substance, quality and action. *Ākāśa* etc. can be only of qualities, and mind and final embodied substance can be only of qualities and actions.

9. Characteristic feature of Quality

dravyāśrayy aguṇavān saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam (1.1.15)

The characteristic features of quality are that it subsists in substance, it does not become endowed with a further quality, and it does not become an independent cause in conjunction and disjunction.

Notes:

This sūtra defines a quality with some characteristics which are simultaneously bound for being a quality. Only 'subsistence in substance' is not sufficient to define quality, because a substance (cloth) also resides in the substance (yarn). That is why the condition 'it will not be endowed with a further quality' is to be added. So there is no substance which has no quality. It is only quality which is without any further quality. Even then the definition is not complete, because, there is 'action' which has two qualifications, i.e. it may reside in a substance and is without any quality. That is why the third condition is set. Action becomes an independent cause to conjunction and disjunction, i.e. when an action produces conjunction and disjunction it depends on no one else to produce them. But conjunction and disjunction are dependent causes to produce conjunction and disjunction.

10. Characteristic features of Action

ekadravyam aguṇaṃ saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣv anapekṣaṃ kāraṇam iti karmalakṣaṇam (1.1.16)

The characteristic features of an action are that an action abides in only a single substance (at a time), it must not be endowed with a quality and it can be an independent cause of conjunction and disjunction.

Notes:

Combined features of the action.

The qualities, conjunction etc. have two substrata (being substances). But action has one substratum. The action does not depend on another factor to produce conjunction or disjunction. Vādideva (*Syādvādaratnākara*, p. 946 accepts the reading .... *anapekṣam kāraṇam* while Uddyotakara reads *saṃyogavibhāgayor anapekṣakāraṇam*, *Vibhāgayor* is

supported by some MSS used in the Asiatic Society of Bengal of the Vaiśeṣika darśana.

11. Another characteristic feature of substance

dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṃ dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyam (1.1.17)

Substance is the common cause of (the three categories, i.e.) the substance, quality and action.

Notes:

Here a cause must mean inherent cause. Vide VS 1.1.14. Yarns (substances are the inherent cause of cloth, substance). Cloth (substance) is the inherent cause of its colour, number etc. (quality). Cloth (substance) is the inherent cause of vibration etc. (action) in it.

Candrānanda notes that earth etc. can be the common cause of three categories; but *ākāśa* etc. (substance) are the inherent cause only of quality. Then how can there be the common cause of substance, quality and action? Here Candrānanda says that each of them has a number of qualities, so *ākāśa* etc. be the common cause of the qualities. Mind is the common cause of quality and action.

tathā guṇaḥ (1.1.18)

Likewise is the case of quality. That is, quality also become the common cause of three categories, substance, quality and action.

Notes:

Here cause must mean non-inherent cause. A special type of conjunction (quality) of the yarns is the cause of a cloth (substance). Vide *Saṃyogānāṃ dravyam, VS* 1.1.25. The conjunction (quality) of fire with the unbaked pot is the cause of red colour (quality) in the pot. Vide *agnisaṃyogācca, VS* 7.1.5. The conjunction (quality) of self and effort is the cause of action in hands. Vide *ātma-saṃyogaprayatnābhyāṃ haste karma, VS* 5.1.1. Candrānanda notes that qualities other than conjunction cannot be the common cause of substance, quality and action.

saṃyoga-vibhāgānāṃ karma (1.1.19)

Action is the common cause of conjunction and disjunction.

Notes:

Action creates disjunction from a thing and creates conjunction with another. So it is a common cause of both disjunction and conjunction, Śaṅkaramiśra reads the sūtra as *saṃyoga-vibhāgavegānāṃ karma samānam.* In this sūtra the word *vega* is important. So action is the cause of velocity (*vega*) also which is included in tendency (*saṃskāra*). *Vega* also indicates the elasticity (*sthitisthāpaka*) of which the action is a cause. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (Verse 158 *ab*) narrates: "In an arrow etc. velocity is produced by action due to (silent) pushing. The return (to their former position) of branches etc. that have been pulled and let go, is caused by elasticity. This elasticity is produced by action".

na dravyāṇāṃ vyatirekāt (1.1.20)

Action cannot be the cause of substance as because action is excluded (to be the

cause of the substance).

Notes:

A question arises : Conjunction gives birth to a cloth, likewise conjunction depends upon action, so action should be admitted as a cause of cloth (a substance).

The solution is that conjunction only is to be admitted as a cause here. If action would be the cause then the action would continue even if it gave birth to conjunction. But we see that the action ceases and only conjunction remains. So action cannot be admitted as a cause of a substance.

guṇavaidharmyān na karmaṇām (1.1.21)

Action being different from quality in nature, cannot be the cause of another action.

Notes:

VS 1.1.10 tells us that action does not originate from another action. According to Candrānanda, *VS* 1.1.21 here is to point out the dissimilarity between quality and action. To explain, quality can produce Action in its own substratum and also in other substratum. To the contrary, action can be the cause of another action neither in its own substratum nor in other substratum.

Weight (*gurutva*), liquidity (*dravatva*), soundless contact (*nodana*), impact (*abhighāta*) and conjunction with what is conjoined (*saṃyyuktasaṃyoga*) can produce action in their own substratum as in other substrata. Effort (*prayatna*), merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are the causes of producing action in other substratum. Contrarily, action cannot produce action in its own substratum. If an action could produce another action, there would not be any actionless substance. Nor can the action produce action in other substratum, because it stops whenever conjunction with that substance is produced.

dravyāṇām dravyaṃ kāryam sāmānyam (1.1.22)

A single substance is the common effect of more than one substance.

Notes:

VS 1.1.17 has pointed out that a single substance is the common cause (inherent) of substance, quality and action. Now *VS* 1.1.22 points out another feature of substance that a single substance is the common effect of a number of substances. For example, cloth is the common effect of several yarns.

dvitva-prabhṛtayaś ca saṃkhyāḥ pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyoga-vibhāgāś ca (1.1.23)

The number—duality etc., separateness, conjunction and disjunction are the common effects of more than one substance.

Notes:

Duality is the common effect of two substances, triplity (*tritva*) is of three substances, and so on. Separateness from two is the common effect of two substances. Conjunction is the common effect of two substances going to be conjoined. Similarly, disjunction is the common effect of two substances going to be divided.

asamavāyāt sāmānyaṃ karma kāryaṃ na vidyate (1.1.24)

As inherence of an action is prohibited (in more than one substance), the common

action in the form of an effect of more than one substance cannot exist.

Notes:

If two substances are in motion, there are two separate actions. If two substances are in inherent relation there is one action. At a time action is in inherent relation with a single substance.

Śaṅkaramiśra reads the sūtra as *asamavāyāt sāmānyakāryam karma na vidyate*, and explains: one action does not inhere in two substances or more than two substances. Objection arises that the action of the body and its limbs is produced by the body and its many limbs; otherwise how does our knowledge grow that there is motion in hands and feet where the body is moving? It means that the action in the body is produced from the actions in its different limbs. Hence the action in the body is the common effect of the actions in the limbs. Śaṅkara answers, the objection is unjustified; as the details of the action of the whole pervades the details of the action of the part, we feel that the parts are moving when the whole is moving. And we never feel that the whole is moving when the parts are moving.

saṃyogānāṃ dravyam (1.1.25)

A single substance is the common effect of more than one conjunction (being non-inherent cause).

Notes:

Cloth is the common effect of 'conjunctions' in the yarns.

rūpāṇāṃ rūpam (1.1.26)

The colour (of substance in the form of an effect) is the common effect of the colours (of more than one substance in the form of causes).

Notes:

The colour of a pot is the common effect of the colours of the constituent parts of the pot (two parts, upper and lower). The same is in the cases of taste etc. also.

gurutva-prayatna-saṃyogānām utkeṣepaṇam (1.1.27)

Throwing up is the common effect of weight, effort and conjunction.

Notes:

Candrānanda: As the sun-rays have no weight, there can be no throwing up of the sun-rays. As there is no effort applied to the mountain there can be no throwing up of the mountain. And as there is no conjunction between pebble and hand there can be no throwing up of the pebble. So throwing up is found to be the common cause of weight (of the substance), effort (of the thrower) and conjunction (with the hands).

saṃyoga-vibhāgāḥ karmaṇām (1.1.28)

The conjunctions and the disjunctions (which are produced by the actions in both the substances) are the common effects of the actions.

Notes:

VS 1.1.19 has pointed out that the action is the common cause of conjunction and disjunction. *VS* 1.1.28 points out that the conjunction and disjunction (due to action in two substances) are the common cause of the actions.

kāraṇasāmānye dravyakarmaṇāṃ karmākāraṇam uktam (1.1.29)

Where the common cause (of the substance etc.) is concerned, the action has been already narrated to be the non-cause of the substance and action. (vide *VS* 1.1.20, 1.1.24).

Notes:

What is the significance of the present sūtra in reminding us of the matter that has already been told?

The answer appears to be in the following:

Where the matter of common cause is concerned, there it is found that substance and quality are variously effective in the matter of causation, but what is the position of an action? *VS* 1.1.19 points out, that action is the common cause of conjunction and disjunction. In 7.2.10 and 11 it is found that conjunction and disjunction also can produce conjunction and disjunction. So the role of an action to be a cause becomes very insignificant. In this situation, the matter of being non-cause for an action, to substance and action is significant and hence it is reiterated.

Candrānanda says, that as the action is a non-cause of the substance and action, the substance and action also in their turn do not become the common effects of the action. Hence substance, quality and action are totally different categories.

CHAPTER I: AHNIKA II

(The *āhnika* deals with Generality and Particularity)

1. The topic dealing with the nature of cause and effect

kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ (1.2.1)

There is non-existence of an effect if there is the non-existence of the cause.

Notes:

Effect and cause have been mentioned in the first *āhnika* of the first chapter. But their nature is to be defined. The consecutive two *sūtras* 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 are for that purpose. Anyway, we see, due to non-existence of yarns (inherent cause) or the non-existence of conjunctions of the yarns (non-inherent cause) or the non-existence of the weaver (auxiliary cause) cloth (effect) cannot be produced.

na tu kāryābhāvāt kāraṇābhāvaḥ (1.2.2)

There cannot be non-existence of cause if there is non-existence of an effect.

Notes:

Even if the cloth is not produced, there is no denial of the existence of its cause, yarns.

2. The topic dealing with the nature of generality and particularity

sāmānyaṃ viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam (1.2.3)

Generality and particularity are dependent on knowledge.

Notes:

We have the knowledge 'This is a cow', 'This is a cow', in different cases, and the nature of this very knowledge of inclusion (*anuvṛtti buddhi*) is that it is repeated in like manner. So the existence of generality depends on knowledge. Again we have the knowledge 'This is different from this', the nature of this very knowledge of exclusion (*vyāvṛtti buddhi*) leads to admit 'particularity'. So the existence of particularity also depends on knowledge. It is to be noted that the knowledge of exclusion is due to particularity (the category) which abides in the ultimate units of the four *bhūtas*, and many other eternal categories.

The matters called *sāmānya* (generality), and *viśeṣa* (particularity) have been utilised in the first *āhnika* of the first chapter (for example *sāmānya viśeṣa* in *VS* 1.1.7, *sāmānya* in *VS* 1.1.17, 22, 24, 29).

bhāvaḥ sāmānyam eva (1.2.4)

Bhāva i.e. existence (also *sattā*) is only generality (as it is repeated in like manner in all of the three, substance, quality and action. It cannot be particularity.)

Notes:

There is one generic attribute which becomes only generality. There are some generic attributes (*jāti*) or characteristic (*dharma*) which sometimes become generality and sometimes particularity according to knowledge. There are some characteristics which become only particularity and those have been regarded as a separate type of category being *viśeṣa*. Existence (*sattā*) i.e. the highest generality produces the knowledge of only repetition in like manner (*anuvṛttipratyaya*) : This exists, this exists (*sat*, *sat*), this *sattā* (Existence) does not produce the knowledge of exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*) from others. In a substance or quality or action we cannot have the knowledge that these are different from generality, inherence etc., because there is *sattā* in the previous three. That is why existence can only be generality.

dravyatvaṃ guṇatvam karmatvaṃ ca sāmānyāni viśeṣāś ca (1.2.5)

The substanceness, quality-ness and actionness are generality and particularity (at the same time).

Notes:

Substanceness is a generality because we have the repeated similar knowledge in different types of substances. Such knowledge is 'This is a substance', 'This is a substance', and so on. At the same time substanceness is a particularity, because due to the presence of substanceness in a substance, we know that it is different from quality and action. The cases of qualityness and actionness are to be explained in the same manner. Particularity, working for exclusion, exists in all the three larger generalities, and also in innumerable inferior generalities. Śaṅkaramiśra explains, that the particle *ca* in the *sūtra* stands for the inferior generalities just mentioned above. Those generalities are on the one hand generalities and on the other hand particularities.

anyatrāntyebhyo viśeṣebhyaḥ (1.2.6)

(The scope of generality-particularity is) apart from the particularities which are ultimate.

Notes:

The generality-particularities in different substances, etc. lead us to produce knowledge in the way: 'This is substance', 'This is substance', or 'This is quality', 'This is quality'; etc. This happens because of similarity in shape, or some other qualities. The Vaiśeṣikas admit the eternal substances. First, there are the atoms of the first four substances. Next, there are space, direction etc. The atoms have no constituent parts at all. The qualities in them are not perceptible. But the gross earth is vividly different from the gross water. This cannot happen if the atoms of those substances are similar. So, the earth-atoms must be different from the water-atoms. Now, even if the generality substanceness be admitted in gross elements, some kind of difference must be admitted in the atoms even in the cases of substances. Therefore, in the eternal substances, (ultimate) particularity is to be admitted.

The particularities are innumerable.

3. The Topic dealing with the nature of highest generality and inferior generalities.

sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu (1.2.7)

Wherefrom does the knowledge 'This is existent' appear in substance, quality and action, though these are different from each other? That "particular" category is *sattā*.

dravya-guṇa-karmabhyo'rthāntaraṃ sattā (1.2.8)

Existence is different from substance, quality and action.

Notes:

A doubt arises: As the knowledge of similarity arises in the three categories, and the existence (*sattā*) is dependent on this knowledge, it would lead to the admission that the destruction of substance etc. may cause the destruction of Existence. The answer is that the present *sūtra* refuses to accept the view, that Existence is not different from its substratum. If it would not be different from them, it would be different in each case, and could not produce knowledge in like manner.

ekadravyavattvān na dravyam (1.2.9)

As existence abides in the complete (entire one) substance category, it is not substance.

Notes:

Substance can subsist in a substance, just as cloth (a substance) subsists in the yarns (the substance). So the doubt may arise whether the existence being the substance is a substance. In answer to this Candrānanda explains that substance can be of two kinds: (i) *adravya* i.e. substance without any substance as its cause, e.g. the atoms, space etc. ; and (ii) *anekadravya* i.e. substance with a number of substances as its constituent parts, e.g. pot etc.

Existence, in nature, does not fall in either of the above two. It has only one substance (entire substance category) as its inherent cause. So the Existence cannot be a substance.

guṇakarmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇaḥ (1.2.10)

Existence cannot be an action or a quality, as it abides in action and quality.

Notes:

VS 1.1.15 has already pointed out that quality is without a further quality and *VS* 1.1.21 directed that action is without a further action. So as existence abides in quality and action it cannot be identical with quality and action.

sāmānya-viśeṣābhāvāc ca (1.2.11)

(Existence cannot be identical with substance, quality or action) because there is no generality-particularity in the Existence.

Notes:

Substanceness, etc, being generality particularity abide in substance, etc. If Existence would by any of the substance. etc., the generality particularities like substanceness etc. would abide in existence. So existence is not substance, quality or action.

ekadravyavattvena dravyatvam uktam (1.2.12)

It is called substanceness as it subsists in each and every substance, exclusively. (Hence the substanceness also is different from the substance as the Existence is from the latter.)

Notes:

Ekadravyavattva means subsistence in the entire one exclusive substance category.

sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvena ca (1.2.13)

As there is the non-existence of generality-cum-particularity (further in the substance, the substanceness is not substance).

Notes:

The above translation is according to Candrānanda. Śaṅkaramiśra explains : As the generality-cum-particularity cannot be the characteristic of a substance, the latter cannot be the substanceness.

Substanceness can be generality on the one hand and particularity on the other. But this type of characteristic is not admitted in the case of a substance. So substance can never be identical with substanceness. This is the mode of Śaṅkaramiśra's explanation. But according to Candrānanda's explanation: substanceness itself has the two-fold characteristic. It is generality and at the same time is particularity. No further generality-cum-particularity like substanceness can be admitted in the previous substanceness. But in a substance the substanceness (which is generality-cum-particularity) has been admitted. So due to this basic difference the substanceness cannot be a substance. Moreover the former would be a quality or an action if qualityness or actionness would subsist in it. So substanceness is neither a substance, nor a quality nor an action.

guṇe bhāvād guṇatvam uktam (1.2.14)

It is called qualityness as it subsists in quality.

Notes:

A quality is not endowed with a further quality but a quality can be endowed with a qualityness. That is why the qualityness is different from a quality. There is no difference between the explanations of Candrānanda and Śaṅkaramiśra here. However Śaṅkara reads the sūtra as *tathā guṇeṣu bhāvād guṇatvam uktam*.

sāmānya-viseṣābhāvena ca (1.2.15)

As there is the non-existence of generality-cum-particularity (further in the qualityness, the qualityness is not quality).

Notes:

We know that 'qualityness' which is generality-cum-particularity abides in quality. But nothing else abides in qualityness. So quality and qualityness are totally different.

Moreover qualityness is not substance or action. If the generality-cum-particularities like substanceness or actionness would abide in qualityness, then qualityness would be substance or action. But it is absurd.

karmaṇi bhāvāt karmatvam uktam (1.2.16)

It is called actionness as it subsists in action.

Notes:

Any further action is prohibited to be present in an action. But actionness is present in an action. So actionness is not action.

sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvena ca (1.2.17)

As there is the non-existence of generality-cum-particularity (further in the actionness, the actionness is also not action).

Notes:

If the generality-cum-particularity like substanceness or qualityness would subsist in actionness then actionness would be substance or quality. But it is absurd. So actionness is not a substance nor a quality.

salliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāvaḥ (1.2.18)

Because of indistinct mark in the form of 'It is existent', 'It is existent', and because of absence of any other special mark (therein) the Existence is not varied (but one).

Notes:

The word *eka* does not mean the number but means 'not many or varied'.

Śaṅkaramiśra explains: A conception in the form of being or the applicability of that word is the property of existence. This conception is common, without distinction, in regard to substances, qualities and actions. Hence existence or being abides in them as only one. For, otherwise, either being would not exist or substanceness etc. would not if existence would be in the same individuals endowed with substanceness etc. Moreover, there is no special ground of inference to examine existence whether it is many.

CHAPTER II: *ĀHNIKA* I

(The *āhnika* deals with the arrangement of qualities in first five material substances)

1. Arrangement of different special qualities in the first five material substances by way of showing divergences between them.

rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśavatī pṛthivī (2.1.1.)

Earth (the first substance) has colour, taste, smell, and touch.

Notes:

Candrānanda : Colour, taste, smell and touch are the special qualities (*vaiśeṣika guṇa*) of earth. Other qualities in the earth are number, dimension (*parimāṇa*), separateness (*pṛthaktva*) conjunction (*saṃyoga*), disjunction (*vibhāga*), distance (*paratva*), nearness (*aparatva*), weight (*gurutva*), artificial liquidity (artificial liquidity as in clarified butter) (*naimittika dravatva*) and tendency (*saṃskāra*). Colour in earth: white etc. Taste in earth: sweet etc. Smell in earth: Fragrance and stench. Touch in earth : Neither hot nor cold.

The qualities colour etc. are subject to chemical change (*pākaja*) (i.e. are changed through the action of fire).

rūpa-rasa-sparśavatya āpo dravāḥ snigdhāś ca (2.1.2).

Water (the second substance) has colour, taste and touch, as well as liquidity and viscidity.

Notes:

Colour in Water	:	White (i.e. Transparent)
Taste in Water	:	Sweet
Touch in Water	:	Cold

Liquidity here stands for natural liquidity.

Other qualities in water are number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, nearness, weight and tendency.

tejo rūpa-sparśavat (2.1.3)

Fire (the third substance) has colour and touch for its qualities.

Notes:

Colour in fire	:	Dazzling and white.
Touch in fire	:	Only hot.

Other qualities of fire are number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, nearness, artificial liquidity and tendency.

Artificial liquidity exists in the gold which is a form of *tejas*. But it does not extend to ordinary fire and extends wrongly to clarified butter etc. The author of *Bhāṣāpariccheda* tries to avoid this difficulty by innovating the special meaning of 'artificial liquidity': "Artificial liquidity really means the possession of those generic attributes directly concomitant with substanceness which are absent in earth, but are present in things having artificial liquidity." But this explanation appears to be weak.

vāyuḥ sparśavān (2.1.4)

Air (the fourth substance) has touch for its attribute.

Notes:

Touch in air: Neither hot nor cold. It is not subject to chemical change (i.e. not changed through the action of fire).

Other qualities in air are number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, nearness, weight and tendency.

ta ākāśe na vidyante (2.1.5)

Ākāśa has none of those (qualities, colour, taste, smell and touch).

Notes:

The qualities of *ākāśa* are sound, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction.

2. *Similarity of earthy and fiery substances with water.*

sarpir-jatu-madhūcchiṣṭānāṃ pārthivānām agnisaṃyogād dravatā'dbhiḥ sāmānyam (2.1.6)

The Earth substances, such as clarified butter, lac and wax, when turned into liquid through the contact of fire, resemble water.

trapu-sīsa-loha-rajata-suvarṇānām taijasānām agnisaṃyogād dravatā'dbhiḥ sāmānyam (2.1.7)

The Fire substances, viz., tin, lead, iron, silver and gold, when turned into liquid through the contact of fire, resemble water.

Notes:

VSs 2.1.6 and 2.1.7 state the similarity between the earth substances and water, and the fire substances and water, respectively. At the same time, the similarity between the earth substances and fire substances is also made clear. However, the liquidity in earth substances and fire substances is not natural but artificial whereas that in water is natural.

3. *Establishment of the existence of air through inference.*

viṣāṇī kakudmān prānteválaḍhiḥ sāsnāvān iti gotve dṛṣṭaṃ liṅgam (2.1.8)

That she has horns, a hump, a tail hairy at the extremity and a dewlap is the received mark of being a cow.

Notes:

This sūtra is for example to introduce received mark in the inference of the air starting with the next *sūtra* (*VS* 2.1.9).

sparśaś ca (2.1.9)

Touch also is the received mark (to infer the existence of invisible air).

Notes:

Horn etc. are the received mark of a cow when almost invisible. Similarly, touch is the mark of air which is not fit to be visible.

Candrānanda argues: Touch is apprehended. It cannot be without a substratum. So the existence of a substance (air) as a substratum of touch is *inferred.*

Śaṅkaramiśra reads the sūtra *sparśaś ca vāyoḥ*. According to him the particle *ca* implies some other qualities, e.g. sounds, wafting (*dhṛti*) and agitation (*kampa*).

na ca dṛṣṭānāṃ sparśa ityadṛṣṭaliṅgo vāyuḥ (2.1.10)

Touch is not (the mark) of the visible objects (like earth etc.) Therefore the air has a mark of an invisible object.

Notes:

Candrānanda: If this touch would be of visible object like earth, (water and fire) it would be accompanied by smell, taste and colour. The touch of air is not like this. So it is the mark of an invisible object other than earth, water and fire.

Śaṅkaramiśra agrees with Candrānanda in explaining the two *sūtras VS* 2.1.9 and 10.

adravyavattvād dravyam (2.1.11)

It (the atomic air) is a substance because of its not having any inherent substances.

Notes:

Here the atomic air is intended. In the explanation of *VS* 1.2.9 Candrānanda said of two types of substances, *adravya and anekadravya. Adravyas* are atomic earth etc., time, *ākāśa* etc., and *anekadravyas* are gross earth etc. So *adravya* air must be atomic air, because it has no constituent parts.

kriyāvattvād guṇavattvācca (2.1.12).

As (the gross air) has action and quality so it is also a substance.

Notes:

VS 1.1.14 has explained that which has action and quality is a substance. So as the gross air has action and quality it must be a substance. But the quality or action of the atomic air cannot be apprehended.

adravyavattvena nityatvam uktam (2.1.13)

(The atomic air) is said to be eternal as (it has) no inherent substances (*VS* 2.1.11).

vāyor vāyusaṃmūrcchanaṃ nānātve liṅgam (2.1.14)

The concurrence of air with air is a mark (to prove the existence) of multiplicity of air.

Notes:

Air has zigzag course. But due to horizontal concurrence of air with air, another flow of air blows upwards. And we see grass, leaves etc. going upwards. The conjunction of two airs cannot be of a single object. So the multiplicity of air is proved.

vāyur iti sati sannikarṣe pratyakṣābhāvād dṛṣṭaṃ liṅgaṃ na vidyate (2.1.15)

When there is the contact (between the cutaneous sense-organ and air), there is no perception in the form of 'This is air', so there is no visible mark.

Notes:

When the cow is connected with the eyes, we perceive the whole cow as 'This is a cow' and its horns etc. are perceived as marks if cow be sometime invisible. But when the cutaneous sense-organ is connected with air we cannot perceive the air as 'This is air' with touch. If air would be perceived then in the event of its invisibility touch would be the mark. But touch cannot be such a visible mark horns etc. in the case of cow.

sāmānyato-dṛṣṭāc cāviśeṣaḥ (2.1.16)

And inasumuch as its (i.e. air's) existence is known by general inference, it is not a particular.

Notes:

Air is said to be inferred from its mark touch. This particular touch cannot be of earth etc., because in those cases the substrata and the relation between touch and its substrata are perceived. And again this particular touch cannot be without any substratum. So the substratum of touch is to be air which is invisible. But this argument cannot be conclusive.

There are many other invisible objects like *ākāśa* etc. How is it that the particular touch is not of them but of the very air? The general inference cannot infer the specific substratum.

It is argued that, the touch of *ākāśa* etc. can easily be excluded because if touch would be present in the omnipresent objects like *ākāśa* etc., there would be no *bhāva* objects and hence that particular touch is not *ākāśa* etc. but of air. Even this argument cannot remove the doubt about the existence of another tenth substance and not of air.

tasmād āgamikam (2.1.17)

Therefore, (that the air exists is) established according to the traditional opinion.

Notes:

Candrānanda intends to mean *āgamika* as *pravādamātra* i.e. traditional opinion. As a result of this the next *sūtra* is its refutation according to him. That is the existence of air is not a matter of traditional opinion but there is scriptural evidence.

saṃjñākarma tvasmadviśiṣṭānāṃ liṅgam (2.1.18)

But, the nomenclature by the being who are distinguished from ourselves, is the mark (of only nine substances and not of any other tenth substance).

Notes:

Here it is to be noted that Candrānanda and Śaṅkaramiśra widely differ as to the interpretation of this sūtra.

According to Candrānanda the existence of air (*vāyu*) has the mark and it is the nomenclature (*saṃjñākarma*) by those beings who are distinguished from ourselves (*asmadviśiṣṭa*). There are nine names *pṛthivī* etc. which are evidence in support of the existence of nine substances. There is no such substance as the tenth. So there are

exclusively nine substances and touch is of the very air. In *asmadviśiṣṭānām* the plural is intended to show honour. *asmadviśiṣṭa* is meant for God.

Quite astonishingly Śaṅkaramiśra explains this *sūtra* in favour of God's existence. Word (*saṃjñā*) and work (*karma*) are the mark (*liṅga*) of the God and the great sages who are distinguished from ourselves (*asmadviśiṣṭānām*). Śaṅkara explicitly says that the particle *tu* (but) is obviously for splitting the topic from the previous one. And according to Vivṛtikāra the topic of God starts with the *sūtra*.

But Śaṇkara's explanation certainly appears to be inaccurate. On the contrary Candrānanda strikes the right target. The mark of God cannot be a relevant topic here.

pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt saṃjñākarmaṇaḥ (2.1.19)

(The mark is right) as the nomenclature is preceded by direct experience (of the God).

Notes:

The God who is distinguished from us has named the substances. We see that the father names his son only after seeing him. Hence as the names of the nine substances are found to have been fixed by God, and those must have been done, only after being perceived by Him. Among those substances here are some, which are not directly perceptible by us. But the visualiser of them is God by whom those are such named.

4. *Establishment of existence of* ākāśa *through inference.*

niṣkramaṇaṃ praveśanam ity ākāśasya liṅgam (2.1.20)

(Objection) : Egress and ingress are the marks of the existence of *ākāśa*.

Notes:

Candrānanda : Egress and ingress of a person is through open space, door etc. and not through a wall etc. So those must be through *ākāśa*. Therefore, those are the marks of the existence of *ākāśa*. In fact, *ākāśa* is the denial of the finite (*mūrta*).

Vivṛti notes that the argument contained in the *sūtra* is of the Sāmkhya philosophy. Egress and ingress are possible when there is empty space. There are egress and ingress, so there must be empty space or *ākāśa*.

tad aliṅgam ekadravyatvāt karmaṇaḥ (2.1.21)

(Objection refuted :) That (Egress or ingress) is not a mark (of the existence of *ākāśa*), for an action inhers in one substance only.

Notes:

Egress or ingress are clearly seen to be present in a person. Now there is a rule that action must inhere in one substance. We also know that *ākāśa* cannot have action because of omnipresence (of the former). So how will egress or ingress which is not connected (in inherence) with *ākāśa* prove the existence of *ākāśa*?

Candrānanda reads *ekadravyavattva* (sic) for *ekadravyatva* while Śaṅkaramiśra reads *ekadravyatva*. *VS* 1.1.16 narrates action as *ekadravya*. So *ekadravyatva* appears to be right expression here.

kāraṇāntarānukḷptivaidharmyāc ca (2.1.22)

Objection refuted: Also because the properties (of *ākāśa*) differ from the mark of another cause.

Notes:

In the previous *sūtra VS* 2.1.21 It has been noted that egress or ingress as not inhered in *ākāśa*, cannot be the mark of the existence of *ākāśa*. But it would not be right. As falling down of the pebble is the mark of having weight, likewise egress in the person would be the mark of the existence of *ākāśa*. But the present *sūtra* rejects that kind of argument. Weight is the non-inherent cause of falling down and in fact, there is no difficulty to infer weight from falling down. But *ākāśa* is not a non-inherent cause of egress or ingress. *ākāśa* is clearly different from weight as it (former) has eternality, substanceness and being non-substratum.

saṃyogād abhāvaḥ karmaṇaḥ (2.1.23)

(Argument in *VS* 2.1.10 refuted:) Non-existence of action results from conjunction.

Notes:

In *VS* 2.1.20 the opponent's argument was that the egress is possible through open space which is made by *ākāśa*. But *VS* 2.1.23 rejects the argument. If the egress is due to *ākāśa* then the absence of *ākāśa* would obstruct the egress. But this kind of argument is absurd. *ākāśa* is omnipresent and its absence cannot be admitted. Egress is ceased by conjunction of body etc., the substrata of action with the wall etc., the substances having touch.

Therefore the mark of the existence of *ākāśa* is sound.

kāraṇaguṇapūrvaḥ kārye guṇo dṛṣṭaḥ (2.1.24)

The quality in an effect is observed to be pre-existent in the quality of the cause.

Notes:

One may argue that the sound is not due to *ākāśa* but due to drum etc. But this is wrong.

The special qualities, of the tangible substances and apprehendable by one sense-organ emerge from the qualities of the causes. No fragments of sound are to be found inhered in the constituent parts of the drum like the colour etc. (in the drum). So sound cannot be the special quality of the drum etc., the tangible substances.

Candrānanda constitutes one *sūtra* (2.1.24) for two *sūtras* of our texts (2.1.24-25). Here Śaṅkaramiśra appears to be correct to suggest out reading and division.

kāryāntaraprādurbhāvācca śabdaḥ sparaśavatām aguṇaḥ (2.1.25)

Sound is not a quality of tangible substances, since there is not other effect.

Notes:

The special quality of the tangible substances is that it pervades in the new effect. But sound is not such an effect. If it would be the effect of drum etc. it would be tangible. So sound cannot be the quality of the tangible substances. According to Candrāṇanda the purpose of the present *sūtra* is as follows: Moreover, the special quality of the tangible things emerges in the new effect from the qualities of the causes. But when a sound is

created from a sound not a little effect is seen in that case. So, because of absence of a different effect, sound cannot be admitted as a special quality of the tangible substance. (Thus it excludes the possibility of the first four substances to be the substrata of sound.)

paratra samavāyāt pratyakṣatvāc ca nātmaguṇo na manoguṇaḥ (2.1.26)

Since it inheres in something else and is known by perception, sound is neither a quality of soul nor a quality of the internal sense-organ.

Notes:

Candrānanda: The term *paratra* means outwardly. The sound is felt to be inhered outwardly. If it would be inhered in the soul it would be felt like happiness, sorrow etc. But the sound is apprehended by the outer sense-organ (auditory) and the quality of soul is not apprehended by the outer sense-organ. So the sound is not the quality of soul.

Again, sound cannot be admitted as a quality of internal sense-organ also. The quality of internal sense-organ cannot be perceived by outer sense-organ. But sound is perceived by auditory sense-organ which is an outer one. Moreover, sound is perceived as an outer thing. The quality of the internal sense-organ cannot be perceived as an outer thing. So sound cannot be the quality of the internal sense-organ also. Candrānanda adds that sound is not even the quality of direction and time. The latters are not apprehended by auditory sense-organ whereas sound is apprehended by the said organ.

liṅgam ākāśasya (2.1.27)

(Therefore, sound is) the mark of *ākāśa*.

Notes:

Sound, being a quality must exist in something, like colour etc. Thus it is proved by a general inference that there is another substance over and above the eight substances—earth, water, fire, air, time, direction, soul and internal sense-organ. It is *ākāśa*.

Śaṅkaramiśra reads the *sūtra*, *pariśeṣāl-liṅgam ākāśasya*.

dravyatva-nityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte (2.1.28)

Substanceness and eternity (of *ākāśa*) are explained by (the analogy) of air.

Notes:

VS 2.1.11 and 12 have observed that the atomic air is a substance and it has no constituent parts. It is a substance because it has quality and action.

VS 2.1.13 has observed that as atomic air has no constituent parts it is eternal.

The matter of *ākāśa* can be explained by the analogy of air. As *ākāśa* has the quality, sound so the former must be a substance. And as *ākāśa* does not have any constituent parts it is eternal.

tattvaṃ bhāvena (2.1.29)

Its unity is explained by (the analogy of) existence.

Notes:

VS 1.2.18 has observed: As existence is one due to an exclusively uniform mark in the form "This exists", "This exists" and also due to absence of any other special mark differentiating knowledge regarding existence. Similarly, *ākāśa* has the uniform mark,

sound and there is also no differentiating knowledge regarding *ākāśa*. So it is one.

The present *sūtra* clearly indicates the previous *sūtra* 1.2.18 and further no specific explanation is suitable. Candrānanda in his *Vṛtti* on *VS* 2.1.29 writes: *yathā "salliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāccaiko bhāvaḥ"* (*VS* 1.2.18) *evam śabdaliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāccaikam ākāśam.* It is to be noted that after *tattvaṃ bhāvena* Śaṅkaramiśra reads a separate *sūtra śabdaliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvācca* which is exactly the *Vṛtti*-line.

CHAPTER II: *ĀHNIKA* II

(The *āhnika* deals mainly with Time, Direction, *Ākāśa* etc.)

1. Imposed qualities in earth and water

puṣpa-vastrayoḥ sati sannikarṣe gandhāntarāprādurbhāvo vastre gandhābhāvaliṅgam (2.2.1)

A flower and a cloth being brought into contact, the non-appearance in the cloth of another smell is the mark of the absence of smell in the cloth.

Notes:

It has been said in *VS* 2.1.24 that the qualities of the tangible substances in the effect emerge from the qualities of the cause. But in the case of sound we see no emergence of new substance yet sound produces another sound.

There would be objection: a flower and a cloth, when combined, do not produce any new substance, but the fragrance of the flower produces the fragrance in the cloth.

But the present *sūtra* rejects the above contention. When a flower and a cloth are conjoined the cloth becomes fragrant. It is true. But by this it cannot be said the cloth has fragrance. Because the cloth had the fragrance of the very flower and not a different fragrance. If the cloth would have its own smell, then there would be new type of smell with the smells of flower and cloth mixed together. So when a new effect is not produced, in that case the fragrance in another object, cannot be admitted to have been produced (*ārambha*) from the fragrance of the flower. In fact, when a new effect is produced, only then the qualities of the causes are to be admitted as the producer of the qualities of that new effect.

etenāpsūṣṇatā vyākhyātā (2.2.2)

By this, heat in water is explained.

Notes:

When water is brought into contact with fire there cannot be any different type of touch (other than touch of fire), and it is the mark of the absence of heat in water. Moreover, heat does not pervade water. Minute parts of flower mingle in the cloth, or minute parts of fire mingle in water. And smell in cloth or touch in water are apprehended from inherence in what is conjoined with the sense-organ.

2. Arrangement of special qualities in earth, water and fire.

vyavasthitaḥ pṛthivyāṃ gandhaḥ (2.2.3)

Smell is established as the mark of earth.

Notes:

Colour etc. of the cloth and the water may appear to be non-pervading in the substances, as at the time of apprehending the smell of flower or touch of heat, smell of the cloth's own or the cold touch in water is not apprehended. But the above contention is not correct. The cloth is an earth substance and smell is established as its quality. The fact in the above flower-cloth case is that smell of earth's own is suppressed by the smell of flower.

tejasy uṣṇatā (2.2.4).

Heat is established as the mark of fire.

Notes:

Heat is natural in fire. When fire and water are brought into contact we find water is hot. But by this we cannot say that water also have heat as its natural quality.

apsu śītatā (2.2.5)

Cold is established as the mark of water.

Notes:

When we find hot water, it is due to entrance of the fire atom by inherence in what is conjoined. In this situtation, cold is not apprehended because heat suppresses cold.

Śaṅkaramiśra explains that as natural cold is the characteristic of water it cannot be also universally affirmed of the surface of stone, sandal-wood etc. By cold also its colour and taste are characterised, and viscidity and natural liquidity are also implied.

3. Time

aparasmin paraṃ yugapad ayugapacciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni (2.2.6)

(A youth) is posterior (*apara*) and (an old) is prior (*para*) (by considering black hair, white hair etc.), (these works) are done simultaneously, these are not, it is done late and it is done swiftly. These are the marks of time.

Notes:

The above ideas are valid, and are the marks of time. The qualities of time are number, measure, separateness, conjunction and disjunction.

dravyatva-nityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte (2.2.7)

The substanceness and eternity (of time) are explained on (the analogy of) air.

Notes:

VS 2.1.11 & 12 have observed the substanceness of atomic air on the ground that it has no substances as its inherent constituent parts and also it has quality and action. Time also is a substance but it is not like gross air. It is like atomic air, hence time has no

constituent parts. Being without any constituent parts, atomic air is eternal (*VS* 2.1.13). Similar is the case of time.

Air is substance because it has the quality 'touch'.

tattvaṃ bhāvena (2.2.8)

The unity of time is explained on (the analogy of) existence.

Notes:

VS 1.2.18 explained that the existence has an uniform mark (*sat*) and no other different mark in different cases, hence is declared as one. Similar is the case of time. The marks of time in diverse cases are same and there is no other particular marks elsewhere. So time is to be considered as one.

kāryaviśeṣeṇa nānātvam (2.2.9)

(Though time is one) its (imposed) diversity is according to different actions.

Notes:

Time is said to be one, but we use the starting time, ending time etc.? How is it possible? The present *sūtra* answers this question. We see starting, staying, finishing of the things, having actions and by imposing difference on time, which is one, we say starting time, staying time etc.

nityeṣvabhāvād anityeṣu bhāvāt (2.2.10)

(The action itself cannot be time) as (the marks of time) do not exist in eternal things and exist in non-eternal ones.

Notes:

Candrānanda explains: If eternal time would be different from action the marks of time would be seen in eternal things like *ākāśa* also. But those are seen in non-eternal things only. So the limit of what is continuing (action) is time. Hence action appears to be the time.

But the *sūtra* rejects the above contention. The marks of time are seen in the non-eternal things after (*uttarakāla*) those come into being. Hence, it cannot be said that 'as the time is action the marks of time are seen in the non-eternal things'.

kāraṇe kālākhyā (2.2.11)

The term '*kāla*' (time) is applicable to a cause.

Notes:

The marks of time (mentioned in *VS* 2.2.6) cannot be without any cause. One may argue that the marks would be due to action, but simultaneity cannot be explained with the help of action. Therefore, the cause of those marks is terms as *kāla* (time).

Śaṅkaramiśra reads *VS* 2.2.10 and 11 together.

4. Direction

ita idam iti yatas tad diśo liṅgam (2.2.12)

(We have the knowledge in the way:) This is (to the east, or west etc.) of this. That

due to which the knowledge like the above occurs is the mark of direction.

Notes:

Śaṅkaramiśra explains: That substance is direction from which, with reference to two bodies in a determinate position (*niyatadigdeśayoḥ*) and existing simultaneously, there springs the knowledge that one in which there is the conjunction with more conjunct object, is more remote than one in which there is conjunction with less conjunct object, and that body, in which there are less conjunctions of conjunct objects is less remote than that body in which there are more conjunctions of conjunct objects. For unless such a substance exists there is nothing to account for the two bodies having more or less conjunctions with conjunct objects. Unless this be accounted for, there can exist no such thing as the conception of each body so characterised; and without such a motion a highest and not highest (genetic and specific) form of generality is impossible; but if that were impossible there would not be, as there actually are, cognitions speculative and practical characterised by such generality.

Candrānanda enumerates the qualities of direction. Those are number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction.

dravyatva-nityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte (2.2.13)

The substanceness and eternity (or direction) are explained on (the analogy of) air.

Notes:

Direction is a substance like air. But it is like atomic air. Eternity could not be admitted, if it was like gross air. That is why Candrānanda says: As the direction is inherent in one substance (*ekadravyavat*) so it is substance and also eternal. *Ekadravyavat* substances are always eternal, like atoms of four substances, time etc. cf. *VS* 2.1.11, 12, & 13.

tattvaṃ bhāvena (2.2.14)

The unity of direction is explained on (the analogy of) existence.

Notes:

The existence has a uniform mark (*sat, sat*) in different cases and there is no other special mark to prove the diversity of existence, and hence it is one. (*VS* 1.2.18). Similarly, the mark of direction also is same in different cases and there is no special mark to prove this diversity. Hence direction is one.

kāryaviśeṣeṇa nānātvam (2.2.15)

(Though direction is one) its (imposed) diversity is according to different actions.

Notes:

Candrānanda explains : The sacrifice for god is to be performed after facing towards east, the sacrifice for Pitṛs to be performed after facing towards south, and so on. By the actions like the above, diversity of direction (east, south etc.) is imposed.

ādityasaṃyogād bhūtapūrvād bhaviṣyato bhūtācca prācī (2.2.16)

(Direction is regarded as) east because of past, future or present conjunction of the sun.

Notes:

The doubt arises: whether the east is previously fixed and then the *deva*-sacrifice is directed towards it, or the *deva*-sacrifice is prescribed towards the east and hence the east is thus named? To reject this dependence on each other the firm reason is given in the present *sūtra*.

In the day-time with which imagined direction the sun was early conjoined, is being conjoined and will be conjoined, that particular direction is east. *prāñcati* means moves. *prācī* (east) is derived from this verb. That is, from which direction the sun starts moving is east.

tathā dakṣiṇā pratīcy udīcī ca (2.2.17)

So likwise (the direction is regarded as) south, west and north.

Notes:

Similarly, pointing to the sun one can imagine the other three directions.

etena digantarāṇi vyākhyātāni (2.2.18)

By this, the other directions (intermediate ones) are explained.

Notes:

Śaṅkaramiśra reads *digantarālāni* for *digantarāṇi*.

5. Nature of 'doubt' in the introduction to sound.

sāmānyapratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣasmṛteś ca saṃśayaḥ (2.2.19)

Doubt (arises) due to perception of common characteristics, non-perception of unique characteristics and remembrance of the unique characteristics of each.

Notes:

Candrānanda points out the relevance of the present *sūtra* at this place.

Having perceived the common characteristic of both pillar and person (in an object), *viz.* a certain height, a person becomes desirous of ascertaining the distinguishing characteristic of each as previously perceived; but he fails to affirm definitely either of the alternatives.

Then he has the knowledge like 'what is it, is it a pillar or a person?' It is to be noted, that the vacillating knowledge is due to the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristic of each. It is right, that there is no perception of unique characteristic of each, but if there is no remembrance of unique characteristic, vacillating knowledge, which is the nature of doubt can never appear.

dṛṣṭam adṛṣṭam (2.2.20)

That (whether) it is already seen or not seen (at all) (is a case of doubt).

Notes:

Candrānanda: Doubt is of two kinds, external and internal. External is further subdivided into two kinds—perceived and non-perceived. *VS* 2.2.20 explains the non-perceived variety of doubt.

The arrival of a person is only announced. On hearing it, the doubt arises as to whether the person who will be perceived, is a known person or an unknown person!

dṛṣṭaṃ ca dṛṣṭavat (2.2.21)

That (whether) it is already seen or is it like that, what is seen before (is a case of doubt). Is it something which has been already seen, or is it just similar to what has been seen before.

Notes:

Candrānanda: *VS* 2.2.21 explains the 'perceived' variety of doubt. Now, the person arrives. On seeing him, if any one has the vacillating knowledge of the form: " Is the person already seen by me or is he not seen by me", it is a case of doubt.

Śaṅkara's explanation is a little different. He explains: Of the two varieties of doubt (external and internal) the external variety, having an external object, relates to something of which the properties are perceived, or to something of which the properties are unperceived. That which relates to something of which the properties are perceived, is such, as when on seeing a determinate object having height as an attribute, the doubt arises, whether the object is a post or a man. That which relates to an object, the properties of which are not perceived, is such, as when on seeing merely the horns belonging to a cow, *gayal*, or other animal in a forest, where it is concealed by bushes, etc., the doubt arises as to whether it is a cow or a *gayal*. In fact, in the latter case the doubt, related to the quality of the horns, whether the horns belong to a cow or to a *gayal*, and consequently the statement of this distinction is due merely to a refinement of language. The common property which is the cause of doubt, gives rise to doubt either when observed in several objects or in one.

In the first instance, the height is perceived in a present object but in the second instance, the horns are perceived in a concealed object.

dṛṣṭaṃ yathādṛṣṭam ayathādṛṣṭam ubhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt (2.2.22)

Whether the object is like what I have seen it to be, or whether it is unlike the above, which has also been seen, it is a case of doubt, as I have seen that object in both the ways.

Notes:

Candrānanda: Devadatta is seen with hair on his head at first. Then he is shaven. Again, later he bacame hairy. In the evening, when Devadatta is sombre, doubt arises whether he is haired or shaven. In the previous *sūtra* (*VS* 2.2.21) doubt arises due to remembrance of *more than one object*, whereas in the present *sūtra* doubt arises due to remembrance of the particular feature of *one object*.

vidyāvidyātaś ca saṃśayaḥ. (2.2.23)

Doubt also (arises) from valid knowledge and want of valid knowledge.

Notes:

Internal doubt is explained by this *sūtra*. Now the matter may be made clear. An astrologer predicted a fortunate thing and it became true. He predicted a second thing but it became false. There, for his next prediction doubt arises "whether it is true like the first prediction or false like the second prediction."

6. *Sound as a mark of* ākāśa.

śrotragrahaṇo yo 'rthaḥ sa śabdaḥ (2.2.24)

The object which is apprehended by the auditory sense-organ is sound.

tasmin dravyaṃ karma guṇa iti saṃśayaḥ (2.2.25)

Doubt arises whether it (i.e. the sound) is a substance, an action or a quality.

tulya-jātīyeṣv arthāntara-bhūteṣu ca viśeṣasyobhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt (2.2.26)

Since, the unique characteristic is perceived both in things similar and in things dissimilar (a doubt arises regarding sound).

Notes:

Earthness is the unique characteristic of the earth, making it different from the water etc. which are similar and also from the quality and action which are dissimilar. So, the doubt arises whether audibility in the sound being unique characteristic, is of the things similar to the qualities, or of the heterogeneous things.

ekadravyattvān na dravyam (2.2.27)

Since it inheres in one substance only, it (sound) cannot be a substance.

Notes:

Since the sound inheres in one substance i.e. *ākāsa*, it is not a substance. A substance can be of two types only. One is *adravya*, which means 'that does not inhere in a substance at all' (i.e. that has no inherent constituent parts, e.g. atoms.) The other is *anekadravya*, which means 'that has a number of inherent constituent parts', e.g. pot etc.

acākṣuṣatvān na karma (2.2.28)

Since it is not visible, it (sound) is not an action.

Notes:

It is seen that substance or action, which is apprehended by other (external) sense-organ is also visible. But sound though apprehended by auditory sense-organ (external) is not visible. So sound is not an action. Hence, it is a quality.

guṇasya sato'pavargaḥ karmabhiḥ sādharmyam (2.2.29)

The transiency of (sound) which (though) is a quality, is a feature common also to action.

Notes:

As an action is seen to be destroyed (or ceased), so also sound when not apprehended afterwards is inferred to be destroyed.

sato liṅgābhāvāt (2.2.30)

Since there is no mark of (sound as) existing (after appearance by utterance), (it cannot be said that *sound is existing but due to some sort of reason it is not apprehended.*)

Notes:

The object which is eternal and not apprehended due to some reasons, its mark can be the receiver of its existence. But after the utterance of sound there is no mark like conjunct etc. existing. Hence sound has no permanent existence.

nityavaidharmyāt (2.2.31)

Since (sound) differs from the eternal (it has no permanent existence).

Notes:

Disappearance (after utterance) of the sound is the differentiating feature if compared to the eternal things. Hence sound is not eternal.

kāryatvāt (2.2.32)

Since (sound) is produced (it cannot be eternal).

Notes:

Sound is an effect (*kārya*) as it is produced by the conjunction etc. So it is not eternal.

kāraṇato vikārāt (2.2.33)

Since (sound) varies due to some cause (it is not eternal).

Notes:

It is our common experience that a large drum produces much intense sound and a small drum produces less intense sound. So the intensity of sound varies according to the size or quality of the sound instrument. Anyway, in short, sound has causes. Hence, that the sound is manifested and the sound instrument is the manifester, cannot be proved valid.

doṣāt (2.2.34)

Since there is defect (in the admittance of manifestation of sound, sound is not eternal).

Notes:

Candrānanda: If sound is manifested as eternal then in the sacrifice *a word* applied by someone could not be further applied by another person. Just as, once used, *darbha* (a type of grass), cannot be used further. So would be the case of sound. But actually the same word is used by many a person in the sacrifice. Hence eternity of sound cannot be admitted.

Śaṅkaramiśra: All the objects which are present in a substratum at a time, are manifested by a single manifester, just as a lamp manifests the colour, weight, number, conjunction, etc. ~~of a~~ pot. Let it be assumed sound is eternal. Then, when the sound *ka* is pronounced, at that time the sound *kha* etc. are also present in the space. So the action of *pronouncing* should manifest also kha etc. with *ka*. But it is not the case. Therefore, as the manifestation of sound would bring about the defect, sound cannot be admitted to be eternal.

saṃyogād vibhāgāc chabdāc ca śabdaniṣpatteḥ (2.2.35)

Since, sound is produced by conjunction, disjunction and also by sound, (it is a product).

Notes:

Sound can be produced by conjunction, for example, when a drum and drum-stick is conjoined together. Sound can be produced by disjunction, for example, when a bamboo is split. Sound can be produced also by sound, for example, when one sound produces a series of sounds. It is our common experience that when a person utters a word other persons at a distance hear it. The sound being heard by those persons cannot be identical with the sound uttered first. Only the last sound in that series in one direction goes to the earhole and it is heard by another.

Anyway, sound is produced, so it is an effect (*kārya*).

liṅgāc cānityaḥ (2.2.36)

(Sound) is not eternal, because of its mark (to be non-eternal).

Notes:

Candrānanda notes the mark (*liṅga*) to be the Vedic mark. There is the Vedic statement which proves the transience of sound. The statement, *tebhyas trayo vedā ajāyanta* (source is untraced). (Three Vedas appeared from them) proves that the sounds were produced. So, the sounds must be non-eternal.

Śaṅkaramiśra relates the *liṅga* to the previous *sūtra* (2.2.35) and explains the marks to be articulate sounds (which were produced by conjunction etc.). And naturally those (i.e. being produced by conjunction etc.) are the marks of non-eternity.

dvayos tu pravṛttyor abhāvāt (2.2.37)

(But, sound is eternal. Otherwise, if it would be quickly destructible) the activities of two would not exist.

Notes:

Śaṅkaramiśra: *dvayoḥ* means 'of two' i.e. of preceptor and pupil. We see that the *śāstra* (being a collection of sounds) is explained between the preceptor and the pupil. If the sound is quickly destructible the activities between them would be ceased. Hence, sound cannot be admitted as non-eternal.

Candrānanda's explanation totally differs from Śaṅkara's. According to Candrānanda: *dvayoḥ* is an adjective of *pravṛttyoḥ*. The *bhāva* or produced objects have two types of activities, (i) they help to produce some other objects; and (ii) they themselves become inhered in production of a new object. But sound has only one activity, i.e. its utterance (being activity) is for bringing about the knowledge of the object. So sound should be treated as eternal.

saṃkhyābhāvāt (2.2.38)

Since there would be no question of number (the sound is to be regarded as eternal.)

Notes:

If the sound would be destroyed soon after its pronunciation, there could not be the repetition of some word of *mantra* according to the scriptural direction like *"dvir ayam*

āmnātaḥ". (It is recited twice).

This *sūtra* is mentioned nowhere except in *Candrānandavṛtti* and *Mithilā vṛtti.*

prathamāśabdāt (2.2.39)

Since there is (the mention of) the word *prathamā* (first), (the sound is to be regarded as eternal).

Notes:

Candrānanda: There is a (Vedic) statement *"triḥ prathamām anvāha"* (source is untraced) i.e. He thrice recited the first. If the sound would be destructible after utterance, counting would not be possible for the recitation of the first *ṛk*. That is why, sound is to be admitted as eternal.

sampratipattibhāvāc ca (2.2.40)

As there is the recognition of the word (sound cannot be regarded as non-eternal).

Notes:

Candrānanda: When a person pronounces the word *gauḥ* (cow) we recognise that it is that very word *gauḥ*. If the sound would be non-eternal, such kind of recognition would not be possible. But such kind recognition is a matter of our common experience. Hence sound is to be regarded as eternal.

sandigdhāḥ sati bahutve (2.2.41)

As there is multiplicity (of objects which prove the reverse, the above reasons in *VS* 2.2.37-40) are doubtful.

Notes:

Candrānanda: The opponent has tried to prove the eternity of sound and for that put forward a number of reasons. Kaṇāda rejects the above arguments as those reasons are not valid but doubtful. There are a number of instances where the reasons are to be found but the objects are not eternal. So the reasons could not invariably prove the eternity of them. Lamp does not have two activities, yet it is non-eternal. Fire flame is different at each moment and hence it is non-eternal.

So the non-eternity of sound is established.

saṃkhyābhāvaḥ sāmānyataḥ (2.2.42)

The existence of number (in sound) is due to similarity.

Notes:

Candrānanda says that the word *prathamā* (first), or the recognition results from similarity. The previous words are in fact different.

Śaṅkaramiśra becomes specific to mention *sāmānya* as generality. He explains: In every different *ka* sound there is the generality of *ka* and this generality prompts a person to recognise the different *kas* as one single sound and nothing different.

CHAPTER III: *ĀHNIKA I*

(The *āhnika* deals with soul. To infer it, the probans and pseudo-probans are also contextually narrated.)

1. Soul

prasiddhā indriyārthāḥ (3.1.1)

The objects of the sense-organs are universally known.

Notes:

Candrānanda: After narrating the dissimilarities of the substances ending with direction, Kaṇāda now goes to discuss soul. In this connection, sense-organs and their objects are mentioned. As sound etc. are universally known as qualities so also the sense-organs correspondingly related are universally known.

Śaṅkaramiśra here takes the opportunity of explaining the things in a little detailed manner: The outer sense-organs are olfactory organ, visual organ, gustatory organ, tactual organ and auditory organ. Their objects are also respectively five—smell, colour, taste, touch and sound. The sense-organs also accept the generality and the negation of their respective objects. But the word *artha* everywhere is intended as an actual subject of attributes, and therefore there is in the above *sūtra* too-wideness of predication which would apply also to the idea of smell and to the negation of smell.

indriyārtha-prasiddhir indriyārthebhyo'rthāntaratve hetuḥ (3.1.2)

The universal familiarity of the sense-organs and their objects is an argument for (the existence of) another object totally different from those sense-organs and their objects.

Notes:

Candrānanda: The sense-organs work as instruments in the knowledge and the objects are apprehendable. Then the question arises 'who is the receiver?' So there must be someone different from those who apprehend. And it is soul.

so'napadeśaḥ (3.1.3)

(Objection:) The above argument is a false mark.

Notes:

In the previous *sūtra* (3.1.2) it has been said that the sense-organs being the instruments and the objects being apprehendable are universally known, and hence there must be another different thing to be the apprehender. The present *sūtra* gives an objection. The argument for a different receiver (soul) is not valid. The sense-organs would fairly be taken as receiver.

kāraṇājñānāt (3.1.4)

Since the causes do not have consciousness, (the sense-organs cannot be conscious)

Notes:

The *bhūtas* which are the causes of the sense-organs are not conscious. So the sense

organs being produced from the *bhūtas* cannot be conscious. So they cannot be regarded as receiver.

kāryājñānāt (3.1.5)

Since the effects (i.e. other effects of *bhūtas* like pot etc.) do not have consciousness (they also cannot be conscious).

Notes:

Apart from the sense-organs there are other effects produced from *bhūtas*. They are pot etc. But the pot etc. are devoid of consciousness. So the other *bhūtas* (parts of the body) other than sense-organs also cannot be admitted as receiver.

Śaṅkaramiśra reads this *sūtra* as *kāryeṣu jñānāt*. It means, the *bhūtas* which are causes of the sense-organs etc. are unconscious. If they would be conscious there would be consciousness (*jñānāt*) in the effects (*kāryeṣu*). The next *sūtra*, *ajñānāt* (3.1.6) naturally means that because it is not known (that any minute degree of consciousness exists in products of *bhūtas*).

ajñānāc ca (3.1.6)

And as the *bhūtas* and their products are devoid of consciousness (so the sense-organs must be regarded as unconscious).

Notes:

According to Candrānanda, this *sūtra* is to sum up the whole matter as the sense-organs are not conscious. But Śaṅkaramiśra explains the *sūtra* rather differently. We have noted it in the exposition on *VS* 3.1.5.

2. Probans

anya eva hetur ity anapadeśaḥ (3.1.7)

A false mark is that which is different from being a (valid) mark.

Note:

Candrānanda: That which is not according to the characteristics of a mark, is not a mark. The sense-organs are universally known as instrumental of the knowledge of the objects, and the objects are also universally known to be apprehended by the sense-organs. But those (sense-organs and the object) have no connection with the soul and for that, the soul would not be inferred.

saṃyogi samavāyy ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ca (3.1.8)

The conjunct, the inherent, the co-inherent in one thing and the contradictory (are the marks of inference).

Notes:

It cannot be said that the sense-organs have no connection with the soul. But there are various types of connection between mark and probandum. The *sutras* from 3.1.8 to 3.1.14 explain those.

Smoke is conjunct with fire. Horn is inherent with cow. The case of 'co-inherent in one thing' is in two ways. Those will be explained in consecutive two *sūtras*, *VS* 3.1.9 and

3.1.10. The case of contradictory is in four ways. Those will be explained in consecutive four *sūtras*, *VS* 3.1.11-14.

The *VSs* 3.1.8-14 (as in our text), constitute one *sūtra* (3.1.8) in the printed text of *Candrānandavṛtti*. But *NB*, *PS*, *PSV*, *Mithilāvṛtti*, *Upaskāra* more strongly suggest arrangement of the *sūtras*.

kāryaṃ kāryāntarasya (3.1.9)

One effect (is the mark of) another effect.

Notes:

This is the first type of *ekārtha-samavāyi*, 'co-inherent in one thing'. The illustration of this is given by Candrānanda in this way: Colour is the mark of touch. Colour and touch are co-inherent in one thing, and they are two different effects.

kāraṇaṃ kāraṇāntarasya (3.1.10)

One cause (is the mark of) another cause.

Notes:

This is the second variety of *ekārtha-samavāyi*, 'co-inherent in one thing'. According to Candrānanda the example is: (The knowledge that) rain, which has not fallen, is a mark of there having been conjunction of air and clouds. An additional example has been given by Śaṅkaramiśra. The recitation of a sacred text is preventive of a tumour etc., and accordingly there not having existed a tumour etc., is a mark of there having been a recitation of a sacred text.

Śrīdhara (*PPB*-Jha, p. 288) does not recommend the example of the conjunction of air and clouds from the absence of rain in this case. The right example according to him is to infer the existence of a man from the knowledge of destroyed sound. Specific type of sound is a mark of human being. Suppose, sound is heard and it is obviously very soon destroyed, or becomes non-existent. But, though the mark (sound for the existence of a man) is absent, its knowledge will help to infer the existence of a man who is not visible.

It is to be noted that though Śrīdhara gave a different example, the example of air and cloud is traditional and ancient (Vide *Viśālāmalavatī*, p. 189).

bhūtam abhūtasya (3.1.12)

That (contradictory) which has been existent (is a mark) of that which has not been existent.

Notes:

This is the second variety of the contradictory mark of inference. According to Candrānanda the example is : Rain which has fallen is a mark of there having been no conjunction of air and clouds. Apart from this example, Śaṅkaramiśra cites an additional example also just opposite to the one given by him in *VS* 3.1.11.

abhūtam abhūtasya (3.1.13)

That (contradictory) which has not been existent (is a mark) that which has not been existent.

Notes:

This is the third variety of the contradictory mark of inference. Candrānanda cites the example. 'There being no redness' is a mark of 'there having been no conjunction with fire'. This *sūtra* has been omitted by Śaṅkaramiśra.

The printed text reads *abhūtā śyāmatā abhūtasya agnisaṃyogasya liṅgam* but it should be *abhūtā aśyāmatā* etc. Because in the absence of *agnisaṃyoga* there *śyāmatā* exists and *aśyāmatā* vanishes.

bhūtaṃ bhūtasya (3.1.14)

That (contradictory) has been existent (is a mark) of that which has been existent.

Notes:

This is the fourth and last variety of the contradictory mark of inference. Candrānanda simply says here, that the effect which has been, is a mark of the conjunction of a cause. Now, he refers to the soul. The universally-known sense-organs are instrument and the objects are to be known. Those being inherent are the marks of soul. If it is argued that those are not inherent in soul, then there would be the argument: The sense-organs are applied by the agent, as they are instruments, like axe etc.

prasiddhi-pūrvakatvād apadeśasya (3.1.15)

(These forms of inference are valid) because the mark is preceded by the universal acquaintance of (conjunct etc.).

Notes:

Those conjuncts etc. are marks of that different thing, as there is relation. An unrelated thing does not become a mark.

Śaṅkaramiśra reads the *sūtra, prasiddhi* etc. and according to him the word *prasiddhi* means the recollection of invariable concomitance. Śaṅkara gives a long elucidation of this *sūtra*. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* and also *Viśālāmalavatī* appear to have followed *prasiddhi* (*PSV*, p. 187, *Viśālāmalavatī*, p. 194). Candrānanda, however, appears to have accepted *prasiddha*.

3. Pseudo-probans

aprasiddho'napadeśaḥ (3.1.16)

The unproved is (a type of) false mark.

Notes:

Candrānanda shows the meaning of the term *aprasiddha* as to be *viruddha* (contradictory). That which has no connection with the characteristics of the probandum, on the contrary has dissolving connection, is a false mark called *aprasiddha*.

According to Śaṅkaramiśra's explanation, where the invariable concomitance between the probans and probandum is unproved, there the so-called probans is *aprasiddha*.

asan sandigdhaś cānapadeśaḥ (3.1.17)

The non-existent and the dubious are (also the false marks).

Notes:

That which is not existent in the subject (*pakṣa*), is called non-existent. *Asan* is equal to *asiddha* (unproved).

The dubious is inconclusive. It means a dubious mark is that which sometimes is connected with the probandum and sometimes not.

Candrānanda, Śaṅkaramiśra read one more word *anapadeśaḥ* after *ca*, but it is omitted in a number of texts like *PDS* (pp. 490, 594), *Vyomavatī* (II, p. 154.) *Nyāyakandalī* (p. 594). However, the texts omitting *anapadeśaḥ* appear to have admitted one longer *sūtra* for 3.1.16 and 17. In the printed text of Śaṅkaramiśra's *Upaskāra* that longer *sūtra* again adds *anapadeśaḥ* and it suggests that Śaṅkara got the *sūtra*-text where obviously two *sūtras* were intended but Śaṅkara may have mistaken in accepting them into one *sūtra* (3.1.15). *Viśālāmalavatī* (p. 193) supports Candrānanda's reading.

yasmād viṣāṇī tasmād aśvaḥ (3.1.18)

Since this has horns, therefore this is a horse.

Notes:

This is an example of *aprasiddha* type of false mark. Where the probandum is 'This object is a horse', there the mark 'Having horns' is contradictory. 'Having horns' is not connected with horse.

The *sutra*-reading is recommended by Praśastapāda (*PPB*-Jha, p. 580). Candrānanda omits *yasmāt* from both of the *VS*s 3.1.18 and 19 and constitute one *sūtra* for them.

yasmād viṣāṇī tasmād gaur iti ca (3.1.19)

And, since this has horns, therefore this is a cow.

Notes:

This is an example of *sandigdha* or *anaikāntika* type of false mark. The probandum is 'This object is a cow'. Here 'Having horns' is dubious or inconclusive as it is connected with the probandum 'cow' and also with what is *not probandum* 'non-cow'.

Candrānanda says that the particle *ca* is to collect the example (of *asat* variety of false mark) which has not been given in the *sūtra*. The example of *asat* mark: "Because it has horns, therefore it is a hare". Here 'having horns' is non-existent in the subject. Hence it is *asat*.

It is to be noted that 'having horns' in the case of horse, is an example of *aprasiddha* fallacious mark, and 'having horns' in the case of hare is an example of *asat* fallacious mark. But the examples appear to be of same type. May be that in the case of horse, 'having horns' causes to remember the non-horse having horns, and in the case of hare, 'having horns' causes to remember its non-existence in the subject only.

The *sūtra*-reading is recommended by Praśastapāda (*PPB*-Jha, p. 581).

4. Inference of one's own soul and other's

ātmendriya-mano'rtha-sannikarṣād yanniṣpadyate tadanyat (3.1.20)

That which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense-organ (outer), the

mind and the object, is different (from the above false mark). (i.e. There arises the valid mark and it is the valid mark to infer the soul).'

Notes:

The knowledge 'It has horns' may be fallacious to infer a horse or a hare but this knowledge being a result of contact between four items is a valid mark to infer that there is soul. The knowledge waits for an inherent cause, because it is an effect, like a pot.

The *sūtra* is frequently referred to as a Vaiśeṣika definition of perception.

pravṛtti-nivṛttī ca pratyagātmani dṛṣṭe paratra liṅgam (3.1.21)

Activity and inactivity, observed in one's own soul are the mark of the existence of other souls.

Notes:

Candrānanda says that the meaning of *pratyagātman* is the body. So the activity and inactivity of one's body are the marks of the other thing (i.e. soul).

The body is occupied by one who has effort, as activity and inactivity regarding good or bad is seen in it, like a pot. According to Candrānanda, this *sūtra* is also to prove simply the existence of soul and not the other soul. But according to Śaṅkara this *sūtra* is to prove the existence of other soul. Śaṅkara's explanation appears to be a little different from Candrānanda's. And Śaṅkara's has been followed in the translation.

According to Candrānanda *pratyagātman* means the body, and *paratra* means the self. According to Śaṅkara, *pratyagātman* means one's own self, and *paratra* stands for other souls.

CHAPTER III: *ĀHNIKA* II

(This *āhnika* deals with mind and soul)

1. Mind

ātmendriyārtha-sannikarṣe jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam (3.2.1)

Existence and non-existence on knowledge on contact between the soul, (outer) sense-organ and object are mark (of the existence) of an internal organ.

Notes:

In *VS* 3.1.20 the knowledge is said to be produced by the contact between soul, sense-organ (outer), internal organ and object. The present *sūtra* (3.2.1) is to probe the existence of that internal organ. When the contact between soul, outer sense-organ and object is present, even then the knowledge does not appear. And the internal sense-organ is that one, in whose absence, this happens. Therefore, existence and non-existence of the knowledge, are the mark of the existence of an internal organ.

The qualities of the internal organ are number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity and impulse.

Candrānanda mentions *saṃskāra*. But only vega (impulse), a variety of *saṃskāra*, is there in the internal organ. cf *parāparatve saṃkhyādyāḥ pañca vagaś ca mānase. Bhāṣāpariccheda*, verse no. 34.

dravyatva-nityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte (3.2.2)

Its substanceness and eternity are explained on (the analogy of) air.

Notes:

The atomic air has no substances as its constituent part, and that is why it is eternal. The substanceness follows in all situations of a substance due to having quality and action. cf. *VS* 2.1.11-12. The internal organ is also admitted as atomic and hence eternal. Substanceness in this case follows simply because of its having quality and action.

prayatnāyaugapadyāj jñānāyaugapadyāc caikaṃ manaḥ (3.2.3)

Because of non-simultaneity of efforts and of knowledge, the internal organ is one (in one organism).

Notes:

In a number of duties, efforts do not appear simultaneously. In a number of knowables, knowledges do not appear simultaneously. So the internal organ is to be admitted as one, as there is non-simultaneity of efforts and of knowledges. If there were many internal organs, we would perceive many things or do many duties at a time. The internal organ has separate existence in each organism. It is limited (*mūrta*), untouchable, partless, eternal, atomic and has highest speed.

2. *More discussions on soul*

prāṇāpāna-nimeṣonmeṣa-jīvana-mano-gatīndriyāntara-vikārāḥ sukha-duḥkhe icchā-dveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni (3.2.4)

The ascending life-breath, the descending life-breath, the closing of the eye-lids, the opening of the eye-lids, life, the motion of the internal organ, and the changes of the other sense-organs, and also pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and efforts are marks (of the existence) of soul.

dravyatva-nityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte (3.2.5)

The substanceness and eternity (of soul) are explained on (the analogy of) air.

Notes:

As an atomic air is eternal because of having no constituent part, similar is the case of soul. It has no constituent part. Again, because of having quality, air is a substance. Similar is the case of soul.

It is to be noted that soul has fourteen qualities:

buddhyādi ṣaṭkaṃ saṃkhyādipañcakaṃ bhāvanā tathā//
dharmādharmau guṇā eta ātmanaḥ syuś caturdaśa/Bhāṣāpariccheda, 32-33.

yajñadatta iti sati sannikarṣe pratyakṣābhāvād dṛṣṭaṃ liṅgaṃ na vidyate (3.2.6)

After the contact (of senses with Yajñadatta) (the perceptual knowledge appears) 'This is Yajñadatta'. But there being no perception, there exists no visible mark.

Notes:

When the eyes come in contact with the visible Yajñadatta there the knowledge appears 'This is Yajñadatta'. But no knowledge of soul appears as being connected with

prāṇa or pleasure. So how can *prāṇa* etc., the connection of which with soul are not seen, be the mark of soul? That is why, the *sūtra* says that *prāṇa* etc. cannot be the visible mark (of soul).

sāmānyato dṛṣṭāc cāviśeṣaḥ (3.2.7)

Moreover, with the help of general observation (also) there results no distinction.

Notes:

If there is no visible mark, then one may take help of general observation to prove the existence of soul. It is the general observation that *prāṇa* etc. having no causes, and the pleasure etc. without any substratum would not exist. But they exist, hence they must have a substratum or a cause.

The above type of general observation certainly proves the existence of a substratum or a cause, but it has no power to set aside the unfair chance of space etc., to be so.

tasmād āgamikam (3.2.8)

Therefore, (that soul exists) is merely a popular belief.

Notes:

Candrānanda: *āgamika* means *pravādamātra* or is a popular belief. In *VS* 2.1.17 also the existence of air was apparently contented to be *āgamika*. There also the meaning of the word was given *pravādamātra*.

In an anonymous *Vṛtti* (*Mithilā Vṛtti*) *āgamika* is meant for scriptural evidence.

aham iti śabda-vyatirekān nāgamikam (3.2.9)

An (earth etc.) are set aside by the word 'I', (and only soul remains to be meant for, therefore, that the soul exists) is not a matter of popular belief.

Notes:

Candrānanda: The word 'I' is distinct from the words 'earth' etc. and has the simultaneous use with *prāṇa*. e.g. 'I am endowed with *prāṇa*' etc., 'I am endowed with pleasure' etc. Hence, the existence of soul has the mark *prāṇa* etc. And it cannot be a mere popular belief.

Śaṅkaramiśra also explains in the same line. The word 'I' is not used in different cases like pot, cloth etc. So, the particular denotable substance meant for 'I' is soul.

yadi ca dṛṣṭapratyakaṣo'haṃ devadatto'haṃ yajñadatta iti (3.2.10)

(Objection:) If there are the clear perceptions like 'I am Devadatta', 'I am Yajñadatta', (then *prāṇa*, pleasure cannot be the mark of soul).

Notes:

We say 'I am Devadatta', 'I am Yajñadatta' etc. and we in ourselves perceive such things. So the word 'I' clearly means 'own' or 'body', as there is the simultaneous use of I and Devadatta, being a word meant for the body. So there cannot be anything like inference of soul by *prāṇa* etc.

devadatto gacchati viṣṇumitro gacchatīti copacāráccharīra-pratyakṣaḥ (3.2.11)

The perception of body is clear due to imposition, in the expressions 'Devadatta goes' and 'Viṣṇumitra goes'.

Notes:

It may be objected that the word 'Devadatta' refers to the soul and does not refer to the body. In answer to this the present *sūtra* is being put forward. As the word 'goes' is being simultaneously used with the word 'Devadatta', the latter must be denotative of body, because soul is motionless. Therefore the word 'I' (in the previous *sūtra*) also is denotative of body because of its simultaneous use with the word 'Devadatta'.

sandigdhas tūpacāraḥ (3.2.12)

The imposition, however, is doubted.

Notes:

The contention of *VS* 3.2.11 is not established. That the word 'I' is denotative of body because of simultaneous application with the word 'Devadatta', is doubtful. Body is auxiliary (*upakāraka*) to soul. In this situation whether the word 'I' being actually denotative of soul, is secondarily applied to body, or the word is actually denotative of body is not decided. In this case of doubt, the meaning of the word 'I' is not determined as to whether it denotes body or soul.

aham iti pratyagātmani bhāvāt paratrābhāvād arthāntara-pratyakṣaḥ (3.2.13)

The cognition of the 'ego', is a perception of a distinctive entity, since it (the word 'I') applies to the self-reflective soul, and not to any one else.

Notes:

Candrānanda: *pratyagātman* simply means *ātman*, *paratra* means śarīra. If the word 'I' would be denotative of body then that very word would be used by everybody in the body of Devadatta like the word Devadatta. But this is not the fact. Hence the word 'I' prompts the perception of a distinctive entity—soul.

In the exposition of *VS* 3.1.21 Candrānanda shows the different meanings of *pratyagātman* and *paratra* according to the context.

na tu śarīra-viśeṣād yajñadatta-viṣṇumitrayor jñānaviśeṣaḥ (3.2.14)

But (we do) not (apprehend) the particular knowledge of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra in consequence of their different bodies.

Notes:

If it is contended that as the word 'I' is not applied to body by others so it would not be applied to the soul also, then in answer to this, the present *sūtra* has been formulated. As the bodies of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra are different from us, so we do not apprehend the pleasure in them as we do not apprehend their ego, as for which we cannot apply the word 'I'. If 'I' would be denotative of body, we would easily apply 'I' like the word Devadatta on seeing him. But it is not the case. Hence 'I' cannot be applied to body. And as 'I' is related to soul, others cannot use the word to indicate other soul. Now, due to

simultaneous use with the word 'I' (*ahaṃ sukhī*) etc. pleasure etc. are related to soul and *prāṇa* etc., are the causes of that soul.

Śaṅkaramiśra appears to read the sūtra as *na tu śarīra-viśeṣād yajñadatta-viṣṇumitrayor jñānam viṣayaḥ*. It means that in consequence of the difference of their bodies, the knowledge of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra does not become an object (of our knowledge). Śaṅkara explains the *sūtra* by showing the comparison between Yajñadata and Viṣṇumitra. But Candrānanda places them on one side in comparison with us.

3. Numerous souls

sukha-duḥkha-jñāna-niṣpattyaviśeṣād aikātmyam (3.2.15)

(Objection:) Soul is one, since there is no difference in the production of pleasure, pain and knowledge.

Notes:

The opponent may argue that soul is one, as pleasure, pain and knowledge are seen to be produced in the same way, in the cases of different persons. There is no different mark to prove different souls. So soul is one. Śaṅkaramiśra in explaining this *sūtra*, cites the instance of *ākāśa*, Though sound is produced in different segments of *ākāśa*, the mark, sound being non-particular proves, the unity of *ākāśa*. Similar is the case of soul.

nānā vyavasthātaḥ (3.2.16)

Because of its circumstances soul is manifold.

Notes:

The fact that, when there is the presence of pleasure etc. in a soul, then there is the absence of those in others, causes to admit the plurality of souls.

Śaṅkaramiśra adds a little more, to the argument. He says that it cannot be maintained, that as there are many circumstances of one soul, due to various states of being, viz., childhood, youth, and old age, so there are many circumstances of one soul in the diverse bodies of *Caitra, Maitra etc.* It is by difference of time only, that the existence in one subject, of contradictory attributes is possible.

śāstra-sāmarthyāc ca (3.2.17)

(That the soul is manifold follows) also from the authority of the Śāstra.

Notes:

To prove the plurality of soul Candrānanda cites the Vedic lines *grāmakāmo yajeta* (one who wishes village as his property should perform sacrifice.), *svargakāmo yajeta* (one who wishes heaven should perform sacrifice.). Those lines clearly indicate diverse souls.

The special qualities of soul are knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit and demerit and tendency. The other qualities are number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction.

CHAPTER IV: *ĀHNIKA* I

(The *āhnika* deals with atoms and conditions of perception of substances and qualities.)

1. Examination of atoms

sad akāraṇavan nityam (4.1.1.)

That which is existent and uncaused is eternal.

Notes:

The qualities, definitions of the nine substances, earth, water etc. have been discussed. Now the very particular doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas i.e. the doctrine of atomic origination of the world, is being started. There are four types of atoms of the four substances, earth, water, fire and air. Atoms are existent but minutest. They have no inherent constituent part. Kaṇāda in 2.1.11 says that the atomic air is eternal because of the absence of its inherent part (*adravyavattvāt*). Here *akāraṇavat* means that very *adravyavat*. And as the atoms have no inherent cause they are eternal.

tasya kāryaṃ liṅgam (4.1.2)

The effect thereof is the mark of its existence.

Notes:

The atoms are said to be existent but minutest. The minutest atoms are not apprehended by the sense-organs. Naturally their existence is doubted. To remove the doubt is the introduction of the present *sūtra*. We see body and many other gross elements of earth, water etc., around us. These are the mark of the existence of the atoms.

Śaṅkaramiśra, to explain this *sūtra*, advanced the argument of the Nyāya Śāstra in this regard. From the evolved (*vyaktāt*) is the production of the evolved (*vyaktasya*) . If this series were unlimited there would be no difference in size between mount Meru and a grain of mustard seed, for they would both be indifferently originated by an infinity of parts. So it is to be admitted that there is the limit of parts. Now, by disjunction, in whatever part, there ceases to be the nature of a product, there ceases also to be that of containing parts; and this is the proof of the existence of invisible atoms.

kāraṇabhāvād hi kāryabhāvaḥ (4.1.3)

Since from the existence of the cause is the existence of the effect.

Notes:

Why is an effect called the mark of a cause? As effects, cloth etc. are produced from their causes, yarns etc., effects are (invariably) preceded by the causes and hence an effect is the mark of a cause.

anityam iti ca viśeṣataḥ pratiṣedhabhāvaḥ (4.1.4)

And such expressions as 'non-eternal' can be accounted for as the negation of the denial of the particular (produced objects).

Notes:

This *sūtra* establishes eternity of atoms. We call many objects before us—'non-eternal'. The conception of using the term 'non-eternal' is that we do not negate the denial of those produced objects. So it follows that there are the objects which are meant for the denial of the produced objects. And those objects are atoms.

Anityam iti ca viśeṣataḥ pratiṣedhabhāvaḥ (*Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 2.2.15). This reading has been taken here as ideal.

Both Candrānanda (according to the editor) and Śaṅkaramiśra, are among the authorities, who accept *pratiṣedhabhāva*. The mode of their explanation of the whole *sūtra* is in the following way: 'Non-eternal' means denial (*pratiṣedha*) of particularity (*viśeṣa*) which is eternity (*nityatva*). i.e. Denial of eternity (in an object) prompts that object to be called non-eternal. The whole conception follows to admit the existence of some objects to be eternal.

Śaṅkarācārya holds that *Viśeṣa* means produced object, whereas Candrānanda says that *Viśeṣa* means particularity.

Śaṅkarācārya's reading agrees with the reading in one manuscript of *Candrānandavṛtti* in Baroda Oriental Institute.

avidyā ca (4.1.5)

And, there is non-apprehension (of the atoms).

Notes:

Atoms cannot be apprehended by the sense-organs. This is also the cause in favour of eternity of the atoms. How can the objects, which are not at all apprehendable, be ascertained that those are non-eternal?

Śaṅkaramiśra takes *avidyā* for erroneous knowledge and explains that the arguments in favour of non-eternity of the atoms are erroneous. But Śaṅkarācārya (*tad yadyevam vivrīyeta-satāṃ paridṛśyamānakāryāṇām kāraṇānāṃ pratyakṣeṇa agrahaṇam avidyeti*, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2.2.15) and Candrānanda take *avidyā* for non-apprehension (of the atoms). We have considered this meaning authentic.

2. Perception of the external objects

mahatyanekadravyavattvād rūpāccopalabdhiḥ (4.1.6)

Perception of a gross object which contains more than one substance and which has colour takes place.

Notes:

Atoms are not perceived. But then, how can the objects be perceived? In answer to this question, the present *sūtra* is being put forward. Perception of those objects is possible, which inhere in causes possessing magnitude (*mahat-parimāṇa*) and have colour. The instances are well-known such as white cloth, black pot etc.

Uddyotakara comments in his *Nyāyavārttika* (p. 356) that according to their own interpretation, it is not that, that the objects which have magnitude, a number of constituent substances and colour, are invariably perceived, but the objects which are perceived must have fulfilled the above conditions.

adravyavattvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ (4.1.7)

There is no perception of an atom because of its non-inherence in any substance.

Notes:

As suggested in the previous *sūtra* (4.1.6) an atom cannot be perceived because in spite of its having colour it has no inherent cause i.e. an atom is not produced by more than one part. An atom is not perceivable because of its lacking in *anekadravyavattva* which is a condition of perception.

rūpasaṃskārābhāvāt vāyāv anupalabdhiḥ (4.1.8)

There is no perception of air because of the non-existence of the impression of colour.

Notes:

In this *sūtra,* another condition (having colour) of the perception of an object, is being judged. The gross air which inheres in more than one substance is also not perceptible because it has no colour. In *VS* 4.1.6 Candrānanda explains *mahati* as *mahat-parimāṇa-samavāyini* and it is not a separate condition of an object to be perceived. But in 4.1.8, it is found that *anekadravyavattva* and *mahattva* are two conditions in this respect.

3. *Perception of quality etc.*

anekadravyena dravyena samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ (4.1.9).

Perception of colour is in consequence of inherence (of colour) in substance which has more than one (inherent cause) and in consequence of particularity of colour.

Notes:

The colour of atoms and dyads is not visible, because it is not inherent in a substance which has more than one constituent part. But, there are substances, which in spite of having more than one constituent part, cannot cause to visualise their colour. It is because of the absence of the particularity of colour (colourness). Taste and touch also cannot be visible only because of not having colourness. But, in the case of rays of the eyes the colour is not explicit (*udbhūta*) and that is why those are not visible. *Nyāyavārttika* (p. 356) states that *rūpa* with manifestness means *rūpaviśeṣa*.

etana rasa-gandha-sparśeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam (4.1.10)

By this, cognition of taste, smell and touch is explained.

Notes:

Like the perception of colour, cognition of taste, smell and touch also is possible, only when the substances in which taste etc., are inhered, are made of more than one part, and taste etc. have their respective particularity.

tadabhāvād avyabhicāraḥ (4.1.11)

Because of non-existence of this (i.e. non-existence of cognition of colour etc. where there is no inherence of them in *anekadravya dravya* and where the colour etc. are not explicit), there is no violation (of the above law of perceptibility).

saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvam saṃyoga-vibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpidravya-samavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi (4.1.12)

Numbers, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction, proximity and remoteness, and action, as inhering in coloured substance, are visible.

Notes:

In the *sūtra*, *rūpidravya* means a substance, the colour of which is perceptible, not that which has colour. The above qualities inhered in such substances are perceptible. According to Śaṅkaramiśra the particle *ca* in the *sūtra* involves the addition of viscidity (*sneha*), liquidity (*dravatva*) and velocity (*vega*).

arūpiṣv acākṣuṣatvāt (4.1.13)

Since, in colourless substances they are not visible.

Notes:

The cause of *the rule* regarding the perceptibility of numbers etc. (containing in *VS* 4.1.13) is contained in the present *sūtra*. It is so because number etc. are not perceived in colourless (gross) substances.

etena guṇatve bhāve ca sarvendriyaṃ jñānam vyākhyātam (4.1.14)

By this is explained the knowledge with regard to qualityness and existence, of all the senses.

Notes:

As at the time of apprehending the gross substances the qualities inhered in them are apprehended, similarly at the time of apprehending those qualities the qualityness and existence inhered in qualities are also apprehended. Each of colour, taste etc. is apprehended by separate individual senses. Number, conjunction etc. are apprehended by two senses. Hence qualityness and existence are to be apprehended by different senses.

CHAPTER IV: *ĀHNIKA* II

(The *āhnika* deals with body)

1. Inherent causes of body

pratyakṣāpratyakṣāṇām apratyakṣatvāt saṃyogasya pañcātmakaṃ na vidyate (4.2.1)

The body is not composed of the five elements (earth, water, fire, air and *ākāśa*) for the conjunction of things, perceptible and imperceptible, is imperceptible.

Notes:

The body is said to be composed of five elements, earth, water, water, air, and *ākāśa*. Among those elements only three are perceptible—earth, water and fire. According to the Vaiśeṣikas air and *ākāśa* are inferable substances. In this situation, the conjunction with the imperceptible air is also imperceptible. Hence, due to origination by the substances perceptible and imperceptible, the body would be imperceptible. But as the body is perceptible it is to be admitted that the body is not composed of the five elements.

guṇāntaraprādurbhāvāc ca tryātmakam api na(4.2.2)

And, the body is not composed of even of the three elements because there is no manifestation of other qualities.

Notes:

If the body would be composed of the three elements, earth, water and fire, there would be the manifestation of the different qualities produced by the combination of the qualities of three elements. But there is manifestation of colour etc. of only the earth element. Therefore it is not right to say that the body is composed of the three elements.

ātmasaṃyogas tvapratiṣiddho mithaḥ pañcānām (4.2.3)

But, the conjunction of the ultimate constituents is not denied between the five elements mutually.

Notes:

That the element of body is earth is said. But other qualities are also not rare. We see perspiration (water), cavity (*ākāśa*), heat (fire) and respiration (air) in the terrestrial body. In this situation the present *sūtra* is being put forward. In the terrestrial body, water etc. are conjunct, not inherent. The atoms of water, fire and air and *ākāśa* are conjoined with the body made of the earth element.

Regarding the reading of this *sūtra* the authorities differ. Śaṅkaramiśra reads *aṇusaṃyogas tvapratiṣiddhaḥ*. *NBh* and *NV* under *NS*. 3.1.27 read *bhūtasaṃyoga* etc. but lack the portion *mithaḥ pañcānām*. The Jaisalmer ms of *NV* clearly mentions the lacking portion and *Candrānandavṛtti* agrees with it. The expression *bhūtasaṃyoga* involves the five *bhūtas* and *ātmasaṃyoga* which Candrānanda reads means the same thing, but the expression *aṇusaṃyoga* keeps off the involvement of *ākāśa*.

2. Non-uterine body

anekadeśapūrvakatvāt (4.2.4)

Non-uterine body is created because the atoms scattering in diverse places precede (their very birth).

Notes:

Anekadeśa means the atoms scattering in diverse places in the universe. The aqueous body, etc. are produced from those atoms and not from semen and blood. The aqueous body is found in the sphere of Varuṇa. In this way, the igneous, aerial and sensorial bodies and their respective dwelling spheres are also found to have been mentioned in the śāstra.

Śaṅkaramiśra reads the *sūtra* as *aniyatadigdeśapūrvakatvāt* which does not materially make any difference in meaning.

dharmaviśeṣāt (4.2.5)

Because of peculiar merit.

Notes:

The atoms having peculiar characteristics generate the body. Semen etc. are not the generator here.

It is said that the non-uterine bodies are produced from the atoms scattering in diverse places. But in the conjunction of atoms, action is presupposed. Now, what is the cause of that action? It is the characteristic nature which causes the atoms to be conjoined.

kāryaviśeṣāt (4.2.6)

Because there is (the existence of) peculiar effect.

Notes:

The body of the locust etc. is the special type of produced thing. It is not from semen and blood (the causes of organism generally known). So at the sight of this effect we can surmise that there is the existence of non-uterine body.

samākhyābhāvāt (4.2.7)

Because names exist.

Notes:

We find some names from which the existence of non-uterine bodies must be admitted. He is called Aṅgiras because he was born of *aṅgāra* i.e. carbon.

saṃjñādimattvāt (4.2.8)

Because the nomenclature has some beginning.

Notes:

The name is found, alright. But how is it justified? In answer to this the present *sūtra* is put forward. The people saw Aṅgiras to be born of *aṅgāra* (carbon) and then they called him so. Hence, it is clear that the names are given from a particular time, and it is for this reason that the names are not fictitious. The above explanation is according to Candrānanda.

Śaṅkaramiśra reads the *sūtra* as *saṃjñāyā āditvāt* and explains. By means of the primordial name Brahmā etc. which became manifest in creation etc., it is known that the non-uterine body exists. For there are not parents of Brahmā, by whom the name Brahmā should be invented.

santyayonijā vedaliṅgāc ca (4.2.9)

There exist non-uterine bodies. (This follows) from the Vedic evidences also.

Notes:

Candrānanda: There are the Vedic references, which indicate that there are the non-uterine bodies. "The moon is born from mind" (*candramā manaso jātaḥ*). This Vedic reference indicates the sensorial body of the moon.

Aqueous body etc. are all non-uterine bodies. The terrestrial body may be uterine or non-uterine. The Vedic reference above is untraced.

CHAPTER V: *ĀHNIKA* I

(The *āhnika* deals with different types of action in minor objects)

1. Action due to effort

ātmasaṃyogaprayatnābhyām haste karma (5.1.1.)

Action in the hand is by means of conjunction with, and effort of, soul.

Notes:

When effort goes to produce action, it depends on the conjunction of its substratum (soul) with that where action is to be produced. So the conjunction between soul and hand is the cause of action in the hand. Moreover, conjunction becomes a cause after being dependent on something (effort). (cf. *VS* 1.1.15). So effort also is a cause here. So conjunction with, and effort of, soul are the causes of action in the hand. Here inherent cause is hand, non-inherent cause is conjunction with soul and auxiliary cause is effort. (For three types of cause, vide *VS* 1.1.7).

tathā musale karma hasta-saṃyogāc ca (5.1.2)

In like manner, and from conjunction with the hand, action (is produced) in the pestle.

Notes:

In like manner, in the conjunction between hand and pestle, and the effort in soul, are the causes of action in the pestle. Here the inherent cause is the pestle, the non-inherent cause is the conjunction between hand and pestle and the auxiliary cause is the effort in soul and the weight of pestle. It cannot be said that the non-inherent cause of action in the pestle is the conjunction between soul and hand, because action appears in the pestle obviously by means of conjunction with hand which is further conjoined with soul.

abhighātaje musalakarmaṇi vyatirekād akāraṇam hastasaṃyogaḥ (5.1.3)

In the action produced in a pestle by impact, conjunction with the hand is not a cause, because (the action there is produced) without it (i.e. without the conjunction with the hand).

Notes:

Impact is the conjunction of a moving object. Now, when the upward motion in the pestle is produced by the impact of the mortar (*ulūkhala*) there the conjunction of the hand with the rising pestle is superfluous because the previous effort is exhausted after producing the impact. Moreover, conjunction is a dependent cause in the production of quality and action, and hence the 'conjunction of the hand with the pestle' - without the effort—is not a cause of the rising of the pestle.

tathātma-saṃyogo hasta-musala-karmaṇi (5.1.4)

In like manner the conjunction of soul (with the hand) is not a cause of the action in hand (which is conjoined with the pestle).

Notes:

In the previous *sūtra* we have seen that the conjunction of hand with the pestle is not a cause of rising of the pestle. Now with the pestle the conjoined hand also rises. Is the conjunction of soul with the hand—the cause of rising in the hand? No. Conjunction is a dependent cause. So as in this case of rising in the hand, no effort is there with the conjunction, conjunction cannot be admitted as a cause.

Śaṅkaramiśra leaves *musala* out.

musalābhighātāt tu musala-saṃyogād haste karma (5.1.5)

The action in the hand is from impact of pestle and from conjunction with pestle.

Notes:

How is the upward motion of the hand conjoined with pestle possible? It has been said that the impact of mortar is the cause of rising in pestle. But the conjunction of hand with pestle can be the cause of action in hand only when the conjunction is existent with the velocity of pestle. Impact in mortar cannot be a cause here because it is not inherent in pestle.

tathātmakarma hasta-saṃyogāc ca (5.1.6)

In like manner action in (the hand's) own is also from the conjunction with the hand.

Notes:

It is said in the previous *sūtra* that the action in hand is due to its conjunction with pestle, which has velocity. In the present *sūtra* it is said that the action in the hand is to be admitted also due to the conjunction with hand. Conjunction with hand is the non-inherent cause. Sometimes this conjunction is with the soul with effort and sometimes with pestle with velocity. This explanation is according to Śaṅkaramiśra.

But Candrānanda's explanation is something different from Śaṅkaramiśra's. According to Candrānanda, the matter is as follows:

ātma means a portion of the body. As there is the automatic action in the hand and the pestle, likewise from the conjunction of the hand with other portion (arm) of the body the action is automatically produced in that portion at the time of rising of the hand with velocity.

saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam (5.1.7)

In the absence of conjunction falling results from weight.

Notes:

When conjunction of the hand with pestle is destroyed by disjunction, the pestle falls down on account of its weight.

Śaṅkaramiśra gives some more clarification. According to him weight is the non-inherent cause of falling, *saṃyoga* means impediment. In a bird etc. sustentative effort is the impediment to falling. In an arrow discharged it is the tendency of velocity that is the impediment to falling. The sense is that falling is dependent on weight in the absence of these obstructives.

nodana-viśeṣābhāvān nordhvaṃ na tiryaggamanam (5.1.8)

No vertical or lateral motion takes place without a particular impulse.

Notes:

Nodana is a particular type of conjunction (soundless contact) dependent on velocity and effort. Due to absence of impulse resulting from the absence of effort of the sender, there cannot be vertical or lateral motion of the pestle. The pestle can move downward only due to weight.

prayatna-viśeṣān nodana-viśeṣaḥ (5.1.9)

Particular impulse results from particular effort.

Notes:

How is a particular impulse produced? The present *sūtra* answers it. The effort is produced from the particular wish 'I shall throw it. That effort produces the (soundless) contact named impulse, of hand etc. with other objects.

nodana-viśeṣād udasana-viśeṣaḥ (5.1.10)

From a particular impulse results a particular casting afar.

Notes:

First the effort is produced from the wish to cast afar. From that effort impulse is produced. Impulse now gives birth to casting afar. But all the casting afar is not of the same type. So it is to be admitted that a particular type of casting afar is produced from a particular type of impulse.

hastakarmaṇā dāraka-karma vyākhyātam (5.1.11)

By the action of the hand, the action of a child is explained.

Notes:

Candrānanda explains the *sūtra* in the following way:

Action in the hand has been explained in *VS* 5.1.1 and 5.1.3. In the plain action in the hand effort is a cause, but in the action in the hand conjoined with the moving pestle, effort is not a cause. In like manner the movement of foetus is explained. *dāraka* means foetus. The movement etc. of the foetus is due to conjunction of body with the soul, and as it (i.e. movement) is dependent on effort preceded by life, it is an action with effort. The entering of the bodily particles of mother into the foetus is an action; but this type of action in the foetus is produced without any effort, and it is produced by means of conjunction with soul which is solely dependent on merit or demerit.

Śaṅkaramiśra's explanation, on the other hand, appears to be imaginative. He explains that the action which is produced in the hand, together with the pestle by the impact of the mortar, is not preceded by effort, or a cause of merit and demerit. The analogy of this motion to a child's movement in the play of its hands and feet is pointed out. Though a child's movement of its hands and feet has effort for the antecedent, it has no good or evil result, and is not a cause of merit and demerit. Such is the meaning of the analogy.

tathā dagdhasya visphoṭanam (5.1.12)

In like manner, the sudden toss (of the hand) of one burnt (is explained).

Notes:

The sudden toss of the hand etc. of one coming into contact with fire at the time when he is unmindful is produced from the conjunction of hand with the soul which is dependent on effort preceded by life. So this sudden toss is not involuntary (*apratyaya*).

Śaṅkaramiśra's explanation is the as follows:

A felon set a house on fire. A man inside the house had been burnt and his body was torn open by the fire. In this case the action which is produced in the hand etc. by the will to kill the wicked man is neither a cause of virtue, nor a cause of vice, as it has been said that in the slaying of a wicked man there is no sin in him that slays openly or covertly. Wrath encounters wrath.

In the explanation of *VSs* 5.1.11 and 12, Śaṅkaramiśra's introduction of virtue and vice and the related explanation appears to be quite irrelevant.

2. Action not caused by effort

prayatnābhāve gurutvāt suptasya patanam (5.1.13)

In the absence of effort, falling of a sleeping person takes place due to weight.

Notes:

The limbs of a sleeping person fall down. This falling is not due to effort, because at that time there is no wish. So the falling then is due to weight.

Śaṅkaramiśra's reading of this *sūtra* is *prayatnābhāve prasuptasya calanam.*

It means, movement of the limbs of a sleeping person is not due to effort. But here the cause of such movement is not mentioned.

tṛṇe karma vāyu-saṃyogāt (5.1.14)

Action takes place in grass from conjunction with air.

Notes:

We see the action in grass, trees, etc. What is the cause of such action? It cannot be admitted that grass etc. have effort. Kaṇāda says that it is the conjunction with air that causes action in them. The conjunction is to be with air which must be with velocity.

maṇigamanam sūcyabhisarpaṇam ity adṛṣṭakāritāṇi (5.1.15)

The movement of the gem and the approach of the needle are due to some unknown causes.

Notes:

The gem moves towards the thief. The needle is attracted towards a leadstone (magnet, *ayaskānta*). The cause of such movement and attraction is due to some unknown causes. However, the commentators understand merit and demerit for *adṛṣṭa*.

iṣāv ayugapat-saṃyoga-viśeṣaḥ karmānyatve hetuḥ (5.1.16)

Particular non-simultaneous conjunctions in an arrow are the cause of the diversity of its action.

Notes:

The initial action in an arrow is due to impulse. And in the subsequent moments there are numerous actions produced in the arrow due to tendency. If there would be a single action it would be ceased immediately after the first conjunction with *ākāśa* and the arrow would fall down immediately after its throwing. But it continues at least for some time. Hence it is to be admitted that there are numerous actions in an arrow and the causes of them are a number of particular connections.

nodanād ādyam iṣoḥ karma tatkarmakāritāc ca saṃskārād uttaram tathottaram uttaraṃ ca (5.1.17)

The first action of the arrow is from impulse, the next is from tendency caused by that action, and in like manner the next, and the next.

Notes:

The impulse which is the cause of action in an arrow in the first moment is the conjunction of string with arrow. This conjunction is due to effort of velocity in the string. Now the initial action in the arrow, which is dependent on impulse, produces tendency. But the action produces conjunction and disjunction without depending on something. Then, when the action is destroyed as a result of conjunction, and when impulse ceases as a result of disjunction, the tendency produced from the initial action produces the subsequent action. In like manner the actions appear successively.

Most texts support the reading *tat-karmakāritāc ca* while Candrānanda appears to accept only *karmakāritāc ca*.

saṃskārābhāve gurutvāt patanam (5.1.18)

Falling results from weight in the absence of tendency.

Notes:

We see that an arrow being obstructed by a wall falls down. Why does it happen? This happens due to weight of the object arrow, when its tendency is already destroyed by the conjunction with tangible objects.

The explanation of Śaṅkaramiśra is that, falling results from the absence of an obstructive. So tendency is here an obstructive for falling of the arrow.

CHAPTER V: *ĀHNIKA* II

(The *āhnika* deals with different types of action in different substances)

1. Action in earth

nodanād abhighātāt saṃyukta-saṃyogāc ca pṛthivyāṃ karma (5.2.1)

Action in earth results from impulse, impact and conjunction with the conjunct.

Notes:

Nodana i.e. impulse is a particular type of conjunction which results from weight, liquidity, velocity and effort collectively, or from any one or two or three of them. It is the

cause of that action which does not produce disjunction, i.e., impulse is the cause of flexible action. Anyway, action in mud, results from the impulse by feet etc.

Abhighāta i.e. impact is the cause of that action which produces disjunction. It (impact) depends on velocity. Action is seen in a part of the earth by the impact of the chariot etc. Praśastapāda gives the example of the action from impact, when a thing gets active on falling on a hard stone.

Action is also produced from conjunction with the conjunct. When the horses pull a chariot, the rope of the horses are tied with it. So the movement of the chariot is due to conjunction with the conjunct, moving horses.

tadviśeṣenādṛṣṭakāritam (5.2.2)

That action which is different (from those previously mentioned), is produced by some unknown causes.

Notes:

There are some actions in the earth, which are not produced by impulse or impact, e.g. earthquake. It is obviously caused but the cause of it is unknown.

Candrānanda's explanation is rather different. According to him the earthquake is caused by the conjunction with air, working adversely. And the earthquake is produced to indicate the good or bad fortune of the people. So, this earthquake is specially produced by destiny, as it indicates the fortune of all the people.

Śaṅkaramiśra also connects destiny with the production of an earthquake. He says that the earthquake has for its non-inherent cause conjunction with soul; since it is the destiny of him, to whom pleasure and pain results from the earthquake, that is the particular cause of the earthquake. According to him, no role is played by impulse, impact and conjunction with the conjunct, in this matter.

2. Action in water

apāṃ saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam (5.2.3)

Falling of water results from weight in the absence of conjunction.

Notes:

It rains when there is no conjunction of clouds with air. Conjunction between them is obstructive of falling of water. In the absence of it water falls, due to its intrinsic quality, i.e. weight.

tadviśeṣeṇādṛṣṭakāritam (5.2.4.)

That action of water which is different (from simple one as mentioned in *VS* 5.2.3.) is produced by some unknown causes.

Notes:

If water falls to produce huge crops due to merit or the subjects or to destroy the crops due to demerit of them, the falling of water is due to *adṛṣṭa*. This is the exposition of Candrānanda. We understand the purport of the *sūtra* in this way: rain-water falls, due to weight, when there is the absence of connection of air with cloud. But it is due to some

unknown cause that air and cloud are not connected with each other.

The *sūtra* is available only in *Candrānandavṛtti* and nowhere in the printed texts of any treatises. That is why it was doubtful whether it is a Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* or not. We see that the sense fully permits the applicability of the *sūtra* here. One manuscript of *Upaskāra* in Darbhanga museum, also reads the *sūtra* here.

dravatvāt syandanam (5.2.5)

Flowing results from liquidity.

Notes:

Śaṅkaramiśra says that the flowing or distant progression of the stream or a great mass of aqueous substance, composed by mutual conjunction of the fallen waters or raindrops, is produced by liquidity as its non-inherent cause.

nāḍyā vāyusaṃyogād ārohaṇam (5.2.6)

Ascent (of water) is caused by the sun's rays with the help of conjunction with air.

Notes:

Nāḍī means sun's ray. The sun's ray is of two types, *śuci* and *śukra*. Function of *śuci* is to draw water and that of *śukra* is to increase it. In the drawing of water, *śuci* functions with the help of conjunction with air. Here effort of the sun also is necessary.

nodanāt pīḍanāt saṃyukta-saṃyogāc ca (5.2.7)

(Ascent of water may be caused) also through the impulse, agitation and conjunction with the conjunct.

Notes:

According to Śaṅkaramiśra, this *sūtra* is the explanation of the previous *sūtra*. Water first gets the impulse of a strong air and then (water) becomes agitated. And then due to conjunction of water with the rays which are further conjoined with the air, the waters fly upwards. *Ca* according to Śaṅkara means 'like'. So the above matter is like the rays of fire, which when driven by the air, draw up boiling water in a cauldron. Waters fly upwards in the form of vapour when sunrays fall on waters for a long time. This is a case of impulse. Waters put on fierce fire boil and fly upwards. This is a case of agitation. Waters fallen on hot earth fly upwards in the form of vapour. This is a case of conjunction with the conjunct. Earth is conjoined with fire and waters are further conjoined with earth.

vṛkṣābhisarpaṇam ity adṛṣṭakāritam (5.2.8)

Circulation (of waters) in trees is done by some unknown causes.

Notes:

Waters sprinkled on the root rise and are circulated in the tree. But there must have been some causes hitherto unknown.

apāṃ saṃghāto vilayanaṃ ca tejasaḥ saṃyogāt (5.2.9)

The freezing and thawing of water results from conjunction with fire.

Notes:

According to Śaṅkaramiśra, the explanation is the following. When fire in the *ākāśa*

(i.e. lightning) does not produce liquidity in the dyad of aqueous atoms, then water appears in frozen form (e.g. snow, hail etc.). But later when those get conjunction of more heated fire of the earth, they become liquid.

According to Candrānanda the thawing of water is due to celestial fire and terrestrial fire.

tatrāvasphurjathur liṅgam (5.2.10)

In "that the fire exists in the waters of *ākāśa*" the rolling of thunder is a mark.

Notes:

Variants of *avasphurjathu* are *sphurjathu* and *visphurjathu.*

vaidikaṃ ca (5.2.11)

There is also Vedic evidence (in support of fire in water of *ākāśa*).

Notes:

Candrānanda cites a Vedic passage "*tam agniṃ garbhaṃ dadhire vabhūṣā.*" Source of the passage is untraced.

apāṃ saṃyogād vibhāgāc ca stanayitnuḥ (5.2.12)

The rolling of thunder results from conjunction of water (with water) and disjunction of water (from water).

Notes:

When there is the mutual impact of waters in the form of waves moved by the winds from opposite directions, there is sound. Again, when there is the disjunction between waters (clouds) created even by a single agitated air, there is also sound.

3. *Action in fire, air, atoms and mind*

pṛthīvīkarmaṇā tejaḥkarma vāyukarma ca vyākhyātam (5.2.13)

The action of fire and the action of air, are explained on (the analogy of) the action of earth.

Notes:

Candrānanda: Action in the earth is said (in *VS* 5.2.1 and 2) to have been resulted from impulse, impact, conjunction with the conjunct and some other unknown causes. Similar are the cases of actions in fire and air.

Śaṅkaramiśra here takes up only the case of destined production of action. In the explanation of *VS* 5.2.2 he said, conjunction with soul destined is the cause of earthquake. In like manner, a sudden conflagration or a sudden agitation of air i.e. storm results from the conjunction with soul influenced by destiny. This conjunction is non-inherent cause. Inherent cause is air and fire and auxiliary cause is destiny.

agner ūrdhvajvalanam vāyoś ca tiryakpavanam aṇu-manasoś cādyam karmety adṛṣṭakāritāni (5.2.14)

The upward flaming of fire and the sideward blowing of air, and the first action of atoms and of the internal organ, are produced by some unknown causes.

Notes:

Both Candrānanda and Śaṅkaramiśra explain *adṛṣtra* as destiny. The nature of fire and air is due to destiny. When after a deluge creation starts, the ingress of the atoms is necessary. But how is their first action possible? It is due to destiny. Similarly, in the new creation, the action in the internal organ to be united with the new body, is due to destiny. In other actions, there is no occasion for an unseen cause (or destiny as a cause).

Candrānanda points out that the upward flaming of fire, etc. are always due to one fixed cause i.e. destiny, but action apart from those are due to various causes, sometimes due to impulse, sometimes due to impact etc.

hastakarmaṇā manasaḥ karma vyākhyātam (5.2.15)

The action of the internal organ is explained on (the analogy of) the action of the hand.

Notes:

The action in the hand results from the conjunction with soul and the effort. Similarly, the action in the internal organ results from the conjunction of the internal organ with soul and the effort.

4. Yoga, salvation and action in soul

ātmendriya-mano'rtha-sannikarṣāt sukha-duḥkhe (5.2.16)

Pleasure and pain result from contact of soul, outer sense-organ, internal organ and object.

Notes:

Though in the *sūtra* pleasure and pain have been mentioned, cognition, efforts, are also implied. Candrānanda justified the introduction of this topic (in *VS* 5.2.16 and 17). *Saṃyoga* means *yoga* (connection) and it is the effect of action. So *yoga* is a part of action. And that is why *yoga* (absolute connection of internal organ with soul) and *mokṣa* (salvation) are being explained here.

Candrānanda adds the first word *tadanārambhaḥ* of *VS* 5.2.17 at the end of the present *sūtra*.

tadanārambha ātmasthe manasi saśarīrasya sukha-duḥkābhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ (5.2.17)

Those (i.e. pleasure and pain as well as cognitions etc.) do not arise, when the internal organ reposes in the soul. So the non-existence of pleasure and pain in one having a body is *Yoga* (meditation).

Notes:

When the internal organ reposes in the soul and does not have connection with the sense-organs, then no pleasure, pain etc. appear in the soul. So this non-existence of pleasure, pain etc. even of one having body, is called *yoga*.

Candrānanda takes *tat* in *tadanārambhaḥ* as for the contact of four. According to him, *yoga* is non-existence of pleasure, and pain which are the effects of the contact

mentioned. The connection of the soul with the internal organ depends upon the restraint of breath. In the state of *yoga* there is no sensation of pleasure or pain of the soul of one having body.

kāyakarmaṇātmakarma vyākhyātam (5.2.18)

Action of the breath (here *prāṇāyāma*) is explained on (the analogy of) the action in the body.

Notes:

The part of *yoga* is *prāṇāyāma* (a type of action of controlling breath). Here the word *ātman* means breath. As action in the hand results from the conjunction with soul, and with effort, in like manner, *prāṇāyāma* results from the conjunction of breath with the soul and from effort.

apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam aśitapītasaṃyogaḥ kāryāntara-saṃyogaścety adṛṣṭakāritāni (5.2.19)

The egress (of the internal organ and soul from the body at the time of death), the ingress (of them into the new body after birth), conjunctions with things eaten and drunk, and conjunctions with other effects, are all caused by some unknown factors.

Notes:

Aśitapītasaṃyoga is the connection of the being in womb with food and drink consumed by mother. This food and drink are in the *nāḍī*. Not only food and drink, but also semen and blood are implied to be connected with the being in womb.

Kāryāntara-saṃyoga is the connection between *kalala, arbuda, māṃsa, peśī* etc. in one structure.

The causes of the egress etc. are not explained and said to be *adṛṣṭakārita*.

tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ (5.2.20)

In the absence of that (unknown) cause, there is non-existence of conjunction, (and) non-existence of manifestation is salvation.

Notes:

In the absence of the unknown cause which brings about egress etc. there is the non-existence of conjunction between soul and internal organ which means life and there is also the non-manifestation of body. This state of being is called salvation.

Śaṅkaramiśra reads the *sūtra* "..... *'prādurbhāvaś ca mokṣaḥ*".

5. *Rejection of action of darkness*

dravya-guṇa-karma-niśpatti-vaidharmyād bhā'bhāvas tamaḥ (5.2.21)

Darkness is the non-existence of light being dissimilar to the production of substance, quality and action.

Notes:

Darkness is destructible and hence it is different from the eternal substance. Again the eternal substance is not finite, not tangible and opposite to manifestation. As the darkness has clear difference in these regards, so darkness cannot be substance. It cannot

be a quality and action because no substratum of it is found, whereas quality and action have substratum. Hence darkness is nothing but the non-existence of light.

tejaso dravyāntareṇāvaraṇāc ca (5.2.22)

And because of the obscuration of light by another substance.

Notes:

The sun-rays are present in the open area but in a cave, these are obstructed due to obstruction created by another substance. So it is confirmed that darkness is the non-existence of light.

6. Substance without action

dikkālāv ākāśaṃ ca kriyābhyo vaidharmyān niṣkriyaṇi (5.2.23)

Space, time and *ākāśa* are inactive, being dissimilar to those which possess action.

Notes:

Direction, time and *ākāśa* are not finite, but the earth etc. are finite and active. So direction etc. are dissimilar to them which are active. Hence they are inactive. The particle *ca* in the *sūtra* indicates that the soul also is inactive.

etena karmāṇi guṇāś ca vyākhyātāḥ (5.2.24)

By this, actions and qualities are explained.

Notes:

The qualities and actions being dissimilar to those which have action, have no action. The particle *ca* indicates that particularity etc. have also no action.

niṣkriyāṇāṃ samavāyaḥ karmabhyaḥ pratiṣiddhaḥ (5.2.25)

The inherence of the things inactive cannot result from action.

Notes:

'The inherence of the things inactive' means the inherence of qualities and actions (which are inactive) with the substance. Action can produce conjunction. But there is no action in qualities and actions. So their conjunction is discarded with the substance. The connection thereof is inherence.

Candrānanda's statement in this regard is that impact etc. cannot further inhere action because the action is produced in the very substratum of impact etc.

kāraṇaṃ tvasamavāyino guṇāḥ (5.2.26)

But qualities, as cause, are non-inherent.

Notes:

The qualities, such as weight, conjunction etc., can become cause of action. But what type of causes are they? They are non-inherent causes.

guṇair dig vyākhyātā (5.2.27)

By qualities, direction is explained.

Notes:

As the qualities cannot be the inherent cause, similarly direction also cannot be an inherent cause. Direction is the auxiliary cause of the knowledge of east etc.

Śaṅkaramiśra explains. As the qualities, like weight etc., being infinite, are not inherent causes of actions, so it follows also from its infinity that direction is not an inherent cause of action. That to be a substratum (*ādhāratā*), does not imply inherence is proved by such instances as those of a jujube fruit in a bowl, curd in a bowl, the roaring of a lion in a forest.

kāraṇena kālaḥ (5.2.28)

By the same reason, time (is explained).

Notes:

Just as it had to be admitted that direction is the cause of difference of knowledge of east, west etc. similarly, it has to be admitted, that time is the cause (auxiliary) of the differences in the knowledge like 'these are simultaneously done' etc.

CHAPTER VI: *ĀHNIKA* I

(The *āhnika* deals with merit recommended by Vedic rites)

1. Authoritativeness of the Vedas

buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtir vede (6.1.1)

The composition of sentences in the Veda is consequent upon design.

na cāsmadbuddhibhyo liṅgam ṛṣeḥ (6.1.2)

There can be no mark of the knowledge of the sage (writer of the Vedas), by comparing with our knowledge.

Notes:

Our knowledge cannot be compared with the sage's knowledge because ours cannot grasp the past and future object, but the sage's can.

The editor of *Candrānandavṛtti* suggests the reading of the *sūtra* as *na cāsmad* etc., and also notes one Jaisalmer ms. of the *Nyāyakandalī* where *na cāsmad* etc. is written. *Nyāyakandalī* (BORI) and *Pañjikā* thereon are clear on this point.

tathā brāhmaṇe saṃjñākarma-siddhir liṅgam (6.1.3)

Likewise, the mark (of the god's knowledge) is the success in forming a name in the Brāhmaṇa (caste).

Notes:

Candrānanda takes the word *brāhmaṇa* as for the brāhmaṇa caste, whereas Śaṅkaramiśra takes it for the Brāhmaṇa literature. So according to Śaṅkaramiśra *brāhmaṇe saṃjñakarma* means the formation of terms in the Brāhmaṇa.

2. Merit produced by charity and reception

buddhipūrvo dadātiḥ (6.1.4)

The rule of charity (in the Dharmaśāstras) is preceded by intelligence.

Notes:

It is seen above that the Vedas are the contribution of God. In conformity with those Vedas the rules of charity have been formulated by Bhṛgu and others in Smṛti literature. So the rules must be the conscious attempts of those sages. The main objective here is to establish that the merit which has been said in connection of each type of charity must not be futile, moreover they are the cause of merit.

tathā pratigrahaḥ (6.1.5)

Likewise, (rule of) reception (also is preceded by intelligence).

tayoḥ kramo yathā'nitaretarāṅgabhūtānām (6.1.6)

Their order is just like the *bhūtas* not in mutual relation of cause and effect.

Notes:

Bhutas are not mutually connected in cause-effect relation. In fact, the fuel is not the cause of fire but, the cause of fire is the very parts of the fire's own body. In spite of this fact there is order of fuel and fire, i.e. fuel is prior and fire is posterior. The order between charity and reception is just like the above. There is no cause-effect relation between them, even then charity is prior and reception is posterior.

ātmaguṇesv ātmāntaraguṇānām akāraṇatvāt (6.1.7)

Because the attributes of one soul are not a cause with regard to another soul.

Notes:

Charity and reception are not in cause-effect relation. Sacrifices, injuries etc. are not a cause of the attributes of pleasure and pain in another soul. So the merit by making a charity, is not caused by the merit, reception or the vice versa, because the merit by charity is produced in a soul and the merit by reception, in another soul.

3. Difference of result due to feeding good and bad brahmins.

aduṣṭabhojanāt samabhivyāhārato 'bhudayaḥ (6.1.8)

Elevation results from the association, by feeding a noble person.

Notes:

If a person gets the results of feeding a noble person (*brāhmaṇa*), he elevates. Merit depends on the association with bliss and elevation results from that merit.

tad duṣṭabhojane na vidyate (6.1.9)

That (elevation) does not exist in the case of feeding the wicked.

Notes:

One may get bliss by feeding a wicked brāhmaṇa, but by that he must not get elevation. The anonymous *Vṛtti* takes *tat* in the *sūtra* for the causes of elevation. Then all

the *sūtras* mean that feeding the wicked cannot be the cause of elevation. Śaṅkaramiśra takes *tat* for the result of blessings. So according to him, the *sūtra* means that by feeding the wicked there can be no result of blessings given by the wicked.

duṣṭam hiṃsāyām (6.1.10)

(The term) *duṣṭa* had reference to one occupied in an evil work.

Notes:

One who causes bodily or mental pain in others is known to be a *duṣṭa*.

samabhivyāhārato doṣaḥ (6.1.11)

Demerit results (even) from the invitation.

Notes:

Candrānanda says that *samabhivyāhara* here means invitation, but in *VS* 6.1.8 the same word was meant for blessing (from that invited person).

Even to invite a gravely sinful person will creat demerit, what then to feed him!

tadaduṣṭe na vidyate (6.1.12)

This (demerit) does not exist in the case of a noble (*brāhmaṇa*).

Notes:

There is no demerit created by invitation, if the invited person is not an evil-committer.

4. Different recipients of charity

viśiṣṭe pravṛttiḥ (6.1.13)

The procedure should be in relation to one who is distinguished (i.e. with superior quality).

Notes:

One desirous of elevation should not only see that the person is without any evil activity but he should see that the person (*brāhmaṇa*) is distinguished in the country, time, knowledge and behaviour.

same hīne cāpravṛttiḥ (6.1.14)

The procedure should not be in relation to one who is equal or inferior.

Notes:

Candrānanda: The *brāhmaṇa* who is noble and also possesses knowledge etc., is called 'distinguished'. The *brāhmaṇa* with any one quality of the above is 'equal'. Now apart from the 'distinguished' and 'equal' *brāhmaṇs*, all others are 'inferior'. This includes the wicked, *kṣatriyas* etc., or any creature. A person desirous of elevation should not proceed to 'equal' and 'inferior' types of people to make charity, but proceed only to 'distinguished' type of people (distinguished *brāhmaṇas*).

Śaṅkaramiśra's explanation stands just opposite to Candrānanda's. His *sūtra*-reading also varies from the latter's. He reads it as *same hine vā pravṛttiḥ*. So according to this *sūtra* Śaṅkaramiśra explains that, where persons more distinguished than oneself are not

procured at obsequial rites, it is explained that the procedure in obsequial rites, alms etc. should be in relation to an equal, i.e. one like oneself, or an inferior, one less in point of merit etc., than oneself. Persons prohibited are by all means to be avoided, but not the unblemished, whether they be equals or inferiors.

etena hīna-sama-viśiṣṭa-dhārmikebhyaḥ parādānam vyākhyātam (6.1.15)

By this is explained reception (of property) from another, from an inferior, equal and distinguished virtuous person (in the reverse order of the case of charity).

Notes:

In the case of reception, first one should receive the property from an inferior and then from an equal. If these two are not available only then one should receive the property of a distinguished virtuous person. According to Śaṅkaramiśra and probably Candrānanda also, *parādānam* should be *parasvādānam* (Candrānanda in his *Vṛtti* : *etena viparītena krameṇa āpadi parasvādānam vyākhyātam*). But they differ in making out the meaning of the very word *parasvādānam.* Śaṅkaramiśra takes it simply for reception (*pratigraha*) as in the first previous *sūtra* charity (*dāna*) is explained. But it appears that Candrānanda takes it for forcibly grasping of other's property as he speaks of crisis-time. It is interesting to note that Śaṅkaramiśra in his *Upaskāra* mentions one Vṛttikāra and refers to his view which resembles Candrānanda's. The view of that Vṛttikāra is as follows:

The reception of property from another, i.e. the taking of property by theft etc. is explained. In conformity with this is the sacred text (*Śrutiḥ*) : "From a *śūdra* on the seventh day, from a *vaiśya* on the tenth, from a *kṣatriya* on the fifteenth, from a *brāhmaṇa* in case of danger of life." To save himself or his family, when starving, a man may steal the food of a *śūdra*, when he has been without food for seven days; when he has been without food for ten days, he may steal that of a *vaiśya*; when he has been fifteen days without food, he may steal that of a *kṣatriya*. When his life is in danger, then only stealing food from a *brāhmaṇa* does not produce demerit.

Charity (according to Candrānanda) is to be made to a distinguished *brāhmaṇa* and not an equal or an inferior. By this, the forcible occupation (according to Candrānanda) will be first of the inferior's property, then of the equal's and at last of the distinguished *brāhmaṇa's property*. In this explanation it appears to be difficult to justify *etena* in the *sūtra* if the previous *sūtra* does not permit charity to *sama* and *hīna*. But as, according to Candrānanda, *VS* 6.1.15 is not on reception (*pratigraha*) but on forcible occupation (*parasvādāna*) no such difficulty arises.

5. Duties of a brāhmaṇa in critical situation of survival.

tathā viruddhānāṃ tyāgaḥ (6.1.16)

Likewise, the killing of the attackers (are permissible).

Notes:

Candrānanda : Likewise (i.e. in order of inferior, equal and distinguished), when a *brāhmaṇa* is attacked by the persons inferior to him, he should kill those enemies.

same ātmatyāgaḥ paratyāgo vā (6.1.17)

In the case of an equal, sacrifice of one's own life or the killing of the other (is permitted).

Notes:

When a *brāhmaṇa* encounters an enemy equal to him, he (i.e. the *brāhmaṇa*) may sacrifice his own life or kill the enemy.

viśiṣṭe ātmatyāgaḥ (6.1.18)

In the case of the distinguished (i.e. a person with a superior quality) the *brāhmaṇa* should sacrifice his own life.

Notes:

cf. *tulyād iha vadhaḥ śreyān viśiṣṭāc ceti niścayaḥ/*
nihīnāt kātarāc caiva kṛpaṇād garhito vadhaḥ// MBH, 12.297.6.
ātatāyini cotkṛṣṭe tapaḥsvādhyāyajanmataḥ/
vadhas tatra tu naiva syāt pāpe hīne vadho bhṛguḥ// Quoted by Śūlapāṇi in *Prāyaścittaviveka* as Kātyāyana's statement.

CHAPTER VI: ĀHNIKA II

(The *āhnika* deals with the other details on the attainment of merit)

1. Some special meritorious activities leading to elevation

dṛṣṭānāṃ dṛṣṭaprayojanānāṃ dṛṣṭābhāve prayogo 'bhyudayāya (6.2.1)

Of the things (available in the śāstras) the purposes are visible, if a thing does not have the visible purpose, then its practice is for elevation.

Notes:

Candrānanda: Bathing etc. are seen to be prescribed in the Vedas, Smṛti etc. If those are not to remove dirt etc. then those must be for elevation.

Śaṅkaramiśra's *sūtra*-reading is *dṛṣṭādṛṣṭa-prayojanānām* etc. He wants to explain that there are some actions where the motives are seen, e.g. agriculture, merchandise, service of the king, etc. But there are some other actions where the result is unseen i.e. of remote consequences, e.g. sacrifice, charity etc. These very actions are for elevation in future.

abhiṣecanopavāsa-brahmacarya-gurukulavāsa-vānaprasthya-yajñadāna-prokṣaṇa-diṅ-nakṣatra-mantra-kāla-nigamaś cādṛṣṭāya (6.2.2)

Inaugurations (bathing in waters of different places), fasting, continence, residence in the family of the preceptor, life in the forest, sacrifice, charity, oblation and the rules regarding the cardinal points, constellations, scriptures and seasons conduce invisible result.

2. Activities without deceit and those with deceit

cāturāśramyam upadhāś cānupadhāś ca (6.2.3)

The duties of the four stages of (religious) life are (sometimes) with deceit and (sometimes) without deceit.

Notes:

Activities without deceit are causes of merit and those with deceit lead to demerit. That is, the duties of the four stages of the religious life, if performed with deceit give birth to demerit. But, reversely, if the duties are perfomed without deceit those give birth to merit. *Caraka Saṃhitā* also (1.93) mentions *upadhā* and *anupadhā*.

bhāvadoṣa upadhā (6.2.4)

Wrong intention is an action with deceit.

Notes:

Vanity (*dambha*) etc. are activity with deceit. Jayanāryāyaṇa mentions the group of six *ripus* (enemies of character) etc. as deceit. Those six *ripus* are lust, anger, coveteousness, infatuation, intoxication and envy. The *Mahābhārata* (3.200.96-7) also says that if the mental restraint is absent, the outer ritualistic activities are for nothing, cf.

tridaṇḍadhāraṇaṃ maunaṃ jaṭābhāro'tha muṇḍanam/
valkalājinasambeṣṭam vratacaryābhiṣecanam//
agnihotram vane vāsaḥ śarīrapariśoṣaṇam/
sarvāny etāni mithyā syur yadi bhāvo na nirmalaḥ//

adoṣo 'nupadhā (6.2.5)

Right intention is an activity without deceit.

Notes:

Activity without deceit is the intention without any vanity etc.

3. Determination of purity and impurity

iṣṭarūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśam prokṣitam abhyukṣitam ca tac chucī (6.2.6)

That which is of prescribed colour, taste, smell and touch, the aspersed and the sprinkled, are pure.

aśucīti śucipratiṣedhaḥ (6.2.7)

Impure denotes the negation of the pure.

arthāntaraṃ ca (6.2.8)

And something else (is also impure).

Notes:

Wine etc. are those other things which are impure.

4. Consumption of food with mental restraint

ayatasya śucibhojanād abhyudayo no vidyate yamābhāvāt (6.2.9)

To the unrestrained there accrues no elevation from eating what is pure, inasmuch as there is an absence of mental restraint (*yama*).

Notes:

Yogasūtra (2.30) mentions the qualities called *Yama*: *ahiṃsāsatyāsteya-brahmacarya-aparigrahaḥ yamāḥ*. On the other hand, *niyamas* are purity (*śauca*), satisfaction (*santoṣa*), penance (*tapaḥ*), reading of the Vedas (*svādhyāya*) and worship of god (*iśvara-praṇidhāna*) (*Yogasūtra*, 2.32).

Viṣṇupurāṇa (6.7.36-38) has the same idea about *yama* and *niyama*:

bhrahmacaryam ahiṃsā ca satyāsteya-parigrahān/
seveta yogī niṣkāmo yogyatāṃ svātmano nayan//
svādhyāya-śauca-santoṣatapāṃsi niyatātmavān/
kurvīta brahmaṇi tathā parasmin pravaṇaṃ manaḥ//
ete yamāḥ svaniyamāḥ pañca pañca prakīrtitāḥ/
viśiṣṭaphaladāḥ kāmyā niṣkāmānāṃ vimuktidāḥ//

Manusaṃhitā (2.97):*vedās tyāgaśca yajñāśca niyamāśca tapāṃsi ca/*
na vipraduṣṭabhāvaś ca siddhiṃ gacchanti karhicit//

Garuḍapurāṇa (230) also mentions *yama* which exactly goes along the *Yogasūtra* line:

ahiṃsā satyam asteyam brahmacaryāparigrahau/
yamāḥ pañcātha niyamāḥ śaucaṃ dvividham īritam//

The same text on another occasion (105) mentions:

brahmacaryaṃ dayā kṣāntir dānam satyam akalkatā/
ahiṃsāsteya-mādhurye damaś ceti yamāḥ smṛtāḥ//

Amarakośa points out *yama* as

śarīrasādhanāpekṣaṃ nityaṃ yat karma tad yamaḥ/
niyamas tu sa yatkarmānityam āgantusādhanam//

vidyate cānarthāntaratvād yamasya (6.2.10)

And there accrues (the elevation), because *yama* is not different (from only sincere effort).

Notes:

Yama is not different from religious observance. It means only sincere effort. As behind every action there is effort, so behind the feeding of pure food also there is effort (of the eater).

In the previous *sūtra, yama* is meant for special mental restraint and in its absence there accrues no elevation. Now, if *yama* is something different from that, i.e. it stands for only effort, then as in the absence of effort there is no action, so eating of pure food being always preceded by *yama*, may accrue elevation.

asati cābhāvāt (6.2.11)

For (there is no elevation), where there is no mental restraint (even if one eats pure food).

5. *Causes of hankering*

sukhād rāgaḥ (6.2.12)

From pleasure arises hankering.

Notes:

Hankering increases from pleasure born from the objects like women etc.

tanmayatvāt (6.2.13)

Also from deep involvement (with the object), arises hankering.

Notes:

Śaṅkaramiśra connects *tanmayatvāt* as the cause of desire and also of aversion. When the unhappy lover, who does not win his mistress, sees his beloved in every object, it is due to *tanmayatva* in the first case. Again when a person who has been once bitten by a snake, sees snakes everywhere, it is due to *tanmayatva* in the second case. However, *tanmayatva* in the case of aversion appears to be irrelevant here.

tṛpteḥ (6.2.14)

From satisfaction (arises hankering).

adṛṣṭāt (6.2.15)

Also through destiny (of a person, arises hankering in him).

jātiviśeṣāc ca rāgaviśeṣaḥ (6.2.16)

And particular type of hankering arises through particular type of race.

Notes:

The animals are seen inclined to eat grass etc. Similarly, some particular race is found to have strong inclination towards some activities. It is the explanation of Candrānanda.

6. *Effect of desire and aversion*

icchā-dveṣa-pūrvikā dharmādharma-pravṛttiḥ (6.2.17)

Activity in merit or demerit, has for its antecedents desire and aversion.

tataḥ saṃyogo vibhāgaś ca (6..2.18)

By these, are conjunction and disjunction.

Notes:

Stored merit and demerit bring about the conjunction of soul with body and sense-

organ and it is called birth. On the contrary, merit and demerit having been exhausted bring about disjunction of soul from body etc. and it is called death.

ātmakarmasu mokṣo vyākhyātaḥ (6.2.19)

Salvation is explained as dependent on the actions of the soul.

CHAPTER VII: *ĀHNIKA* I

(The āhnika deals with the nature of five qualities and dimension).

1. *Introduction to quality*

uktā guṇāḥ (7.1.1)

The qualities have been stated.

Notes:

The qualities have already been enumerated by the *sūtra—rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyoga-vibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhyaḥ sukha-duḥkhe icchā-dveṣau prayatnaś ca guṇāḥ* (*VS* 1.1.5)

guṇalakṣaṇaṃ coktam (7.1.2)

The definition of quality has also been stated.

Notes:

Quality has been defined by the *sūtra—dravyāśrayy aguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam* (*VS* 1.1.15)

idam evaṃguṇam idam evaṃguṇam iti coktam (7.1.3)

And, 'This (substance) in endowed with such and such quality' and 'This again with such and such' - in this way the arrangement has already been done.

Notes:

Substances are stated with their respective specific qualities, e.g.
rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśavatī pṛthivī (*VS* 2.1.1);
rūpa-rasa-sparśavatya āpo dravāḥ snigdhāś ca (*VS* 2.1.2);
tejo rūpa-sparśavat (*VS* 2.1.3);
vāyuḥ sparśavān (*VS* 2.1.4);
ta ākāśe na vidyante (*VS* 2.1.5) etc.

2. *Nature of colour, taste, smell and touch in earth*

pṛthivyāṃ rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa dravyanityatvād anityaḥ (7.1.4).

The colour, taste, smell and touch of the earth, inasmuch as (gross) substance is non-eternal, are non-eternal.

Notes:

Pot etc. are earthy substance. The qualities like colour etc. thereof are destroyed when those substrata are destroyed.

agnisaṃyogāc ca (7.1.5)

Also due to conjunction with fire.

Notes:

The colour etc. in the earth atoms may also be destroyed if there is conjunction with fire. It is to be noted that the destruction of colour etc. is obviously due to destruction of the very substrata.

etena nityeṣv anityatvam uktam (7.1.6)

By this the non-eternity (of the qualities) in the eternal (earth atoms) is stated.

Notes:

The Vaiśeṣikas admit that the colour etc. in the eternal atoms are non-eternal due to emergence of other qualities but those eternal atoms are obviously earth atoms and others.

Śaṅkara's reading of the *VSs* in this section widely varies. He reads *pṛthivyādi-rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśā dravyānityatvād anityāś ca* and *etena nityeṣu nityatvam uktam*. According to him the *sūtra* Nos. are 7.1.2 and 3. Anyway, the meaning of the *sūtras* are "colour, taste, smell and touch in earth etc. are non-eternal when those substances are non-eternal and are eternal when those substances are eternal." But Candrānanda clearly says that qualities are not eternal in the earth atoms, though the atoms are eternal. Śaṅkara's reading "*nityeṣu nityatvam*" must be incorrect because of qualities in the eternal substances are eternal; then to formulate a separate *sūtra* (*apsu tejasi* .... 7.1.8) would be unnecessary.

Moreover, *pṛthivyādi* (according to Śaṅkaramiśra) is also inaccurate as "*anityeṣv anityā dravyānityatvāt* (7.1.9) is admitted separately.

Just before this *sūtra* Candrānanda reads one *sūtra—guṇāntaraprādurbhāvāt*. First, this is nowhere else as a Vaiśeṣika *sūtra*. Next, the very nature of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 7.1.5 with the particle *ca* strongly suggests the topic of non-eternity of the qualities ends herewith. So we have left the *sūtra* (as noted by Candrānanda) out from our critical text.

Anyway, the exposition of Candrānanda thereon is like the following: How is it known that the colour etc. in an earthy substance are destroyed due to conjunction with fire? The present *sūtra* answers it. As there arises another quality different from black colour etc. due to conjunction of fire, than it follows that at first the previous qualities are destroyed. A new quality does not arise in an object already endowed with similar qualities.

3. Nature of colour, taste and touch in water, fire and air

apsu tejasi vāyau ca nityā dravyanityatvāt (7.1.7)

They (taste, colour and touch) are eternal in water, fire and air (respectively) inasmuch as the substances are eternal.

Notes:

The colour etc. in the atoms of water, fire and air are eternal, because their substrata

are eternal. Moreover there cannot be the emergence of other qualities. So the destruction of qualities by the conjunction of fire, cannot be admitted here.

anityeṣv anityā dravyānityatvāt (7.1.8)

In things non-eternal they are non-eternal, because these substances are non-eternal.

Notes:

The colour etc. in the gross water etc. are non-eternal because the former are destroyed with the destruction of their substrata.

4. Origination of the first five qualities

karma-guṇapūrvāḥ pṛthivyām pākajāś ca (7.1.9)

(The qualities) in earth are preceded by the qualities of the causes. They are also due to chemical change.

Notes:

In the non-eternal earth-products the colour etc. are produced after being preceded by the qualities of the causes. For example, red colour in the pot will come from the red colour of the inherent causes, by which the pot is constituted.

Now the question arises, the colour etc. of the earth atoms cannot be from the colour etc. of the causes because the atoms are ultimate and there are no causes of atoms. The present *sūtra* is to answer it. In the eternal earth atoms the new qualities will come by chemical reaction.

apsu tejasi vāyau ca kāraṇa-guṇa-pūrvāḥ pākajā na vidyante (7.1.10)

(The qualities) in water, fire and air are always preceded by the qualities of the causes (and) are not due to chemical change.

Notes:

Obviously in the gross non-eternal inherent cause, the colour etc. emerge from qualities of the causes, but in the eternal atoms of the water etc. the qualities cannot emerge by chemical reaction, because there can be no other opposite quality therein.

aguṇavato dravyasya guṇārambhāt karmaguṇā aguṇāḥ (7.1.11)

Inasmuch as the qualities emerge, in a produced substance void of qualities (by the qualities of the cause), the actions and qualities are without any further quality.

Notes:

Qualities cannot be endowed with further qualities, because qualities are not atomic in character. As such they cannot create a separate quality but simply inhere in the *avayavin* itself. The same is for actions also.

etena pākajā vyākhyātāḥ (7.1.12)

By this, (the qualities) due to chemical changes are explained.

Notes:

By the conjunction of fire the black colour etc. of the pot are ceased and there arise

chemically produced colours. Those colours etc. are possible in an object, only when it is without any quality.

ekadravyatvāt (7.1.13)

Because there is only one substance.

Notes:

The question may arise that ás the conjunction is seen to have been produced in an object already having a conjunction, so let there be the chemically produced colour in an object already having colour, what is the harm? In answer to this, the present *sūtra* is formulated. The qualities produced from chemical reaction are inhered in one substance, so how is the emergence of another quality (*ārambha* i.e. appearance due to more than one constituent) possible in that very single atom, because the other quality is contradictory to the previous quality. But in the case of conjunction, another conjunction in a substance having conjunction is possible, as there are more than one substance.

5. Dimension

aṇor mahataś copalabdhyanupalabdhī nitye vyākhyāte (7.1.14)

The perception of the gross and the non-perception of the atoms have been explained in the section where the eternal substances are explained.

Notes:

Nitya refers to the chapter where *nitya* i.e. eternal substances, are explained. It is the fourth chapter (*sūtras* 6-8) where the conditions of perceiving and not perceiving a substance are stated. Thus, a substance which is perceived must have grossness, and a substance which is not perceived might have been either atom or dyad, and the internal organ. Triad, though gross is not yet capable of perception because of the non-existence of the manifestation of colour.

kāraṇabahutvāt kāraṇamahattvāt pracayaviśeṣāc ca mahat (7.1.15)

In consequence of a plurality of causes (i.e. a number of inherent cases), grossness of causes and a particular coalescence, magnitude is produced

Notes:

The magnitude in a triad is produced by the plurality of dyads which is the cause of triad. Again, magnitude in a two-finger combine is produced by the magnitude of the fingers. Magnitude in a two-heap cotton combine is produced by the coalescence (i.e. loose conjunction) between the constituents.

Candrānanda accepts the lengthy *sūtra*. But Śaṅkaramiśra reads only *kāraṇabahutvāc ca*, and according to him the particle *ca* implies the addition of magnitude and loose conjunction.

tadviparītam aṇu (7.1.16)

The contrary of this is the minute.

Notes:

If there is not a single cause to produce magnitude, it is atomic, like dyad (which is also the minute to a Vaiśeṣika).

aṇu mahad iti tasmin viśeṣabhāvād viśeṣābhāvāc ca (7.1.17)

The notions bigger and smaller (arise) in this conception (of a relatively great and a relatively small object) from the existence of particularity, and from the non-existence of particularity.

Notes:

The gross objects (*mahat*) like jujube etc. are called small (*aṇu*) in relation to an embelic myrobalan and the latter is bigger, and again that very embelic myrobalan is called small (*aṇu*) in relation to a wood-apple. In this way, due to existence and non-existence of excellence, the use of small and big in a single object is notional.

ekakālatvāt (7.1.18)

Because time is one.

Notes:

Why is the use of "small" and "big" in a single object, notional? Because the same object, at the same time, is called small and big, by two persons in relation to that one object. So from this contrary use of terms for a single object, we decide that the use is nothing but notional.

dṛṣṭāntāc ca (7.1.19)

And because of the example.

Notes:

In an object relatively small the use of "small" (*aṇu*) is notional. As a cloth produced by the white yarns is always white and never black, so, the object produced from the gross element is always gross and never "small" (*aṇu*). So the use of *aṇu* for that object is secondary. The explanation is according to Candrānanda.

Śaṅkaramiśra explains that cloth, conch-shell and crystal are all white, even then we say cloth is white, conch-shell is whiter and crystal is whitest. Just like this, to indicate the relative magnitude between the different gross objects we use the words *aṇu*, *mahat* etc.

aṇutva-mahattvayor aṇutva-mahattvābhāvaḥ karmaguṇair vyākhyātaḥ (7.1.20)

The non-existence of bigness and smallness in bigness and smallness, is explained by (the causes) of actions and qualities.

Notes:

Qualities and actions are said to be without any further qualities. Why? The substances are endowed with qualities because the qualities of the parts are inherent in the whole that is produced. But, the colour etc. are not produced by the qualities of their parts, and then those qualities inhere in the *avayavin*. The case of "smallness" and "bigness" is similar to this.

aṇutva-mahattvābhyām karmaguṇā aguṇāḥ (7.1.21)

On the analogy of smallness and bigness, action and quality are devoid of quality.

Notes:

No inherence in one object (*ekārthasamavāya*) by the multiplicity of causes is possible in the cases of "smallness" or "bigness". So "smallness" and "bigness" cannot be further endowed with "smallness" and "bigness". Likewise, action and qualities are also void of "smallness" and "bigness". It simply means that a quality is never seen to have been produced by component parts. So are the cases of "smallness" and "bigness" (both being quality). And following the same rule, action and quality are explained as being devoid of any quality.

etena dīrghatva-hrasvatve vyākhyāte (7.1.22)

By this, "length" and "shortness" are explained.

Notes:

Length is produced by the "bigness of the causes" etc. The opposite of this is "shortness". On the analogy of "bigness" and "smallness", "length" (a quality) cannot further be in another "length" and "shortness" in another "shortness".

karmabhiḥ karmāṇi guṇair guṇāḥ (7.1.23)

Actions and qualities are (explained) to be (void) of action and qualities.

Notes:

As actions and qualities are devoid of "smallness" and "bigness" due to no inherence in one object by the multiplicity of causes, likewise those are also void of "length" and "shortness". This is the explanation of Candrānanda.

tadanitye 'nityam (7.1.24)

These four types of dimension are non-eternal in the non-eternal (objects).

nityam parimaṇḍalam (7.1.25)

Atomic dimension is eternal.

avidyā vidyāliṅgam (7.1.26)

Non-existence (regarding something) is the mark of existence (of something).

Notes:

Atoms are imperceptible, and the dimension in those are termed as "*parimaṇḍala*". But what is the proof of this peculiar type of dimension? The present *sūtra* is an answer to this. Candrānanda explains it in this way: *avidyā* means *asambhava* (non-existence) and *vidyā* means *sambhava* (existence). Now, the meaning of the *sūtra* is the non-existence of the substance without dimension is the mark of existence of the atomic dimension of the atoms, i.e. as no substance is possible without dimension, the atoms also must have dimension and that dimension is *parimaṇḍala*.

Śaṇkaramiśra's explanation is quite polished here. Ignorance like "Earth is eternal" etc., is the mark of the right knowledge like "Atomic earth is eternal" etc. In fact, one who

has no knowledge of eternity cannot commit a mistake as "earth is eternal". So the argument contained in this *sūtra* is apparent.

vibhavād mahān ākāśaḥ (7.1.27)

Ākāśa is infinitely great because of its universal pervasion.

Notes:

In consequence of conjunction with all the finite objects, *ākāśa* is admitted to have infinite dimension.

tathā cātmā (7.1.28)

Likewise is soul.

Notes:

Like *ākāśa*, soul also is admitted to be infinitely great.

tadabhāvād aṇu manaḥ (7.1.29)

As because of non-existence of that (kind of nature as in *ākāśa*) the internal organ is absolutely small.

Notes:

Due to absence of conjunction with all the finite objects (at a time) the internal organ is admitted to have atomic dimension. The absence of simultaneous knowledge of different things proves that there cannot be simultaneous conjunction with a number of finite objects. So the internal organ is atomic.

guṇair dig vyākhyātā (7.1.30)

By the qualities, direction is explained.

Notes:

When the direction of things are mentioned, such as, this is to the east of this, etc. the verbal use like these are related to the finite objects. So because of qualities called conjunctions with the finite objects (at a time) the direction is admitted to have infinitely great dimension.

kāraṇena kālaḥ (7.1.31)

Time (is admitted as ubiquitous), because of the cause.

Notes:

The existence of time is inferred from our use such as " this is prior to this" or "this is posterior to this" etc. So time naturally exists everywhere. The above cause leads to the admission of the ubiquity of time.

CHAPTER VII *ĀHNIKA* II

(The *āhnika* deals with qualities like number, priority, posteriority, conjunction etc. and with the category 'inherence')

1. Number

rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-vyatirekād arthāntaram ekatvam tathā pṛthaktvam (7.2.1)

Because of difference from colour, taste, smell and touch, Unity is a different entity. Likewise is separateness.

Notes:

We have the knowledge like "this is one". The cause of this knowledge cannot be colour etc., because that knowledge is totally different from the knowledge of colour etc. Duality etc. are produced from two knowledges of unity or a number of knowledges of unity.

As the knowledge of unity is a separate type of knowledge, so also is the knowledge of separateness. Of this knowledge, the knowledge of colour etc. cannot be the cause. The cause thereof is separateness. As duality is produced from two knowledges of unity, double separateness etc. from two etc. also is produced from two single separatenesses, or a number of "separateness from one".

Candrānanda reads two more *sūtras* after 7.2.1 : *tayor nityatvānityatve tejaso rūpasparśābhyām vyākhyāte* and *niṣpattiś ca*. But their authenticity is not attested by any other source known to us. Anyway, the exposition thereon is like the following:

The colour and touch of the fire atoms are eternal, because the substances are eternal. Similarly 'unity' and 'separateness from one' contained in eternal substance are eternal. Again, the colour etc. in fire which has been produced is non-eternal, because the substance is non-eternal. Similarly, 'unity' and 'separateness from one' in non-eternal substance are non-eternal.

The exposition of the second one is as follows:

Colour and touch in the fire, which has been produced are produced from the colour and touch of the cause. Unity and separateness are also like colour and touch. Likewise are weight, liquidity and viscidity.

ekatva-pṛthaktvayor ekatvapṛthaktvābhāvo'ṇutva-mahattvābhyām vyākhyātaḥ (7.2.2)

The non-existence of unity and separateness in further unity and separateness, is explained by smallness and bigness.

Notes:

VS 7.1.21 states that smallness and bigness do not further contain smallness and bigness. On the analogy of those, unity and separateness also do not further contain unity and single separateness. It is a general dictum that qualities and actions do not further contain quality and action respectively.

karmabhiḥ karmāṇi guṇair guṇāḥ (7.2.3)

Actions are (devoid of any further action), qualities are devoid of any further qualities.

Notes:

It is a vital point of the Vaiśeṣika tenet that the qualities, actions etc. are devoid of any further quality and action. It may be contended that action or quality is endowed with a unity or separateness, as we use 'this is a quality', 'this is an action', 'this is a separate quality', or 'this is a separate action'. But it cannot be permitted, because we do not find any quality or action, where the constituent parts of quality or action are inhered therein.

niḥsaṃkhyatvāt karmaguṇānāṃ sarvaikatvaṃ na vidyate (7.2.4)

Unity does not exist everywhere for actions and qualities are devoid of number.

Notes:

Objection: All the categories contain unity, as they are all existent (*sat*) and in this sense they are one.

Answer: No. As actions and qualities do not contain number, unity does not exist everywhere.

ekatvasyābhāvād bhāktaṃ na vidyate (7.2.5)

In consequence of non-existence of (primary) unity, secondary unity (also) does not exist (in quality etc.).

Notes:

It may be argued that unity is secondarily used in the qualities etc., and to answer this, the present *sūtra* is formulated. Unity does not exist in qualities etc. primarily. So, by imagining that it is secondarily present one is not able to prove the existence of unity in qualities etc. Because unity in the substance is primarily existent and the same is secondarily existent in the qualities etc.

kārya-kāraṇaikatva-pṛthaktvābhāvād ekatva-pṛthaktve na vidyate (7.2.6)

In between cause and effect there is no unity and separateness in consequence of the non-existence of unity and separateness.

Notes:

Objection: There is unity (*ekatva* secondarily means identity) of cause and effect, because the number is found to be unrestrictedly existent in substance. Again, due to absence of unity there is difference.

Answer: No. Neither unity nor separateness is existent in cause and effect, because the absence of unity and separateness is established by argument. Cause and effect (both in substance) constitute duality and not identity (*ekatva*). Again, effect cannot exist in the substratum other than its cause, so cause and effect do not exist separately.

etad anitya-nityayor vyākhyātam (7.2.7)

This is explained in relation to non-eternal and eternal.

Notes:

etat means the previous *sūtra*. So though the matter in the previous *sūtra* is related to non-eternals, the matter is also applicable to 'eternals and non-eternals'. As for example, neither identity nor separateness of sound (non-eternal) and *ākāśa* (eternal) are admitted.

2. Conjunction and disjunction

anyatara-karmaja ubhayakarmajaḥ saṃyogajaś ca saṃyogaḥ (7.2.8)

Conjunction is produced by action of any one of the two objects, by the action of both, and by conjunction.

Notes:

When any one of the two objects begins to move towards the other, then conjunction is produced. As for example, conjunction is produced with the still tree trunk and the flying hawk. Again, when both of the two objects begin to move towards each other, conjunction is produced. As for example, conjunction between two wrestlers. Conjunction is also produced by conjunction. As for example, conjunction between a cause and a non-cause gives birth to a conjunction between an effect and a non-effect. As in the case, conjunction between finger and *ākāśa* (when two fingers are being joined together supposing one finger as fixed, and the other as coming in contact with) it. The latter creating the conjunction with another part of *ākāśa*) creates conjunction between a unit of two fingers with *ākaśa*. Finger is a cause, *ākāśa* is a non-cause and the unit of two fingers is an effect, and *ākāśa* is a non-effect.

etena vibhāgo vyākhyātaḥ (7.2.9)

By this disjunction is explained.

Notes:

Contrary to conjunction, disjunction also is produced in three ways. First, due to disjunction of any of the two objects, e.g. disjunction of dispersing hawk from still stuff. Secondly, due to disjunction of both of the two objects, e.g. disjunction between two sheep themselves dispersing from each other. Lastly, due to disjunction, e.g. disjunction between the two fingers immediately creates disjunction of the unit of two fingers. This disjunction creates disjunction between finger and *ākāśa*. Again, disjunction between cause and non-cause may also create another disjunction: hand (cause) is disjoined from (a part) of *ākāśa* (non-cause) and it (disjunction) creates the disjunction between body and *ākāśa*.

saṃyoga-vibhāgayoḥ saṃyoga-vibhāgābhāvo'ṇutva-mahattvābhāvābhyām vyākhyātaḥ (7.2.10)

The non-existence of conjunction and disjunction in conjunction and disjunction is explained on (the analogy of) smallness and bigness.

Notes:

In *VS* 7.1.21 we have seen that no quality contains any quality and naturally smallness and bigness do not further exist in smallness and bigness. On this analogy conjunction and disjunction are prohibited to be further existent in conjunction and disjunction. Candrānanda is more specific on this question. He says that as there is the absence of unconnectedness (in a conjunction) there cannot be further connection.

karmabhiḥ karmāṇi guṇair guṇāḥ (7.2.11)

Action is devoid of any further action and quality is of any further quality.

Notes:

Conjunction and disjunction may be felt to be present in action or quality, such as 'these two actions are conjoined' or 'these two qualities are conjoined' or 'these two actions are being disjoined' or 'these two qualities are being disjoined.' But those are misconception. Conjunction and disjunction are present in those, whose separate existence is proved. But action and quality do not have individual existence, hence conjunction and disjunction cannot reside in them.

yutasiddhyabhāvāt kāryakāraṇayoḥ saṃyoga-vibhāgau na vidyete (7.2.12)

Inasmuch as there is non-existence of unconnectedness (*yutasiddhi*), conjunction and disjunction in an effect and its cause do not exist.

Notes:

An example of the above is absence of conjunction and disjunction in the pot and its parts. Conjunction and disjunction in such objects are not admitted because their separate existence is not possible, i.e. the separate existence of pot and its parts at the same time is not possible. The term *yutasiddhi* is defined by Candrānanda as "having movement of the two or any one of the two". Śaṅkaramiśra defines it: "Existence of the two having no mutual connection".

3. Sound

guṇatvāt (7.2.13)

Inasmuch as it (sound) is a quality (of *ākāśa*, it cannot be connected with other objects).

Notes:

Now if it is said that the sound has the connection (conjunction) with the objects, then the answer is that sound has no connection with objects other than *ākāśa* (in inherence), and the conclusion is that sound is a quality, exclusively of *ākāśa*.

guṇe ca bhāṣyate (7.2.14)

And sound is used (to call) qualities.

Notes:

And, sound (a quality) is used in qualities and actions (to call colour, taste etc.). But as no connection is admitted between qualities and qualities, or qualities and actions, so sound is not connected with qualities or actions. In the previous *sūtra* the connection between sound and substances (other than *ākāśa*) has been prohibited.

niṣkriyatvāt (7.2.15)

Inasmuch as there is no action (in the sound there exists no conjunction between them).

Notes:

If there could be the conjunction with the object, then the sound would get the object. But as sound, being a quality, cannot be endowed with action (according to Vaiśeṣika rule), so sound cannot move. But we feel the spreading of sound. It is because sound creates another similar sound.

asati nāstīti ca prayogāt (7.2.16)

Inasmuch as the expression *does not exist* is used of the non-existent.

Notes:

If the question of conjunction of the sound with the object arises then how can it be justified that the sound *nāsti* is used when there is non-existence? The answer is that no conjunction is possible with non-existence.

śabdārthāv asambaddhau (7.2.17)

The sound (word) and its (corresponding) object are without any connection.

saṃyogino daṇḍāt samavāyino viṣāṇāc ca (7.2.18)

(The knowledge) of that which possesses conjunction (results from knowledge of the conjunct as) from a stuff; and (the knowledge) of that which possesses inherence (results) from the horns.

Notes:

The present *sūtra* contains the *prima facie* argument. It is not right to say that there is no connection between sound and the corresponding object. From the stick connected in conjunction, there appears the knowledge of the stick holder, and from the horn connected in inherence appears the knowledge of horn-possessor. And from sound, there appears the knowledge of the object, so there must be some relation between sound and object.

dṛṣṭatvād ahetuḥ pratyayaḥ (7.2.19)

The knowledge (of the object) is not a cause (of relation between them) because (the relation between the stick and stick-holder etc.) is perceived, (but relation between them is not perceived).

Notes:

The relation between sound and object cannot be proved, for the knowledge of the object and the sound is not a causal relation. The relation between them is not perceived. However the stick-holder or horn-possessor is perceived. After this *sūtra* (7.2.19) Candrānanda reads two more *sūtras* the authenticity of which is not attested by any other source known to us. The *sūtras* are: *tathā pratyayābhāvaḥ* and *sambaddha-sambandhād iti cet sandehaḥ*. Anyway, the propose of them may be noted in the following way:

1. If the sound would be related with the object, then even the sound, denotation of which is unknown, would produce knowledge. But sound in the said condition cannot produce knowledge. Then it proves that sound and object have no mutual relation.

2. Sound is not connected with the object. Now if it is assumed that sound is connected with *ākāśa*, which is further connected with the object and in this way sound can be connected with the object, the *sūtra* denies this. *Ākāśa* is connected with all the

objects including the object indicated by the sound. This type of doubt leads to no apprehension at all. Therefore, the relation between sound and the object cannot be admitted.

sāmayikaḥ śabdād arthapratyayaḥ (7.2.20)

The recognition of a meaning from a word is conventional.

Notes:

The knowledge of the object from the sound is not due to their mutual relation but due to convention.

4. Priority and posteriority

ekadikkālābhyāṃ sannikṛṣṭa-viprakṛṣṭābhyāṃ param aparaṃ ca (7.2.21)

The prior and posterior (are produced) by two objects occupying the same direction and occupying the same time as near and remote.

Notes:

When two objects occupy the same direction and time then we have the knowledge like—this one is remote (*para*) and this one is near (*apara*). The qualities giving birth to such specific knowledge are priority and posteriority. Śaṅkaramiśra admits only spatial nearness and remoteness here in this *sūtra*. But Candrānanda explains both the spatial and time-related, for this *sūtra*. When two objects occupy the same direction (obviously, unity of time is a must here), the knowledge of priority and posteriority arises due to knowledge of the near and the far. Now when two objects occupy the same time (in present time) (no compulsion regarding unity of direction) knowledge of priority and posteriority arises due to knowledge of *before* and *after*.

kāraṇaparatvāt kāraṇāparatvāc ca (7.2.22)

(Priority and posteriority result) from posteriority of the cause and from priority of the cause (respectively).

Notes:

Now, the inherent causes of priority and posteriority are the two objects. The non-inherent causes are the connections with the near and remote spaces—when it is spatial *parāparatva*. When it is time-related *parāparatva*, the non-inherent causes are the connections with the posterior of prior segments of time.

Śaṅkaramiśra takes this *sūtra* as an explanation of time-related priority and posteriority. But Candrānanda takes this *sūtra* as an explanation of non-inherent causes of priority and posteriority whereas the previous *sūtra* according to him is for the explanation of inherent causes of them.

paratvāparatvayoḥ paratvāparatvābhāvo'ṇutva-mahattvābhyāṃ vyākhyātaḥ (7.2.23)

The non-existence of priority and posteriority in priority and posteriority is explained by smallness and bigness.

Notes:

Priority and posteriority are qualities, and as they are not separately existent from the object, so the conjunction between the object and priority or the object and posteriority

is not possible. And as they are not separately existent, further priority or posteriority cannot reside in them. For the cases of smallness and bigness, see *VS* 7.1.21.

karmabhiḥ karmāṇi guṇair guṇāḥ (7.2.24)

As the action and qualities (cannot be) endowed with any further action or quality (so they are void of priority or posteriority).

Notes:

Actions and qualities cannot be further endowed with actions or qualities. The reasons behind it are two:

(i) *ekārthasamavāya-abhāva* i.e. as those further action or qualities cannot be inhered in a single entity; and

(ii) *yutasiddhi-abhāva* i.e. as the actions or qualities are not independently existent.

5. *Inherence*

iheti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ (7.2.25)

That is inherence by virtue of which it may be said of cause and effect that (the one is) in this.

Notes:

The qualities inhere in a substance. This is our common experience. Now what is this inherence? The answer is given by the present *sūtra*. The category which gives rise to such knowledges like 'this is in this', more elaborately, 'cloth is in these yarns', or 'colour etc. in this pot' or 'action in this pot' and the like,—is inherence. In the *sūtra* the knowledge of 'cause and effect' has been stated. But it is notional. So inherence is also admitted between the *individual and generality* and *eternal substances and particularities*.

dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatva-pratiṣedho bhāvena vyākhyātaḥ (7.2.26)

The negation of the substanceness, qualityness and actionness is explained on (the analogy of) the existence.

Notes:

Substance can be of two types:

(i) *adravya* i.e. which has no substance as cause e.g. atoms, *ākāśa* etc.

(ii) *anekadravya* i.e. which has two or many substances as its cause, e.g. pot etc.

There is another expression *ekadravya* which has one entire substance class as its inherent cause. e.g. *sattā*, substanceness etc. *Bhāva* means *sattā*. Vide *VS* 1.2.4. As *sattā* is not a substance due to *ekadravyavattva* (of the former) and is not an action and quality as it (*sattā*) exists in action and quality, inherence is also neither a substance, nor an action, nor a quality.

tattvaṃ ca (7.2.27)

And its reality (is explained on the analogy of the existence).

Notes:

As existence is one, due to uniform knowledge of the form 'this is existent', 'this is

existent' etc. Similarly, inherence also is one, due to uniform knowledge '(the one is) in this', '(the one is) in this', etc. This inherence is eternal and without any parts.

CHAPTER VIII

(The chapter deals with causes and nature of perception)

1. Perception

dravyeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam (8.1)

Perception has already been explained (in the topic of) substances.

Notes:

In 3.1.13 perception has been explained in connection with substances. But it requires a detailed treatment as a quality. And here it starts.

mana ātmā ca (8.2)

(Likewise), explained are the mind and the soul.

Notes:

The mind and the soul, both as the causes of knowledge, are likewise explained in *VS* 3.1.13.

jñānanirdeśe jñānaniṣpattir uktā (8.3)

The (mode of production) of the knowledge has been stated in the enumeration of knowledge.

Notes:

Now in the topic of quality, knowledge is being explained. In the context of production of knowledge the mode 'being produced by the connection with sense-organ' has been already mentioned.

guṇakarmaṣv asannikṛṣṭeṣu jñānaniṣpatter dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca (8.4)

Qualities and action cannot be brought into contact (with the sense-organs). Substance is the cause of the production of knowledge (of substance) and the cause of the cause (of the production of knowledge of qualities and actions).

Notes:

The connection with sense-organ is said to be the cause of knowledge, but it creates a problem. Sense-organ cannot be directly connected with the qualities etc. Again cognition cannot be admitted, without any connection. Then how will the knowledge of the qualities and actions be produced? The *sūtra* answers that qualities and actions are inhered in the substance. So it is the inherent cause of them. Now, a connection as the cause of knowledge must be admitted. And as this is not directly possible with the qualities and actions, so the very substance is to be admitted as the cause of that knowledge. The knowledge of qualities and actions then will appear.from the connection which is inherence with the conjoined.

The particle *ca* is used to denote 'reason'.

The printed editions of Śaṅkaramiśra's reading of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra shows *guṇakarmasu sannikṛṣṭeṣu* which appears to be contradictory to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view.

sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu sāmānya-viśeṣābhāvāt tata eva jñānam (8.5)

Inasmuch as in generalities and particularities there exist no generalities and particularities, so their knowledge is produced from that very (substance).

Notes:

The knowledge of substance, and not of the generalities and particularities, produces the knowledge of generalities (superior and inferior) and particularities.

Here the question of existence of further generalities and particularities, in generalities and particularities has been raised. The contention behind it, is that if another generality or particularity resides in former, then generality or particularity as a substratum would be cognised. In that case the knowledge of generality or particularity would be direct. But as it is not the case, so the substratum being a substance is primarily connected with the sense-organ to produce the knowledge of generalities or particularities.

sāmānya-viśeṣāpekṣaṃ dravyaguṇakarmasu (8.6)

(Knowledge) of substances, qualities and actions depends on the superior generality and particularities.

Notes:

The knowledge of substance, quality and action has been stated. Now, in the present *sūtra*, the knowledge such as 'This is existent and a substance', 'This is existent and a quality' and 'This is existent and an action' is being explained.

First, substance among the substance, quality and action is connected with the sense-organ. Then the *sattā* (existence) and substanceness etc. are cognised. From those the knowledge in the form like 'This is existent and is a substance' etc. appears. Candrānanda notes that *sāmānya* in the *sūtra* means existence (*sattā*) and *viśeṣa* means *sāmānya-viśeṣa* i.e. inferior generality like substanceness etc. But in the previous *sūtra, sāmānya* is meant for all the generalities and *viśeṣa* for particularities.

dravye dravyaguṇakarmāpekṣam (8.7)

(Knowledge) of substance depends upon substance; quality and action.

Notes:

Here the knowledge of qualified substance is being explained. Due to connection with the visual sense-organ the knowledge appears. Now when the knowledge like 'a substance with horns' (*viṣāṇin*) appears, it depends upon another substance. When the knowledge like 'It is white' appears, it depends upon the quality in a substance. And when the knowledge like 'It is going' appears, it depends upon the action in a substance. Hence the knowledge of qualification is the cause, and the qualified knowledge is the effect.

guṇakarmasu guṇakarmābhāvād guṇakarmāpekṣam na vidyate (8.8)

Inasmuch as there exist no qualities and actions in qualities and actions, there is no knowledge thereof which depends on qualities and actions.

Notes:

Qualities and actions cannot be present as qualification in the qualified knowledge of qualities and actions. As they do not exist in qualities and actions, therefore the knowledge of qualities and actions does not depend on further qualities and actions.

samavāyinaḥ śvaityāc chvaityabuddheḥ śvete buddhis te kāryakāraṇabhūte (8.9)

The knowledge of a white object results from the whiteness of the substratum (i.e. a substratum where whiteness resides in relation of inherence) and from the knowledge of whiteness; and these ('whiteness of the substratum and the whiteness' and the 'knowledge of the white object') stand in a relation of cause and effect.

Notes:

There is no steadfast rule that the knowledge of this one appears first, from among the knowledge of substance, qualities etc. This is clarified here by this *sūtra*.

dravyeṣv anitaretarakāraṇāt kāraṇayaugapadyāt (8.10)

Because sometimes the knowledge of substances are not mutually the causes due to absence of simultaneity of the cause (being the internal organ) (there appear some knowledges where the matter of qualifications and qualified does not exist.).

Notes:

In *VS* 8.7, the knowledge of a substance ('It is with horns') is found as having been dependent with another substance (horn). But substances are not always found to be in relation of the qualification and the qualified. For example, the knowledge of pot and cloth. It is true that they have sequence. But this is not because of the fact that 'it is prior as it is a cause, or it is posterior as it is an effect'. It is because of the very atomic character of the internal organ and because of this very reason the internal organ cannot be present in both the cases simultaneously. The knowledge of pot and cloth cannot be mutually cause and effect, because there cannot be any such matter being the qualification and the qualified. In knowledge like 'it is with horns' (*viṣāṇin*) or 'It is white' etc. the substance etc. are cognised first as they are the qualification. Thus the knowledge of qualification is the cause and that of the qualified is the effect.

tathā dravya-guṇa-karmasu kāraṇaviśeṣāt (8.11)

(It may be argued that the matter of qualification and qualified is not tenable. Then the following is said). Similar are the cases of substance, quality and action, because the (previously stated) reason prevails here too.

Notes:

'Cow', 'white' and 'going' are knowledge of substance, quality and action, which appear in a series, and not simultaneously. Here also there is no cause-effect relation, because there is no such qualification and qualified. So it is seen, that the reason which has been stated in the previous *sūtra*, applies here too. Therefore, the knowledge of substance is the cause of the knowledges of quality and action, or vice versa.

ayam eṣa kṛtaṃ tvayā bhojayainam iti buddhyapekṣam (8.12)

"This", "That", "Done by you", "Feed him" and such expressions depend upon intellection.

Notes:

The expression "This" produces the knowledge of proximity and "That" of remoteness. The expression "Done by you" produces the knowledge action and agent. The expression "Feed him" produces the knowledge of agent and object. The knowledge in remoteness depends upon the proximity. The knowledge in agent depends upon the action "Done". The knowledge in object depends upon the agent of Feed.

dṛṣṭeṣu bhāvād adṛṣṭeṣv abhāvāt (8.13)

Inasmuch as (such expressions) exist in reference to objects seen, and do not exist in reference to objects unseen.

Notes:

In the previous *sūtra* we see that there is knowledge which depends on other knowledge. If the objects which are near are seen, then there arises the knowledges of remote objects. Not when the objects which are near are unseen. So, in this way the knowledge of remote objects are dependent on the knowledge of objects which are near. Yet they are not in cause-effect relation, as the knowledge of objects which are near, does not become a qualification and consequently the relation of qualification and qualified does not exist.

artha iti dravyaguṇakarmasu (8.14)

The term *artha* (object) applies to substances, qualities and actions.

Notes:

The knowledge depends on object (*artha*) and sense-organs. Here in the *sūtra* the denotation of 'object' is being stated.

The term *artha* (object) in the *sūtra* 3.1.13 is to be considered as a technical term.

2. Nature of sense-organs

dravyeṣu pañcātmakaṃ pratyuktam (8.15)

That the substance is composed of five elements has been discarded.

Notes:

Now another cause of knowledge i.e. sense-organ, is being explained. By the present *sūtra* it is being reminded that 'the substances are composed of five elements' has been discarded in 4.2.1. A substance cannot be produced by the five elements. Earth is produced from earth element, water from water elements, etc. So the sense-organs are also the effects of some specific elements. Visual sense-organ is from fire elements, auditory sense-organ is from the *ākāśa* element, olfactory sense-organ is from earth elements, gustatory from water element and tactile from air element.

bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne (8.16)

In the olfactory sense-organ (by which smell is cognised) earth is the cause, inasmuch as the earth constitutes its parts, and also as it possesses smell.

Notes:

The *gandhajñāna* (of which *gandha* is the object of knowledge) means the olfactory

sense-organ. In the production of this sense-organ, earth is the cause because of *bhūyastva* which means 'the sense-organ draws from earth more than a body'. In this way the cases of all other sense-organs are to be explained.

tathāpas tejo vāyuś ca rasa-rūpa-sparśa-jñāneṣu rasa-rūpa-sparśa-viśeṣāt (8.17)

In like manner, water, fire and air (are the inherent causes) of the gustatory, visual and tactile sense-organs, inasmuch as they (organs) have taste, colour and touch respectively in a predominant way.

Notes:

The gustatory sense-organ (*rasana*) is composed of the inherent cause which is sweet taste (*rasa*) not chemically changed, and hence it is *rasavat*. It is not suppressed by another element. Similarly, the visual organ is composed of white shining colour and the tactile is made of touch, which is not chemically changed and is neither hot nor cold. They are not suppressed by qualities, other than their respective inherent qualities. Candrānanda puts up the cause *bhūyastva* here also (as in *VS* 8.16) to justify one particular organ from a particular *bhuta* or element. *Bhūyastva* means 'not to be suppressed by other element'. In the *Vṛtti* of *VS* 8.16, he stated a slightly different meaning of the very term. There was no question of suppression. But comparison with the other was associated there.

CHAPTER IX

(The chapter deals with the nature of inference and yogic perception)

1. The object of inference

kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvād asat (9.1)

(An effect) is (antecedently) non-existent, inasmuch as there is non-existence of assertion of actions and qualities.

Notes:

Effect is not perceived before its production . Nor is it inferred, because it is possible, only if there is the mark. If there is no knowledge of action or quality there is no question of mark. There is no other mark which would be indicated by the word *vyapadeśa*. So before production an effect is non-existent.

sadasat (9.2)

The existent (becomes) non-existent.

Notes:

An effect is existent, but when it is destroyed it becomes non-existent afterwards. This disappearance of an existent object is not because of non-existence of assertion of action or quality of that very object.

asataḥ sat kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvād arthāntaram (9.3)

Existent (object) is a different entity from non-existent (object) because in the latter,

there is no reference to action or qualities.

Notes:

An object being present before destruction and after production, is entirely different from non-existence. It (object) is called existent (*sat*) because the assertion of action and quality can be made relating to it.

saccāsat (9.4)

The existent also is non-existent.

Notes:

An object though existent, is non-existent in relation to another object. For example, a cow (existent here) is not a horse. In these cases and the like, the matter of 'non-existent' is imposed.

yaccānyat satas tadapyasat (9.5)

Whatever else (apart from the above cases of the non-existent) is other than the existent, is also non-existent (absolute).

Notes:

VSs 9.1, 2 and 4 in fact state the prior non-existence, posterior non-existence and mutual non-existence. The cases have shown in how many ways *sat* may be *asat*. Now apart from those, what else is different from *sat* is *asat* and it is (absolute) non-existence. For example, the hare's horn.

asad iti bhūta-pratyakṣābhāvād bhūtasmṛter virodhi-pratyakṣatvāc ca jñānam (9.6)

The knowledge that a thing is non-existent, results from the non-existence of a past perception, remembrance of the past and perception of the contradictory (object).

Notes:

Here *asat* means posterior non-existence. A pot is destroyed. Then there arises the knowledge that 'It is non-existent'. This knowledge results from a number of causes:

(i) Non-existence of the past perception of the past object;

(ii) Remembrance of the past object; and

(iii) Perception of the broken parts which are contradictory to the pot. From these knowledges, the destruction of the pot is inferred and the pot is declared to be 'non-existent'.

tathā'bhāve bhāvapratyakṣatvāc ca (9.7)

Likewise, the knowledge in (prior) non-existence results from the perception of existence.

Notes:

In the lump of earth, when there is prior non-existence, perception regarding pot is not there. But now, perception of the pot, which is contradictory to the prior perception, arises. And the situation of non-existence is remembered. Therefore, now there is existence, and before it was non-existent. Consequently the knowledge that 'It is non-existent' is confirmed in the prior non-existence.

etenāghaṭo 'gauradharmaś ca vyākhyātaḥ (9.8)

By this, (the non-existences) expressed as 'not a pot', 'not a cow' and 'not merit' are explained.

Notes:

Suppose, the knowledge of pot (*ghaṭa*) is produced in rice-cooking vessel (*sthālī*). Next due to other causes, the right knowledge appears- 'It is not a pot, but is a rice-cooking vessel'. Now, obviously there is the absence of the knowledge of pot, but the pot is remembered. And at the same time the contradictory *sthālī* is perceived. In the same sequence there appear the knowledge of 'not a cow' or 'not merit'.

abhūtaṃ nāstītyanarthāntaram (9.9)

Apart from prior non-existence, posterior non-existence and mutual non-existence, there remains the absolute non-existence, e.g. the hare's horn etc. It is not different from the synonymous terms *abhūta* (not real) or *nāsti* (does not exist). There is no restriction of direction or time regarding this non-existence.

nāsti ghaṭo geha iti sato ghaṭasya geha-saṃyoga-pratiṣedhaḥ (9.10)

(The assertion) that there is no pot in the house, is a non-existence of connection between an existent pot and the house.

Notes:

When we say that there is no pot in this place or at this time, there the connection of the pot with the place or with the time is negated.

nāstyanyaścandramā iti sāmānyāc candramasaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ (9.11)

(The assertion) that there is not another moon is a non-existence of the moon from the generality (i.e. *candratva*).

Notes:

We sometimes assert 'There is no second moon'. Now, what kind of non-existence is it? Here by the negation of number, moon is negated from the generality called moon-ness (*candratva*). Second moon would be permitted if only there would be moon-ness. So by the above assertion generality called moon-ness is being negated. Here place, time essence etc. are not associated with this non-existence. It is a different type of absolute non-existence where generality is negated.

sadasator vaidharmyāt kārye sadasattā na (9.12)

Because of difference between an existence and a non-existence, there cannot be existence and non-existence in an effect i.e. an effect is not existent and non-existent at the same time.

Notes:

An effect is always non-existent in its cause. It cannot simultaneously be existent and non-existent, only because those two phenomena are mutually contradictory.

2. Yogic perception

ātmanyātmamanasoḥ saṃyoga-viśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam (9.13)

Perception of the soul results from a particular conjunction between the soul and the internal organ—in the soul.

Notes:

Pulling the five sense-organs and the internal organ out from the objects, when only the internal organ is set in meditation in the very soul, the perceptual knowledge of the soul appears in the yogin's soul because of a conjunction of the particular soul and internal organ which depends on yogic power.

tathā dravyāntareṣu (9.14)

Likewise (perception) of other substances.

Notes:

The conjunction between the two ubiquitous objects is prohibited. So soul (a ubiquitous) substance cannot be conjoined with another ubiquitous substance. Anyway, there is no restriction of conjunction between the atoms and the soul. But due to yogic power, the knowledge of the atoms is produced, even when the atoms are not conjoined with the internal organ. However, the conjunction between soul and the internal organ is necessary here.

ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣāc ca (9.15)

(Perception of the yogins results) also from connection between soul, sense-organ, internal organ and the object.

Notes:

As the yogins by dint of yogic power can perceive the atoms without the connection with them, likewise they can perceive the minute, remote, obstructed objects as well as ordinary perceptible objects with the help of a connection between the four, i.e. soul, sense-organ, internal organ and the object. The peculiarity of this perception is that the general people cannot perceive those even with the connection between the four, but the yogins can.

tatsamavāyāt karmaguṇeṣu (9.16)

(Perception of the yogins is seen) in actions and qualities as those (actions and qualities) are inhered (in substances).

Notes:

It has been said that the yogins can perceive the ordinary perceivable objects as well as minute, remote and obstructed objects with the connection of four. Similarly the actions and qualities of those objects are also perceived by them with the connection of four because these actions etc. are existent in the inherence in those objects.

ātmasamavāyād ātmaguṇeṣu (9.17)

(Perception of the yogins is seen) in the qualities of the soul because those are inhered in the soul.

Notes:

In *VS* 9.13 it is said that the connection between the soul and the internal organ gives birth to the knowledge of the soul. Now by the present *sūtra* it is being said that the same connection can produce the knowledge of the qualities of the soul also because those are existent in the soul in the relation of inherence.

3. Nature of inference

asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sambandhyekārtha-samavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam (9.18)

Inferential cognition appears in the way—'This one is of this', (where this one may be) an effect, a cause, a related object, 'inhered in one substance' and contradictory.

Notes:

The mere relation between the two objects of the inference (probandum and probans) is meant by the expression *asya idam* i.e. 'This one is of this'. Specific relation between the two is meant by *kāryaṃ kāraṇam* etc. (effect, cause etc.). When one thing is the effect of another thing or one is the cause of another, the specific relation between them is inherence. The term *sambandhin* means *saṃyogin*. When one is conjoined to another, the specific relation between them is conjunction, e.g. between smoke and fire. 'This one is of this' may mean 'This one is inhered in one' with e.g. colour is of touch. The former is inhered in one with touch. This is an example of one variety (one effect is of another effect) of *ekārthasamavāyi*. Another variety is, for example, 'hand is inhered in one with leg'. Here one cause is of another cause. The case of contradictory may be of four types, vide *VSs* 3.1.11-14.

Regarding this *sūtra* Vācaspati's comments (under *NVTT* on *NS* 1.1.5) are very important. He says the following:

Four types of relation are said by the Vaiśeṣikas in the *sūtra—asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sambandhyekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam*. Here all others are collected by the term *sambandhi* and hence the rest are ineffective. It is said that the rest are not obstructing the unwarrantable stretch of what is meant by the term *sambandhi* must be dropped, as the rest will clarify the varieties of *sambandhi*. Moreover, the relation which is an important part of the inference cannot be four-fold in this way. Still, the Vaiśeṣikas advocate such kind of four-fold relation. Then the term *sambandhi* would unwarrantably stretch in the four relations. Furthermore, one happened event (*bhūta*) is said to be contradictory to one unhappened event (*abhūta*). Example given by the Vaiśeṣikas: 'It rained' (*bhūta*) is contradictory to the absence (*abhuta*) of connection between air and cloud. Vācaspati supervises how the absence of connection is contradictory to rain. Rather, according to him the absence of connection between air and cloud is favourable for raining. In this way, the examples of the other three are not at all the cases of contradiction.

etena śābdaṃ vyākhyātam (9.19)

By this the verbal testimony is explained.

Notes:

The inferential knowledge of the objects related to three times (past, present and

future) and of the objects not apprehended by the sense-organs (i.e. super-sensory objects) is dependent on the remembrance of effects etc. Similarly, the verbal knowledge of the same objects mentioned above is dependent on the remembrance of conventional meaning. So, having the same nature with inferential knowledge, the verbal knowledge also is a type of inferential knowledge.

hetur apadeśo liṅgam nimittaṃ pramāṇaṃ kāraṇam ity anarthāntaram (9.20)

There is no difference of meaning in *hetu, apadeśa, liṅga, nimitta, pramana* and *kāraṇa*.

Notes:

'This one is the effect of this one' or 'This one is the cause of this one' etc. are the ways in which the relation between the two is determined. But what is the term for the object? To answer this, the present *sūtra* is put forward. The answer is that word is the cause or mark (*kāraṇa* or *liṅga*) of the object, in the knowledge of the latter.

asyedam iti buddhyapekṣatvāt (9.21)

Because (the verbal knowledge) 'This one is of this one' depends on intellection in this way.

Notes:

How is the word a mark of the object? The answer is that 'This word is the cause of the knowledge of this object.' In this way that convention is well-known. Then from that word, the object is cognised. The word is indicative of the object by dint of convention and hence the word is the cause. In general it can be said that 'word is of the object' and thus the knowledge of an object from a word, is nothing but inferential knowledge.

Candrānanda adds that in this way analogical knowledge is included in the inferential knowledge. Thus the instruments of valid knowledge are only two, not more.

4. Remembrance is (a type of inference)

ātma-manasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣāt saṃskārāc ca smṛtiḥ (9.22)

Remembrance results from a particular conjunction of the soul with the internal organ, and from tendency.

Notes:

The person desirous of getting fire, first perceives smoke. Then from it there happens a particular conjunction of the soul with the internal organ and there arises a type of tendency *(saṃskāra)* called impression (bhāvanā). Then from these two appears remembrance of the form, where there is smoke, there is fire.

tathā svapnaḥ svapnāntikaṃ ca (9.23)

So are 'dreaming' and 'consciousness in dreaming'.

Notes:

Both 'dreaming' and 'consciousness in dreaming', result from a particular conjunction of the soul with the internal organ.

Praśastapāda says that 'dreaming' occurs when the sense-organs have stopped

functioning and the internal organ has stood still in the heart. Then through conjunction between the soul and the internal organ, there appears 'dreaming'. 'Consciousness in dreaming' also results in the above-mentioned way. In both the cases the causes (i) particular type of conjunction between the soul and internal organ and (ii) impression, are compulsory, as in the case of remembrance.

dharmāc ca (9.24)

Also from merit.

Notes:

'Dreaming' or 'consciousness in dreaming' may be of an object never cognised before. So here *bhāvanā* or impression is not a cause. But merit is a cause here. Candrānanda interprets *ca* in the *sūtra* as indicating *adharma* (demerit). So from demerit also 'dreaming' or 'consciousness in dreaming' may occur.

indriyadoṣāt saṃskārāc cāvidyā (9.25)

False knowledge results from tendency grown due to defects of the sense-organs and from other (mentioned factors).

Notes:

A person whose sense-organs turned defective due to unbalanced humors cognised previously the silver. Now from the impression and from a particular conjunction between soul and the internal organ, there results the false knowledge of silver in the conch-shell.

There is another type of false knowledge which is called 'unascertained' (*anadhyavasita*), e.g. the unascertained knowledge of the Southerners at the sight of a camel.

Śaṅkaramiśra reads the *sūtra* as *indriyadoṣāt saṃskāradoṣāc cāvidyā*. It simply means the false knowledge appears when the sense-organ is defective. The person with the jaundiced eye sees a white object as yellow. Again, false knowledge appears in a person by reading bad books.

tad duṣṭaṃ jñānam (9.26)

This is imperfect knowledge.

Notes:

Candrānanda takes *tad* (this) for four types of false knowledge. These are doubt (*VS* 2.2.19), false knowledge (*VS* 9.25), unascertained knowledge (not mentioned in any *sūtra*) and dreaming (*VS* 9.23).

aduṣṭaṃ vidyā (9.27)

Free from imperfection it is valid knowledge.

Notes:

Perceptual and inferential knowledge are valid.

ārṣaṃ siddhadarśanaṃ ca dharmebhyaḥ (9.28)

The knowledge of inspired sages and siddhas results from merits.

Notes:

We know that there are some inspired sages who can visualise the objects of the past, present and future, without depending on any mark. This happens due to merit in those sages. There are also some sages, who acquire extraordinary power, by applying collyrium or chemical substances. They can know the nature of the creatures. And it happens due to their merit. Now, in brief the knowledge of the inspired sages and of the siddhas results from particular merit and from the conjunction of the soul with the internal organ.

CHAPTER X

(The chapter deals with pleasure and pain and some other forms of knowledge)

1. Pleasure and pain

ātmasamavāyaḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ pañcabhyo'rthāntaratve hetus tadāśrayibhyaś ca guṇebhyaḥ (10.1)

The inherence of pleasure and pain in the soul, is the cause of their (i.e. of pleasure and pain) being different from five (elements, earth, water, fire, air and *ākāśa*) and also from the qualities subsisting in them (earth etc.).

Notes:

Some say that pleasure, pain, ignorance, fear etc. are *bhūtas*. But it is incorrect. Pleasure and pain inhere in the soul. But earth etc. do not inhere in the soul. So the inherence in the soul in the cases of pleasure and pain is the differentiating feature from the five elements and their qualities.

iṣṭāniṣṭa-kāraṇa-viśeṣād virodhāc ca mithaḥ sukha-duḥkhayor arthāntarabhāvaḥ (10.2)

Inasmuch as causes, desirable and undesirable, are different and as (pleasure and pain are) opposed (to each other), so pleasure and pain are mutually different objects.

Notes:

Pleasure is produced by the causes, such as wife etc. Pain is produced by the causes, such as poison etc. So the causes are different. Furthermore, pleasure and pain are opposed to each other because one is produced only when the other is destroyed. Pleasure and pain are also different from the five elements and their qualities (*VS* 10.1). And they are mutually different from each other (*VS* 10.2).

3. Doubt and ascertainment

saṃśaya-nirṇayayor arthāntarabhāvaś ca jñānāntaratve hetuḥ (10.3)

And the appearance of doubt and ascertainment, from different objects, is the cause of their being different types of knowledge.

Notes:

Objection: Doubt and ascertainment are only reciprocal non-existence. Not are they positive entities.

Answer: Doubt and ascertainment arise from different causes. Doubt arises when the particular differences of the objects are not apprehended but only similarity is grasped. After doubt, when the particular is apprehended by another *pramāṇa*, then arises the ascertainment. If these were not positive entities these would not arise from different causes. Therefore doubt and ascertainment are different from each other and one is not the absence of the other.

The above is the contention of Candrānanda. Śaṅkaramiśra's *sūtra*-reading is different and naturally the explanation differs from Candrānanda's. The reading is *saṃśaya-nirṇayāntarabhāvaś ca jñānāntaratve hetuḥ*. It contends pleasure and pain (*VS* 10.2) are different from knowledge because they cannot be included either in doubt or in ascertainment. If pleasure or pain would be the knowledge it would either be doubt or be ascertainment. It cannot be doubt because at the time of pleasure there is no mention of two sides. It can neither be ascertainment because there is no such thing, which is confirmation of one side. So pleasure and plain are not knowledge, but mental feelings. This matter reminds one of the well-known controversy between the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists regarding pleasure and pain, whether they are knowledge or mental feelings. Vide *Nyāyamañjarī*.

According to Candrānanda, this *sūtra* has no link with pleasure and pain. It is about only doubt and ascertainment. But according to Śaṅkaramiśra, the matter is linked up with the pleasure and pain.

3. *Knowledge of cause-effect*

tayor niṣpattiḥ pratyakṣa-laiṅgikābhyām jñānābhyām vyākhyātā (10.4)

The production thereof (i.e. of doubt and ascertainment) is explained by the perceptual and inferential knowledges.

Notes:

As a person with remembrance acquires the knowledge of an unseen object through the perceived mark, similarly a person with remembrance doubts when he sees only similarity in the object of which particulars are not seen.

Again, as a person perceives due to connection with the right object, similarly, when the doubt removes after a particular connection the person ascertains.

The above is according to Candrānanda. According to Śaṅkaramiśra, the production of doubt and ascertainment is by perception and by mark. Pleasure and pain are neither by perceptual objects, nor by any mark. In the exposition of this *sūtra* Śaṅkara cites one Vṛttikāra who contends the following: *tayoḥ* means 'of knowledge and pleasure'. Those have been explained by perception and mark. Knowledge may be by perceptual sense-organ or by the mark. But no such question arises in the case of pleasure etc.

bhūtam iti pratyakṣam vyākhyātam (10.5)

By (the expression 'The effect) is produced'—the perceived (object) is explained.

Notes:

In the effect produced from its own causes, the knowledge arises in these forms—'This is done', or 'This is produced' or 'This is the effect'. This knowledge is explained in

the following mode: first arises the knowledge of qualification and then that of the qualified. And this perception is meant to produce the notions like 'effect to be produced', 'effect being produced' and 'effect already produced'.

bhaviṣyatīti kāryāntare dṛṣṭatvāt (10.6)

(The knowledge 'the effect) will be produced' appears inasmuch as the fact is seen in the case of (production of) other effects.

Notes:

In other cases apart from that where the object is perceived, the expressions are secondary.

The effect, such as cloth etc., is seen to be produced after the arrangement of the materials. Now, when the materials like those are seen, but the effect is not yet produced, then though the effect is not produced the term effect is secondarily applied and the knowledge of the effect appears—'The effect will be produced'.

tathā bhavatīti sāpekṣebhyo'napekṣebhyaś ca (10.7)

Likewise (the notion 'the effect) is being produced' appears from some causes on which the effect has already been dependent and from some on which the effect has not yet been dependent.

Notes:

The yarns are spread. A number of conjunctions between the yarns have already been completed. So the cloth has been dependent on those conjunctions. But there are yet some other conjunctions. So the cloth has not been dependent on them. Thus in this situation the notion arises—the cloth is being produced.

abhūd ity abhūtāt (10.8)

(The notion 'the effect) was produced' is due to destruction.

Notes:

Candrānanda explains that the knowledge 'This was produced' is already explained by *VS* 9.6. But there the relevant matter was the substances, pot etc. By the present *sūtra* (10.8) the relevant matter is the human body etc.

Abhūtāt means 'due to destruction'. Seeing the scattered parts, hands, legs, throat etc. and also seeing the destroyed non-inherent cause, conjunctions between the parts, there appears the knowledge that 'there was the effect called body'.

Śaṅkaramiśra excludes three intermediary *sūtras* 10.5-7 and then reads the *sūtra, abhūtād ityapi*. So he connects the sense of this *sūtra* with *VS* 10.4 which according to him, involves pleasure and pain. There is no doubt that explanation of the *sūtra* by Śaṅkara appears to be beating about the bush.

sati ca kāryāsamavāyāt (10.9)

(Some conjunctions) being intact and (some) not being so, (the knowledge 'the effect is being destroyed' appears) inasmuch as there is no inherence in the effect.

Notes:

The *sūtra* narrates the method of producing the knowledge like 'This is being

destroyed'. *Sati* means 'there having some conjunctions' and *ca* means 'there not having some other conjunctions'. So, in spite of the action of the 'cause of destruction' like a killer etc. when some conjunctions of the parts like throat etc. are not destroyed and some other conjunctions of the parts like hands etc. are destroyed due to disjunctions, there is no inherence in the body (an effect). And as the conjunctions are gradually being destroyed by the cause of destruction, so by observing the destroyed and undestroyed conjunctions, the knowledge 'The effect is being destroyed' appears. According to some, the above condition actuates to produce the knowledge 'it was produced'. Candrānanda does not agree, because *abhūt* is associated with the fully destroyed effect. But according to another reading of the text Candrānanda allows it, because the effect is very near to destruction.

The above is the explanation by Candrānanda. Śaṅkaramiśra's explanation here is totally assumptive, due to ignorance of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* tradition. According to him the *sūtra* is connected with pleasure and pain. But it is totally irrelevant. Besides, his reading of the present *sūtra* is *sati ca kāryādarśanāt*.

ekārthasamavāyiṣu kāraṇāntareṣu darśanād ekadeśa ity ekasmin (10.10)

The knowledge 'the effect was produced' arises in one part due to perception of the (parts) present with other causes co-inherent with the same object.

Notes:

By the perception of some destroyed and some undestroyed conjunctions, the knowledge 'It is being destroyed' arises, and not the knowledge 'It was produced'. The method of the knowledge 'it was produced' is narrated by the present *sūtra*. When the parts like hands etc. which are the inherent causes are found in an effect like body etc. then in them (hand etc.) the knowledge of the parts arises. Now binding those divided parts after division (of the body) the knowledge arises in any one part that 'the effect was produced.'

śiraḥ pṛṣṭham udaraṃ pāṇir iti tadviśeṣebhyaḥ (10.11)

The knowledge such as, 'The head', 'the back,' 'the stomach', and 'the hands' arise from their particularity (i.e. generality-particularity).

Notes:

The generality-particularity of 'the head' is 'the headness', that of 'the back' is 'the backness' and so on. By these characteristics the parts like hand, back etc. are cognised.

kāraṇam iti dravye kāryasamavāyāt (10.12)

(The knowledge) 'the substance is a cause' arises in the substance from the inherence of its (i.e. the substances) effects.

Notes:

The substance, qualities or action are found to be inherent in the substance. By this there arises the main knowledge—'the substance is the cause'. Because the effect is produced.

saṃyogād vā (10.13)

Or from conjunction (the knowledge, 'the substance is a cause', arises).

Notes:

When an effect is being produced such as when a cloth is being produced from the reciprocal conjunctions of the yarns etc. there arises the knowledge 'these yarns are causes of cloth', though the effect 'cloth' is yet to be produced.

kāraṇasamavāyāt karmaṇi (10.14)

The knowledge 'this is a cause' arises in the action as it inheres in the cause (substance).

Notes:

VS 1.1.16 has already stated that an action, when it produces conjunction or disjunction, dies without depending on some other factor. Because of this factor and also as an action is inherent in a substance, being a cause, the knowledge of a cause arises, the moment the action is produced.

tathā rūpe kāraṇa-kāraṇa-samavāyāc ca (10.15)

The knowledge 'it is a cause' arises in the colour as it inheres in the cause of the cause, and also (when colour is not yet produced).

Notes:

The colour inheres in the yarns (cause) which are the inherent cause of the cloth. So the colour is inherent in the cause of the cause. So in this colour, the knowledge 'it is a cause' appears. Obviously it is when a cloth is produced. When the cloth is yet to be produced then also the colour of the yarns is cognised as a cause. Here only the instance of colour is shown. This type of knowledge is about other qualities also.

kāraṇasamavāyāt saṃyoge (10.16)

The knowledge 'This is a cause' arises in the conjunction as it inheres in the cause (substance).

Notes:

Cloth is the effect. The inherent cause of the cloth is the yarn. There inheres the conjunctions. These conjunctions are cognised as 'causes' to the substance cloth.

tathā kāraṇākāraṇasamavāyāc ca (10.17)

Likewise, the knowledge 'It is a cause' arises (in a quality and an action) as those inhere in a cause and also in a non-cause.

Notes:

The cause of the qualities that chemically change (*pākaja*) is conjunction with fire. But this conjunction is not exclusively inhered in the cause of the qualities (i.e. pot) like the previous instance (10.16), but in the cause pot as well as the fire which is not a cause at all of the *pākaja* qualities. Now in the case of action, we see that conjunction with a fast moving substance is the cause of action. The above conjunction is inferred in the cause of action i.e. object to get impact and also in the non-cause of action i.e. object to make impact.

saṃyukta-samavāyād agner vaiśeṣikam (10.18)

(In the cases of emergence of *pākaja* qualities) the specific quality of fire (is a cause) as it (i.e. that specific quality) exists in inherence in the substance conjoined.

Notes:

When the *pākaja* colour etc. of the atoms are going to emerge there, after the conjunction with other atoms (i.e. fire atoms) the conjunction depends on the hot touch (a specific quality) inhering in the fire. This fact leads to admit a rule regarding conjunction that barring the emergence of substance, the conjunction becomes the dependent cause.

laiṅgikaṃ pramāṇaṃ vyākhyātam (10.19)

The inferential instrument (of valid knowledge) is already explained.

Notes:

Now the cause in the case of inference is also a matter of discussion. That is what are the causes or different types of instruments to infer a thing obviously where it is not directly perceived? The present *sūtra* answers this. *VS* 9.18 has already explained the matter.

3. Conclusion

dṛṣṭānāṃ dṛṣṭa-prayojanānām dṛṣṭābhāve prayogo'bhyudayāya (10.20)

If there is the absence of seen quality of the actions found mentioned (in the Vedas and *Smṛtis*), the application of these actions are for elevation.

Notes:

The *sūtra* here is just the repetition of *VS* 6.2.1. The necessity of repeating the *sūtra* is that, *dharma* is promised to be explained, so the scriptural advice and adjustment regarding *dharma* is to be looked for.

tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam (10.21)

The authoritativeness of the Vedas and other śāstras (*Smṛti*) is to be admitted because those deal with the (very characteristic features of the categories).

ĀTREYA-THE BHĀṢYAKĀRA

Considering the antiquity of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*, the paucity of its extant exegetical literature seems to be very striking. Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is the oldest work based upon these *sūtras*. There is a strong controversy as to its characteristic of being a *Bhāṣya*.[1] No less an authority on Vaiśeṣika than Udayana denies it to be the same. After Praśastapāda too, eminent Vaiśeṣika writers preferred to comment on his work or to write independent treatises and paid very little attention to the original *sūtras*.

History still maintains the tradition of a Vaiśeṣika *Bhāṣya* by Rāvaṇa and a *Vṛtti* by Bhāradvāja. But none of these has come to light as yet which we will discuss in detail in the topic of "the problems of the immediate successors between Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda" in Chapter II. Mention has been made of a *Vṛtti* by Śaṅkaramiśra and a few passages have been cited, therefrom in his *Upaskāra* (commentary on the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*). These are no doubt old commentaries on the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*, which if even now published, will throw much light on the Vaiśeṣika views. Uddyotakara, the author of the *Nyāyavārttika* occasionally refers to the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* and often gives their explanations which are quite different from the current ones.[2] He was a Bhāradvāja. But at the present stage of our knowledge we cannot identify him with the author of the Bhāradvāja *Vṛtti*, though legitimate doubts are entertained in this connection.

While enumerating the important works on Vaiśeṣika, Guṇaratna in his *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* (a commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra) mentions one *Ātreyatantra*. No manuscript of this work has been discovered till now. But some authorities are found to have really quoted from Ātreya's works. And this Ātreya is in all probability the same Ātreya as mentioned by Guṇaratna. Rājaśekhara mentions that Praśasta's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is a Saṃgraha from the Ātreyatantra etc. But Mallavādin's *Dvādaśārānayacakra* knew one Vaiśeṣika Bhāṣya and Prasasta's Tīkā on it but is quite silent on Ātreya.

Vādideva Sūri in his *Syādvādaratnākara* quotes and criticises some of the views of the Bhāṣyakāra Ātreya. Vādideva calls him the old leading Brāhmin (*varṣīyān viprapuṅgavaḥ*). The fragments quoted in Ātreya's name refer to Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* beyond doubt. Two of the said fragments explain *VS* 1.1.14 and 1.1.16 while a third is related to perception. While explaining Kaṇāda's definition of substance (1.1.14) *kriyāguṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam*, Ātreya remarks (*yat punaḥ ātreyaḥ procivān*); *na kriyātve prasaṅgāt kriyātvam api kriyāvad bhavati kriyādhāratvāt/ na ca tad dravyam iti tadvyavacchedārthaṃ guṇavad iti/ na ca khalvādhāra evādheyena tadvān bhavaty ādheyam apy ādhāreṇa.*[4] This passage justifies the word *guṇa* in the expression *kriyāguṇavat*. If we define *dravya* (substance) as *kriyāvat* (possessing action alone) the definition becomes too wide to include *kriyātva* (actionness) which is no substance. In order to differentiate the *sūtra* he adds the word *guṇa*. A container cannot alone be called *tadvān* (possessing that, i.e. the content) by the content but the content also can be called *tadvān* (possessing the container) by the container. It should be noted that Śaṅkaramiśra does not raise the problem at all.

Vādideva criticises this view of Ātreya in the following manner:

Here the *Viprapuṅgava* does not consult even what he has said in close proximity. He himself begins the passage by saying 'action raising upwards, etc'. A substance may be called *kriyāvat* (possessing action) only when an action inheres it. But (says Vādideva) an action is not related to actionness by inherence. For there is illusion. Similar is the case of *guṇatva*—(qualityness). If you affirm your position in this way, *guṇatva* too may be *guṇavat* (possessing quality) on account of its being the receptacle of *guṇa* (quality). In order to differentiate it from that the word *kriyāvat* has been introduced. Here also Ātreya does not explain the *sūtra* well ... For he himself explains: whatever possesses a quality by the relation of inherence is called *guṇavat* (possessing a quality).[5]

Vādideva concludes his criticism on this point with a damaging remark:

'Oh Ātreya, you have thus taken recourse to the method of flying away, which shows that by all means you have admitted yourself to be an object of shame.'[6]

Vādideva mentions one more view of Ātreya which the latter expressed in connection with explaining the term *dravyāśrayī*, in the definition of *guṇa—dravyāśrayī aguṇavān saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣu akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam* (*VS* 1.1.15). According to Ātreya, *dravya* is the permanent receptacle of a *guṇa* and *guṇa* is a dependent factor in the *dravya*.[7]

Vādideva refers to Ātreya's explanation of the definition of *karma* (action): *ekadrav(yam) aguṇam saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣv anapekṣa-kāraṇam iti karmalakṣaṇam* (*VS* 1.1.16):

'Inherent is a single substance' (*ekadravya*) means that which is not non-inherent in the substance, not that which is inherent in many substances. 'Without quality' (*aguṇam*) means it possesses no quality nor is itself a quality. *Saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣu kāraṇam* means the cause of conjunctions and disjunctions. An action, when generated conjoins its substratum (with another object) after disjoining it from another object. While such conjunction and disjunction are to be operated an action is itself sufficient and does not require any superfluous cause. Hence the word *anapekṣam*. It does not mean that the inherent cause too is not required or does not require any extraordinary cause. Hence the word *anapekṣam*. This does not show that the common causes can be dispensed with. An action, depending on a particular conjunction, generates conjunction and disjunction from a certain quarter. Thus an action proceeds towards that quarter, to which the sender's activity is directed and from that action conjunction and disjunction are produced towards that direction. This explains the beginning of conjunction and disjunction arising from an action that depends upon *adṛṣṭa* or God."[8]

Ātreya is said to have remarked in the same context: 'Non-dependent cause of conjunctions and disjunctions' constitutes the definition of *karma* while 'inherent in a single substance' and 'without a quality' have been inserted to explain its character and not to define it'.[9]

A further passage in Vādideva's work quotes Ātreya to explain the cause of doubt and illusion of visual perception: "Just as on account of the proximity of a light generality is perceived from a distance but not the particularities, and doubts and illusions arise from the light, similarly on account of the proximity of the visual organ generality is perceived from a distance and not the particularities. Hence doubts and illusions arise

from the visual organ. Here generality is perceived even from a distance as it has a larger scope while particularities are not perceived from a distance as they have very limited scope."[10]

In the anonymous *Vṛtti* of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* three references to Ātreya's views are found. In the first one, Ātreya shows the necessity of separate mentioning of *rūpa, rasa, gandha* and *sparśa* in a single compound word in the *sūtra* enumerating seventeen *guṇas*. The necessity is to show the common features like eternity, non-eternity, change due to chemical action etc. in those four.[11] According to the anonymous author of the above-mentioned *Vṛtti*, the necessity is to show that each of the four is apprehended by exclusively one single sense-organ.[12]

In the second, Ātreya explains the *sūtra, antyatrāntyebhyo viśeṣebhyaḥ* (VS 1.2.6) : How is to be the final (*antyaḥ*) of the *Viśeṣas* (particularities) justified? To exist in the final (state of something) is *antya*. The term *anta* means the eternal substances as they exist at the end of creation and destruction. They (particularities) exist in them and therefore the term *antya*, means *viśeṣas*.[13]

In the third, Ātreya cleares the purpose of formulating the *sūtras*—*kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ pṛthivyām* and *pākajāś ca*. In the first *sūtra*, the 'colour of the produced earth', etc. are due to the qualities of their causes. And the second *sūtra* is to express that the 'colour of the atomic earth' etc. are due to chemical action. Praśastapāda also had the same view.[14]

A few other views of Ātreya are available in the *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* of Vādirāja. Ātreya said that to produce a substance, conjunction is an independent cause.[15]

Ātreya expresses his view regarding the existence (*bhāva* or *sattā*). It appears from his argument that Ātreya contradicts his opponent's view regarding Existence being different in each substance. According to him Existence is one in spite of its different substrata.[16]

The Existence is perceived after its being qualified with that object which becomes the factor of perceptual knowledge and not being qualified with all the substrata. By this the perception of the composite whole has been explained. The composite whole is perceived with those parts which are fit to be perceived, and where the constituent parts are not fit to be perceived there the composite whole is not perceived with those parts.[17]

The *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* quotes some passages as to be the *Bhāṣya*. Most probably those also are of Ātreya as they have been quoted in continuous discussion of Ātreya's views, though in the present cases Vādirāja does not mention the name of Ātreya as he did in the previous three cases. However, there are some passages which have been associated with some *bhāṣya* and in these cases also Ātreya is most probably the Bhāṣyakāra. Anyway, the following *Bhāṣya* passage is connected with the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra*—*sad iti yato dravya-guṇa-karmasu* (1.2.7). The *Bhāṣya* says, "Due to what (category) there is the uniform verbal expression 'It is existent' and also corresponding knowledge in Substance, Quality and Action—the three being different from one another, that (category) is called Existence. The *sūtra* (*sad iti* etc.) is for implication. Therefore, the verbal expression 'It is substances' in Earth etc. leads to admit substanceness, the verbal expression 'It is Quality' in colour etc. leads to admit Qualityness and the verbal expression

'It is Action' in 'Throwing upward' etc. leads to admit Actionness."[18]

The *Bhāṣya* opines that the generality, particularity and inherence also may be called Existent (*sataḥ*) but that is the case of imposition.[19]

The following *Bhāṣya* passage is connected with the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra—sāmānyaṃ viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam* (1.2.3): The same *gotva* (cowness) is on the one hand generality and on the other, individuality due to intellection. We have the knowledge 'This is a cow', 'This is a cow' in different lumps and the nature of this very knowledge leads to admit *gotva* as a generality. And again the knowledge 'This cowness is different from the horseness' leads to admit *gotva* as a particularity.[20]

The *Bhāṣya* passage in connection with the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra, dravyatvaṃ guṇatvaṃ karmatvaṃ sāmānyāni viśeṣāś ca* (1.2.5) is as follows: Substanceness being perceived as a generality due to its existence in many substrata, gets also the imposed name of particularity due to knowledge of difference from other generalities.[21]

The *Bhāṣya* appears to have suggested a tentative definition of particularity as *ekavṛttir viśeṣaḥ* i.e. the particularity is that which exists in one subject. It, however, rejects the same subsequently.[22]

The *Bhāṣya* contends that in spite of the perceptibility of the generality the inference in favour of its existence is for emphasis.[23]

The *Bhāṣya* in connection with the *sūtra* defining doubt (*sāmānya-pratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣasmṛteś ca saṃśayaḥ,* 2.2.19) contends that the Ascertainment is the confirmed knowledge of the qualified with the common characteristic of height, and the Doubt is the knowledge where no particular confirmation occurs, such as in the way, whether it is a stuff or a person. This doubt is a single knowledge.[24]

The *Bhāṣya* under the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra, ātmendriyārthasannikarṣād* etc. (3.1.13), ones image in the mirror etc. is a wrong perception yet the whole of it cannot be wrong. That is the perception regarding 'face' cannot be designated as wrong.[25]

The *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* of Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra quotes as many as twenty times the views of Ātreya. It is not a wonder that the commentator quotes so many times because of the fact that a *Vārttika* (the work is also called a *Vārttika*) in a way of systematic composition, becomes a commentary on any *Bhāṣya* and as Vādīndra's work is a *Vārttika* in nature it must be on a *Bhāṣya* and most probably it is on *Ātreyabhāṣya*. It is curious that Udayana, a commentator on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, mentioned not a single fragment from Ātreya, but Vādīndra being posterior to Udayana has been lucky enough to get a manuscript of the *Ātreyabhāṣya* which was subsequently lost for ever. Anyway, Ātreya's views as are recorded in the above text of Vādīndra are being noted below:

1. The purport of the first Vaiśeṣika *sūtra, athāto dharmaṃ vyākhāsyāmaḥ*, according to Ātreya is to denote the objectives of the *śāstra* which deals with the materials regarding different types of promoting and ceasing faculties and total stoppage of the enjoyment in a chain of cause and effect.[26]

2. Ātreya admits merit and its effect like body, pleasure etc. in the supreme god, and not demerit and its effects like body, pain etc. in the same.[27]

3. The *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* 1.1.5 enumerates the seventeen qualities. Among them colour,

taste, smell and touch—these four have been mentioned separately in a compound word—*rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ*. What is the necessity of mentioning them in such a way? Ātreya says that it is to show similarities among them. And they are eternity, non-eternity, chemical changeability, etc. and the like.[28]

4. What is the cause of destruction of the final sound? Ātreya says, it is the particular conjunction with the tangible substance that sound dies away by it.[29]

5. It is well-known that qualities are the substratum of the qualityness. But the latter also becomes a substratum of the qualities—it is the view of Ātreya.[30]

6. On the perspective of the above i.e. when the qualityness becomes a substratum of the qualities, the former then may be called *guṇavat* i.e. endowed with qualities. But then the definition of a substance (*guṇavat dravyam*) over-extends to the generality. To avoid this undesirable thing the Sūtrakāra (Kaṇāda) has put an additional term *kriyāvat* (i.e. endowed with action) in the definition of substance. The above contention is of Ātreya.[31]

7. The definition of quality is *dravyāśrayi na guṇavān saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇa-lakṣaṇam*.[32] In connection with the above definition the true definition element lies in the phrase *saṃyogavibhāgayor akāraṇaṃ guṇaḥ*[33] and the rest is to indicate the remaining characteristics of quality. This is the contention of Ātreya.[34]

8. Action is generated by the dimension of a limited object. It cannot appear in a limitless object like *ākāśa* etc. Likewise, velocity also generates action in its own substratum. As for example we find the former in the whole of water which is produced by the parts of mobile water. But Ātreya does not permit it because there is no proof at all. The velocity in the whole of water cannot be a proof of action in it because the action there is due to liquidity and not due to velocity. Then the point is that at the time of liquidity there would not be any velocity. Yet, it is true because there is no contrary proof. If the opponent says that the perception is here the proof of the simultaneity of liquidity and velocity, it is wrong because the perception itself is not correct. We do not see the velocity at the time of emergence of liquidity. In the perception of mobile water, velocity which is generated by a different action which in its own turn is generated by liquidity, is a superfluous cause of the action. In this way, further a lengthy argument has been recorded by Vādīndra.[35]

9. Ātreya explains the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra, na dravyāṇāṃ vyatirekāt* in the following way: Action cannot be a cause of substance because it (the action) is destroyed (already before as for which it cannot be called a cause at all). The action, in fact, is destroyed just after the productive conjunctions come into existence and the substance appears only after those conjunctions.[36]

10. Vādīndra reads one more *sūtra, tathā guṇaḥ*[37] after *dravyāṇāṃ dravyaṃ kāryaṃ sāmānyam* (*VS* 1.1.22) and he says that Ātreya ignored it (*tathā guṇaḥ*) as because he (Ātreya) thought that the colour etc. of a dyad cannot be the effect of a dyad (i.e. colour etc. of a dyad must be the effect of the colour of its constituent parts—atoms) and this meaning is well indicated in the *sūtra, dvitva-prabhṛtayaś ca saṃkhyāḥ* etc. (*VS* 1.1.23.) Duality in two things together, being a quality, comes into being from the singleness of the constituent object.[38]

11. The number [Duality etc.] in the *sūtra, dvitva-prabhṛtayaś ca* etc. (1.1.23) means for those starting with duality and ending with *parārdha* (= 10^{12}).[39]

12. The emergence of the number 'hundred' follows the following process according to Ātreya. First, the final oneness is apprehended. Then the recognition regarding many onenesses (in many objects) appears. And this type of mental knowledge prompts to generate 'hundred'.[40]

13. Two-string fragmentary cloth is produced by two strings; Tri-string fragmentary cloth by two-string fragmentary cloth and another string. So this tri-string cloth is produced with the help of one conjunction (i.e. between two-string cloth and a separate string). The strings thus spread lead to a part-cloth by the conjunction of the last string and that part of the cloth is further added with another string. Thus, another new part-cloth is produced. In this way when the final string is conjoined with the last part-cloth, the full cloth is produced. Thus cloth also is produced by one conjunction. So that 'a substance is produced by several conjunctions' which is the ordinary meaning of the *sūtra, saṃyogānāṃ dravyam* (*VS* 1.1.24), is not justified. The other conjunctions may be called causes but only in secondary sense as they are only pre-existent.[41]

14. The word *anta* indicates the eternal substances as they exist at the final stage in destruction and also at the stage when no type of production is there. *Antya* means what exists in those (eternal) substances and by this the particularities are meant. This is the view of Ātreya[42] which is recorded under the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra, anyatrāntyebhyo viśeṣebhya iti* (*VS* 1.2.6).

15. The existence is inhered in many things. This characteristic may lead the existence to non-eternity. But that 'the existence is eternal' is the accepted theory of the Vaiśeṣikas. Remembering this, Ātreya asserts that its difference from substance, quality and action is the actual cause of its eternity, and this is the contention of the *sūtra, dravya-guṇa-karmabhyo 'rthāntaraṃ sattā* (*VS* 1.2.8).[43]

16. The Vaiśeṣika *sūtra, ekadravyavṛttitvāt sattā na dravyam* (1.2.9). Here *ekadravyavṛtti* means 'Inherence in one substance' as in the case of a quality. But this meaning does not suit in the case of the existence because it exists in several objects like pot, cloth, etc. So the true meaning of *ekadravyavṛtti* will be that which continues to come to knowledge (*upalabhyamāna*) when the sense-organ comes into contact with a substance. This is the contention of Ātreya.[44]

17. The atomic air also is a substance. Substance can be in two ways: a substance, subsisting in substance is *dravyavat* (type of substance), and that which is not subsistent in that way is the *adravyavat* type. Air is the instance of first type and atomic air is of the second.[45]

18. Sound must be a special quality of some substance, as it (i.e. sound) is endowed with generality-particularity and as a rule apprehended by a single external sense-organ, just like colour. As colour must have some substratum, so the sound also must require a substance. That substance is *ākāśa* and it is the proof for the existence. This is the contention of Ātreya and some other teachers.[46]

19. Ātreya and some other teachers explain 'the other directions' (*digantarāṇi* in the *sūtra* (2.2.18) *etena digantarāṇi vyākhyātāni,* as to be the South-East, South-West, North-

West and North-East.[47] and not upward and downward directions.

20. Ātreya has also been referred to in course of discussing the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras, rūpa-rasa-sparśavatya āpo dravā snigdhāś ca* (2.1.2).[48] *sparśaś ca* (2.1.9) and *na ca dṛṣṭānāṃ sparśaityadṛṣṭaliṅgo vāyuḥ* (2.1.10)[49] and once more under *etena digantarāṇi vyākhyātāni* (2.1.18).[50] The views recorded in the above cases are on some minor points.

REFERENCES

1. Bharata (*Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.9) defines a *Saṃgraha* in the following way:
   vistareṇopadiṣṭānām arthānāṃ sūtrabhāṣyayoḥ/
   nibandho yaḥ samāsena saṃgrahaṃ taṃ vidur budhāḥ//
2. Vide section "Uddyotakara—The Vaiśeṣika"
3. *NK* (BORI), p. 12
4. Vide *SVR*, p. 847
5. *tatrāyaṃ varṣīyān viprapuṅgavo 'nantaram eva svayam uktam nāpy anusandadhāti iti kiṃ brūmaḥ/ karma utkṣepaṇādi/tad yasmin samavāyena vartate tad kriyāvad iti tatrādāv anena vivabre/na ca kriyātve kriyā samavāyena vartate/viparyayasadbhāvāt/ athaivam guṇatve'pi prasaṅgaḥ/ guṇatvam api hi guṇavad bhavati guṇādhāratvāt/ na ca tad dravyam iti/ tadvyavacchedārtham kriyāvad bhavati/tad api na susūtram ātreyeṇa abhāṇi..... guṇā rūpādayas te yasmin samavāyena vartante tad guṇavad ityādau svayam eva vyākhyānāt// SVR*, p. 847
6. *tvayā so 'yam upakrāntaḥ prakāraḥ prapalāyane/*
   trapāpātratvam ātreya svasya svīkṛtya sarvathā// SVR, p. 848
7. *Ātreyo vyākhyātavān nityam asyāśrāyaḥ pāratantryaṃ dravye iti dravyāśrayi. SVR*, p. 912
8. *lakṣaṇāntaram punar ātreyo vivṛṇoti/ ekadravyam iti nādravyam na cānekadravyam ityarthaḥ/ nāsya guṇāḥ santi svayam ca guṇo na bhavati ity aguṇam/ saṃyogāś ca vibhāgāś ca saṃyoga-vibhāgās teṣu saṃyogavibhāgeṣu kāraṇam ityutpannaṃ karma svāśrayam āśrayāntarād vibhajya saṃyojayati iti/ teṣu ca saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣu kartavyeṣu karma kāraṇāntaram nāpekṣata iti anapekṣam/ na punaḥ samavāyi-kāraṇam api nāpekṣata iti/ yad vā saṃyoga-vibhāgā .....karmāsādhāraṇaṃ nāpekṣata ity anapekṣam/ na punaḥ sādhāraṇam api nāpekṣata iti/ diśaḥ khalu saṃyoga-viśeṣāpekṣam karma svāśrayasya saṃyoga-vibhāgau ārabhate/ tathā ca prerakasya yāṃ diśam prati prayatna-samārambhas tadabhimukham karma jāyate/ tasmācca karmaṇas tadabhimukhau saṃyoga-vibhāgau bhavataḥ/ anenādṛṣṭeśvarādyapekṣasya karmaṇaḥ saṃyoga-vibhāgārambho vyākhyātaḥ// SVR*, p. 945
9. [*yad āha sa eva*] *saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣv anapekṣaṃ kāraṇam ity etāvat karmalakṣaṇaṃ/ ekadravyam aguṇam ity abhidhānam tu karma-svarūpopavarṇanārtham/ na punaḥ karmalakṣaṇārtham iti/ SVR*, p. 964
10. [*yat punar ātreyo bhāṣyakāraḥ prāha*] *yathā sāmānyasya viśeṣāṇāṃ ca pradīpālokena sannikṛṣṭatve 'pi dūrāt sāmānyam upalabhyate na viśeṣā iti pradīpālokakāritau saṃśaya-viparyayau bhavataḥ/ tathā sāmānyasya viśeṣānāṃ ca cakṣuṣā sannikṛṣṭatve 'pi dūrāt sāmānyam upalabhyate na viśeṣā iti cākṣuṣau saṃśaya-viparyayau bhavataḥ/tatra mahāviṣayatvāt sāmānyaṃ dūrād apy upalabhyate 'lpaviṣayatvāt tu viśeṣā na dūrād upalabhyanta iti saṃśaya-viparyayor upapattiḥ/ SVR*, p. 332
11. *ātreyācāryas tu rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśānām nityatvānityatvapākajatvādisādharmyapratipādanaṃ prayojanam ity āhuḥ. Mithilāvṛtti*, p.3
12. ibid, p. 3
13. *kiṃ punar antyatvaṃ viśeṣāṇām/ ante bhavatvam, utpattivināśayor ante vartante ity antaśabdena nityadravyāny ucyante/ teṣu bhavanti ity antyaśabdena viśeṣā ucyante ity ātreyācāryāḥ/ Mithilāvṛtti*, p. 15
14. *ātreya-praśastapādādayas tu kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ pṛthivyām iti sūtraṃ kāryapṛthivīrūpādīnāṃ kāraṇa-guṇa-pūrvakatva-pratipādakam/ vahni-saṃyog[āt paka]jāś ceti sūtraṃ tu paramāṇupṛth-*

vīrūpādīnāṃ pākajatva-pratipādakam iti vyācakṣate// Mithilāvṛtti, p. 65

15. *saṃyogasya dravyārambhe nirapekṣakāraṇatvāt ity ātreyavacanāt/ NVV*(I), p. 413
16. *atra yaduktam ātreyeṇa—pratidravyaṃ bhidyate bhāvaḥ iti bruvāṇo bhavān bhāvam dharmiṇaṃ pratipadyate vā, na vā? yadi na pratipadyate; hetur āśrayāsiddho bhavati, atha pratipadyate; yenaiva pramāṇena sat sad ity anuvṛttapratyayena bhāvam dharmiṇaṃ pratipadyate tad eva pramāṇam tasyāśrayabhede 'pyabhedakatvam anuśāsti iti/ NVV* (I), p. 506
17. *tathā ca yaduktam ātreyeṇa—yadupalabdhi-kāraṇopapannaṃ vastu tadviśeṣaṇatvenopalabhyate bhāvo na sarvādhāraviśeṣaṇatvena/ etena avayavidravyam api vyākhyātam. yeṣāṃ avayavānām upalabdhikāraṇam asti taiḥ saha upalabhyate 'vayavī, yeṣām nāsti na taiḥ saha iti;—NVV* (I), p. 507
18. *yat punar idam sūtram—sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu sa bhāvaḥ* (1.2.7) *iti tatraiva bhāṣyañca "parasparaviśiṣṭeṣu dravya-guṇa-karmasv aviśiṣṭam sad iti yato 'bhidhānaṃ pratyayaśca bhavati sa bhāva iti/ upalakṣaṇārthañcaitat sūtram, tathā dravyam iti yataḥ pṛthivyādiṣu tad dravyatvaṃ guṇa iti yato rūpādiṣu tadguṇatvam karmeti yata utkṣepaṇādiṣu tat karmatvam iti/-NVV*(I), p. 508
19. *tathā ca bhāṣyam—"yathā ca santi dravya-guṇa-karmāṇi satām api dravya-guṇa-karmaṇām viśeṣaṇam tathā sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyā iti santa iva santa ity ucyante"/ NVV*(I), p. 508
    kathaṃ tarhīdam bhāṣyam — sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānāṃ tu sad ity abhidhāna-pratyayāv aupacārikau iti? NVV (I), p. 508
20. *atra bhāṣyam—tatraikam gotvam buddhivaśāt sāmānyam viśeṣa iti ca ucyate, anutvṛttabuddhihetutvāt sāmānyam vyāvṛttabuddhihetutvād viśeṣaḥ; NVV* (I), p. 121
    "gotvam anuvṛttabuddhihetutvāt sāmānyam" ityetad eva bhāṣyam........ vyāvṛttabuddhihetutvād *viśeṣaḥ / NVV* (I), p. 123
21. *dravyatvaṃ guṇatvaṃ karmatvaṃ ca sāmānyāni viśeṣās ca iti/atra bhāṣyam—tatra dravyatvam anekavṛttitvād añjasā sāmānyam sat vyāvṛttapratyayahetutvād anupacārikam viśeṣākhyām api labhate iti. NVV* (I), p. 121
    tathā ca bhāṣyam—kaḥ punar dravyatvanimittau dravyasyānuvṛtta-pratyayaḥ? dravyam dravyam iti, vyāvṛttapratyayo 'pi sa eva. NVV (I), p. 122
22. *ekavṛtti viśeṣaḥ iti tallakṣaṇād iti cet; na. NVV* (I), p. 123
23. *tathā ca bhāṣyam—bhavatu vā dravyatvam pratyakṣaṃ tathāpy anumānopanyāsaḥ dārḍhyārtha ity adoṣaḥ. NVV*(I), p. 123
24. *tathā ca saṃśayalakṣaṇasūtre bhāṣyam—tatrāyam ūrdhvatā-sāmānyaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇo avadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ sthāṇur vā puruṣo veti viśeṣānavadhāraṇaṃ saṃśayaḥ, eka eva pratyayaḥ. NVV* (I), p. 124
25. *tathā ca ātmendriyārtha-sannikarṣād ityādau bhāṣyam—tatrādarśādiṣu mukham abhimukhaṃ mukham iti ca bhrāntaḥ pratyayo mukham ity etāvatā samyak iti. NVV*(I), p. 124
26. *tasmāt sātiśayānekavidha-pravartaka-nivartaka-dharmasya āśrayopakaraṇa-kārya-kāraṇopabhoga-vināśā-kāraṇa-sahitasya śāstrapratipādyasya pratipādakam ityātreyācāryamatam ..... KN*, p. 15
27. *ātreyācāryas tu parameśvare dharma-tajjanya-śarīra-sukhādīni manyante, na tvadharma-tajjanya-śarīraduḥkhādīni iti. KN*, p. 41
28. *ātreyācāryas tu rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa iti samāsasya rūparasagandhasparśānāṃ nitya-anityatva-pākajatvādi-sādharmyapratipādanaṃ prayojanam ityāhuḥ. KN*, p. 66
29. *kaḥ punar antya-śabda-vināśa-hetur iti cet—sparśavad-dravya-saṃyoga-viśeṣa ityātreyācāryāḥ. KN*, p. 87
30. *guṇāśritatve 'pi guṇatvaṃ guṇāśrayo 'pi iti guṇāśrayatvam iti vyāpakam ityātreyācāryāḥ. KN, p. 92*
31. *ātreyācāryāḥ punar guṇavatā*[*śraya*]*sya guṇatve 'tivyāpti-parihārārthaṃ kriyāvad iti viśeṣaṇaṃ sūtrakāreṇopāttam ityāhuḥ. KN*, p. 92
32. This reading is according to the printed text of *KN*.
33. It suggests that according to Ātreya the reading of portion of the definition *saṃyoga-vibhāgayor akāraṇam*.
34. *ātreyācāryas tu saṃyoga-vibhāgayor akāraṇaṃ guṇa ityetāvad eva lakṣaṇam. paraṃ śeṣasvarūpakathanārtham ityāhuḥ. KN*, p. 107

35. *KN,* pp. 121-2
36. *yat punar ātreyācāryavyākhyānam—karma na dravya-kāraṇaṃ vyatirekāt vināśāt. ārambhakasaṃyogād vinaṣṭe karmaṇi dravyodayād iti. KN,* p. 123
37. The *sūtra* reading may be *tathā guṇaḥ*. It appears to be the contention of Ātreya that this sūtra does not convey any special meaning here as *dvitva-prabhṛtayaś ca* etc. *(VS* 1.1.22) indicates the meaning which is said to be the meaning of *tathā guṇaḥ*. But this *sūtra* (1.1.18) has its contextual meaning when put after *dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṃ dravyam kāraṇaṃ sāmānyam (VS* 1.1.17).
38. *ātreyācāryās tu dvyaṇuka-rūpādīnām ekaika-dvyaṇukādi-dravya-kāryatvānupapatteḥ. dvitvādīnāṃ cānekadravya-kāryatvasya dvitva-prabhṛtayaśca saṃkhyā ityanenaiva gatārthatvād idaṃ sūtram aphalam iti manvāna upekṣitavantaḥ. KN,* p. 125
39. *yad ātre[yaḥ .... saṃ]khyā tu dvitvādikā parārdhānteti. KN,* p. 128
40. *antyaikatvānubhavanāntaram aśeṣaikatva-gocaram anuvyavasāyātmakaṃ sākṣātkāri-mānasa-jñānam utpannaṃ śata-saṃkhyotpādakam iti ātreyācāryāh. KN,* p. 140
41. *ātreyācāryās tu punar evam āhuḥ. tantubhyāṃ dvitantukam ārabhyate. dvitantuka-tantva*[*nta*] *rābhyām ca tritantukam iti tritantu*[*kame*]*kenaiva saṃyogena janyate. tathā prasāriteṣu tantuṣu antarālapraviṣṭena tantunā prathamaṃ khaṇḍapaṭa ārabhyate. tadanantaram tena tantvantareṇa khaṇḍa-paṭāntaram ityanena krameṇa paṭasyotpādāt paṭo'pyekenaive saṃyogenārabhyata iti na bahūnāṃ saṃyogānāṃ dravyam iti sūtram yathāśrutamanupapannam eveti paṭāvayava-tadavaya-vaniṣṭha-khaṇḍa-paṭārambhakasaṃyogānāṃ kāraṇa-kāraṇādīnām api pūrvabhāvitva-mātreṇa kāraṇatvopacārāt upacāra-pravṛttyā vyākhyeyam* iti. *KN,* pp. 149-50
42. *utapatti-vināśayor ante vartata ityanta-śabdena nitya-dravyāṇyucyante. teṣu bhavanti ityantyaśabdena viśeṣā ucyante ity ātreyācāryāḥ. KN,* p. 175
43. *ātreyācāryas tu sattāyā aneka-samavetatvādinā* [*a*]*nityatvam āśaṃkya sattā nityeti pratijñām anusandhāya dravya-guṇa-karmabhyo 'rthāntaratvaṃ hetur anena sūtreṇa pratipādayata ityāha. KN,* p. 186
44. *ekadravyāśritatvāt, rūpavad iti. tad ayuktam, sattāyā ghaṭa-paṭādyaneka-dravyāśritatvena ekadravyāśritatvāsiddheḥ. ekadravyendriyasannikarṣeṇa upalabhyamānatvam ekadravyāśritatvam iti ātreyācāryāḥ. KN,* p. 187
45. *ātreyādayas tu paramāṇulakṣaṇasya vāyor dravyatvam anena sādhyata ityāha—dravyam āśrayo 'syāsti iti dravyavān. dravyānāśritasya bhāvo* ['] *dravyavattvam. tasmāt dravyaṃ vāyur iti. prayogas tu vāyuparamāṇavo dravyaṃ dravyānāśritatvāt ghaṭa-paramāṇuvad iti. KN,* p. 217
46. *ātreyācāryādayas tu śabdaḥ kasyacid viśeṣaguṇaḥ, sāmānya-viśeṣavattve sati niyamenāsmadādi-bāhyaikendriya-grāhyatvāt rūpavad ityākāśe pramāṇam āhuḥ. KN,* p. 227
47. *ātreyādayas tu digantarāṇi diśam antarāṇi pūrvadakṣiṇa-*[*dakṣiṇa*]*-paścima-paścimottarottarapūrvāṇi vyākhyātāni iti sūtrārthaṃ varṇayanti/ KN,* p. 239
48. *KN,* p. 205
49. *KN,* p. 215
50. *KN,* p. 242

CANDRĀNANDA AND HIS *VṚTTI*

Information from different sources has now made us aware of the existences of some early commentaries on the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*. They are *Kaṭandī Bhāṣya, Rāvaṇa Bhāṣya, Ātreya Bhāṣya,* the commentary of Śrāyaska (mentioned in *Viśālāmalavatī*) and some *Vṛtti* (mentioned in Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*) and probably a few more. But unfortunately none of them have come down to us. Though we got Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra's *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* alias *Saṃgrahavārttika*, which is a running commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*, it is not a commentary of much early period because Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra lived in the A.D. thirteenth century. Moreover it abruptly ends in *sandigdhāḥ sati bahutve* (*VS* 2.2.41). A simple *Vṛtti* is found and it is an abridgement of the *Saṃgrahavārttika*. It breaks off at the end. Besides these, we have in our hand *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkaramiśra who is a scholar of A.D. fifteenth century. According to *Upaskāra*, Śaṅkaramiśra got almost no help from any early commentaries and hence we can suppose that Śaṅkara himself was doubtful about his own exegesis of the *sūtras*. So in this situation, a *Vṛtti* by Candrānanda came to our tremendous benefit. We could not satisfactorily determine the exact reading of Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* before the discovery of *Candrānanda-vṛtti*. As this *Vṛtti* has remained entirely faithful to the ancient tradition of the Vaiśeṣikas it is now a great possession for us.

Candrānanda's life-history is completely shrouded in mystery. Neither can his date be specifically determined. Candrānanda only once (p. 29) mentions Uddyotakara by name. As Uddyotakara's date falls in the A.D. fifth or sixth century, so Candrānanda is certainly posterior to him. He twice mentions one Vṛttikāra (pp. 69, 70), but we cannot ascertain who this Vṛttikāra is.

Candrānandavṛtti is a short commentary on the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*. It is still a neat commentary with its marked simplicity and faithfulness with the ancient Vaiśeṣika tradition. A *sūtra, sadasator vaidharmyāt kārye sadasattā na* (*VS* 9.12) mentioned by Mallavādin (DANC, p. 459) is available only in *Candrānandavṛtti* and hence it proves its ancient nature. Anyway, though the *sūtras* in *Candrānandavṛtti* are undoubtedly perfect in reading, a few of them, however, cannot be passed for the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* as they are nowhere quoted in the entire philosophical literature. These are as follows:

(i) *abhāvāt* (2.2.33),
(ii) *tad viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭakāritam* (5.2.4)
(iii) *guṇāntara-prādurbhāvāt* (7.1.6)
(iv) *tayor nityatvānityatve tejaso rūpa-sparśābhyām vyākhyāte* (7.2.2)
(v) *niṣpattiś ca* (7.2.3)
(vi) *tathā pratyayābhāvaḥ* (7.2.22)
(vii) *sambaddhasambandhāt iti sandehaḥ* (7.2.23)

BHAṬṬA VĀDĪNDRA—THE VAIŚEṢIKA

Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra is a highly important figure in the field of Indian philosophy. His real name was Mahādeva. Harakiṅkara, Śaṅkarakiṅkara, Nyāyācārya, Paramapaṇḍita and Bhaṭṭa are the epithets that shows his religious affiliation and scholarship. The word Vādindra is also an epithet showing that he was a great debater. The scholars[1] place this author during the reign of the Yādava king Siṅghaṇa of Devagiri (A.D. 1210-47) otherwise called Śrīsiṃha. A disciple of one Yogīśvara, Vādīndra in his turn was the preceptor of Bhaṭṭa Rāghava whose *Nyāyasāravicāra* has since been published.

Over and above the (i) *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* (ii) *Haraprasāda-kiraṇāvalīṭippaṇaka* (the commentary on the *Kiraṇāvalī*), (iii) the *Kaṇādasūtranibandha*, (iv) a commentary on Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvalī* and (v) a treatise on materialistic philosophy, have been attributed to Vādīndra, but the last two works have not been traced.

Bhuvanasundara in the commentary on the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*, describes Vādīndra as *tarka-sāhityālaṃkārādi-sakalaśāstrāmbudhi-pārīṇapratibhaḥ* and *svakīya-dūṣyavaiduṣya-kalārañjita-nānā-narendrasabhaḥ*[2] showing that he was proficient in various śāstras including logic, literature and poetics and he decorated many royal courts by his presence. The available works and the references to the lost ones, prove Vādīndra's place in the galaxy of the logicians. There are only a few verses to speak indirectly of his literary genius.[3] The references and quotations in the available works show that he had thorough knowledge of Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, grammar and Buddhist philosophy and that he consulted a good number of works in various branches of learning which are not available to us.[4]

As regards Vādīndra's presence in the royal courts, we come to know that he was a religious councillor of Śrīsiṃha.[5] Again the colophon of the Trisūtrīprakaraṇa of the *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* attributes the work to Mahārājādhirāja Śrīkṛṣṇabhūpāla who was carefully brought up by the mighty king [Bhāskarabhūpala?] that added glory to the Yādava family.[6] The attribution only shows Vādīndra's devotion to Śrīkṛṣṇabhūpāla who seems to be his patron in later life. The work was written by Vādīndra himself and the verse and other sectional colophons[7] are clear on this point. Kṛṣṇabhūpāla must be the Yādava king Śrīkṛṣṇa (A.D. 1247-1261), the grandson and successor of Śrīsiṃha, who has also been indirectly mentioned in the colophon.

The importance of Vādīndra's contribution can be understood by the fact that he has been quoted with approval, or otherwise by eminent authors like Pratyagrūpabhagavān, Veṅkaṭanātha, Mādhavācārya and Śeṣaśārṅgadhara.[8]

Among his available works the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* is the earliest and it made him famous. The Mahāvidyā theory came into existence after Udayanācārya and its main purpose was to refute the eternity of sound as propounded by the Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa school. But it was employed in other spheres also. The author of the *Daśaślokīmahāvidyāsūtra* was a Yaugācārya called Kulārkapaṇḍita. Telang[9] does not subscribe to the view that Kulārka was identical with Śivāditya though Vādīndra accepts Śivāditya as the foremost among the propounders of the Mahāvidyā.[10] The theory depends

upon *kevalānvayi* probans and was supposed to establish syllogisms free from all sorts of fallacies.[11] It caused a sensation and both the supporters and antagonists of the theory of eternity of sound attached much importance to it. Vādīndra in his *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* first explained the Mahāvidyā-sūtra and then added an elaborate refutation thereof. Telang shows that Citsukha, Pratyagrūpa, Amalānanda, Veṅkaṭanātha, Śrīnivāsa and Śeṣaśārṅgadhara refer either to the Mahāvidyā or to the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* or to both.[12] This shows its popularity in the south. Among the authors of the north we find Maṇikaṇṭhamiśra, a predecessor of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya adding a summary of the *Daśaślokī* to his *Nyāyaratna*. We hear of many treatises on the Mahāvidyā theory and its refutation, but the credit of demolishing it goes to Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra after whom no serious attention was paid to the theory and we find no trace of it in the works of Gaṅgeśa and his followers.

A question was raised by Vādīndra himself as to the propriety of his refutation of the Mahāvidyā theory which served the purpose of the Vaiśeṣikas. But Vādīndra would not accept the wrong means though leads to the right end. The Mahāvidyā theory has the *kevalānvayi* syllogism for its support. Vādīndra shows that this has been accepted neither by the Sūtrakāra (Kaṇāda) nor by the Bhāṣyakāra (Praśastapāda). The acceptance thereof by later commentators (who are not regarded as authorities by Vādīndra on this point) need not be given much importance as they might have accepted it from other systems.[13]

The second work of Vādīndra is the commentary on the *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayana. Incidentally it is the oldest available commentary on the work. The Guṇa section of it appeared in the Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana series under the title *Rasasāra*. MM Dr. Gopinatha Kaviraja raised a doubt as to the correctness of the queer title befitting a work on Alaṃkāra or Āyurveda and pointed out that "neither the name of the commentary nor that of its author appears anywhere at present in the body of the MS". For both the titles of the work and its author, he depended upon the "Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems" by Dr. Fritz Edward Hall. The Dravya section of the work has appeared in the Bibliotheca Indica Series (No. 200, Fas. 4) as an appendix to the *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayanācārya. Here also the beginning and the colophon are wanting. But a verse in the body of the work refers to the Mahāvidyā theory and points out that Vādīndra is its author.[14]

That Vādīndra had a *Kiraṇāvalīṭīkā* to his credit is also attested by the *Kaṇādasūtranibandha*, another work of Vādīndra which will be discussed a little later. The title of this commentary is given there as *Haraprasāda-kiraṇāvalī-darpaṇaka*.[15] The same verse introduces the Guṇa section of the *Kiraṇāvalīṭīkā* and the third chapter of the *Mahāvidyā-viḍambana*.[16] Again both the parts present common characteristics including textual criticism, style and reference to the same authorities.

One point deserves special mention here. Vādīndra refers to Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* as a *Bhāṣya* notwithstanding the opinion of Udayana to the contrary. Vādīndra himself also refers to the views of another Vaiśeṣika-bhāṣyakāra, which have nothing to do with Praśastapāda's work. This Bhāṣyakāra may be identical with Rāvaṇa or Ātreya who are known to have written *Bhāṣyas* on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda. However, we find Ātreyācārya quoted in the available portion of the

Kaṇādasutranibandha of Vādīndra. So that another Vaiśeṣikabhāṣyakāra may most probably be this Ātreya. It is noteworthy that Vādīndra followed Praśastapāda whenever there is a conflict between the two.

Vādīndra critically examined the text of the *Kiraṇāvalī* and there are instances when he had to mend the existing readings with reasons adduced.[17] He refers to the earlier interpretations and in most cases refutes them.

The *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* is really the *magnum opus* of Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra. The work of his mature age, it is a voluminous commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*. But unfortunately the discovered portion extends upto first 41 *sūtras* of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda. The work is once called *Tarkasāgara*[18] and all the colophons call it *Vaiśeṣikasūtra-vārttika* or *Kaṇādasūtravārttika*.[19]

The title *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* must have come from the initial verse.[20] The other titles are also appropriate. It may be rightly called a *Tarkasāgara*—'Ocean of disputes' as it is both vast and full of intricate discussions. Again it conforms to the definition of a *Vārttika* which the Vaiśeṣika system lacked. The explanation to the *sūtras* is not always very important here. But things connected are elaborately discussed.

The *sūtras* of Kaṇāda have been divided into ten chapters. Each chapter again is found subdivided into two *āhnikas* i.e. daily lessons. However the last three chapters have no such sub-division. But the *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* does not follow the usual sub-division even in the first and second chapters. The colophons available show that Vādīndra had a different sub-division here and each *āhnika* consisted of a less number of *sūtras* in his work. Thus the first *āhnika* of Śaṅkaramiśra's version of the Vaiśeṣikadarśana has here been split up into two. Again the first chapter ends with *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.2.17 of the same version. In the second chapter no colophons exist as the manuscript breaks off with *sandigdhāḥ sati bahutve* (*VS* 2.2.36) practically leaving one or two *sūtras* of the chapter in the end.

The *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* is highly important to the student of the Vaiśeṣika system inasmuch as it gives us an interpretation of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* written in the first half of the A.D. thirteenth century, while so long we had to depend on the mid-fifteenth century, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra-upaskāra* which by its author's (Śaṅkaramiśra) own admission is cut off from the ancient Vaiśeṣika tradition. The *Nibandha*, on the other hand, is uninfluenced by other systems and has close relation with ancient works of the Vaiśeṣikas.

An anonymous *Vyākhyā* of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, which has also been discovered, is found to be an abridged version of the *Nibandha* giving mainly the interpretation of the *sūtras*. It must have been prepared by Vādīndra himself or some of his followers, for those who were interested in the purport of the *sūtras* and had no aptitude to enter into the abundant discussions in the *Nibandha*. We find the *Vyākhyā* extends upto the seventh *sūtra* of the ninth chapter of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*. From the close agreement between the *Nibandha* and the *Vyākhyā* in the first two chapters it is easy to conclude that the same agreement continued in the rest of the two works and Vādīndra had surely completed his commentary upto the tenth chapter.

All the three works of Vādīndra show that this author was a true Vaiśeṣika. Though he has criticised and referred to the views of the non-Vaiśeṣikas, he was not influenced

in the least by them. Here lies the difference between Vādīndra and the later commentators of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, who were cut off from the pure Vaiśeṣika tradition and tried to infuse new matter in the system. Vādīndra informs us that one *Prācīnavaiśeṣikamahāsūtra*, composed by Lord Śiva himself is presupposed by the present *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* which also was taught to Kaṇāda by the Lord in the form of an owl. Vādīndra preserved a much better *sūtra* text than we get in the version of Śaṅkaramiśra. With regard to the import of the *sūtras* also he is nearer to the ancient tradition. Vādīndra was well-versed in the literature of both the lines, through which the Vaiśeṣika system developed. The first one is the commentary literature on the *sūtras*. Many ancient texts on this line no doubt perished before him, but he at least knew the *Ātreyabhāṣya* and a *Vaiśeṣika-sūtravṛtti*. The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda was the starting point of the second line. Vādīndra being a commentator on the *Kiraṇāvalī*, which in its turn is itself a commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* belongs to it. But his references to and criticisms of the views of Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara, the two older commentators on Praśastapāda's work, show his deep knowledge of their works also. Vādīndra's partiality to the views of Praśastapāda, in preference to those of Ātreya is visible in the *Kaṇādasūtranibandha*.

Among the post Udayana Vaiśeṣika authors of the Mithila School Vādīndra knew Śivādityamiśra and Śrīvallabha. The former as an exponent of the Mahāvidyā theory has been ruthlessly criticised in the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*. Many of Śivāditya's works are still unknown to us. Vādīndra quotes two of his verses[21] in the *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* besides those mentioned in the Introduction to the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*. Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya also quotes one verse from some of Śivāditya's works.[22] The *Lakṣaṇamālā* attributed to Śivāditya[23] has now been proved to be a work of Udayana.[24] Thus the *Lakṣaṇamālā* of Śivāditya is yet to be discovered.

Śrīvallabha, the author of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, has twice been quoted in the so-called *Rasasāra*.[25] In one case his view has been accepted and in the other it is rejected. The *Nibandha* also refers to him.[26]

There are some other Vaiśeṣika authors mentioned by Vādīndra. Vādivāgīśvara, the author of *Mānamanohara* (Vaiśeṣika treatise) has been quoted in the *Nibandha*[27] and the *Vyākhyā*.[28]

About Vidyādharamiśra[29] and Śrīkara[30], apparently two Vaiśeṣika authors, we know nothing. Viṣṇumiśra is another such author once mentioned in the *Nibandha*[31] on generality. He seems to be identical with Varadaviṣṇumiśra quoted by Veṅkaṭanātha in his *Nyāyapariśuddhi*[32]. One Bhaṭṭa Viṣṇu belonging to the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā wrote the *Nyāyatattvasaṃgraha*. He is found quoted in the *Mānameyodaya*.[33] But the identity of these authors cannot be established.

In many cases Vādīndra draws a line of distinction between the ancient and modern Vaiśeṣikas.[34] Other indirect references to Vaiśeṣika authorities are also met with in his works.[35] In one place he quotes one verse from an author who considered himself to be a Vaiśeṣika.[36] Among the Naiyāyikas the Bhāṣyakāra has once been quoted.[37] Vācaspati is also known to Vādīndra.[38] But it seems that Vādīndra attaches more importance to Nyāyabhūṣaṇakāra-Bhāsarvajña who has been mentioned or quoted several times.[39]

The scholarship of Vādīndra, is undoubtedly great and his works have given a permanent fame as a Vaiśeṣika authority.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. M.R. Telang (Introduction to the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*, GOS, Baroda). MM Dr. Sir Ganganatha Jha and MM DR. Gopinatha Kaviraja
[Introduction to the *Rasasāra* (*Guṇakiraṇāvalīṭīkā*)].
2. *Mahāvidyāviḍambanavṛtti*, p. 1
3. *vākkāyacetaḥ-prabhavāparādha-prabandhasambandhatamaḥprakāśa/*
unmudrita-jñānasudhā-nidhāna gauripate tvāṃ śaraṇaṃ prapadye//
Mahāvidyāviḍambana, p.1
namasyāmo dūrīkṛtabhavanabhaṅgaṃ bhagavato
vapurviśvārambhasthitilayanidānaṃ puraripoḥ/
yad aspṛṣṭaṃ bhogairapi dalitakāmaṃ karuṇayā
bhavānibhrūbhaṅgapraṇayakalahebhyaḥ spṛhayati//Mahāvidyāviḍambana, p. 99
4. Works of Vidyādharamiśra: *KN*, pp. 95, 111
Śrīkara : *KN*, p. 100
Viṣṇumiśra : *KN*, p. 165
5. *teṣāṃ eṣa viśeṣeṇa nirākaraṇa-saṃbhramaḥ/*
śrīsiṃhadharmādhyakṣeṇa vādīndreṇa vidhīyate//
Mahāvidyāviḍambana, p. 99
6. *iti śrīyadukula-kamalakalikā-vikāsa-bhāskarabhūpāla-lālita-mahārājādhirāja-śrīkṛṣṇabhūpāla-viracite tarkasāgaranāmni vaiśeṣikasūtra-vārttike trisūtrīvyākhyā samāptā// KN*, p. 57
7. *praṇamya gaurīśam acintyaśaktiṃ sarvajñam ajñānatamaḥpradīpam/*
kāṇādasūtrasya mayā nibandho vidhīyate śaṅkarakiṅkareṇa// Invocation.
iti śrīharakiṅkara-paramapaṇḍita-nyāyācārya-bhaṭṭavādīndra-viracite vaiśeṣikasūtravārttike prathamādhyāye prathamāhnikam.
iti śrīharakiṇkara-pramapaṇḍita .... prathamādhyāye dvitīyāhnikam.
8. Vide "Introduction to the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*", GOS, p. 35-38
9. The editor of the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* (GOS ed.)
10. *upādhivyādhinirdhūtam anvayavyatirekiṇam/*
matvodbhinnamahāvidyāḥ śivādityāditārkikāḥ// Mahāvidyāviḍambana, p. 99
11. *tasya ca mahāvidyātvam—asiddhatvādisakaladoṣavirahaḥ/*
Mahāvidyāviḍambana, p. 3
12. Vide "Introduction to the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*" (GOS ed), pp. 35-38
13. *na ca vaiśeṣikādīnāṃ kevalānvayināṃ nirākurvatām apasiddhāntaḥ sūtrakāra-bhāṣyakārābhyāṃ kvacid api tadavyutpādanāt. ṭīkākārādīnāṃ cāsmābhir anādaraṇāt. ādaraṇe vā tadīyakevalānvayivyutpādanasya paramatatvena vyākhyānāt. Mahāvidyāviḍambana*, p. 98
14. *prayatante yannātha sanāthā nirupadravāḥ/*
mahāvidyāvinyāsā mayi śaṅkarakiṅkare// Dravyakiraṇāvalīṭīkā, p. 677
15. .... *[prapañcitam] caitad asmābhiḥ haraprasādanāmni kiraṇāvalīdarpaṇake.*
16. *namsyāmo dūrīkṛtabhuvanabhaṅga... spṛhayati// Rasasāra*, p. 1 and *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*, p. 99
17. (a) *ghaṭavad iti pūrvagranthaśeṣa eva nāsau paramāṇur iti granthaḥ prathamapustakalekhakadoṣād vyavadhānam āpanna ity apare sampradāyavidaḥ. —Dravyakiraṇāvalīṭīkā*, p. 655
(b) *keṣucid pustakeṣu yadyapy ekasyotpādavināśahetutvam ityādikaḥ āmadaśāyām śyāmādīnām anutpādaprasaṅgād ityanto granthasandarbho dyaṇukavināśakṣaṇam ārabhya pañcame kṣaṇe punar anyad dvyaṇukam utpādya rūpādimad bhavati iti prakriyāmadhye paṭhyate tad*

anupapannam. vyākhyānaparagranthasandarbhasya etadbhāṣyānekabhāṣyavyākhyānottara-kālabhāviprakriyā-vyutpādanamadhye 'tyantam asaṅgatatvāt. tasmād vahnisaṃyogāt pākajā jāyanta iti rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ saṃkṣepeṇoktā ityetasmād anantaram tasmāt paramāṇupākād eva rūpādivināśotpādau ityetasmāc ca pūrva yadyapy ekasyotpādavināśa-hetutvam ityādiḥ āmadaśāyāṃ śyāmādīnām anutpādaprasaṅgād ityanto grantha-sandarbho yeṣu pustakeṣu paṭhyate tānyeva śuddhāni, anyāni tu lekhadoṣavaśād asamīcīnapāṭhavanti iti draṣṭavyam.—*Rasasāra*, p. 28

(c) *yat tajjanmātiriktakarmajanakatvād iti ... kvacit tu yattajjanmābhighātaḥ karmajanakatvād iti pāṭhaḥ sa tu samyag eveti.*

18. The printed editions differ from both the readings. cf. *Kiraṇāvalī. yat tajjanyaṃ karma kāryadravyaṃ pūrvavyūhāt pracyāvayati. tadavayavavāṃśca vyūhāntaraṃ prāpayati.* (BI), p. 437
19. Vide *KN*, p. 57 Vide *sūtra*, pp. 119, 158, 190
20. *kaṇādasūtrasya mayā nibandho vidhīyate śaṅkarakiṅkareṇa//KN*, p. 1
21. *taduktam śivādityamiśraiḥ—*
    hetur vyāptisahāyo hi sādhyasādhanam iṣyate/
    svaniṣṭhā sābhyupetavyā prakṛte durlabham tvidam//
    anyasmin jñātasambandhe katham anyasya liṅgatā/
    aliṅgajam ca vijñānam anumānam alaukikam// iti. KN, p. 54
22. *vyāvartanīyam adhitiṣṭhati yaddhi sākṣād*
    estad-viśeṣaṇam ato viparītam anyat/
    daṇḍī pumān iti viśeṣaṇam atra daṇḍaḥ
    puṃso na jātiranudaṇḍamasau ca tasya// Tattvacintāmaṇī (BI), Pratyakṣa, p. 829
23. Journal of Oriental Research, Madras XIX, i. pp. 44-52
24. *History of Navya Nyaya in Mithila,* p. 2f
25. *Rasasāra*, pp. 55, 92
26. *KN*, p. 205
27. *KN*, p. 221
28. *Vyākhyā*, p. 36
29. *KN*, pp. 95, 111
30. *KN*, p. 100
31. *KN*, p. 165
32. *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, p. 221
33. cf. "Introduction to the *Tattvabindu*" (Annamalai ed.) and the *Mānameyodaya* (Adyar ed.), p. 278
34. *Dravyakiraṇāvalīṭīkā*, pp. 640, 661, 684, 689; *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*, p. 109; and *KN*, p. 20.
35. *Dravyakiraṇāvalīṭīkā*, pp. 651, 653, 695, 700
36. *yaduktam vaiśeṣikammanyaiḥ—*
    tadabhāvāt sapakaṣe na na pakṣe siddhasādhanāt/
    anvayo vyatirekitve rāddhāntavirahaḥ sphuṭaḥ// iti. Dravyakiraṇāvalīṭīkā, p. 696
37. Vide *Rasasāra*, p. 103
38. *KN*, pp. 16, 26
39. *KN* pp. 115, 145, 207; *Dravyakiraṇāvalīṭīkā*, p. 647; *Rasasāra*, pp. 4, 5

A FRAGMENTARY *VAIŚEṢIKASŪTRAVṚTTI*

The archives of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, possess two very rare palm-leaf manuscripts of the commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda.[1] They cover the ninth and tenth chapters of the Vaiśeṣikadarśana and are written in Maithili and Newari scripts respectively. Only the ninth chapter has come to light in the second Pariśiṣṭa of *Vaiśeṣikadarśana* published from the Kameshwarsingh Darbhanga Sanskrit University. Though the condition of the manuscripts was very bad and there were the consequent imperfections in the text, the data supplied by these manuscripts seem to be highly important.

The work is called *Śrīkaṇādasūtravṛtti* in the colophons of both the chapters.[2] The name of the author is not known. But incidentally they refer to king Vallālasena and to Śrīmān, the preceptor of the author. While illustrating the third member of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika syllogism the author pays high tributes to king Vallālasena of the famous Sena dynasty of Bengal; "Even during the dark Kali age when investigations regarding the source of all (*dharmas*) in the Vedas have vanished, outstanding personalities excelling Sri Ramachandra in character are visible. For example, here is king Vallālasena, the scion of the (royal) Sena family."[3] This casual reference fairly decides the date of the *Vṛtti* in question. We are told that king Vallāla, a champion of the Vedic culture, reigned for twelve years and died in A.D. 1118-9. The date of the present *Vṛtti*, therefore falls in the beginning of the A.D. twelfth century. It thus happens to be prior in date to the Vaiśeṣika-sūtravṛtti of Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra (A.D. thirteenth century) and the *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* of Śaṅkaramiśra (A.D. fifteenth century).

Both the manuscripts refer to one *Nyāyavṛtti* several times and acknowledge the author's indebtedness to it. Two pre-colophon verses in the Newari manuscript give some description of Śrīmān, the preceptor of our anonymous author, whom we are inclined to accept as the author of the *Nyāyavṛtti*, just mentioned. Those narrate : "The Nyāya system propounded by Gautama withered away like a tender creeper under the excessive heat of the thunderlike arrangements of the formidable adversaries. And it was revived by Śrīmān, the preceptor of this author, by dint of showers (in the form) of his mature reasonings. It was the kind teaching of this Śrīmān that actuated the present author to write the *Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti* in order to refute the views of the scholars of the heterodox scholars."[4] But no more information about this Śrīmān who revived the Nyāya views and possibly belonged to the Royal Court of the Senas, is available. The laborious researches of the late Professor Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya have brought to light a neo-logician named Śrīmān Bhaṭṭācārya who was the grand teacher of Pragalbhamiśra and contemporaneous with Śaṅkaramiśra. The consideration of data stands in the way of identifying this Bhaṭṭācārya with an author who belonged to the early Sena period. Pragalbha belonged to the later half of the A.D. fifteenth century and his paramaguru (*prathama-parama-guruvaḥ śrīmān-bhaṭṭācāryāḥ*) can at best be seventy-five years older.[5]

The pāṣaṇḍi-paṇḍitas mentioned by our author are none else than the Buddhist scholars of the Vijñānavāda school, as is attested by his references to and quotations from

their works in the present chapters of the *Vṛtti*.

The manuscripts preserved almost all the *sūtras* of the last two chapters of the Vaiśeṣikadarśana (vide the Appendix). They show some peculiarities also. A comparison with the *sūtra* texts of Candrānanda and Śaṅkaramiśra discloses that the present text agrees more with the text of Candrānanda than with that of Śaṅkaramiśra in spite of the fact that the author of the present *Vṛtti* and Śaṅkara hail from neighbouring states and that the *Vṛtti* in all probability gained currency in Mithila, the native land of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara's *sūtra*-text is highly defective inasmuch as it omits the important Vaiśeṣika *sūtra*, *tathā bhavatīti sāpekṣebhyo 'napekṣebhyaśca*, whereas this (*VS* 10.7) has been accepted as such by authorities like Praśastapāda,[6] Vyomaśiva,[7] Śrīdhara[8] and Udayanācārya.[9] The author of the present *Vṛtti* also along with Candrānanda accepts it a Vaiśeṣika *sūtra*. Again, unlike the *sūtra*-text of Śaṅkara the last two chapters of the Vaiśeṣikadarśana have not been divided into *Āhnikas*. It has been found that neither Candrānanda nor the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* accepts this division into *āhnikas* in the last three chapters of the Vaiśeṣikadarśana.

The exposition of the *sūtras*, in the *Vṛtti* under consideration, is not exhaustive. It pays little attention to the expressions constituting the *sūtras*. On the other hand, defence of the Vaiśeṣika tenets against the opponents receives more attention of the author. It evinces no knowledge of ancient Vaiśeṣika works like the *Vaiśeṣika-vākya*, *Kaṭandī*, *Rāvaṇabhāṣya* or Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya-ṭīkā*. Only the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of the last named author seems to have been utilised here.

A question arises as regards the identity of the present *Vṛtti* quoted and referred to by Candrānanda and Śaṅkaramiśra. The former seems to use the word Vṛttikāra to denote Praśastapāda. The latter quotes a Vṛttikāra several times. That this Vṛttikāra is different from the author of the *Vṛtti* under consideration is attested by the fact that in *tayor niṣpattiḥ pratyakṣa-laiṅgikābhyām vyākhyātā* (*VS* 10.4), the former takes *tayoḥ* to mean *jñāna-sukhayoḥ* while the latter takes the same for *sukha-duḥkhayoḥ*. The wide divergence in reading of the *sūtras* also precludes the possibility of any relation between their authors.

On one point, however, we find Śaṅkara agreeing with the present author. On topics where the Vaiśeṣika differs from the Naiyāyika, both would follow the Nyāya stand-point. This agreement is visible in the acceptance of the four *pramāṇas* in both the works. We have already noticed the fact that the *Vṛtti* under discussion was written under the influence of a great Nyāya scholar. Śaṅkaramiśra himself also was a Naiyāyika of considerable importance. Both of them were cut off from the ancient Vaiśeṣika tradition. This similarity is therefore accidental.

The author and works touched by the *Vṛtti* under consideration, gives a good idea about the curriculum prevalent in the then contemporary Bengal. Among the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, the *Nyāyavārttika*[10] of Uddyotakara and the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*[11] of Udayana have been quoted. The author seems to have been influenced by the Mithila school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and we find no trace of any influence of the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha-ṭīkās* of Śālikanātha and Śrīdhara, hailing from Bengal.

The *Ślokavārttika*[12] is found quoted several times. The *Prakaraṇapañjikā*[13] of

Śālikanātha has once been quoted anonymously. One verse and a half from the long lost Mīmāṃsā work of Mahāvrata[14] are met with here.

The *Sāṃkhyakārikā*[15] of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and some other Sāṃkhya work[16] (attributed to one Sāṃkhyācārya in the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*) have contributed one verse each.

There are reference to or quotations from the *Bhagavadgīta*, Pāṇini-smṛti, Jyotiṣaśāstra, the Bāhyas, Saugatas particularly Dharmakīrti, the Digambaras and the Cārvākas.

On the section on inference we come across two ornate verses from the pen of the author himself:

uddāma-vidyud-uddyota-dyotita-dyodharāntarāḥ/
visphūrad-vajra-nirghoṣa-kampitādhi-mahīdharāḥ//
añjanādri-tamastoma-malināntānabhonibhāḥ/
gamayantyavinābhūtaṃ vṛṣṭimiṣṭāṃ balāhakāḥ//

APPENDIX

Vaiśeṣikasūtrapāṭha: a comparison of the different versions [*C* = Candrānanda; *V* = Vādīndra; *Ś* - Śaṅkaramiśra, *Vṛ.* = the *Vṛtti* under discussion]

CHAPTER IX

1. *kriyāguṇa-vyapadeśābhāvād asat. CV. °bhāvāt prāg asat. Ś Vṛ.*
2. *sadasat. C Ś Vṛ.*
3. *asataḥ sat kriyā-guṇa-vyapadeśābhāvād arthāntaram. C Ś; asati kriyā°V ; asataḥ kriyā. Vṛ*
4. *saccāsat. C V Ś Vṛ.*
5. *yaccānyat satas tad apyasat. C V; °nyadsad atas tas asat° Ś; °nyad atas tad asat. Vṛ*
6. *asad iti bhūtapratyakṣābhāvād bhūta-smṛter virodhi-pratykṣatvāc ca jñānam. C V; pratyakṣavat Ś; pratyakṣatvāj jñānam Vṛ.*
7. *tathābhāve bhāvapratyakṣatvāc ca. C V Ś Vṛ.*
8. *etenāghaṭo 'gaur adharmaś ca vyākhyātaḥ. C V*[17] *Ś Vṛ.*
9. *abhūtam nāstītyanarthāntaram. C Ś Vṛ.*
10. *nāsti ghaṭo geha iti sato ghaṭasya geha-saṃyoga-pratiṣiddhaḥ. C Vṛ. ; geha-saṃsarga° Ś*
11. *nāstyanyaś candramā iti sāmānyāc candramasoḥ pratiṣiddhaḥ. C*
12. *sadasator vaidharmyāt kārye sadasattā na. C*
13. *ātmanyātmamanasoḥ saṃyoga-viśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam. C Ś*
14. *tathā dravyāntareṣu. C °su pratyakṣam. Ś*

* *asamāhitāntaḥkaraṇa upasaṃhṛtasamādhayas teṣāṃ ca. Ś*

15. *ātmendriyamano'rtha-sannikarṣāc ca. C Vṛ.*
16. *tatsamavāyāt karmaguṇeṣu. C Ś Vṛ.*

17. *ātmasamavāyād ātmaguṇeṣu. C Ś; tatsamavāya° Vṛ.*[18]

18. *asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sambandhi ekārthasamavāyi ceti laiṅgikam. C; °ṇaṃ saṃyogi virodhi samavāyi ceti. Ś: °kāraṇaṃ saṃyogi virodhi samavāyyekārtha-samavāyi ceti. Vṛ.*

* *asyedam kārya-kāraṇa-sambandhaścāvayavād bhavati. Ś*

19. *etena śādam vyākhyātam. C Ś*

20. *hetur apadeśo liṅgaṃ nimittaṃ pramāṇaṃ kāraṇam ityanarthāntaram. C °liṅgam pramāṇaṃ karaṇami° Ś*

21. *asyedam iti buddhyapekṣatvāt C; °pekṣitatvāt Ś*

22. *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣāt saṃskārāc ca smṛtiḥ. C Ś Vṛ.*

23. *tathā svapnaḥ svapnāntikaṃ ca. C Ś* and *Vṛ* omit *ca* and divide *tathā svapnaḥ, svapnāntikam* into two *sūtras*.

24. *dharmācca C Ś Vṛ.*

25. *indriyadoṣāt saṃskārāc cāvidyā. C; °saṃskāradoṣācca° Ś Vṛ.*

26. *tad duṣṭam jñānam, C Vṛ.; °ṭajñānam Ś*

27. *aduṣṭaṃ vidyā. C Ś Vṛ*

28. *ārṣaṃ siddhadarśanaṃ ca dharmebhyaḥ. C Ś Vṛ.*

CHAPTER X

1. *ātmasamavāyaḥ sukha-duḥkhayoḥ pañcamyo'rthāntaratve hetus tadāśrayibhyaś ca guṇebhyaḥ. C; śrayebhyaś ca° Vṛ.* (supported by one manuscript forming the basis of *C*.).

2. *iṣṭāniṣṭakāraṇaviśeṣād virodhāc ca mithaḥ sukha-duḥkhyor arthāntarabhāvaḥ C Ś Vṛ.*

3. *saṃśaya-nirṇayayor arthāntarabhāvaśca jñānāntaratve hetuḥ. C; °nirṇayānta-rābhāvaśca Vṛ.*

4. *tayor niṣpattiḥ pratyakṣalaiṅgikābhyāṃ jñānābhyāṃ vyākhyātā. C; laiṅgikābhyām Ś; °laiṅgikābhyāṃ vyākhyātā Vṛ*[19]

5. *bhūtam iti pratyakṣaṃ vyākhyātam. C Vṛ.*

6. *bhaviṣyatīti kāryāntare dṛṣṭatvāt. C; kāraṇāntare Vṛ.*

7. *tathā bhavatīti sāpekṣebhyo 'napekṣebhyaś ca. C Vṛ.*

8. *abhūd ityabhūtāt. C Vṛ; abhūd ityapi Ś*

9. *sati ca kāryasamavāyāt. tathā sati ca Vṛ.* (It reads this *sūtra* after the next). *kāryadarśanāt Ś*

10. *ekārthasamavāyi-kāraṇāntareṣu darśanāt C* (It adds here *ekadeśa ityekasmin* from the next *sūtra*) *dṛṣṭatvāt* for *darśanāt Ś Vṛ.*

11. *ekedeśa ityekasmin śiraḥ pṛṣṭham, udaram pāṇir iti tad-viśeṣebhyaḥ. Vṛ, °mudaram marmāṇi tadviśeṣas tadviśeṣebhyaḥ Ś*[20]

12. *kāraṇam iti dravye kāryasamavāyāt. C Ś Vṛ.*

13. *saṃyogād vā. C Ś Vṛ.*

14. *kāraṇasamavāyāt karmaṇi. C Vṛ. kāraṇe sama° Ś*

15. *tathā rūpe kāraṇakāraṇa-samavāyāc ca. C Vṛ.; kāraṇaikārtha° Ś*

16. *kāraṇasamavāyāt saṃyoge. C Vṛ; °saṃyogaḥ paṭasya Ś*
17. *kāraṇakāraṇa-samavāyāc ca. Ś Vṛ; tathā kāraṇākāraṇa° Ś*
18. *saṃyuktasamavāyād agner vaiśeṣikam. C Ś Vṛ.*
19. *laiṅgikaṃ pramāṇam vyākhyātam. C; laiṅgike Vṛ.*
20. *dṛṣṭānāṃ dṛṣṭaprayojanānāṃ dṛṣṭābhāve prayogo 'bhyudayāya.C Ś ; dṛṣṭānāṃ dṛṣṭābhāve Vṛ.*
21. *tadvacanād āmnāyaprāmāṇyam. C; °mnāyasya prā° Ś Vṛ.*

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Vide Descriptive Catalogue Sanskrit Mss A.S.B., Government Collection, Vol. XI, pp. 23-4
2. (a) *iti kaṇā... ttau navamo 'dhyāyaḥ.* (*Vaiśeṣikadarśana*, Pariśiṣṭa 2)
   (b) *iti śrīkaṇādasūtravṛttau daśamo 'dhyāyaḥ samāptaḥ.* (MS No. 7432)
3. *vilupta-sakala-trayī-mūlānusandhāne kalāv apyadharīkṛtaśrīrāmacaritaḥ puruṣātiśayo dṛśyate, yathāyaṃ senakulāvataṃsaḥ śrīmān vallālasena iti. Vaiśeṣikadarśana,* Pariśiṣṭa, 2, p. 358.
4. *durvārā-sama[dṛpta]durjana-vaco-vajrānalenāhatāḥ*
   śrīmadgotama-nirmitā rasayutās tā bhāratī-vallayaḥ/
   yena prauḍha-vikalpajālasalilair ujjīvitāḥ santataṃ
   jīyād adbhutakīrtir ujjvalaguṇaḥ śrīmān asau me guruḥ//
   tat-prasāda[sama]vāptaṃ mayaitat kiñcid īritam/
   pāṣaṇḍīpaṇḍita[vrāta]khaṇḍanāhūta-kautukāt//
5. Vide *VNNC*, p. 259
6. *PDS* (Vizianagram ed.), p. 139. Some other editions confused to take it as a *sūtra*.
7. *Vyomovatī* (II), p. 64
8. *NK*, p. 348
9. *Kiraṇāvalī* (Varanasi ed.), p. 221
10. *Vaiśeṣikadarśana, Pariśiṣṭa* 2, p. 360
11. Ibid p. 332
12. Ibid pp. 326, 328, 331, 333, 334
13. Ibid p. 320
14. *Mahāvratenāpi pūrvapakṣa uktam—*
    idam evetyataḥ pūrvam idam tāvad iti dhruvam/
    buddhir bhavati sānyasya na vidhir na ca vārṇam//
    tam abhāvadhiyo hetuṃ dhiyam āha prabhākaraḥ/ Ibid, p. 321
15. Ibid p. 318
16. *asattvān nāsti sambandhaḥ kāraṇaiḥ sattvasaṃgateḥ/*
    *asambaddhasya cotpattim icchatāṃ na vyavasthitiḥ//*Ibid, p. 317
17. *V* is available up to this *sūtra* only.
18. Here ends the first *āhnika* of Śaṅkaramiśra's, *Upaskāra.*
19. *Vṛ* is supported by the Vṛttikāra quoted by Śaṅkaramiśra.
20. The first *āhnika* of the 10th chapter of *Upaskāra* ends here.

ŚAṄKARAMIŚRA AND HIS *UPASKĀRA*

Śaṅkaramiśra, the son of Bhavanāthamiśra is a name to conjure with in Mithila. He lived during the second quarter of the fifteenth century in the village of Sarisab, about eighteen miles from Darbhanga.[1] He was a poet, a dramatist, a Smṛti writer and above all the foremost Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholar.[2] He belonged to a most distinguished Śrotriya family of Mithila and maintained two large seminaries in his celebrated homestead which is a place of pilgrimage in Mithila. His works may be noted as follows:

His poetical works were *Paṇḍitavijaya*(?) and *Rasārṇava*, his drama *Gaurīdigambara-prahasana* and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, e.g. *Vādivinoda*, *Kaṇādarahasya*, *Līlāvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*, *Upaskāra*, *Ātmatattva-viveka-kalpalatā*, *Trisūtrīnibandhavyākhyā*, *Bhedaratnaprakāśa*, an yet undiscovered work *Kiraṇāvalīniruktiprakāśa*, *Āmoda* on Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, and the unpublished *Mayūkha*, a commentary on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. Śaṅkaramiśra wrote also a commentary on Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*.

In the introduction of the *Vādivinoda*, edited by himself, Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Ganganatha Jha recorded a most interesting account of the great scholar of extraordinary talents. He confronted the reigning monarch (probably the famous Śivasiṃha) when barely five years old with the extempore verse, still recited by Maithila students in wonder and worship:

bālo'haṃ jagadānanda na me bālā sarasvatī/
apurṇe pañcame varṣe varṇayāmi jagattrayam//[3]

(Oh king! I am a young boy, but my learning is by no means little. So I am ready to describe all the three worlds even before I have reached my fifth year in age.)

This royal visit fetched him money, which by promise went to the drummer woman, whose drum sounded by itself at the time of Śaṅkara's birth! She dug a tank with the money, which still goes by her name in the vicinity of Śaṅkara's house. There is a copy of the *Harivaṃśa* preserved in his house which was written by his students in one night. A copy of the *Gītāṭīkā* from his house ends:

aho sarṣapasāmrājyam etaj jānīta sajjanāḥ/
yāmayugmena yatrāsīd etat-patraśatatrayam//

It is found from the colophons of the works that Śaṅkaramiśra got full academic training and instructions on philosophy from his father Bhavanātha, who again was indebted to his elder brother Jīvanātha.

The extant Vaiśeṣika works of Śaṅkaramiśra comprise the *Upaskāra* commentary on the *Kaṇādasūtra*, *Līlāvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* on Vallabhācārya's *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, and lastly *Kaṇādarahasya*, an independent treatise on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The undiscovered *Kiraṇāvalīniruktiprakāśa*, by its name indicates that it is an analysis of the great treatise *Kiraṇāvalī*, a Vaiśeṣika commentary of Udayana. The text is referred to only once in the *Kaṇādarahasya* (p. 177).

Last of all, mention must be made of Śaṅkaramiśra's sense of history. His *Ātmatattvavivekakalpalatā* ably discovers the right pūrvapakṣin of Udayana being

Jñānaśrīmitra while no other commentator of *Ātmatattvaviveka* could know of this Jñānaśrī, although their commentaries in some cases excelled Śaṅkara's in explanation.

"The original Vaiśeṣika-sūtras of Kaṇāda, like the Sāṃkhyasūtras of Kapila, were neglected by scholars ever since Praśastapāda composed the excellent manual named *Padārtha-praveśa* which ousted all previous works of school and came to be regarded as the *Bhāṣya*, which it was strictly not."—This is the candid observation of Prof. Bhattacharya about the position of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* after the composition of *Padārtha-praveśa* by *Praśastapāda.* Though at present we come across at least four commentaries[4] on the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* composed after Praśastapāda, yet the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda remained neglected, as we realise in Śaṅkaramiśra's statement in one of the introductory verses of the *Upaskāra*:

sūtramātrāvalambena nirālambe 'pi gacchataḥ/

khe khelavan mamāpy atra sāhasaṃ siddhim eṣyati// It is clear here that a scholar like his stature, could not procure good commentaries on the Kaṇādasūtras, for which he had to go with the *sūtras* only. And in this situation a genius, Śaṅkaramiśra, immortalised himself by writing the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-upaskāra* being a running commentary upon them. Śaṅkara was quite conscious of the adventurous nature of his task, which he likened to sporting in the sky, but his ambition was more than fulfilled when we find that the *Upaskāra* became the standard work on the subject throughout India. Its study made the Nyāya students aware of the systematic Vaiśeṣika-sūtras as a result of which numerous manuscripts of *Upaskāra* text were found and at least two commentaries also were written on it. They are *Pariṣkāra* of Pañcānana Tarkaratna and *Vivṛti* of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana.

The only previous work Śaṅkara had before him was a certain *Vṛtti* which he had frequently cited.[5] It was an early work, as indicated by Śaṅkara and is now completely lost. It is certain that neither the *Mithilā-vṛtti* nor the *Candrānanda-vṛtti* can be suspected for the *Vṛtti* mentioned by Śaṅkara because of the fact that Vṛttikāra in *Upaskāra* explained *ca* in *asan sandigdhaś ca* (*VS* 3.1.11) to indicate *Bādha* and *Satpratipakṣa* pseudo-probantia thus showing inclination towards the Nyāya philosophy but the other *Vṛttis* show not the slightest inclination towards Nyāya, and moreover other places also evidently follow the same divergent principle.

Śaṅkara mentions three works of his own in the *Upaskāra*: *Mayūkha*, *Kanādarahasya* and *Vādivinoda*. The Vaiśeṣika topics explained by him in great length are the process of chemical change (pp. 285-92), Duality (pp. 318-24), Conjunction (pp. 324-27), Disjunction (pp. 327-23) and Priority and Posteriority (pp. 341-47). The prominent characteristic of Śaṅkara's writing in it, is that he, in a number of places, refers to the Nyāya-sūtras[6] or adorns it with brilliant summaries of Navya-nyāya topics.[7] At the time of explaining 'Generality' Śaṅkara cites the famous *Pramāṇavārttika* verse:

na yāti na ca tatrāsin na cotpannaṃ na cāṃśavat/

jahāti pūrvam nādhāram aho vyasana-saṃtatiḥ//

The *sūtra*-reading of Śaṅkara's *Upaskāra* is undoubtedly defective in a number of places though this demerit of the author can be ignored in view of his attempt to restore the study of *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* in the country. A few examples of the defects in the *sūtra*-

reading in the *Upaskāra* may however be shown. *Dharmaviśeṣa-prasūtād dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām tattvajñānān niḥśreyasam* recorded as a *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* (1.1.4) in the *Upaskāra* is not at all a Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* as it is supported by none. On the other hand the genuine Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* 10.5,6,7 in Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* are totally omitted in the *Upaskāra*. There are some more which may be shown in this regard. Anyway, it may also be a justification in some places that Śaṅkara got the *sūtras* of a Vaiśeṣika tradition which was different from that of Candrānanda or others. e.g. *kāraṇabahutvāc ca* (7.1.9) is the *sūtra*-reading in the *Upaskāra* and *kāraṇabahutvāt kāraṇamahattvāt pracayaviśeṣāc ca mahat* is in Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*. We see that Śaṅkara tries to include *mahattva* and *pracaya* by the strength of *ca* and it is not at all inconsistent in the explanatory technique of a śāstra. According to the *Upaskāra*, the number of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* is 370.

Now below is a summary of the work:[8]

CHAPTER ONE, ĀHNIKA ONE

VS 1.1.1 *athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ.*

The import of the introductory words "now therefore" (*athāto*) is explained in a manner reminiscent of commentaries of the Brahma- and Mīmāṃsāsūtras, indicating why the enquiry is useful.

VS 1.1.2 *yato 'bhyudayaniḥśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ.*

"*Abhyudaya*" means the right knowledge and "*niḥśṛeyasa*" means the absolute negation of suffering. The merit (*dharma*) is the result of meditation and *yoga*, and is the same as *adṛṣṭa*.

The Vṛttikāra, however, explain "*abhyudaya*" as pleasure, and "*niḥśreyasa*" as the simultaneous destruction of all the specific qualities of the soul.

VS 1.1.3 *tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam.*

Here the "that" (*tad*) may refer to God, so that the authority of scripture is due to its being God's word, or it may refer to merit, and the meaning would be that scripture's authority is due to its speaking of merit.

VS 1.1.7 *utkṣepaṇam avakṣepaṇam ākuñcanam prasāraṇam gamanam iti karmāṇi.*

Objection: There are not five kinds of action, but only four, since "going" (*gamana*) is just a synonym for "action".

Answer: It is true that "going" is a synonym for "action", still it is mentioned here to comprehend a number of kinds of action which do not fall under the first four kinds. Or else, goingness is a fifth kind of action, thus pervaded by actionness, and the actions of the first four kinds are not really cases of going, but are called so in only a secondary sense.

In the case of the first four kinds of action, however, precise definitions can be given which do not allow cross-connection, e.g., throwing upwards (*utkṣepaṇa*) is an action

caused in the hand by the desire to throw the pestle upwards, where the non-inherent cause is contact with the soul which possesses the desire; then from the non-inherent cause of action in the hand thrown up, the upward action of pestle results. The other kinds are defined in relevant fashion.

In the case of prescribed rituals, bathing, giving etc. the actions involved are produced by contact with a soul whose efforts are devoted toward merit, while in actions involved in going to a forbidden place, killing, tobacco-chewing etc. the soul's efforts tend toward the production of demerit.

VS 1.1.8 *sad anityaṃ dravyavat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānya-viśeṣavad iti dravya-guṇa-karmaṇām aviśeṣaḥ.*

Substance, quality and action are said to be non-eternal in the sense of having posterior negation as their relatum (*dhvaṃsa-pratiyogitva*); thus, though atoms are not non-eternal in the ordinary sense, still all members of these three categories share as distinguishing condition (*vibhājaka upādhi*) the function of tending toward annihilation.

Likewise, "substance-possessing" (*dravyavat*), though it does not literally apply to atoms, means that which has a substance as its inherent cause, i.e., all members of these three categories share this function as distinguishing condition. "Effect" (*kārya*) indicates the distinguishing condition of functioning as the counterpositive of a prior negation. "Cause" (*kāraṇa*) indicates the distinguishing condition of being the invariable antecedent of all kinds of effects except for awareness. The clause excludes awareness from the relevant class of effects so that a soul, or cowness, etc. will not fall into the definitions of these three categories.

"Generality- and particularity-possessing" (*sāmānya-viśeṣa-vat*) means that the members of these categories possess generality like substanceness, qualityness, actionness which, though generalities, still mutually demarcate (*vyāvarttaka*) their particularities (*viśeṣa*).

Objection: The specification of being a cause over-extends to include generalities; e.g., in scriptural texts like "Give a cow" or "A cow should not be touched with the feet" cowness is the cause of merit or demerit.

Answer: No; generalities have as their only function delimitation (*avacchedakatā*).

Objection: Praśastapāda says "Causality occurs elsewhere than in the atoms, etc.", implying that only things which have causes can be effects and non-eternal.

Answer: Then the *sūtra* must mean that these properties cannot be viewed as qualified by their being distinguishing conditions of categories.

VS 1.1.11 *karma karmasādhyaṃ na vidyate.*

No action is originated by another action. If an action could produce another action, it would have to produce it immediately after its own production. Now when an action is produced in x which was in contact with y disjunction is effected in x from y. Disjoined through the first action, there is no conjunction from which x can be disjoined by the second action. But the definition of action involves its being a cause of conjunction and disjunction.

Objection: Then the second action need not immediately follow the first one.

Answer: No, since there is no occasion for its not being produced immediately, since the first action has (according to the hypothesis) the ability to produce another action.

The same line of argument applies if one thinks of action as producing conjunction. Then how can the action produce conjunction?

CHAPTER ONE, *ĀHNIKA* TWO

VS 1.2.1 *kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ.*

The notions of cause and effect are required in order that we explain what conditions what in the world. If causality were not operative, there could be no activity or withdrawal (*pravṛtti/nivṛtti*); for only if we know that by doing *x* we can get *y* will we be moved to act, and only if we know that by refusing to do *x* we can avoid *z*, will we be moved to withdraw from activity.

Objection: Only what exists arises, and not what does not exist, as the Vedas say ("In the beginning there was only the existent"). And if it were not so, a cloth might arise from potsherd.

Answer: If so, those who believe in transformation (*pariṇāmavāda*) will have some difficulty in explaining why pots only arise from potsherds and not cloth, etc. Furthermore, if the idea of the opponent is that the effect already exists before its production, then causality is merely the development (*āvirbhāva*) and envelopment (*tirobhāva*) of things. But even so, development and envelopment depend on causes, and are processes which bring about states not present prior to the process.

Thus causality (*kāraṇatva*) can be defined as (i) the possession of the natural kind (whose members are the regular antecedents of members of the effect class), where the relation is otherwise unexplainable, or it may alternatively be defined as (ii) the property of possessing the absence of the effect produced by a deficiency in the accessory conditions.

These definitions are intended to encompass plurality of causes. "One should perform the sacrifice with either barley or rice" (where one can get the same effect using either foodstuff) technically lacks "regular antecedence", but nevertheless constitutes a case of causality according to the second definition. (ii) in the previous paragraph provides a definition of causality which suffices in both ordinary (*laukika*) and scriptural (*vaidika*) contexts, while (i) is satisfactory only in the former context, the reason for which is that in a scriptural context such as provided by the sentence quoted ("One should perform the sacrifice....") positive concomitance is sufficient to show causality, negative concomitance is unnecessary. So it has rightly been said that one who follows Vedic practices in all their parts will necessarily get the results. When the Teacher (*ācārya* viz. Udayana) says "because it is rooted in the scripture, non-concomitance is not a fault in this case" he has in mind (scripturally) authenticated objects (*ṛjvartha*) (i.e. that in the case of such objects it is not necessary to show negative concomitance to prove causality). But in the case of objects such as grass, wood and jewel (each of which can cause fire) it is necessary to show that when the cause is absent the effect is also so. If that were required also in the

case of scriptural objects one would have to suppose that different effects were produced by different sacrifices (*rājasūya*, *vājapeya* etc.).

VS 1.2.3 *sāmānyaṃ viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam.*

Awareness is the mark of generalities and particularities. There are two kinds of generalities: (i) Existence (*sattā*), the higher, and (ii) lower generalities, such as substanceness. A generality is responsible for reidentification (*anuvṛtta*), a particularity for differentiation of (*vyāvṛtta*) things. A generality is that something eternal which occurs in many individuals (*nityam anekavyaktivṛtti*). Or, a generality is that which, being eternal, has a common substratum with the mutual negation of its own substrata. A lower generality is also a particularity as it results in both reidentification and differentiation.

Buddhist objection: Generalities do not exist, since reidentification can be explained merely by negation of differentiation. "This is a cow" has as its content, differentiation of *this* from what is not a cow. Even the believer in generalities admits that the notion of cowness arises in this way, since being a specific kind of entity is nothing other than not being differentiated from what is so specified. Furthermore, where does this "generality" cowness allegedly reside? Not in the cow, since there is no cow before cowness occurs in it. Not in non-cow, obviously. Where was the generality before the piece of flesh, etc., became a cow? Not there, since then the place would have already been bovine! And you say that the generality is eternal, so it cannot have a beginning. Furthermore, since it has no parts it cannot occur in many distinct individuals.

Answer: A generality is eternal and pervasive (*vyāpaka*). Pervasiveness consists in something being related to all places naturally (*svarūpatas*). But places themselves cannot be bovine, since the relation involved is inherence, and time (and places) do not have shapes, colours, etc. So the cowness, which pervades a particular place, where the piece of flesh is situated at a particular time, constitutes the cow. As for "where does the generality reside?", the answer is, that it resides where it is cognised. You say that the reidentification "this a cow" means differentiation from what is not cow, but this cannot explain "this is a cow or an ox", for disjunction presupposes single properties as disjuncts.

The Prābhākaras say that generalities are manifested just in their instances. If its mark is reidentification, then what is the fault in saying that generalities are merely qualities and motions (and not a separate category of all)? For we reidentify colours, tastes, etc., and thus recognize a property. Just as there is a property *ākāśa*ness in a single kind of thing, *ākāśa*, so colourness resides in a single kind of thing, viz., colour—thus our theory does not violate the requirement of (i) identity of individuals (*vyaktyabheda*) (among Udayana's six requirements of generalities). Nor does it violate the requirement that the putative generality not be (ii) equipollent (*tulya*) with any other property (e.g. *ghaṭatva* and *kalaśatva*, both being potness), since colourness is not equipollent with any other property. And there is no (iii) cross-connection (*jātisaṅkara*), for the same reason. Nor is there (iv) infinite regress, for no other generalities are contained in colourness. There is not (v) giving up a thing's own nature (*rupahāni*), because our generalities also have the nature of being particularity (*viśeṣatva*); such particularity which resides in substance will be either qualities or actions, and those residing in all-pervading substances

will be qualities only, and though this may repudiate the category of individuators (*viśeṣa*), it does not affect anything critical. Finally, our theory does not violate the requirement of (vi) relation (as inhering in something does). We accept inherence as residing in the relevant items (as you do). Even though inherenceness is not a generality (on the standard theory), because of violating the first requirement of *vyaktyabheda*, still one should also consider the view of those who think that there are many inherences (which would allow inherenceness to qualify many substrate, viz., the inherences).

The author of a *Vṛtti* is quoted in favour of the notion that generalities are proved to exist by the fact of reidentifying awareness.

VS 1.2.5 *dravyatvaṃ guṇatvaṃ karmatvaṃ ca sāmānyāni viśeṣāś ca.*

Objection: Substanceness cannot be satisfactorily defined.

Answer: Yes it can be; substanceness is that what limits the inherence causality of an effect limited by conjunctionness. The conjunction occurs between atoms, etc. Qualityness is that which limits the causality in a thing having a generality and which is not an inherent or non-inherent cause of conjunction or disjunction. A similar definition is provided for actionness. There is a discussion of our inference that the sun moves—although we cannot directly perceive the *ākāśa*, etc., with which the sun is in conjunction and disjunction, still as the rays of the sun be perceived to be in conjunction with the solar zone (*maṇḍala*), the sun's movements can be inferred. Uddyotakara is quoted.

CHAPTER TWO: *ĀHNIKA* ONE

VS 2.1.1 *rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśra-vatī pṛthivī.*

Objection: That is, earth is different from other things because it has smell, according to you. But is this property of being different from others already accepted or not? If it is not already accepted, then there can be no desire to infer anything involving it. But if its being different from others is already accepted, does the *hetu* (possessing smell) pervade it or not? If it does not, then the "fallacy of too-specific" is committed, as no *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa* can be provided. But if it does pervade that property, the inference is a positive (*anvayin*) one and does not provide a differentiating mark.

Answer: Our thesis is supported by perception. Differences from other things such as water, etc., are evident in a pot. Thus it does not depend on inference, and your objection is without point. (Nevertheless, Śaṅkaramiśra goes on to discuss the technicalities of the inference which the objector attributes to him.)

VS 2.1.2 *rūpa-rasa-sparśa-vatya āpo dravāḥ snigdhāḥ.*

Objection: But we find blueness in the river Yamunā, bitterness in the juice of berries and warmth in water at midday. Furthermore water cannot be naturally fluid and viscous since ice is not fluid and viscidity is not always perceived in water. Finally, waterness is not a proper generality since it has no differentia. Viscidity is found in butter, etc., and so cannot be the differentium.

Answer: The blue colour, bitter taste and warm touch in the cases mentioned are due to the conditions of the substratum of the water in each case and are thus adventitious. Thus specific qualities listed are differentia of water as claimed. Viscidity is found in water; the evidence is that when it is mixed with barley or sand, etc., a compound (cohesive ball) of stuff results; this does not result when these things are mixed with ghee (butter), etc. Indeed, the viscidity found in butter is adventitious there, due to the water in the butter; viscidity is natural to water. Finally, waterness is a proper generality directly pervaded by substanceness, since it has been proved that it is a property which is found in the ultimate atoms and which limits the inherence causality of conjunction occurring just among objects having viscidity.

CHAPTER TWO: *ĀHNIKA* TWO

VS 2.2.6 *aparasmin aparam yugapat ciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni.*

Time is inferred from the use of (e.g.) "later" with respect to something which is later (than something else), "simultaneous", etc. That is, with respect to a young man the notion of "older than" arises with respect to an old man, in virtue of the fact that his birth is separated from us by a large number of revolutions of the sun. This priority (of being older than) must depend on some non-inherent cause. But colour, touch, dimension, etc., cannot be the non-inherent cause in question; by elimination it is concluded that cause must be conjunction between the sun in its revolutions and some other substance, indeed, some substance which is also in conjunction with the body of the individual man in question. Now, that substance cannot be *ākāśa*, for if it were so, then when one beats a drum at one place, every place would resound with drumbeats; so the substance 'time' must be inferred.

Objection: Time is not uniform but manifold, since it comes in moments, hours, days, etc.

Answer: The appearance of difference is due to limitors such as the motion of the sun, etc., as well as the limits imposed by the effects of such limitors. Thus the moment (*kṣaṇa*) is a limitor of time which does not pervade another limitor of time, or else it is that time which is not the substratum of the counterpositive of either the prior or posterior negation of what is subsisted in it—that is, something is produced and destroyed at every moment.

Objection: Yet time must be at least of three kinds—past, present and future.

Answer: No, for the distinction is due to the distinction between the existence, prior negation, and posterior negation of a thing, e.g. time limited by a thing's existence is its present, time limited by a thing's prior negation is its future; time limited by its posterior negation is its past.

VS 2.2.10 *ita idam iti yatastaddiśyaṃ liṅgam.*

Direction (*diś*) is inferred as the substance which makes possible that there be more or less conjunctions among a few conjuncts, thus explaining judgements of spatial direction and extent.

Objection: Why not let time be this substance? Why do we not need still another substance?

Answer: Time was inferred in order to establish fixed actions (*niyatakriyā*). If it is also supposed to establish non-fixed (i.e., subject of differences of degree) properties such as 'farness' (*paratva*) then it would establish Kashmiri saffron paste on the breasts of Karṇāṭaka women! For the same reason one would not suppose that *ākāśa* or the soul can function in direction of direction. Time supports actions, while direction supports conjunction between simultaneously existing substances.

Another difference between time and direction is this: limitors which qualify time are such that if *x* is present with respect to *y*, *y* is present with respect to *x*, but in the case of direction, if *x* is east with respect to *y*, *y* is not east, but west, with respect to *x*.

"East is the name given to that direction where the first conjunction of the sun took, takes, or will take place as it circles around Mt. Meru, says the *sūtra* (2.2.14). The reason for putting it thus is that the observer may be thinking of 'east' at different times of the day or night."

VS 2.2.21 *śrotra-grahaṇo yo 'rthaḥ sa śabdaḥ.*

Objection: In order to explain the judgement "this is a single word" or "this is a single word" we must postulate a *sphoṭa* which causes these judgements and becomes manifested in the final syllable or letter (respectively) of the word or sentence.

Answer: The *sphoṭa* is not needed to explain our understanding of the meaning, since that is provided through convention. As for the judgement "one word" or "one sentence", this is a mere manner of speaking (*vyavahāra*) through which we indicate that a number of syllables (or words) convey a single sense. If we could perceive some inner meaning of a word in addition to its syllables we might denominate it "*sphoṭa*", but as we cannot, Gautama has ignored the *sphoṭa* doctrine as pointless.

CHAPTER THREE: *ĀHNIKA* ONE

VS 3.1.14 *prasiddhi-purvakatvād apadeśasya.*

Objection: what is invariable concomitance? Not (i) a non-wandering relation[9]; nor (2) being a necessary condition[10]; nor (3) a relationship with the whole[11]; nor (4) an essential or natural relation[12]; nor (5) a relation without superfluous condition[13]; nor (6) merely being any relation; nor (7) having a common substratum with the *sādhya* which is not the counterpositive of the absolute negation residing in the *hetu*; nor (8) being the substratum of that which does not have a common substratum with *sādhya*; nor (9) having a form limited by being related to *hetu*. These are all rejected for technical reasons by the opponent.

Answer: No, invariable concomitance is (5) as obstructionless relation, more specifically, having a common substratum with that *sādhya* which co-varies with the *hetu*, or alternatively, having a common substratum with that *sādhya* which has a common substratum with the absolute negation whose counterpositive is the counterpositive of the absolute negation having a common substratum with the *hetu*.[14]

Udayana's definition of "superfluous condition" is given, viz. a superfluous condition is that which pervades the *sādhya* but does not pervade the *hetu*.

Objection: The definition fails to include a superfluous condition which is merely non-concomitant of *sādhya*, e.g. in the inference "air is perceptible, because it is the substratum of perceptible touch", possession of manifested colour is a superfluous factor which fails to pervade the *sādhya*, since soul is perceptible though it lacks manifested colour.

Answer: No, for the rule only applies after the proper extent of the *sādhya* is finally determined. In the example offered, possession of manifested colour does pervade the *sādhya* perceptible as the limitor of external substanceness.

Objection: Still, this is not what the word "superfluous condition" means primarily. A superfluous condition is a property which appears elsewhere than where it belongs, e.g., the redness of the flower in the crystal.

Answer: We admit that the use is a secondary one, at least where there is unequal concomitance (*viṣama-vyāpti*). Still, a rule of debate allows a disputant to bring forward a superfluous factor relevant to the *sādhya* as finally determined even though it may not be concomitant with the *sādhya* as proposed by the speaker, as a way of showing counterbalance (i.e. to show that an equally weighty argument proves the opposite of the conclusion the speaker is arguing for).

CHAPTER THREE: *ĀHNIKA* TWO

VS 3.2.1. *ātmendriyārtha-sannikarṣe jñānasya bhāvā'bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam.*

The internal organ is proved from the correlation of its contact with the soul and the presence of awareness.

Objection: The internal organ is all-pervading (*vibhu*) because, like time, it lacks special qualities (*viśeṣa-guṇa*), because, like the soul, it is the substratum of a contact which is the non-inherent cause of awareness, and because, like *ākāśa*, it has absolute negation of touch.

Answer: No. If the internal organ were all-pervading it would be in contact with all the sense-organs, and there would be only one kind of perception, namely, omni-sensuous.

Objection: That does not happen, since the effects are of different sorts (i.e. visual, auditory, etc.).

Answer: A total factor (*sāmagrī*) produces an effect which comprehends contrariety of that sort (otherwise we could not specify causes in general at all).

Objection: Then what is produced is of variegated form, analogous to variegated colour, as when we eat some pudding (and have multisensory experience).

Answer: No, since even there we can attend to one kind of sensation at a time.

Objection: But we also cognize that we are simultaneously perceiving colours, tastes, smells, touch—how is that possible?

Answer: Because the internal organ moves swiftly and we remember the several sensations and produce a complex judgement.

VSs 3.2.4-18

Objection: You think that the soul can be inferred to exist. But there is no mark perceived by which to infer it, since when there is contact of the senses with Yajñadatta one does not perceive a soul.

Counter-objection: The inference can be by analogy (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*), so that no perceived mark need be present.

Objection: Then one could not infer the soul in particular but only that desires, etc., must have some substratum or other. For this reason we conclude that the soul must be proved by scripture, e.g., from hearing the Upaniṣads.

Answer: No, the soul can also be proved by inference from the fact that the word "I" must have a referent, and none of the other substances, etc., are appropriate as referents of that word. Granted, this is an inference by analogy, but nevertheless a particular thing can be inferred thereby, since the word "I" indicates the property of egoity or soulhood by its nature. Furthermore, merely hearing scriptural statements about the soul is not enough, for without reflection (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyāsana*) mere hearing will not guarantee soul-knowledge.

Objection: How can one know the soul by inference when the soul is imperceptible?

Answer: We never said the soul was imperceptible. It is directly known in such experiences as "I am happy", "I desire", "I feel pain", etc.

Objection: If the soul is perceived, no inference to its existence is necessary.

Answer: Though the soul is present in perception, it is frequently obscured by confusing it with the body ("I am fair", "I am lean"), and so inference is needed to arrive at a proper conception of the soul. It has been said "skillful logicians wish to understand through inference even what is grasped by perception". Anyway, if thinking and meditating on the soul is specified in scripture as requisite, the soul must be the object of inference—otherwise those activities would be impossible.

Objection: If "I am Devadatta" refers to the soul, then the statement "Devadatta goes" must be an error.

Answer: It is not error, but a metaphorical extension. This is indicated by the fact that we use the word "I" to refer to oneself and not anyone else; if the primary reference of that word were to be body, we should not speak the way we do. Again, we know that a blind man or one with his eyes closed is still aware of his soul, we realize that the referent of "I" is not the perceptible body but something non-perceptible.

Objection: Just as when we speak of hot, fragrant water, though heat and fragrance do not belong to the water but are superimposd on it, so when we speak of our self we superimpose on the body qualities, such as awareness, pleasure, etc., which do not belong to it. The real substratum of those qualities must be gleaned from scripture, and is not perceptible.

Answer: No. Experience such as "I feel pleasure" arise from perception alone, and do not need scripture or inference; we have as a primary idea of egoity through immediate awareness.

CHAPTER FOUR: *ĀHNIKA* ONE

VS 4.1.10 *tasyābhāvād avyabhicāraḥ.*

Objection: Weight is inherent in many substances, and has a common substratum with colour and size—so why is it not (visually) perceptible?

Answer: Because there is absence of manifested colour, etc., in weight. Śaṅkaramiśra notes the difference between Praśastapāda and Vallabhācārya in the acceptability of weight. According to the former, weight is super-sensory, while according to the latter, it is tactual.

CHAPTER FOUR: *ĀHNIKA* TWO

VS 4.2.5 *tacca śarīraṃ dvividhaṃ yonijam ayonijaṃ ca.*

"Bodies not born from the womb" include watery, fiery and airy bodies and also the bodies of gods and sages like Manu; these are not produced by sexual union at all. Of these bodies produced by sexual union there are two kinds, womb-born and egg-born.

Trees and plants are also bodies, since they are the seat of experiences; that is shown by their being alive or dead, propagating seeds, woundable, etc., and by passages from scripture which indicate that they get liberated, etc.

CHAPTER FIVE: *ĀHNIKA* TWO

VS 5.2.18 *tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaś ca mokṣaḥ.*

Direct intuition of the nature of the soul is produced by the power of *yoga*; thus false awareness is destroyed, and so faults like passion, hatred, delusion disappear; so activity stops, birth does not take place, and thus frustration ceases. Now a *yogin* wears away, the karmic residues produced by previous merit and demerit earned in various bodies, such as, horse, elephant, snake, bird, by taking up those kinds of bodies and experiencing the results of those former acts; thus his faults are removed, and no future body is produced.

CHAPTER SEVEN: *ĀHNIKA* ONE

VS 7.1.6 *kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ pṛthivyāṃ pākajāḥ.*

A discussion over the theory of cooking takes place. The piṭharapākavādins say that the whole pot—from atoms up to the whole—is baked. The pīlupākavādin holds that it is only the atoms which are burnt. Their view entails that the pot must break down into its ultimate components while in the kiln, that the pot will be destroyed. Indeed, only if it is, can the heat get to the inside parts of the pot and change their colour.

Piṭharapākavādin: If the pot is destroyed, how is it that we say of the pot coming out of the kiln "this is the same pot I put in?" Why does it have the same form as before, and in the same place on the pan in which they were inserted? Why should there be the same number of pots on the pan, and of the same size, with the same markings?

Answer: When one removed a few "molecules" (*trasareṇu*, triple-dyads) from a pot one can still recognize it as the same, even though in a sense it has been destroyed. At least, this is what the Mīmāṃsakas say. But they should be asked, how is it that with a smaller number of constituent parts the same recognizable arrangement can be maintained? Pots are not like cloth, contractible in dimension.

There is an extended and highly technical discussion, of different views about the number of moments involved in the cooking process—whether it involves nine, ten or eleven moments. The author says he has also explained the points in his *Kaṇādarahasya*.

CHAPTER SEVEN: *ĀHNIKA* TWO

VS 7.2.2 *tathā pṛthaktvam.*

Objection: Separateness (*pṛthaktva*) is nothing but mutual negation (*anyonyābhāva*).

Answer: No. When we speak of separateness we use a different locution ("This is separate *from* that", but "This is not that").

Objection: It may be considered that "This is distinct *from* that", and "This is a separate *from* that"—both of these involve the "from".

Answer: No. "Maitra is distinct from the stick he holds" is consistent with his not being separate from the stick. Likewise, substances are separated from each other, but not from qualities, etc., though a substance is certainly distinct from a quality, etc.

VS 7.2.8 *etad anityayor vyākhyātam.*

Non-eternal unity separateness-of-a-single-thing have as their antecedents qualities of their causes; other numbers and separateness are produced by enumerative cognitions. An elaborate discussion shows that it takes eight moments to produce duality, e.g., beginning with the contact between object and organ and ending with a trace, and likewise eight moments to destroy it. Some intricate objections to this account are considered.

A difference of opinion between Śrīdhara and Udayana is reported. Śrīdhara, holding that the processes reviewed can explain the generation of our idea of multiplicity, but not of specific large numbers such as "one hundred" or "one thousand". Udayana retorts that in that case one could not entertain the doubt whether there be a hundred or a thousand in the army. The question here is, our author says, whether "multiplicity" denotes in general all numbers above three to the highest number, or whether it denotes a different number from any of those. Neither answer is satisfactory, according to the two writers under discussion.

However, Śaṅkaramiśra says that multiplicity (*bahutva*) is actually a different number which co-exists in the same substratum with three, four, etc. That it is different is shown

by its having a different prior negation as its antecedent from each of the cardinal series, i.e., when we say "there are many", we do not know precisely how many. Thus, threeness is produced by enumerative cognition accompanied by twoness, fourness by enumerative cognition accompanied by threeness, etc. one can have doubts about which of these is present, but when we are speaking of multiplicity there are no alternatives available about which to doubt.

VS 7.2.10 *etena vibhāgo vyākhyātaḥ*.

Objection: There is no proof of the existence of disjunction, for it is just the negation of conjunction.

Answer: If it is supposed to be absolute negation, then the term "disjunction" would also apply to qualities and actions as well as disjunct substances. Further, it would apply to the Vindhya and Himalaya mountain ranges (which are not disjuncts, but just distinct).

Objection: Disjunction is just the destruction (posterior negation) of conjunction.

Answer: But if something with several parts loses the conjunction of one part with *x*, it has not become disjoined with *x*.

Objection: Then disjunction is the destruction of all conjunctions between *y* and *x*.

Answer: Then when one part of *y* leaves *x* there will be no disjunction. Actions produce conjunctions and disjunctions, but actions cannot destroy conjunctions, since a quality can only be destroyed by its opposite quality. Thus it is disjunction of *x* and *y* which destroys the conjunction between *x* and *y*, as is observed.

Sarvajña(sic) [Bhāsarvajña][15] is discussed as holding that the action of, say, a finger can produce destruction of conjunction between the hand and the tree, but since it is generally observed that destruction of a quality is brought about only by the opposite quality his opinion should not be accepted without some further argument against the principle. Examples are discussed in detail, both of destruction of conjunction and of disjunction.

CHAPTER EIGHT: *ĀHNIKA* ONE

VS 8.1.2 *tatrātmā manaś cāpratyakṣe*.

Awareness born of the senses is of two kinds—omniscient and non-omniscient. The omniscient kind is born of the merit accruing from *yoga*, and it allows *yogins* to perceive objects—such as the atoms—which are normally beyond the scope of vision by grasping properties indicative of those objects.

Objection: How can that be? There are no properties such as dimension, which belong to atoms which *yogins* can grasp by their senses.

Answer: *Yogins* can grasp properties by their internal organs only; their merit is so strong that no auxiliaries are required for them to see things.

Non-omniscient awareness is of two kinds, construction-filled and construction-free. Dharmakīrti and Dignāga hold that construction-filled awareness is not an instrument of knowledge because it involves relationship with words, generalities, etc., and thus cannot

be related to the momentary particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). But we say that even though construction-filled awareness involves a relation with words, still, since it is produced by contact between object and sense-organ it is at least open to question whether it is an instrument of knowledge. Furthermore, a thing distinguished by a name can be an object of awareness, the connection being furnished by memory. And we admit that generalities are present qualifying existing things. So both construction-filled and construction-free are instruments of knowldege.

Objection: What is the proof of construction-free awareness?

Answer: It has to be inferred from the fact of construction-filled awareness, for the materials of construction must be provided somehow.

CHAPTER NINE: *ĀHNIKA* ONE

VSs 9.1.1-10

An effect is negated prior to its production, and this negation is called its prior negation. It is the perception of this prior negation which enables us to say, as the clay is on the potter's wheel, that there will be a pot produced there, etc. And this prior negation is a causal condition in the production of its counterpositive (the pot). The author goes on to distinguish posterior negation, mutual negation and absolute negation and shows that they are all perceptible.

Objection: The negation of pot in the room is not an absolute negation, since the pot may be there at some other time, it is neither a prior nor posterior negation, for they occur only in inherent causes, it is not an absolute negation undergoing production and destruction, for that is impossible. So what kind of relational negation is it?

Answer: "The negation of pot in the room" means that there is negation of contact of pot with room. This is an absolute negation if no such pot ever has existed, does exist or will exist. It is prior negation if the pot will exist later, and posterior negation if the pot existed in the past.

Objection: Then the judgement should have been "There is negation of contact of pot with room" (and not "there is negation of pot in the room"). And then it would follow that the pot is always there, at least that would not be denied.

Answer: No. The only two ways the pot could be in the room are through contact or inherence; the judgement denies the former, and the latter is impossible.

CHAPTER NINE, *ĀHNIKA* TWO

VS 9.2.1. *asyedam kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ saṃyogi virodhi samavāyi ceti laiṅgikam.*

Jīvanāthamiśra is cited as holding that the *pakṣa* (in inference) is that in which there is a negation limited by the property of preventing the arising of doubt, which negation is terminable by ascertainment of a producible *sādhya*. Others say that the *pakṣa* is that in which there is negation of the property of proving accompanied by a desire to prove.

The cause par excellence of inferential awareness is the *liṅga* (or *hetu*) alone, and not its consideration, since once a properly qualified *hetu* is known to be there consideration has no function.

Objection: How can there be inferential awareness when the hetu is past or future?

Answer: The *sādhya* which is inferred is also past or future.

Objection: How, in your view, can there be inference of fire from a cloud of dust mistaken for smoke"?

Answer: Because the cloud of dust is taken to be pervaded by fire—how is it any better on the view that consideration is the cause?

Objection: Suppose the *hetu* is beyond the scope of the senses; how can it function to produce an inference, since no consideration can occur?

Answer: It can if there is a powerful causality showing the *hetu's* existence—otherwise the functioning of inference in cases of hearing, etc., would not be possible.

VS 9.2.2 *asyedam kārya-kāraṇa-sambadhaścāvayavād bhavati.*

The property of being pervaded (by the *sādhya* in the *hetu*) is the possession of a natural relation, where naturalness means being without superficial condition (*anaupādhikatva*). This relation is sometimes grasped directly from perception, sometimes (in the case of supersensible objects) through other inferences. The doubting devil (*śaṅkāpiśācin*) who says "but still there may be some superficial condition after all" would be rejected, as he undermines all injunctions and prohibitions, for there is the possibility of ascertainment.

VS 9.2.3 *etena śābdaṃ vyākhyātam.*

Verbal testimony is included within inference. (The inference goes as follows: These objects possess interconnection, because they are remembered as possessing expectancy, etc., like the words "drive away the cow".)

Objection: Verbal testimony is not inference in a case where the words are spoken by an untrustworthy person.

Answer: No, for the words must have the qualification of being spoken by a trustworthy person. Trustworthiness means knowing that one's sentence corresponds to the way things are within the scope of the meaning of that statement, not merely that he is not a liar.

Objection: How can we detect the presence of such a property in the speaker's words before we understand their meaning?

Answer: Well, those (Naiyāyikas) who hold that verbal authority is distinct from inference appeal to trustworthiness to detect false statements.

Objection: But verbal awareness (*śābdajñāna*) is produced whether or not the property of trustworthiness is discerned in the speaker, whereas in your case the *hetu* must necessarily be known to have that property.

Answer: No, since we can have the awareness "he is infallible as regards this sort of thing".

Objection: But we do not know what sort of thing prior to hearing the sentence.

Answer: No, we can know that in general this speaker is trustworthy with regard to this sort of thing, even though in a given case we may be mistaken, in which case the inference proceeds as in the instance (above) of inferring fire from a cloud of dust mistaken for smoke.

Objection: In this alleged inference of yours, what is the *sādhya*? Is it that the meanings of the words are connected, or that connection is possible? Not the first, since in the case of the untrustworthy speaker the connection is absent. And the second does not prove enough.

Answer: It is the regularity of interconnection of objects that is the *sādhya*, and this is not dependent on trustworthiness.

Objection: Expectancy is the prior negation in the hearer of awareness of the interconnection (of the objects or the words). Only as long as this expectancy exists can there be a relevant *hetu* in an inference of the sort you have in mind. But since according to you awareness of the inter-connection of the object must occur before awareness of expectancy, your inference is useless.

Answer: No. Expectancy is qualified by the possession of an inseparable relation between what is remembered and what is presented now. It is not a prior negation as you say. Or else, expectancy may be defined as the desire to know the objects denoted by the words, or as the comprehending of the meaning. Whichever definition is accepted, in any case awareness of expectancy is necessary in the words, as well as semantic fitness and contiguity, as contrasted with what is to be proved, the interconnection of the objects.

CHAPTER TEN: *ĀHNIKA* ONE

VS 10.1.1 *iṣṭāniṣṭa-kāraṇa-viśeṣād virodhāc ca mithaḥ sukha-duḥkhayor arthāntarabhāvaḥ.*

Śaṅkaramiśra interprets this *sūtra* as saying that pleasure and pain are different from each other. When Gautama says (in *NS* 4.1.58) that pleasure is another kind of pain he is teaching non-attachment (and not speaking seriously).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *EIP* (VI), p. 395
2. The *Mayūkha* is seen in Stein's Jammu Cat. p. 144, Ns. No. 1537. Complete in 55 fols. But it comprises only the Śabda section.
3. *HNNM* (2nd ed.), p. 135. The same story is found in elaborate form in the *EIP* (VI), p. 395.
4. Candrānandā's *Vṛtti, Vallāla-vṛtti, Vaiśeṣika-vārttika* of Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra and *Mithilā-vṛtti* of probably the same *Vādīndra.*
5. Vaiśeṣika-darśana (*Upaskāra*, ed. 1861), pp. 6, 51, 55, 58, 161, 200, 260, 264, 283, 411, 414 and 419.
6. *NSs* referred to in *VUP*, pp. 8, 11, 124, 161, 173, 194, 212, 275, 278, 416, etc.
7. Maṅgalavāda (pp. 3-6), Muktivāda (pp. 10-18), Vyāptivāda (pp. 149-55).
8. Summarised from *EIP* (VI), pp. 423-50
9. *avyabhicāratas sambandha*
10. *avinābhāvatva*
11. *kārtsnyena sambandha*
12. *svābhāvika sambandha*
13. *anaupādhika sambandha*
14. *yāvatsvavyabhicāri-vyabhicārisādhya-sāmānādhikaraṇya.*
15. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, pp. 161-2

JAYANĀRĀYAṆA TARKAPAÑCĀNANA AND HIS (*KAṆĀDASŪTRA*) *VIVṚTI*

Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, a Vaiśeṣika commentator of the A.D. nineteenth century is well-known for the *Kaṇādasūtravivṛti*. He himself gives a short account of his ancestors and his activities at the end of his work.[1] The account is as follow:

In the western side of Tollygunge (in Calcutta) there is a place named Baḍishā where lived Śyāmasundara Vācaspati, an ancient relative of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana. He was famous for his erudition in different śāstras and was a great devotee. He descended from the western Vaidika line of heritage. His brother's son was Rāmacandra Tarkālaṃkāra who after learning a lot from Śyāmasundara became well-established in the learned circle. Rāmacandra's son was Hariścandra Vidyāsāgara, whose second son was Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana. In his boyhood Jayanārāyaṇa received preliminary training in Sanskrit grammar, Dharmaśāstra etc. from his father. Later he had his education in tarkaśāstra from Jaganmohana Tarkasiddhānta in Śālikā (in Howrah on the western bank of Gaṅgā just opposite Calcutta). He composed his *Kaṇādasūtravivṛti* in 1860-61.

The *Kaṇādasūtravivṛti* is an independent commentary on the *Kaṇādasūtras*. Though it has been independent it appears to have intimately followed the *sūtra*-readings of *Upaskāra* and the explanation in the *Upaskāra* itself. As Jayanārāyaṇa was a recent author he had come in touch with many a modern book of the Vaiśeṣika and neo-logic. Anyway, the salient features of the *Vivṛti* may be noted in the following way:

1. *Vivṛti* is a commentary with occasional influence of the navya-nyāya style of language.

2. *Vivṛti*, in the very beginning, tries to determine the broad classification of the chapters of the Kaṇāda *sūtras*: the first chapter deals with the all the categories, second—Narration of substances, third—Definition of soul and mind, fourth—Body and its related objects, fifth—Narration of action, sixth—Examination of Vedic rites, seventh—Narration of quality and inherence, eighth—Production of knowledge and its cause, ninth—Narration of specific varieties of knowledge, and tenth—Establishment of distinctness between soul and its qualities.

3. *Vivṛti* quotes from and refers to the Vaiśeṣika ācāryas like Kandalīkāra (Śrīdhara) (pp. 19, 20, 447), Śrīvallabhācārya (pp. 14, 204), Upaskārakāra Śaṅkaramiśra (pp. 11 , 32, 67, 108, 346), Muktāvalīkāra (pp. 23, 36, 74, 116) and Sūktikāra (Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra) (p. 21). It mentions the *Padārthakhaṇḍana* or *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* (of Dīdhitikṛt i.e. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi) (pp. 313, 461). Jayanārāyaṇa mentions the name of Viśvanātha also (p. 444) and it seems that he knows Viśvanātha as the author of *Muktāvalī*. That *Tarkāmṛta* is a work by Jagadīśa is not at all a controversial matter with Jayanārāyaṇa. Praśastapāda (Paraśastadevācārya) is remarkably rare in the *Vivṛti* (p. 21).

4. *Jayanārāyaṇa* utilises the Nyāya *sūtras* at numerous places (pp. 91, 121, 193, 210, 212, 275, 279, 280 and many more). The Naiyāyika ācāryas like Vācaspatimiśra (p. 179), Udayana (Nyāyācārya, p. 53, Nibandhakṛt, p. 33) and Pakṣadharamiśra (pp. 167, 382, 454) have been mentioned and the view of neo-logicians noted at a few places (pp. 23,

26, 219, 377) though the names of the specific ācāryas are not mentioned.

5. Another remarkable feature of the *Vivṛti* is that it, by the end, prepared a resumé of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It has been a general tendency of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra*-commentator further to write a resumé of the śāstra. Praśastapāda wrote his *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (a resumé) in addition to his *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* (a commentary) which is now lost. Śaṅkaramiśra wrote his *Kaṇādarahasya* (a resumé) though he was further tempted to write *Upaskāra* later. *Kaṇādarahasya* is an earlier work than *Upaskāra* (pp. 119, 292). Any resumé of Vādīndra is not heard of till now. Most probably he did not write any resumé and his commentary on the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* is of *Vārttika* nature (as Vādīndra himself calls his work *Saṃgrahavārttika*). The cause behind the attempt to write a resumé for the Vaiśeṣika commentators obviously lies in the fact that the *Sūtra* work of Kaṇāda not being topic-wise and well-arranged, obviously prompted them to do so. The resumé contained in the *Vivṛti* can easily be circulated as a separate Vaiśeṣika treatise.

Excellence of resumé has been enhanced with a feature that Jayanārāyaṇa notes the tenets contrary to the traditional ones as invented by Raghunātha in the *Paadārthatattvanirūpaṇa* and exposes 31 places therein. We have in our discussion on *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, mentioned some important ones.

Jayanārāyaṇa places the section of similarities and dissimilarities between the categories as a concluding section in the *Vivṛti*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Vaiśeṣika darśana (BI ed.), pp. 474-476

DIFFERENT OTHER *BHĀṢYAS* (COMMENTARIES) ON KAṆĀDA *SŪTRAS*

The primary commentaries on the Kaṇāda *sūtras* in the later period (with Śaṅkaramiśra) showed total diversion from the ancient *sūtra* tradition and the commentaries' artificial attempt to explain them (*sūtras*). From the very words of Śaṅkaramiśra we come to know that he had the *sūtras* alone in his hand when he wrote the *Upaskāra* (vide Introductory verse). And the later commentaries had got this *Upaskāra* as their chief source of exposition and to proceed further they had to depend mostly upon their knowledge of other systems of Indian philosophy.

Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana wrote his *Vivṛti* on the Kaṇāda *sūtras* and Pañcānana Tarkaratna—his sub-commentary *Parīkṣā* on Śaṅkara's *Upaskāra*. They show marked influence on the neo-logical system. Candrakānta Tarkālaṃkāra wrote a *Bhāṣya* which is an independent one on the line of *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* but it turned into an advaitic interpretation of the Kaṇāda *sūtras*. The *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya* of Gaṅgādhara Vaidya shows the influence of Sāṃkhya, Vaidyaka etc. We find a commentary named *Vaiśeṣika-rasāyana* which shows the marked influence of Mīmāṃsā philosophy.

KAILĀŚACANDRA ŚIROMAṆI AND HIS *TARKĀLAṂKĀRABHĀṢYAPARĪKṢĀ*

Kailāśacandra Śiromaṇi[1] was a Naiyāyika of the nineteenth century. He was born in the Mukhopādhyāya family in Dhātrīgrām in the Katwa sub-division of the Vardhamāna district of West Bengal. His parents were Ghanaśyāma Sārvabhauma and Ādaramayī. At a quite grown-up age of 24-25 years he went to Navadvīpa to learn navya-nyāya with Golokacandra Nyāyaratna, the then best Naiyāyika. He studied for four-five years and after getting the title of Śīromani he returned to his native village. Then onwards he established a Catuṣpāṭhī in his own house. Later he went to Kashi to meet Rāmadāsa Bhaṭṭācārya. At this time the post of the teacher of Nyāya Śāstra in Kashi fell vacant, as the then teacher went on leave for a few months. Kailāśacandra was appointed teacher in that post and soon became permanent on account of his effective teaching and efficiency in work. In 1896 Kailāśacandra got the title of Mamāmahopādhyāya. He passed away in 1909.

Kailāśacandra's Vaiśeṣika work *Tarkālaṃkārabhāṣyaparīkṣā* (*TBP*) has long been printed by Chowkhamba in 1917 under the editorship of Pt. Vindhyesvari Prasad Dvivedin. It is a Review on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* and a new *Bhāṣya* composed by Candrakānta Tarkālaṃkāra (1243 B.S.- 1316 B.S.). It is to be noted that Candrakānta composed a new *Bhāṣya* on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* line. Candrakānta's mastery over Vaiśeṣika philosophy is further proved with his composition of one *Tattvāvalī* (with auto-commentary) in verse. Anyway, Kailāśacandra examines the passages of both the *Bhāṣyas* and in fact discards the views of *Candrakāntabhāṣya* to reinstate Praśastapāda and Kaṇāda's views, In simple assessment Kailāśacandra was invariably a traditionalist in comparison to a rather defiant Candrakānta. Some references in this regard are the following:

1. .... *iti ṛṣikalpānām sarvaśāstra-pāradṛśvānām eteṣāṃ vacanam anādṛtya adhunātanasya alpajñasya śāstrasya ekadeśadarśino nibandhṛmmanyasya vacaḥ kathaṃ prekṣāvad-apekṣaṇīyaṃ bhavet iti* (*TBP*, p.7).

2. ...*dravyāśrayy aguṇavān ityādisūtrakāra-lakṣaṇopari hastacālanam ayuktatamam eva* (*TBP*, p. 12).

3. ... *ato vaiśeṣika-tantram prāktanānām ṛṣīnām ṛṣikalpānāṃ ca śrīmat praśastapādācāryaprabhṛtīnāṃ vyākhyānam ullaṅghya svakapolakalpanayā vyākhyātava-dbhir atinirmaladhīsampannair api atisāhasam anuṣṭhitam iti vivecayāma ityalam vistareṇa* (*TBP*, p.36).

The views of Candrakānta's *Abhinavabhāṣya* contradicted in *Tarkālaṃkārabhāṣya-parīkṣā* are the following:

1. The three categories *Sāmānya, Viśeṣa* and *Samavāya* are included in *Dravya, Guṇa* and *Karma*. To declare the special doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika śāstra the Sūtrakāra (Kaṇāda) separately mentioned those others (pp. 2-3).

2. *Sāmānya* is not a distinct category (pp. 4-7).

3. *Veśeṣa* is not a distinct category (pp. 7-9).

4. *Samavāya* is not a distinct category but a quality opposite to separateness (pp. 9-12).

5. Time and Direction are included in *ākāśa* (pp. 12-15, 31-34).

6. "*Sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam*" and *Abhinavabhāṣya* on it (pp. 15-19).

7. Lightness is another quality contrary to weight (pp. 19-21).

8. *Śakti* (potency)—an essential category (pp. 36-39).

All through the Review, Kailāśacandra cites Kaṇāda *sūtras*, Praśastapāda's long passages and refers to Udayana and Vardhamāna. Though the revolutionary Raghunātha Śromaṇi has been referred to a few times (*TBP*, pp. 4, 5, 15), Kailāśacandra refers to him as an authority. Raghunātha's antagonistic views against the traditional ones have hardly been touched. At the end of the work (*TBP*) nine Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* (9.1-9) have been annotated to expose Kaṇāda's approval of four types of negation.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Vide *Vangīya Mahāmahopādhyāya jīvanī* (The lives of the Mahāmahopādhyāyas of Bengal), Ed. Hemachandra Bhattacharya, Pragati Prakasani, Calcutta, 1379 B.S.

CHAPTER II

Padārthadharmasaṃgraha And Its Commentary Literature

THE PROBLEM OF IMMEDIATE SUCCESSORS OF KAṆĀDA UPTO PRAŚASTAPĀDA

It is very unfortunate that the Vaiśeṣika school of Indian Philosophy which had a vast field and strong influence on the schools of all other major Indian philosophies was itself ceased to hold a living status a long ago.[1] The *sūtras* of Kaṇāda were composed in a very remote time. There were also different types of commentaries written successively. But we have a very little knowledge as regards them, in fact the whole history of the Vaiśeṣika system until a number of new texts of the philosophical literature have been discovered or published. And after studying those it is found that the lost portion of the Vaiśeṣika literature is much greater than the available portion. But what is the cause of this loss? It appears that the vastness of the early commentaries and lack of meritorious students at the same time have driven these Vaiśeṣika texts to be left out of study and consequently been lost. We find Bhaṭṭa Jayanta quoting a verse condemning *Kaṭandī* (a Vaiśeṣika commentary) that makes an intelligent person, stupid.[2]

Anyway, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda have come down to us more or less in complete form though with a number of variant readings in a number of *sūtras*. After these *sūtras* the text came down to us in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda (*c.* AD fifth century and pre-Dignāga). But between the time of Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda there were a number of works composed, now lost, about which we come to know through references and quotations.

On the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda there was the *Vākya* which was an important work in the Vaiśeṣika system. Mallavādin (AD early sixth century) in his *Dvādaśāra-nayacakra* records an interesting point that the passage *niṣṭhāsambandhayor ekakālatvāt* along with the *Bhāṣya* on it had to be reconsidered by Praśasta.[3] The passage in question is called *Vākya*. Subsequent references[4] show that this *Vākya* was also a commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* but it has not come down to us. It seems to have been written in the aphoristic style for all the quotations so far traced present an aphoristic character. We find a number of individual aphoristic sentences[5] in the *Vyomavatī* which seem to have been taken from this *Vākya*.

We come across the name *Kaṭandī* or *Vaiśeṣika-kaṭandī* in a number of texts and it seems to be an elaborate work based on the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda. It has twice been referred

to and quoted by Mallavādin as we learn from Siṃhasūri's (6th-7th cen.) *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*.[6] The first passage relates to *VS* 9.12 while the second is an advocacy in favour of the Vaiśeṣika theory of *Āsatkāryavāda* against the Jaina theory of *Sad-asat-kāryavāda*.

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's reference to the *Kaṭandī* is of general character.[7] Cakradhara notes that *Kaṭandī* is a commentary (*bhāṣya*) on the Vaiśeṣika śāstra.[8] In Murārimiśra's *Anargharāghava*,[9] we find that Rāvaṇa, the mythical king of Laṅkā, represents himself as 'one well-versed in the *Vaiśeṣika-kaṭandī*.

Now we come to the case of the *Bhāṣya* which we have already found to have been referred to in the *Dvādaśāra-nayacakra* of Mallavādin.[10] It is obviously difficult to make much commitment regarding this *Bhāṣya*. The *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayana refers to a *Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya* and remarks that is was very extensive.[11] Here Padmanābhamiśra in his *Kiraṇāvalībhāskara* says that this *Bhāṣya* was written by Rāvaṇa.[12] *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* has also been referred to in the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* and the *Ratnaprabhā*, both being commentaries on *Brahmasūtraśāṃkarabhāṣya*.[13] We find in the *Viśālāmalavatī* the views of Rāvaṇa in the context of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. So there is little doubt that there was a *Bhāṣya* written by Rāvaṇa which has not come down to us.

MM Kuppusvamin Shastrin on the basis of the commentary of Rucipati on Murāri's drama *Anargharāghava* puts forward a suggestion that the *Vaiśeṣika-kaṭandī* may be identical with the *Rāvaṇabhāṣya* referred to in the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* and *Ratnaprabhā*.[14] But until we get further definite proof it is safe to consider them as different works. Moreover, Rāvaṇa being well-versed in *Kaṭandī* may suggest that he wrote a separate commentary as he is also accredited to a *Bhāṣya*. The *Viśālāmalavatī*[15] refers to the views of Rāvaṇa and a Bhāṣyakāra.[16]

Along with the above *Bhāṣyas*, a *Ṭīkā* (on one *Bhāṣya*) of Praśastapāda is another important work which has not come down to us. We would like to discuss about that work in this section only because Praśastapāda actually dealt with his compendium *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.

We have already seen in Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri's writings that Praśasta had to reconsider the *Vākya* and *Bhāṣya*. Moreover, the series of works mentioned there is *Vākya*, *Bhāṣya* and *Ṭīkā*.[17] Again on another occasion Siṃhasūri refers to the views of Praśastamati by introducing him in this way: "As stated by Praśastamati in his *Ṭīkā* to the Syādvādins".[18] So from it, it is clear that the *Ṭīkā* must have been by Praśastamati and obviously it is a commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-bhāṣya*.

The *Ṭīkā* must have covered the *Sūtra* and *Vākya* also. Mallavādin profusely quotes passages from this elaborate sub-commentary and devotes a large section in the Seventh Ara to the refutation of Praśastamati's views.[19] His (i.e. Mallavādin's) treatment clearly points out that the *Ṭīkā* of Praśastamati was regarded as one of the standard Vaiśeṣika works at the time. Praśasta also criticised the Jaina views in his *Ṭīkā*.

Some Vaiśeṣika views of Praśastamati have been referred to by Śāntarakṣita[20] in his *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the corresponding extracts have actually been quoted by Kamalaśīla in his *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*.[21]

Abhayadeva (eleventh century AD) in his *Sanmatiṭīkā* is found to reproduce some of these fragments.[22]

These refer to the problems of God, inherence (*samavāya*) and particularity (*viśeṣa*).

That two of these are identical both in sense and language with the passages in Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*[23] is very important from the historical point of view. And this leads us to safely declare that Praśastamati is none but Praśastapāda, the author of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. We have seen above that Praśastamati has been referred to as Praśasta also. Elsewhere he is called Praśastakara,[24] Praśastakāra,[25] Praśastadeva,[26] Praśastakaradeva,[27] etc. The identical passages and other unfound ones in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* indicate a fact that the same author wrote a comprehensive commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* (along with *Vākya* and *Bhāṣya*) and a separate compendium of the Vaiśeṣika tenets in the form of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. And in fact, that Praśastapāda wrote a commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* is clearly attested by the *Vaiśeṣikasūtravyākhyā*. It shows that the *sūtra 'kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ pṛthivyāṃ pākajāś ca'* (*VS* 7.1.10) has been split up into two by Ātreya and Praśastapāda.[28] As the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* does not mention this *sūtra*, it is quite certain that some other Vaiśeṣika work must have been composed by Praśastapāda. And that in all probability is the *Ṭīkā*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Even when Śaṅkaramiśra went to write the commentary *Upaskāra* on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* he strongly felt the paucity of the earlier commentary literature. (*sūtramātrāvalambena nirālmbe'pi gacchataḥ/khe khelavan mamāpy atra sāhasaṃ siddhim eṣyati// Upaskāra*, the initial verse.)
2. *vṛttisūtraṃ tilāḥ māṣāḥ kaṭandī kodravaudanaḥ/*
   ajaḍāya pradātavyaṃ jaḍīkaraṇam uttamam//-NM(II), p. 184
   S.N. Sukla's edition of the *Nyāyamañjarī*(I), p. 386 reads *kapatrī* in place of *Kaṭandī* but the *Granthibhaṅga* of Cakradhara corrects it to be *Kaṭandī*. Vide *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, p. 177.
3. *asatsambandhaparihārārthaṃ ca niṣṭhāsambandhayor ekakālatvāt iti etad eva vākyaṃ sabhāṣyaṃ praśasto 'nyathā vyācaṣṭe. DANC*, p. 512. The *Vākya, niṣṭhā*, etc., has been mentioned also in other places, e.g. *Yadapi coktam—vikalpatrayānāśrayād vikalpatrayānāśrayanāc ca vikalpānupapatteḥ iti na doṣaḥ, niṣṭhāsambandhayor ekakālatvāt. DANC*, p. 508. Also in *Vyomavatī (II)*, p. 282
4. *sūtrakāramataṃ samarthyatāṃ vākyabhāṣyaṭīkākārāṇām. DANC*, p. 516
5. (i) *avibhuni dravye samānendriyagrāhyāṇāṃ viśeṣaguṇānām asambhavāt. Vyomavatī* (I), p. 63
   (ii) *adravyaṃ dravyam anekadravyam iti*. ibid, p. 74
   (iii) *bhūyastvād rasavattvāc codakaṃ rasajñāne prakṛtiḥ*. ibid, p. 82
   (iv) *bhūyastvād rūpavattvāc ca rūpajñāne prakṛtiḥ kāraṇaṃ tejaḥ*. ibid, p. 85
   (v) *bhūyastvād sparśavattvāc ca sparśajñāne prakṛtiḥ vāyuḥ*. ibid, p. 90
   (vi) *smṛtir vāsanākhyād iti*. ibid, p. 153
   (vii) *param aparam ceti buddhyapekṣam. Vyomavatī* (II), p. 97; *Nyāyakandalī* (p. 68) refers to one *Vākya: Kāraṇe dik*.
6. (a) *sadasator vaidharmyāt kārye sadasattā na* (*VS* 9.12). *sadasacchabdāthayor virodhād ekasmin eva kārye sadasacchabdayor ekādhikaraṇabhāvena prayogo nāsti, 'sad evāsat' ity anusandhānaṃ nāsti ekādhikaraṇabhāvena iti saptamyabhidhānena darśayati. DANC*, p. 498. cf. *saptamyabhidhānena darśayati iti sūtrārthaḥ kaṭandyāṃ vyākhyātaḥ. NAA*, p. 498.
   (b) *āpekṣikaṃ sadasattvam, prāgutpatteḥ mṛdātmanā sat kāryam ghaṭātmanā cāsat niṣpanne 'pi ghaṭe mṛttvadarśanāt mṛdupādānopapattiḥ, ghaṭātmanā cāsattvād ghaṭārthakriyopapattir ityevaṃ kilārhata āha. attrottaram—na, asatkāryatvasiddheḥ. evaṃ tarhi mṛdātmanaḥ kartavyatvābhāvād ghaṭātmanaḥ kartavyatvād asad eva kāryam. tasmān na prāgutpatteḥ sadasat kāryam. DANC*, p. 499. cf. *atra kilottaram kaṭandīkāra āha—asatkāryatvasiddheḥ. NAA*, p. 499

7. *anyair apy uktam—*
vṛttisūtraṃ tilā māṣāḥ kaṭandī kodravaudanaḥ/
ajaḍāya pradātavyaṃ jaḍīkaraṇam uttamam// NM(II), p. 184
8. *kaṭandī vaiśeṣikabhāṣyaviśeṣaḥ. NMGB*, p. 177
9. [*nepathye*] *bho bho lakṣmaṇa Vaiśeṣikakaṭandīpaṇḍito jagadvijayamānaḥ paryaṭāmi.... Anargharāghava* (*Kāvyamālā*), p. 235
10. *asatsambandha ... ity etad eva vākyaṃ sabhāṣyaṃ praśasto 'nyathā vyācaṣṭe. DANC*, p. 512
11. *bhāṣyasya ativistṛtatvāt. Kiraṇāvalī* (BI), p. 34
12. *bhāṣyasya rāvaṇapraṇītasya. Kiraṇāvalībhāskara*, p. 12.
13. *Rāvaṇabhāṣya*—MM Kuppusvami Shastrin, JOR, Madras, Vol. III, pp. 1–5.
14. ibid.
15. Portions retranslated into Sanskrit from Tibetan, by Muni Sri Jambuvijayaji, Vide *Vaiśeṣikasūtram*, pp. 153-219
16. *asautram api bhāṣyakṛd abhihitam asti indriyārthasannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣam ātmamanaḥsannikarṣo veti ataḥ sautram ityuktam ... tato rāvaṇādayaḥ/* [*ātmamanaḥsannikarṣam*] *manyate.* Vide *Vaiśeṣikadarśanam* (GOS), p. 174.
17. *vākya-bhāṣya-ṭīkākārāṇām. NAA*, pp. 516-7
18. *ṭīkāyām praśastamatau syādvādinaṃ prati. NAA*, p. 495
19. *atra prakrāntaṃ praśastamatinā .. NAA*, p. 461; *praśastamatir āha atrāpyuttaram.* ibid, p. 462; *vākyaṃ sabhāṣyam praśasto 'nyathā vyācaṣṭe. DANC*, p. 512; *praśastamato 'bhiprāyaḥ. DANC,* 517 and also in *NAA*, p. 517.
20. Nakamura: 680-740; Frauwallner: 725-788
21. cf. *TSP*, pp. 54, 55, 72, 99, 325 and 331.
22. *Sanmatiṭīkā*, pp. 101, 716.
23. (a) *svata eva ityādinā* (*TS*, verses 816-7) *praśastamater atrottaram āśaṅkate. sa hyāha—"yathā śvamāṃsādīnām* [*? aśvamāṃsā...*] *svata eva aśucitvaṃ tadyogāc ca anyeṣāṃ tathehāpi tādātmyād anyeṣu viśeṣeṣu svata eva vyāvṛttipratyayahetutvam, tadyogāt paramāṇuṣu".*
TSP, p. 325
cf. *yathā gavāśvamāṃsādīnāṃ svata eva aśucitvam tadyogād anyeṣām tathehāpi tādātmyād antyaviśeṣeṣu svata eva pratyayavyāvṛttiḥ tadyogāt paramāṇvādiṣu iti. PDS*, p. 771
(b) *ādhāra ityādinā* (*TS*, verse No. 840) *atra praśastamater uttaram āśaṅkate. sa hyāha yadyapy ekaḥ samavāyas tathāpi pañcapadārthasaṅkaro na bhavati, ādhārādheyaniyamāt. tathā hi dravyeṣv eva dravyatvam, guṇeṣv eva guṇatvam, karmasu eva karmatvam.* (*TS*. 841-2) ... *iheti samavāyanimittasya pratyayasya sarvatrābhinnakaratayā anvayadarśanād sarvatraikaḥ samavāya iti gamyate. satyapi caikatve dravyatvādinimittānāṃ dhiyāṃ pratiniyatādhārāvacchedenotpatteḥ vyatirekasyānvayalakṣaṇasya darśanād dravyatvādijātīnām vyatireko vijñāyate.*
(*TS*, 834-4) *yathā hi kuṇḍadadhnoḥ saṃyogaikatve 'pi bhavaty āśrayāśrayipratiniyamaḥ, tathā dravyatvādīnāṃ samavāyaikatve 'pi vyaṅgya-vyañjaka śaktibhedād ādhārādheya-*[*prati*]*-niyama iti. TSP*, pp. 331-32
cf. *yady apy ekaḥ samavāyaḥ sarvatra svatantraḥ, tathāpy ādhārādheyaniyamo 'sti katham? dravyeṣv eva dravyatvam, guṇeṣv eva guṇatvaṃ karmasv eva karmatvam. ...iheti samavāyanimittasya jñānasya anvayadarśanāt sarvatraikaḥ samavāya iti gamyate. dravyatvādinimittānāṃ vyatirekadarśanāt pratiniyamo jñāyate. yathā hi kuṇḍadadhnoḥ saṃyogaikatve bhavati āśrayāśrayibhāvaniyamaḥ, tathā dravyatvādīnām api samavāyaikatve'pi vyaṅgya-vyañjakaśaktibhedād ādhārādheyaniyama iti. PDS*, pp. 779-81
24. *Āptaparīkṣā*, p. 106; *Hetubinduṭīkāloka*, p. 393; *NVV*(I), p. 418
25. *Tarkarahasyadīpikā,* vide *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra, p. 277; *SVM*, p. 29
26. *Vaiśeṣikopaskāra,* pp. 28, 165, 204, 411
27. Rājaśekhara's sub-commentary on the *Nyāyakandalī*. Vide *Nyāyakandalī* (GOS), p. 2
28. Vide *KN*, p. 65

DAŚAPADĀRTHAŚĀSTRA OF CANDRAMATI

In the Vaiśeṣika line one odd work which attracted the attention of the world scholars is the *Daśapadārthaśāstra* of Candramati. In 1917 Hakuju Ui, in his work entitled 'The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy' had translated this work from its Chinese version. The original Sanskrit is lost. The Chinese version was prepared by the famous Chinese pilgrim Hsuan-tsang. Ui ascertains the date of the translation as AD 648.

Though the date of the translation has been ascertained, the composition of the original work still remains a matter of controversy. The work is clearly on the line of the Vaiśeṣika system as it discusses the categories thereof, but that ten categories are there in the place of the well-known six categories, has created an additional problem with ascertaining of the date of the work.

Ui argues: As Dharmapāla, a well-known Buddhist commentator of the mid-sixth century knows Vaiśeṣika in the six-category system expounded in Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda, but not in the ten-category system as found in Candramati, therefore Dharmapāla cannot have lived after Candramati. However, a contemporary date of Candramati and Dharmapāla may well be fixed.

Erich Frauwallner does not admit the above view of Ui. According to him, Candramati may well precede Praśastapāda as well as Dharmapāla. "Dharmapāla may have ignored the ten-category system merely because it was unorthodox; furthermore, Dharmapāla's discussion of Vaiśeṣika occurs in the course of discussing a work of Āryadeva's and since Āryadeva probably preceded Candramati it would have been anachronistic for Dharmapāla to relate his text to Candramati's version. Ui also seems to think that Candramati's work presupposes the prior existence of Praśastapāda's but Frauwallner points out that the correspondences are not great, and that the arrangement of the sections and other aspects of Candramati's text suggests more dependence, on a work such as the *Abhidharmakośa* than on the commentary of Praśastapāda. Furthermore, on internal grounds we should date Candramati earlier. His treatment of many matters is primitive by comparison with Praśastapāda's expansiveness, and where Candramati does provide expanded treatment his explanations tend to be closer to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* than to Praśastapāda's." Frauwallner even thinks that Praśastapāda's work is to re-establish the sūtrakāra's view against e.g. Candramati's system of ten categories. Moreover "He [Frauwallner] suggests that Candramati gets his theory of inference from Vārṣagaṇa's Sāmkhya, which featured a bipartite division (*dṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*) rather than the tripartite one found in the Nyāyasūtras and more common later on."

On the basis of the above argument, Frauwallner contends that Candramati may be taken to be a contemporary of Vindhyavāsin and of Vasubandhu the younger—i.e. to be in the first half of the fifth century. It is to be noted that Frauwallner fixes the date of Praśastapāda to be the second half of the sixth century.

On the basis of the internal arrangement it is clear that the *Daśapadārthaśāstra* of Candramati is very close to the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda and not to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda. Though from this affinity it is very difficult to ascertain the

priority of any one of them, it appears that *Daśapadārthaśāstra* may be posterior to *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* due to some reasons. The mention of twenty-four qualities, the two types of inference—*dṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, the definitions of different qualities, the definition of inherence are some as we find in Praśasta's text. Moreover, Praśasta's text does not bear any Nyāya influence whereas Candramati's text on negation may clearly be accepted as Nyāya influence. Anyway, besides those affinities there are a number of other tenets which are very difficult to adjust in the traditional Vaiśeṣika system. These are the following:

1. In addition to the six well-known categories of the Vaiśeṣika śāstra, there are four other categories which are found to have been mentioned in *Daśapadārthaśāstra*.viz (i) causal efficacy (*śakti*), (ii) lack of causal efficacy (*aśakti*), (iii) generality-particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) and (iv) negation (*abhāva*). Causal efficacy and lack of causal efficacy are not products, are eternal, possess neither quality nor action, do not consist of parts, and are immaterial. There are many of them, and they differ according as they reside in substances, qualities, or motion. The cognition that *A* is efficacious, *B* is not efficacious, and the like are their marks.

2. Generality (*sāmānya*) is meant for only the absolute generality i.e. *sattā* (Existence) which exists in substance, quality and action.

3. Negation, though discussed in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda (Chapter IX), is not counted in the list of categories. Quite surprisingly Praśasta's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* did not even discuss this category. *Daśapadārthaśāstra*, on the other hand, not only enumerates it but also admits its five varieties which, again, stand a bit peculiar to the Vaiśeṣika system. Those five varieties are prior negation (*prāgabhāva*), posterior negation (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), mutual negation (*anyonyābhāva*), relational negation (*saṃsargābhāva*) and absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*). In the later Vaiśeṣika work like *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (verses Nos. 12-3) we find that the negation is primarily divided into two, relational negation and mutual negation. Relational negation again is divided into three varieties, prior negation, posterior negation and absolute negation.

Relational negation, clarified in Candramati's śāstra is the negation of the mutual relation between existence (*sattā*) and substanceness (*dravyatva*).

4. Sphericity (*pārimāṇḍalya*) is divided into two, viz., absolute minuteness which resides in an atom, and absolute largeness which resides it *ākāśa*, time, direction and soul. In the traditional Vaiśeṣika system the term *pārimāṇḍalya* is admitted only in the case of absolute minuteness of an atom, the not in the case of absolute largeness of *ākāśa*, etc.

PRAŚASTAPĀDA

After the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is the most authentic sourcebook of the Vaiśeṣika system. It virtually began a new era in the Vaiśeṣika literature. Being apparently alarmed with the huge commentary literature on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* and dissatisfied with the lack of order and clarity in the arrangement of topics in the *sūtras*, he prepared an independent concise systematic comprehensive treatise on the Vaiśeṣika school, the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.

Praśastapāda has been called by different names, such as Praśasta, Praśastamati, Praśastakara, Praśastakaradeva.

Now what is the date of Praśastapāda? To determine it we seem to be in a fix. Frauwallner gives Praśastapāda's date as the first half of the sixth century, although other writers have attempted to place him earlier. Stcherbatsky, for example, argued that Praśastapāda must have been contemporary with Vasubandhu, since Vasubandhu quotes Vaiśeṣika views which to our knowledge are only found in Praśastapāda. This line of argument has also been used by others like Krishna Rao, to push Praśastapāda's date back to an even earlier time than Vasubandhu's, for Vaiśeṣika views of a sort not precisely found in the *sūtras* are found in Harivarman, Āryadeva and Vātsyāyana.[1] But it appears to be extremely odd to be the case.

Frauwallner thinks that Praśastapāda went far beyond most members of his school in accepting a good deal of the Buddhist logical theory which was developed by Vasubandhu and Dignāga. Notably among such theoretical elements is the theory of the threefold mark (*trairūpya* of *trailakṣaṇya*) which was initially adopted by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, as well as Kumārila, but later given up by members of all the three schools (see e.g. Jayanta and Pārthasārathi-miśra). Thus he concludes that Praśastapāda must have lived after Dignāga.[2]

Randle also tried to prove with the help of the comparison between the works, *Nyāya-praveśa*, *Nyāya-dvāra*, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, that Praśastapāda is later than Dignāga.[3]

Muni Jambuvijayaji, in the introduction of his edition to the *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram* (vol I), p. 54, admits the pre-Dignāga date of Praśastapāda and adds that if this date be taken (specifically 414 V.S. corresponding to AD 357) there will be no contradiction.

Praśastapāda composed at least two works. His *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is well-known to us and the other is a commentary on "the *Vākya* and one *Bhāṣya*" which in their own turn are the commentaries on the *Kaṇāda-sūtras*.[4] The latter however is lost. The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is freely called a *Bhāṣya* and its author Bhāṣyakāra. Though indicating the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* the designations are not appropriate. Perhaps the lost work being a commentary (*Ṭīkā*).[5] on one *Bhāṣya* was taken by the ancient authors and commentators as another new *Bhāṣya* and its writer was designated as a Bhāṣyakāra. This name was already established. And when the commentary went into oblivion, the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* most probably a specimen of a mistaken identity for that.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. EIP (II), p. 282
2. Ibid, p. 282
3. Ibid, p. 282
4. DANC, p. 512
5. Ibid, p. 512 fn.

PADĀRTHADHARMASAṂGRAHA: ITS SPECIAL FEATURES

It does not appear far from reality that the Vaiśeṣika philosophy which we generally discuss, or refer to, is associated with the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda. There were *Kaṇādasūtras* and commentaries, but for many a century after the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* we did not get any systematic commentary on the *sūtras*, obviously because the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* made the line of commentary on *Kaṇādasūtras* totally closed. This success of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* depended upon some unique features of the text, which also became a model text for a number of later Vaiśeṣika authors, to compose similar other *saṃgraha* or summaries. Anyway, we may now discuss some special features of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* which attracted our attention.

1. We find that the treatise itself calls it a *Saṃgraha*. What is the nature of this *Saṃgraha* type of composition? In *Nāṭyaśāstra* (6.9) we find a verse defining *saṃgraha* and it is

vistareṇopadiṣṭāṇāṃ arthānām sūtrabhāṣyayoḥ/
nibandho yaḥ samāsena saṃgrahaṃ taṃ vidur budhāḥ//

That is, *saṃgraha* is a type of composition which treats in a nutshell the subject-matter treated in the *Sūtras* and *Bhāṣyas* in great detail. If we go through the text of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* we see that it does not touch all the *sūtras*, but only a selection of them is taken into account, to justify different new definitions formulated in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. Now regarding the other point we are unlucky to lose the *Bhāṣyas* on the *Kaṇādasūtras*, and no direct investigation to assess how much concise is the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* from the *Bhāṣya* or *Bhāṣyas* is possible. We know from the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, a Jaina commentary, that there were a *Vaiśeṣika Bhāṣya* by Rāvaṇa and another by the name *Kaṭandī*. Again there was another *Bhāṣya* by Ātreya. Praśastapāda wrote a commentary on a certain *Bhāṣya*.

The clear designation of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* as a *saṃgraha* has not been uniformly noted by the commentators or some other authors. This treatise has well been called *Praśastapādabhāṣya* though the work never appears to call itself a *bhāṣya*. Vyomaśiva and many others are in favour of calling it a *bhāṣya*.

Vyomaśiva cites a line to be a sentence from the *Bhāṣya*: *tathā ca bhāṣyam jalādyanabhibhūtaiḥ* etc. The sentence *jalādyanabhibhūtaiḥ*, etc.[1] is actually a sentence from the divergent earth (*Pṛthivīvaidharmya*).[2] On the other occasions[3] Bhāṣyakāra is clearly none other than Praśastapāda. So Vyomaśiva has no hesitation to call the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* a *bhāṣya*. He however calls it a *Saṃgraha* also where he mentions a number of the *PDS* sentences as *Saṃgraha-ukti*.[4]

Śrīdhara calls the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* a *saṃgraha* as well as a *bhāṣya*. He clearly says that as he is commenting upon a *saṃgraha* he should not explain much.[5] Again, at the end of the Guṇa section he says that this sentence has been well-discussed by the logicians, and therefore only the mere implication of the *Bhāṣya* has been put

forward and no other argument has been adduced.[6] He also supplies another title to the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*—*Padārthapraveśa*—which appears to be also appropriate to the work.

Udayana in *Kiraṇāvalī* clears the term *saṃgraha* as a compilation where the subject-matters are scattered in different places.[7] He gives stress on the word *pravakṣyate* which means the treatise is committed to maintain clarity, conciseness and comprehensiveness. The *sūtra* work of Kaṇāda lacked clarity, the *bhāṣya* lacked conciseness and the *prakaraṇa* works lacked comprehensiveness. So according to Udayana this *saṃgraha* of Praśastapāda have all the three merits.[8]

The definition of a *bhāṣya* which we find to be quoted here and there, is

sūtrārtho varṇyate yena padaiḥ sūtrānusāribhiḥ/
svapadāni ca varṇyante bhāṣyam bhāṣyavido viduḥ//

i.e. a *bhāṣya* is that kind of work where the meaning of the *sūtra* is cleared by the words which are close to the words in the *sūtra*, and where the commentator's own words are also sometimes explained. To say the truth, the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* never explains the words in the *sūtra*, only to formulate a new definition it makes the reference to the words in *Kaṇādasūtras*. Above all a *bhāṣya* is a type of commentary of the *sūtras*, but the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is in no way a *bhāṣya* in this sense. In spite of this inconsistency the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is generally called the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. So we find the effort of the celebrated Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika commentator Vardhamāna to define *Bhāṣya* in a new way and justify the ascription of the Bhāṣya character to *the Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* accordingly. He says: a *bhāṣya* is the explanation of the *sūtras* by retaining them only in the sense and not mentioning them actually. Thus without the *sūtra* readings, their explanation is called a *bhāṣya* as the treatise of Praśastakara in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.[9] Vardhamāna also mentions another definition of the *bhāṣya* according to which the explanation of the *sūtras* without mentioning their different interpretations is a *bhāṣya*. The explanation of the *sūtras*, where different other interpretations are contained, is a *Vṛtti*.[10]

2. In some cases it quotes or refers to the *sūtras*. This has been discussed in detail in 'Sūtra elements in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*'.

3. In others it gives the gist of the *sūtras*. In a few cases explanatory notes also have been added by the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.

4. At places it adds new matter which may be his new contribution or that of his predecessors in the school. This topic has been discussed in detail in 'Non-sūtra elements in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*'.

5. It shows that the sections in the *sūtras* were well-defined and were called *adhikāras* (cf. Guṇaviniveśādhikāra).

6. The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is a text which attaches absolute authority to the Vedas and Vedic texts.

7. It has preserved the Vaiśeṣika tenets.

8. The *sūtras* quoted in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* are more faithful in reading than the current sūtrapāṭha.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Vyomavatī* (I), p. 77
2. Ibid. p. 63
3. Ibid. p. 12; (II), pp. 196, 209
4. Ibid. (II), p. 49
5. *PDS* (*BORI*), p. 279
6. Ibid. p. 639
7. *Kiraṇāvalī* (Sampurnananda), p. 43
8. Ibid. p. 44; *KR* (*BI*), p. 34
9. *sūtram buddhisthīkṛtya tatpāṭhaniyaṃ vinā tadvyākhyānaṃ bhāṣyam/ata eva sūtrapāṭhaṃ vināpi tadvivaraṇaṃ vaiśeṣike praśastakarācāryagranthe bhāṣyam/Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa, Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (Jha), p. iv.
10. *yāvad sūtravyākhyānāntaram anupajīvya tadvyākhyānaṃ bhāṣyam/vyākhyānāntaram upajīvya sūtravyākhyānaṃ vṛttir iti/* Ibid, p. iv.

SŪTRA ELEMENTS IN THE *PADĀRTHADHARMASAṂGRAHA*

It is well-known that the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (*PDS*) of Praśastapāda acquires the position of utmost importance in the Vaiśeṣika literature. When the commentary literature of Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* grew in a tremendously bulky volume, summarisation of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy became the crying need for its study and culture among the pupils. This need led Praśastapāda to write the *PDS*. This summary contained the main tenets of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* (*VS*) as well as same non-*sūtra* elements, which we shall discuss later.

Now if we go through the text of the *PDS* we find that Praśastapāda did not take up all the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* in his work. In the discussion of different topics the relevant *VS*s have been quoted by him. The expressions mentioned with the term *vacana* are invariably the *VS*s as *vacana* obviously meant for *Kaṇādavacana* or *Sūtrakāravacana*.

Apart from the above, it is very natural to the *PDS* that many a topic discussed therein are obviously according to the *VS*s and though the very *sūtras* are not cited or indicated in the text we feel quite easy to point out the *sūtras* which are at the background of the *PDS* expressions.

The *PDS* expression *guṇāś ca rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-saṃkhyā-parimāṇa-pṛthaktva-saṃyoga-vibhāga-paratvāparatva-buddhi-sukha-duḥkhecchā-dveṣaprayatnāś ceti kaṇṭhoktāḥ saptadaśa*[1] clearly refers to the *VS rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ* .... etc. (1.1.5), where seventeen qualities have been enumerated.

The five varieties of action mentioned in the *PDS* is just the paraphrasing of the *VS* 1.1.6.

In the topic of earth enumerates its qualities: *rūpādayo guṇaviśeṣāḥ siddhāḥ. Cākṣuṣa-vacanāt sapta saṃkhyādayaḥ. patanopadeśād gurutvam. adbhiḥ sāmānya-vacanād dravatvam. uttarakarmavacanāt saṃskāraḥ.* The expression clearly refers to a number of *VS*s. They are:

(i) *rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśavatī pṛthivī* (2.1.1),

(ii) *saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvam saṃyogavibhāgau pratvāparatve karma ca rūpidravyasamavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi* (4.1.12),

(iii) *sarpirjatumadhūcchiṣṭānāṃ pārthivānām agnisaṃyogād dravatā 'dbhiḥ sāmānyam* (2.1.6) and

(iv) *nodanād ādyam iṣoḥ karma karmakāritāc ca saṃskārād uttaram tathottaram uttaraṃ ca* (5.1.17).

In the topic of water *PDS* indicates some *VS*s by saying *pūrvavad eṣām* (i.e. of the qualities of water) *siddhiḥ*. The *VS*s concerned here are: *rūparasasparśavatya āpo dravāḥ snigdhāś ca* (2.1.2) and others above starting with 4.1.12 commonly applicable here.

In the topic of fire, the concerned *VS*s are : *tejo rūpasparśavat* (2.1.3) and other *VS*s starting with 4.1.12.

Then air explained in the *PDS* involves the *VS vāyuḥ sparśavān* (2.1.4).

Praśastapāda indicates two other *VS*s by saying *arūpiṣv acākṣuṣavacanāt sapta*

saṃkhyādayaḥ and *tṛṇakarmavacanāt saṃskāraḥ*. Those sūtras are: *arūpisv acākṣuṣvāt* (4.1.13) and *tṛṇakarma vāyusaṃyogāt* (5.1.14).

In the topic of *ākāśa* the *PDS* expression *vibhavavacanāt* refers to the *VS vibhavād mahān ākāśaḥ* (7.1.28) and the expression *śabdakāraṇatva-vacanāt* refers to *saṃyogād vibhāgāc chabdāc ca śabdaniṣpatteḥ* (2.2.36).

To mention the qualities of time Praśastapāda refers to two *VSs* (i) *kāraṇe kālākhyā* (2.2.11) and (ii) *kāraṇaparatvāt kāraṇāparatvāc ca paratvāparatve* (7.2.26).[2] The first one means that the cause of knowledge like 'These two are simultaneous' etc. is termed as *kāla* (time). By this the ubiquitious nature of time is understood, as everywhere there can be the sense of simultaneity, etc. In the second one the expression *kāraṇaparatva* indicates the conjunction between time and the composite substance. Therefore the quality, conjunction, is proved of time. The point simply is that the senses of old or new arise from the fact that when a thing is connected with more time than another it is old, and when a thing is connected with less time than the previous one it is said to be new. So in either case the conjunction with time is the main factor.

On the occasion of mentioning the qualities of the soul, Praśastapāda writes *dharmādharmāv ātmāntaraguṇānām akāraṇatvavacanāt*.[3] This expression refers to the *VS ātmāntaraguṇānām ātmaguṇeṣu ātmāntaraguṇānām akāraṇatvāt* (6.1.7). Candrānanda reads the *sūtra, ātmaguneṣu ātmāntaraguṇānām akāraṇatvāt*. In the *VS* (3.2.4) the marks of a soul are said to be *buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa* and *prayatna*. But that the merit and demerit are also the marks of a soul is known from a *VS ātmāntaraguṇānām,* etc. Here the *sūtra* says that: the *sukha* etc. in a soul cannot be the causes of *sukha* etc. in another soul (it means that if one soul is happy it does not imply that another soul is also happy). Thus it necessarily follows that merit and demerit present in a soul cannot produce pleasure and pain in another soul. So it is a clear indication that Kaṇāda admitted merit and demerit as of the qualities of the soul, otherwise he could not support the above two (merit and demerit) as to be the producer of pleasure and pain and also as to be similar to them.[4]

In continuation of the same topic *PDS* refers to the *VS* (9.22) *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogāt saṃskārāc ca*.[5] This admits *saṃskāra* as a quality of the soul. The *PDS* expression *vyavasthāvacanāt saṃkhyā* indicates another *VS* (3.2.16) *nānātmano vyavasthātaḥ*, which admits *saṃkhyā* as a quality thereof. This *sūtra* also proves the existence of *pṛthaktva* in the same. *Tathā cātmeti vacanāt* in the *PDS* refers to the *VS* (7.1.28) *vibhavavān mahān ākāśas tathā cātmā*. It proves the ubiquity of the soul.

Now coming to the internal organ, we find that the *PDS* refers to a *VS* (3.2.3) *prayatnāyaugapadyāj jñānāyaugapadyāc ca pratiśarīram ekam manaḥ* when it says *prayatnajñānāyaugapadyavacanāt pratiśarīram ekatvaṃ siddham*. By this *sūtra* the existence of one internal organ in one body is established. The *sūtra* also establishes the difference among the internal organs in different bodies. The expression *tadabhāvavacanāt* in *PDS* refers to the *VS* (7.1.30) *tadabhāvād aṇu manaḥ*. The expression *apasarpaṇopasarpaṇavacanāt* in the same refers to another *VS* (5.2.19) which is *apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam aśitapītasaṃyogavat kāryāntarasaṃyogaś cādṛṣṭakāritam*.

In the topic of number the *VS* (3.1.8) *abhūtam bhūtasya* is interpreted by Praśastapāda as inference may occur from without any mark but from mere knowledge

of it. When the inference of a person appears from a particular type of sound there the mark is that type of sound. But after some time sound dies out. Even then the non-existent (*abhūta*) sound becomes the mark of the existent person. Some explain this Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* in the following way: 'Not raining (*abhūtam varṣakarma*)' is a mark of conjunction between air and cloud. Here even in the absence of the mark 'raining' inference appears from its mere knowledge. Śrīdhara refutes this view, because here absence of raining and not raining is the mark. And this absence is still existent because this prior absence cannot be destroyed till the thing is actually produced. In the case of sound and person, the absence of sound can be the mark of a person.

In the very same topic of number, Praśastapāda quotes another *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* (8.9) *samavāyinaḥ śvaityāc chaityabuddheḥ śvete buddhis te kāryakāraṇabhūte.*

The expression *jñānāyaugapadyavacanena* indicates the *VS* (3.2.3) *prayatnāyaugapadyāj jñanāyaugapadyāc caikaṃ manaḥ.*

In the topic of conjunction, Praśastapāda quotes two *VSs* (10.7, 10.18) (i) *tathā bhavati, iti sāpekṣebhyo nirapekṣebhyaś ca*[6] and (ii) *saṃyuktasamavāyād agner vaiśeṣikam.* The *Nyāyakandalī* explains the first: as from the functioning threads there appears the knowledge 'The cloth will be produced', similarly, from some dependent causes and some independent ones there appears the knowledge 'The cloth is being produced'. That is when some threads are conjoined and some are not; in this situation we have the knowledge 'The cloth is being produced'. The introduction of this *sūtra* here is to mean that conjunction is an independent cause when it produces a substance. The second *sūtra* is introduced to justify that in case of producing quality and action, conjunction plays the role of a dependent cause. How? *Vaiśeṣika* in the *sūtra* is meant for *Vaiśeṣika guṇa* i.e. special quality. Now, when the earth atoms are conjoined with fire, colour etc. are produced in the former. Here conjunction independently is not able to produce colour etc., but conjunction depending on the hot touch of fire produces them. Had it been not the case *vaiśeṣika* (*guṇa*) of *agni* would not be pronounced, simply *agni* would be sufficient. In production of action also conjunction is a dependent cause.

Three types of pseudo-probans are admitted by Kaṇāda. Praśastapāda in his *PDS* cites two *sūtras* enumerating those as of Sūtrakāra. The *sūtras* are (i) *aprasiddho 'napadeśaḥ* (3.1.10) and (ii) *asan sandigdhaś ca* (3.1.11).

Now on the occasion of clarifying the nature of mark (*liṅga*) Praśastapāda says, *evam ādi tatsarvam asyedam iti sambandhamātravacanāt siddham*. In the expression *asyedam* is the indication of the *VS* (9.18) *asyedam iti kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sambandhy ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam*. Whatever type of relation between probans and probandum there may be, the common relation between them is that 'this (*idam*) is of this (*asya*)'.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas verbal testimony is not a separate instrument of valid knowledge. It is included in inference. Going to prove it Praśastapāda cites four *VSs*: (i) *tadvacanād āmnāyaprāmāṇyam* (1.1.3), (ii) *liṅgāc cānityo* (2.2.37), (iii) *buddhipūrva vākyakṛtir vede* (6.1.1) and (iv) *buddhipūrvo dadātiḥ* (6.1.4).

To give example of *viruddha* (contradictory) pseudo-probans, Praśastapāda cites the very example already given by Kaṇāda himself in his *sūtra*—*yasmād viṣāṇi tasmād aśvaḥ* (3.1.12). To exemplify the *sandigdha* pseuo-probans, Praśastapāda cites the very *VS*,

yasmād viṣāṇi tasmād gauḥ (3.1.12). In this topic of pseudo-probans, to illustrate the cause of doubt, Praśasta quotes the *VS* (2.2.26) *tulyajātīyeṣv arthāntarabhūteṣu (ca) viśeṣasyobhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt*. The *PDS* expression *ubhayathā darśanam saṃśayakāraṇam* is the clear indication of the *VS* (2.2.22) (*dṛṣṭaṃ*) *yathā dṛṣṭam ayathādṛṣṭam ubhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt saṃśayaḥ*.

Apart from the direct reference to the *VSs* in *PDS* there are a number of expressions or views which correspond the *VS*s. Some such cases are the following:

PDS: aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ saṃyogaḥ. sa ca trividhaḥ—anyatarakarmajaḥ, ubhayakarmajaḥ saṃyogaś ca.[7]

VS: anyatarakarmaja ubhayakarmajaḥ saṃyogajaś ca saṃyogaḥ (7.2.10).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *PPB*, p. 38
2. *PDS*, p. 160
3. *PPB*, p. 209
4. *NK*, *PPB*, p. 209
5. *PPB*, p. 209
6. D. Jha's edition of the *PPB* shows *tathā bhavatīti* is a part of Praśastapāda's writing, but actually it is a part of the *VS*. The *Kaṇdalī* portion also is to be rectified accordingly.
7. *PPB*, p. 347

NON-SŪTRA ELEMENTS IN THE *PADĀRTHADHARMASAṂGRAHA*

We have already seen that to establish different natures of the categories, the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* sufficiently refers to the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* of Kaṇāda and where the *sūtras* convey a very little idea about a topic it extends some additional ideas also in that regard. But there are some more topics in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* about which elaborate intricacies are absent in the *Sūtras* of Kaṇāda and it is curious that those very topics acquired a very key position in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, and it was in vogue that one is recognised to be a Vaiśeṣika who knows those. The well-known verse containing the idea is

dvitve ca pākajotpattau vibhāge ca vibhāgaje/
yasya na skhalitā buddhis taṃ vai vaiśeṣikaṃ viduḥ//

Here the topics mentioned in the verse are *dvitva* (duality), *pākajotpatti* (chemical transformation) and *vibhāgaja-vibhāga* (disjunction produced by disjunction). Apart from those the method of origination and destruction of the universe (*sṛṣṭi-saṃhāra*) is also a topic which had no place in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras of Kaṇāda. Intricate time-calculation in the cases of *paratva* and *aparatva* is another case which is absent and also not hinted at in the *Sūtras*.

Now the question is, from where did these non-sūtra elements enter the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. Perhaps it is not wrong to assume that *dvitva*, *pākajotpatti* and *vibhāgaja-vibhāga* must have come from the vast commentary literature of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*, which is not now extant. There were at least three *bhāṣyas* before the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha—Kaṭandī-bhāṣya, Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* and (?) *Ātreyabhāṣya*. Praśastapāda himself wrote a commentary on a certain *bhāṣya*, which we cannot ascertain, as that particular commentary also has not come down to us. So as the concerned work of Praśastapāda is a *saṃgraha* work i.e. summary, the very nature of this type of work is to collect the bare outline of the vast philosophy contained in those *bhāṣyas* and commentary.

In the discussion of time, Praśastapāda mentions different units of time like *kṣaṇa*, *lava*, *nimeṣa*, *kāṣṭhā*, *kalā*, *muhūrta*, *yāma*, *ahorātra*, *ardhamāsa*, *māsa*, *ṛtu*, *ayana*, *saṃvatsara*, *yuga*, *kalpa*, *manvantara*, *pralaya* and *mahāpralaya*. If we consult the *Mahābhārata* we find that all the units of objective time are available therein. The following are some of those references:

saṃvatsartavo māsāḥ pakṣāhorātrayaḥ kramāt/ Adi, 1.37
truṭiśo lavaśaś cāpi gaṇyate kālaniścayaḥ/ Uddyoga, 109.4

The *Mahābhārata* contains in the Śāntiparvan (231-12) the time units and relation between them which are as follows:

15 *nimeṣas*	=	1 *kāṣṭhā*
30 *kāṣṭhās*	=	1 *kalā*
30 *kalās* + 3 *kāṣṭhās*	=	1 *murhūta*

30 *muhūrtas*	=	1 *ahorātra*
30 *ahorātras*	=	1 *māsa*

The eighth chapter of the first parvan of the *Harivaṃśa* describes in detail the topic of time. Śrīdhara however, expresses his confidence that the mathematical treatises are to be consulted to get at the meanings of those time units.

The texts like *Arthaśāstra, Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, etc., though they mention different units of time, but they cannot be the source of Praśastapāda as they differ much from the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. Nearest approach of the *PDS* is roughly the *Mahābhārata, Manusaṃhitā* and *Harivaṃśa*.

Kaṇāda mentions three kinds of pseudo-probans, *aprasiddha* (= *viruddha*, contradictory), *asiddha* (unproved) and *sandigdha* (dubious). But Praśastapāda mentions a fourth one called *anadhyavasita*. He explains that it is not a new one, but obviously indicated by *Kaṇāda* by the *sūtra—aprasiddho 'napadeśaḥ* (3.1.10). But the varieties of *asiddha* pseudo-probans i.e. *ubhayāsiddha*, *anyatarāsiddha*, *tadbhāvāsiddha* and *anumeyāsiddha* are obviously a later development of the Vaiśeṣika epistemology.

Five inference-components is the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* are *pratijñā*, (thesis), *apadeśa* (mark), *nidarśana* (example), *anusandhāna* (application), and *pratyāmnāya* (conclusion). Though *apadeśa* is found to have been well mentioned and utilised in the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* the other four are absent in words there. However, it is not legitimate to think that they were totally unknown by Kaṇāda because an inference greatly needs them. But the six varieties of *nidarśanābhāsa* (pseudo-example) in agreement (*sādharmya*)[1], and six of it in disagreement (*vaidharmya*)[2], in all certainty came in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* either from the earlier *bhāṣyas* or from the lost *Ṭīkā* of Praśastapāda himself.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *liṅgāsiddhi, anumeyāsiddhi, ubhayāsiddhi, āśrayāsiddhi, ananugata* and *viparītānugata*. *PPB*, p. 600
2. *liṅgavyāvṛtta, anumeyavyāvṛtta, ubhayavyāvṛtta, āśrayāsiddhi, avyāvṛtti* and *viparītavyāvṛtti*. *PPB*, p. 604

THE CATEGORIES

Different things as we see around us are signified by different words. The words are *padas*. By the *padas*, the corresponding objects appear in our minds and those are called *arthas*. As such a kind of relation is admitted between the *pada* and the *artha*. Hence, etymologically the word *padārtha* (*padasya arthaḥ*) signifies the object behind the word. The *padārtha* may be anything which is an object of knowledge. A thing, however, must also have a name; and as such knowability and nameability regarded as definitions of a *padārtha*, are interchangeable.

The Vaiśeṣika system, is undoubtedly the propounder of a philosophy, which firmly believes in an objective order of reals, external to and independent of the cognising subject. It is mainly a study of reality itself in its various aspects. According to the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* of Kaṇāda there are six categories, viz. substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*). Among these six categories, the first three in fact are the main and the rest determine the relation between them i.e. first three. The subsequent authors like Praśastapāda and commentators like Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara simply admit the above six but they all had the tacit support for the existence of a seventh category called 'Negation' (*abhāva*). In the very *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* of Kaṇāda the four types of negation have been narrated (VS 9. 1-9) and the matter is clear from the discussion in *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* (pp. 498-500). It is Śivādityamiśra who made the seven-category scheme in the Vaiśeṣika system official.

Now to talk of the attitude of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy towards the categories, we may quote the observation of Prof. S. Bhaduri: "The Vaiśeṣika realist would repudiate all attempts to interpret the categories as ideal construction necessitated by the exigesis of human understanding and serving as convenient tools in the task of systematization of experimental data. These categories, or *padārthas* as they are called, are believed by the Vaiśeṣika to be ultimate reals, absolute objective facts. They are not products of thought; they are independent of all thought referring to them. It is an accident that there are conscious beings who cognise them, but this cognition makes no difference to their autonomous reality. They would exist as reals even if there were not a single mind to think of them. There are, therefore, not merely logical categories but ontological. Hence the study of the categories is for the Vaiśeṣika, a classification of the forms which actually characterize reality." (*Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, pp. 2-3).

Thus the diagram of reality is demonstrated in the following way:

- Reality
  - Being (*bhāva*)
    - Existential (*sattāsamavāyin*)
      - Substance (*dravya*)
      - Quality (*guṇa*)
      - Action (*karma*)
    - Other than existential (*svātmasat*)
      - Generality (*sāmānya*)
      - Particularity (*viśeṣa*)
      - Inherence (*samavāya*)
  - Non-being (*abhāva*)

The number of *padārthas* in different systems of Indian philosophy is not the same as that of the Vaiśeṣika system. The Nyāya system admits sixteen *padārthas*, viz., (i) instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), (ii) objects of knowledge (*prameya*), (iii) doubt (*saṃśaya*), (iv) purpose (*prayojana*), (v) instance (*dṛṣṭānta*), (vi) proved doctrine (*siddhānta*), (vii) inference-component (*avayava*), (viii) hypothetical argument (*tarka*), (ix) final ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), (x) discussion (*vāda*), (xi) wrangling (*jalpa*), (xii) destructive criticism (*vitaṇḍā*), (xiii) logical fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*), (xiv) purposive distortion (*chala*), (xv) futile rejoinder (*jāti*) and (*xvi*) point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*). The Sāṃkhya system propounds fifteen *tattvas*, viz., *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*, *mahattattva*, *ahaṃkāra*, five *tanmātras*, five produced elements, five cognitive senses, five conative senses and mind. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, there are five categories, viz., substance, generality, quality, action and negation, while according to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā the number of categories is eight viz., substance, quality, action, generality, potency (*śakti*), similarity (*sādṛśya*), number (*saṃkhyā*) and inherence. Candra, a sectarian Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka, accepted eleven categories, viz., substance, quality, action, generality, number, inherence, similarity, potency, and by adding three more, sequence (*krama*), benefit (*upakāra*) and tendency (*saṃskāra*).

Among the Vaiśeṣika categories, the substances are nine: earth, water, fire, air, *ākāśa*, time, direction, soul and mind; The qualities are twenty-four; colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, weight, fluidity, viscidity, sound, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, virtue, vice and tendency. The actions are five: upward motion, downward motion, contraction, expansion and movement in general; the generality is three: the highest generality, the lowest generality and intermediary generality; the particularity is innumerable; the inherence is the inseparable relation between substances and qualities, substances and actions, substances and generalities, cause, and effect, and atoms and particularity; and, the negation is four: prior negation, posterior negation, reciprocal negation and absolute negation.

The Vaiśeṣika author like Annambhaṭṭa shows the inclusion of sixteen Nyāya categories into seven Vaiśeṣika ones. Perception is included in the substance as the sense are said to be the *pramāṇas* of perception. Inference i.e. the knowledge of invariable concomitance, comparison i.e. the knowledge of the similarity, and the verbal testimony i.e. the knowledge of the words, will be included in the category of quality. Among the twelve *prameyas*, namely, soul, body, sense-organs and mind will be included in the category of substance. Knowledge, motivation, result and pain are to be included in the category of quality. Objects of the senses (odour, taste, colour, touch and sound) are in the category of quality; rebirth (death is as the last destruction of the life-connection and after death, birth is as the first life-connection with the body) is to be included in the category of quality; emancipation is in the category of negation as the former is the absolute negation of pain. Doubt is in the category of quality, purpose (pleasure and absence of pain) is included in the categories of quality and negation. Instance and proved doctrine (*siddhānta*) are in the substance, etc. Inference-components which are in

the form of verbal statements are in the category of quality; hypothetical argument (*tarka*), final ascertainment, discussion, wrangling, destructive criticism, purposive distortion and futile rejoinder are also to be included in the category of quality. The logical fallacies and the point of defeat are to be counted in the categories of substance, etc.

It is to be noted that the terminological similarity in different systems of Indian philosophy does not always demonstrate the ideological similarity of the categories.

SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES AMONG THE SIX CATEGORIES

Similarities among the six categories:

The similarities between the six categories are 'beingness' (*astitva*), 'nameability' (*abhidheyatva*) and 'cognisability' (*jñeyatva*).

'Being subsistent' is the characteristic of the categories other than eternal substances.

'Being inherent' and 'plurality' are the characteristics of the five categories, substance, quality, action, generality and particularity.

Quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence—these five do not possess quality and action.

Characteristics of the first three categories:

Substance, quality and action—these three have the relationship with Existence, have generality-particularity (like substanceness, qualityness and actionness), are called by the term *artha* as a technicality of the Vaiśeṣika system and become the causes of virtue and vice.

The character of being an effect and that of being non-eternal, belong only to those that have causes. The things having causes obviously are meant for those three—substance, quality and action.

The character of being the cause belongs to all except the atomic measure etc. This statement of Praśastapāda requires clarification. Śrīdhara explains:[1] The 'etc.' includes (i) the dimension of the dyad, (ii) the ubiquity of *ākāśa*, time, direction and soul, (iii) the ultimate sound, (iv) the dimension of the mind, (v) posteriority and priority, (vi) dual separateness and (vii) dimension of the ultimate bodied substance.

'Being subsistent in substances' is with the exception of the eternal substances. This similarity is to be explained in a critical way. Praśastapāda has said before, that 'Being subsistent is the characteristic of the categories other than eternal substances.' It may appear redundant. But it is not so. To justify some answer: as the subsistence is spoken of by connecting substance, so it is different from the simple case of 'subsistence'. According to Śrīdhara, this is not satisfactory.

Here the similarities are described regarding substance, quality and action and not others. If subsistence by connecting substance is advocated, the generality etc. would be relevant here as those are 'subsistent in substance'. So the matter is to be explained in this manner: in the expression 'with the exception of the eternal substances' the word substance should be taken as including also the ultimate particularities of these. The sense of the sentence thus comes to be this: subsistence in substances alone, is common to the three—substance, quality and action—with the exception of the eternal substances and particularities in them.

It is to be noted that the characteristics of the first three categories, substance, etc. as said by Praśastapāda correspond to the *VSs* 1.1.7 and 8.14 in a clarified way.

Characteristics of the three—generality, particularity and inherence:

Having the sole being within itself, having *buddhi* or the cognitive faculty as its sole indicator, not being an effect, not being the cause, having no generality-particularity, being eternal, and not being expressible by the term *'artha'* are the characteristics of the three categories—generality, particularity and inherence.

The above corresponds to the *VSs* 1.2.3, 11, 13, 15, 17; 7.2.29. The *VS* 1.2.3 says, generality and particularity to be dependent on knowledge. Though the similar characteristic of inherence is not noted here, its definition (in 7.2.29) clearly indicates it. And that is why Praśastapāda did not hesitate to declare the dependence on knowledge to be common nature of generality, particularity and inherence. Not being an effect or not being a cause or not being expressible by the term *'artha'* all for generality, particularity and inherence are simply got in contradiction with substance, quality and action—the three—all possessed by the three qualities contradictory to the above.

Similarities and dissimilarities among the nine substances:

Belonging to the generality 'substanceness', self-productiveness, having qualities, being not destructible by their causes and effects and being connected with ultimate particularities are the similarities among the nine substances.

The above corresponds to the *VSs* 1.1.11, part of 1.1.14 and 10.12.

The character of not being dependent and that of being eternal belong to all substances except those that are made up of certain constituent parts.

The character of being many and that of having less extensive generalities belong to earth, water, fire, air, soul and mind.

The character of having actions, that of being finite, that of having priority and posteriority and that of having speed belong to earth, water, fire, air and mind.

The above is derived from the *VSs* 5.2.1-8, 13, 14, 15, etc.

The character of being all-pervasive, that of having the largest dimension and that of being the common receptacle of all corporeal things belong to *ākāśa*, time and direction. *VSs* 7.1.28, 29.

The character of being *bhūta,* that being the main material principle of the sense-organs and that of being endowed with such special qualities as are each perceptible by each of the external sense-organs—belong to five substances,—earth, water, fire, air and *ākāśa*.
VSs 8.15, 16 and 17.

The character of being the component cause of substances and that of being perceptible by touch, belong to the four substances—earth, water, fire and air.
VSs 2.1.1-4, 1.1.22

The character of being perceptible by the sense-organs, that of having colour and that of having liquidity—belong to the three substances—earth, water and fire.
VSs 2.1.1-3, 6, 7.

The character of having weight and that of having taste belong to the two

substances—earth and water.
VSs 2.1.1-2, 5.1.7, 18, 5.2.3.

The *bhūta* categories have the common feature of having special qualities. Here the *bhūtas* are earth, water, fire, air, *ākāśa* and soul.

Special qualities are those qualities, of colour, etc., which tend to specify or distinguish their substrates from other things. Such qualities are present only in the five material substances (*bhūtas*) and in the souls.

Ākāśa and the souls have such special qualities which last only for a single moment and exist only over a certain part of their substrates. The special quality of *ākāśa* is sound and the special qualities of the soul are knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc. Those are momentary i.e. they are quickly destroyed.

Direction and time have the common characteristic of having five qualities, that of being auxiliary cause of all that originate. The five qualities are number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction.

Earth and fire are possessed of artificial liquidity. This is based upon the fact, that butter, which is of the nature of earth, and gold, which is of the nature of fire, are found to melt in fire.

In this way, the similarities of a number of things are divergences from the other things.

Similarities and dissimilarities of the qualities:

We know that the twenty-four qualities are admitted in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The definitions and the justifications to admit the existence of them are very naturally treated in a Vaiśeṣika treatise. But in addition to that to group the qualities according to some special common characteristic and to group some other qualities according to the opposite characteristic common to them, are found to have got special treatment in the Vaiśeṣika works. In fact the different types of grouping automatically show the dissimilarities between them.

Conjunction, disjunction, duality, separateness between two, etc. are connected with more than one substance at a time. 'Etc.' indicates to include threeness, separateness between three and many more like these. The rest of the qualities subsist in one substance.

Colour, taste, odour, touch, viscidity, natural liquidity, knowledge, pleasure, pain, wish, aversion, effort, virtue, vice, impression and sound are sixteen special qualities.

Number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, posteriority, weight, artificial liquidity, and velocity are eleven general qualities.

Each of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour is cognisable by a separate sense-organ.

Each of number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, liquidity, viscidity and velocity is cognisable by two sense-organs.

Each of knowledge, pleasure, pain, wish, aversion, effort is cognisable by the mind.

Weight, virtue, vice and impression are super-sensory.

Colour, taste, odour, touch, dimension, oneness (*ekatva*), separateness from one (*ekapṛthaktva*), weight, liquidity, viscidity and velocity—all these if not chemically

produced follow the qualities of their causes.

Knowledge, pleasure, pain, wish, aversion, effort, virtue, vice, impression and sound—all these do not follow the qualities of their causes.

Knowledge, pleasure, pain, wish, aversion, effort, virtue, vice, impression, sound, dimension of cotton, conjunction with posterior body, artificial liquidity, priority, posteriority, chemically processed qualities are produced by conjunction.

Conjunction, disjunction and velocity are produced by action.

Sound, posteriority and disjunction are produced by disjunction.

Priority, posteriority, duality, separateness from two, etc. are dependent on knowledge.

Colour, taste, odour, touch other than hotness, sound, dimension, oneness, separateness from one, and viscidity are producers of similar things.

Pleasure, pain, wish, aversion and effort are producers of dissimilar things.

Conjunction, disjunction, number, weight, liquidity, hot touch, knowledge, virtue, vice and tendency are the producers of similar and dissimilar things.

Knowledge, pleasure, pain, wish, aversion, impression and sound become producers, being inherent in their own substratum.

Colour, taste, odour, touch, dimension, viscidity and effort become producers, being inherent in other substratum.

Conjunction, disjunction, number, separateness from one, weight, liquidity, velocity, virtue and vice—these (nine) are producers, being inherent both in their own substratum and other substratum.

Weight, liquidity, velocity, effort, virtue, vice and some particular types of conjunction (soundless touch—*nodana*, violent touch—*abhighāta*) are the cause of action.

Colour, taste, odour, touch other than hotness, number, dimension, separateness from one, viscidity and sound—these (nine) are the non-inherent causes.

Knowledge, pleasure, pain, wish, aversion, effort, virtue, vice and impression—these are the auxiliary causes.

Conjunction, disjunction, hot touch, weight, liquidity and velocity—these are the causes in two ways (i.e. each of them may be non-inherent and auxiliary causes).

Priority, posteriority, duality, separateness from two, etc, are no causes at all.

Conjunction, disjunction, sound and the special qualities of the soul pervade a part of their substratum. The rest pervade their substratum.

Colour, taste, odour and touch, which are not chemically produced, dimension, separateness from one, natural liquidity, weight and viscidity are existent till their substrata substances last. The rest are not existent till their substrata substances last.

The qualities, colour, etc., are different from each other as each of them is qualified by a separate intermediary generality and according to that qualification those are called colour etc.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *PPB* (D. Jha), p. 47

GOD

It is very doubtful whether God (*Īśvara*) was at all implied in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* of Kaṇāda. Though we cannot designate Kaṇāda as a *nāstika* (nihilist), yet it appears that to explain his philosophy there had been no utility of god. But it can ignite the fire of criticism because an ancient scholar like Udayana clearly understands *tad-vacanād* (*VS* 1.1.3) as *īśvara-vacanād*. Anyway, about whether *īśvara* exists or not, is to be found in Kaṇāda's śāstra.

In the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda also, no argument about the existence of god is found. However, in the topic of 'process of creation and destruction' the role of supreme lord is essentially felt. Anyway, in the main two commentaries of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*—the *Vyomavatī* and the *Nyāyakandalīm* we find a lengthy argument given to establish the existence of god. Already in this period, the topic of god has been fiercely attacked by the Buddhists and existence has been denied. And the *Nyāyaśāstra* held strong opposition against them. So the topic has been well developed and that is why, we find a lengthy essay particularly in the *Nyāyakandalī*.

The existence of god can be confirmed by scriptural authority and inferential argument.

The vital is the inferential argument as with the help of it the opponent can dare challenge the concerned scriptures also. Anyway, the argument is: the four *mahābhūtas* are preceded by some one having knowledge of them, because those are produced objects. Anything that is produced, is preceded by one having knowledge of it. As for instance, the jar. We find that the jar is always preceded by the potter. Now, as the four *mahābhūtas* are produced, they must be preceded by one having knowledge of them.

Now, the very producibility of the *mahābhūtas* is called in question by the opponents: which is the one we call 'produced'? Certainly the one, of which the first point, i.e. starting point of existence, is known. But as the first point of existence of the earth, etc., cannot be known by the *pramāṇa*, the fact of the earth being a produced effect, cannot be regarded as duly established.

The objection is not right, as the earth, etc., are made up of parts. Everything that has parts is a produced effect, as for instance, the jar. The earth, etc., have parts. Hence they must be regarded as produced effects.

The opponent may now give another objection. We infer a thing only when the invariable concomitance upon which the inference is based, has been duly recognized. But the invariable concomitance between the character of an effect and that of being preceded by one having knowledge of it can never be known. Though we see at the same time a jar and its maker, who has the knowledge of it, we do not see at the same time, the maker (sower) of a growing sprout, though the sprout is an effect. So the invariable precedence of a doer cannot be established. Nor could the sprout, etc., be designated the subject of the inference in question, because it is only after the invariable concomitance has been duly cognized, and the inference has begun to operate, that we proceed to distinguish the subject, etc., of the inference, for the benefit of the opponent. But here in

the case of the sprout, it is found to be always included in cognition contrary to concomitance and as such, there could be no cognition of the necessary concomitance.

Answers Śrīdhara: non-perception here serves no purpose. If this type of non-perception of the co-existence of probans and probandum prevents the knowledge of invariable concomitance, then the inference of 'the moving of the sun'—an instance of a general inference (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna*) as shown by the *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*-writer—would be improper. As therein also, we find that it is merely the fact of the stars etc. having assumed different positions, and not that of their having moved, that is perceived at the same time as the cognition of their other positions preceded by the movement of Devadatta (the observer) from one place to another.

The opponent may say—though the movement of the stars is not perceived on account of the great distance, yet this non-perception cannot set aside the effect of the repeated seeing of the sun, which is unconditionally effective towards bringing about a cognition of the necessary concomitances.

The above contention of the opponent will help Śrīdhara. Though the sower (doer) is not actually found to be present in the case of the sprout and is apparently regarded as to be bodiless, yet the effectiveness of the repeated perceptions, operating unconditionally could not be set aside by the said non-perception.

Now the opponent asks: does the above inference proves the existence of only the Creator, or a Creator capable of creating the earth etc.? If it proves a mere creator, then it will not accomplish what is desired. As a mere agent, like ourselves, who cannot create the earth etc. is not what is expected. Then, an agent capable of creating the earth etc. is not cognisable, so the invariable concomitance with such a one cannot be established. So what we could prove is the existence of an agent similar in nature to own, perceived in the case brought forward as the corroborative instance.

Śrīdhara replies that the objection does not apply to the case, as what the inference sought to prove, is not any particular kind of creator. The invariable concomitance only helps to prove in general an agent with intelligence. Then this necessarily establishes his particular character in the shape of the capability of creating the earth, etc. Why does the question of the particular type of a thing arise here? In answer to this, Śrīdhara says that the existence of no general entity can be proved without the accompaniment of particular characteristic.[1]

If now the opponent says let the existence of the general entity be not established, what of that? He is to be told; that the concomitance of the general entity is not set aside, along with its producibility. If an inference did not establish that which is invariably concomitant with the probans, then the sight of smoke too, would not prove the existence of fire in general, as in this case too the existence would not be established of the particular 'fire', which has not yet been perceived to be in any way related to the seen smoke; and no general essence of fire could have an existence apart from a particular fire.

Now a fresh objection is being forwarded: an inference has two main characteristics—(i) the invariable concomitance between the probandum and probans, and (ii) the relationship between the subject and the probans. There the first establishes the existence

of generality and the second establishes that of the particular, in the form of the fire located in the mountain. If it were not so, the use of the second i.e. the relationship between the subject and the probans, would become invalid; and there could be no validity of the inference which proves the same already cognised.

Śrīdhara says that the very argument above, is suitable in the case of the god also, because in that inference not merely the existence of an agent with knowledge is proved but something other than that is indicated. Now the objection may be summed up: all right, an inference establishes the existence of a particular entity also, where there is no contradiction with the right knowledge. In the inference of the fire from smoke, we find no incongruity when the particular fire is inferred in the mountain side; specially as we often find the individual particulars occupying different points in direction and time. In the case of the inference of god, however, we cannot have any individual particular proved as there is the means of right knowledge pointing to the contrary. For instance, the inference cannot prove the fact of the effects, earth, etc., being preceded by a body (of the god); because if there be a body, it would necessarily contain the sense-organs and having these organs the god could not have any knowledge of super-sensory things (e.g. atoms, Karmic tendencies of the souls, etc.), and as such He could not be the creator of the world. Then as for the creator not being preceded by someone with body, it is absolutely impossible to prove this, because we find that a doer does a thing through a series of actions such as ascertainment, desire, etc. So like knowledge, body also is a precondition to be a creator. Just as in the case of the inference of smoke, we cannot discard the notion of the fire, at the same time fuel also cannot be discarded. If then, in the case of the inference of god, His body would be discarded, then we would as reasonably discard His knowledge also. And we would admit, that God without a body and also without knowledge, could create earth, etc., out of His great power. But He could not do so without knowledge of the nature of the material and accessory causes. We have the ordinary experience, that a person without knowledge, cannot create anything. So as mere desire, not being followed by the effort, cannot bring about an effect, similarly mere effort, not being connected with bodily action cannot bring about any creation.

The objection continues: now on the above limited conclusion, the matter of the general precedence of an intelligent creator cannot be established, as such a creator could not rightly be regarded either as bodied or bodiless. The existence of a mere general conclusion without any specific characteristic cannot be established. It may be asked—what is the flaw, in the inferential argument put forward in support of such a being? We reply that there is no actual flaw; but the man who, in the absence of any specific character, would put forward an argument to prove the unprovable existence of the mere generic entity, which, in such a case, would be as much an absurdity as the hare's horn, would stand defeated; just like a man who would take up a sharp sword to strike at empty space. If the Siddhāntin is not satisfied without showing some flaw in the inference of god, then it would be pointed out that the inference is open to fallacy of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*, inasmuch as the inference of the precedence of a bodiless being is set aside by the means, whereby the invariable concomitance (of cause and effect) is recognised; and the invariable concomitance thus contradicting the desired character of bodilessness, the

inference becomes open to the fallacy of *viśeṣaviruddha*, which is only a particular form of the fallacy of *viruddha*.

Now Śrīdhara throws some questions to the opponent on return and deduces his conclusions step by step.

According to the opponent, what is the nature of the creator? Is it 'being bodied' or 'being the operator of instruments recognized as capable of bringing about the necessary effects'? The first alternative cannot be admitted, because in that case a person in deep sleep, or one who is not doing anything towards an action would be regarded as a creator. But the nature of a creator is to be admitted only in the second case, as we find the effect coming about only when there is the instrumentality of the operator. This character can belong to a bodiless being also: as we find in the case of the soul (which is an immaterial being), sometimes coming to and at others being separated from the body. It might be argued that the body belongs to the soul, who has obtained it through its previous deeds, and as such the operating soul cannot be regarded as strictly bodiless. True, the body belongs to the soul, but it is not the body that supplies the force impelling itself, as any such impulsion by itself would involve a contradiction. It may be urged that the body may be regarded as the means of impulsion, inasmuch as it is the object of the impelling. But in the case of god also we have the atom as the object to be impelled or operated upon.

The opponent gives an objection: the impelling (*preraṇā*) of the soul's body is found to be brought about by desire and effort. And not when the body does not exist. From this, we infer that the body is the means of its own impelling through the said desire and effort.

Śrīdhara answers: the above contention of the opponent, cannot be accepted, as the body can be only admitted as giving rise to desire and effort and not to its own operation. After the desire and effort have been brought about, and when these begin to operate towards impellings (the body to a certain course of action), the body is then not found to be the impelling agent. We find that the intelligent being merely through his own desire and effort moves the inanimate things to action. The opposite we never perceive. So the existence of god can be established from the above facts.

The opponent may now object that the production of desire and effort also depends on the existence of the body.

In answer Śrīdhara says: where desire and effort are adventitious in that case lies the dependence of the body, but where these are natural, the body would not be necessary. Nor is there any inconsistency in believing the intelligence, desire and effort to be eternal, obviously in the case of god. In the case of colour, etc., we find two types of their nature—eternality and non-eternality. There is no obstacle for knowledge etc., to be of two types. The god must be endowed with permanent knowledge etc., and the other animate beings with temporary knowledge.

After having established the existence of god, Śrīdhara now answers some other different relevant questions, such as limitations of the souls, god is one or many, etc.

If the opponent says that the atoms themselves, presided over by the souls, would operate towards creation and as such there would be no need of an extraneous god, then he would be answered that the souls depend for their cognitions, upon the sense-organs obtained in accordance with their previous deeds and as such before they have obtained

the physical body they could not have the cognition of anything and hence the soul cannot supervise the atoms.

The opponent may say that the souls also have a natural intelligence pervading over all things and there it cannot be said that the souls have no cognition. But then it would be difficult to answer by what agency does this natural intelligence of the souls vanish when they were connected with the body. That is when a soul comes to have a body after birth he looks upon all things as wholly new. If the intelligence would remain in the soul permanently the soul would recognize everything, but it is not a fact that the soul recognizes everything.

Also it cannot be said that the natural intelligence turns inwards into the soul after the disappearance of the bodily covering and then does not operate outwards, because the soul being all-pervading could never cease to be connected, with cognizable objects, and being eternal, its character of illuminating the objects would subsist in it for ever; as such what could be the meaning of the said 'disappearance' of the natural intelligence?

The disappearance of intelligence cannot also mean the stopping of its functioning. Because then, we would not satisfactorily explain how the souls sometimes have the power to cognize objects. If the power of the souls in this regard is admitted to be ever-functioning then the question arises, what is the special cause that souls sometimes have the power and sometimes not.

In defence, if the opponent argues, that due to possession of sense-organs, the souls cognise the objects, then in that case the functioning of intelligence towards the objects of cognition would be dependent upon the sense-organs, and would not be brought about by mere proximity of the object of the intelligence, for though the souls are all-pervading, the souls are not found to have the knowledge of everything. If without the sense-organs souls could cognise, sense-organs would be useless.

Therefore, it is reasonable to hold that the souls, so long as they have no bodies, do not have the cognition of objects. In support of this we have the śāstric declaration: "The self-born one sent forth the sense outwards, hence it is that one perceives the outside and not the inside."[2] The souls, then, at first having no cognition could not be the controllers of the sense-organs. Consequently, it is necessary to assume a certain controller above these souls. We cannot admit that the non-intelligent souls function without the operation of an intelligent controller.

Even if the existence of the controller is admitted, the number regarding Him is again a disputable matter. Is this controller, one or many? Śrīdhara is in favour of one controller. If there were many of them, then if they were not omniscient, they would be as powerless as ourselves; and if all of them were omniscient, then as much as one such omniscient controller would be enough for all purposes, there would be no use for the others. Moreover many chiefs connected with one project cannot always be unanimous. If a project is carried out by one chief then the others are not chiefs. If, now all the chiefs are of the same rank, then none are to be designated as chief. So the chief—whose existence has been proved by the peculiar character of his creations—being omniscient, could not be without specific cognition with regard to any object. And hence he could have no misconception, which is always due to the non-recognition of the peculiarities of

objects. There being no misconception, He would have no attachment or aversion, which are produced from misconception and as those are absent His activity cannot be preceded by misconception.

As He has no activity he has no virtue or vice, which are produced by activities. And as there are no virtue and vice, there can be no pleasure and pain, which are produced by virtue and vice respectively.

And as He would always be directly perceiving all things, He could never have mere memories (*smṛti*) or impressions (*saṃskāra*) and hence the supreme lord is held to possess only eight qualities (number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, knowledge, desire and effort). Such is the opinion of some people. Others however hold that to god belongs pure and unimpeded intelligence alone, which constitutes His creative power, and that desire and effort do not exist in him. So according to them god has only six qualities.

Now, is this god bound or free? He cannot be bound, as He is without any grief (*kleśa*), etc., which are the causes of being bound and which are called bondage. Nor could He be regarded as free because the idea of 'freeness' is synonymous with the removal of bondage. If He is admitted as 'free' it is natural to think of His bondage for sometime. It may however be acceptable, if He is considered as 'ever-free', which is held by Patañjali—"God is the particular person who is untouched by troubles, actions with their fruits and residues".[3]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *nirviśeṣasya sāmānyasya siddhyabhāvāt*. *NK*, Vide *PPB*, p. 136.
2. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* IV. 1.
3. *Yogasūtra*, 1.24.

PROCESS OF CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE FOUR *MAHĀBHŪTAS*

In the discussion and critical analysis of the Vaiśeṣika categories, this one topic in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* seems to show some mythological biases. The *Sūtras* of Kaṇāda have no such topic like this. Yet where did Praśastapāda get it and introduce it in the Vaiśeṣika *śāstra*? The commentators, Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara, do not throw any light upon the source of it. In the course of commenting, they got a much desired topic like 'god' and in discussion, though they quoted a few lines from Mīmāṃsā text, this does not come to any use, to discover the source. So in this situation we may think of the lost commentary literature on the *Kaṇādasūtras* as a source of Praśastpāda which again may have in their own turn, got some ideas and also materials from the great epic *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*.

Now the following is how the creation and destruction of the four *mahābhūtas* take place.

When a hundred years by the measure of Brahmā[1] are at the end, there comes the time for the emancipation of the Brahmā existing at that time. Then for the sake of resting at night, of all living beings wearied by their sorrows in the form of staying in the wombs and of many others in different lives, there arises in the mind of the supreme lord, a desire to reabsorb all creations. Simultaneously, with this desire, there comes about a cessation of the operations of the merits and demerits (*adṛṣṭa*) of all souls that are the causes of their bodies, sense-organs and gross-elements. Here according to Śrīdhara the gross-elements cannot evade the dyads though they are not gross (atomic) in nature. The very word *vidhi* (process) in Praśastapāda's expression (*sṛṣṭisaṃhāravidhi*) is meant for the process, by which the elements are produced and destroyed, and the dyad is obviously produced and ended with atoms. Anyway, then out of the Supreme Lord's desire (to reabsorb) and from the conjunction of the souls and the material atoms, there come about certain actions of the atom constituting the bodies and sense-organs. These actions, destroy the conjunctions of those atoms. Ultimately this brings about the destruction of all things down to the atoms.

Then there comes about a successive destruction of the ultimate material substances, Earth, Water, Fire and Air, one after the other.

After this, the atoms remain by themselves in their isolated condition. Simultaneously with these there remain the souls. But they are not devoid of the merits and demerits of their past virtues and vices. In this way the souls remain for a period of a hundred years by the measure of Brahmā. Direction, etc., remain as before, as they are eternal.

Then again, for the sake of the experiences to be gained there arises in the mind of the Supreme Lord, a desire for creation. Then under the influence of the merits and demerits, that begin to operate in all souls, there are produced some conjunctions between souls and atoms. Now due to those conjunctions, actions are produced in the air atoms and these actions bring about their mutual conjunctions which lead to grow, through dyads, triads, etc.—finally to the 'great air' which exists vibrating in the *ākāśa*. Here the

air atoms are inherent cause, the conjunctions of the atoms with the souls endowed with active merits and demerits are non-inherent causes, and the merits and demerits are the auxiliary causes.

After this, in this great air, there appears, in the same order, out of the water atoms, the great stock of water which remains there surging.

Thereafter, in this stock of water, there appears, out of the earth atoms, the great earth which rests there in its solid form.

Then in the same stock of water, there appears, in the same order, out of the fire atoms, the great mass of fire and not being suppressed by anything else, it stands shining radiantly.

The enumeration of the four *mahābhūtas* was in this way, earth, water, fire and air. It is seen that in the destruction, the sequence followed the enumeration, i.e. first earth was dissolved, then water, then fire and at last air. But in creation the reverse sequence was not followed. First, truly, air is produced, but then came water, then earth and at last fire.

In the *Mahābhārata* (Śānti 182.14) we find the process of creation and destruction of the *mahābhūtas*. But it is clear there, that the process is according to the Sāṃkhya philosophy. There the creator is Brahmā but the creation and destruction are of the five *mahābhūtas* including *ākāśa* of which creation and destruction cannot be admitted by the Vaiśeṣika due to its eternal character. Moreover, the five *mahābhūtas*, earth, water, fire, air and *ākāśa* are dissolved starting from the earth and are created in its reverse order.[2] Besides this simple assertion, the process of *mahābhūtas* is categorically narrated in Śānti 182.14. First, *ākāśa* was created, then from *ākāśā*—water, then from water—fire and air, and at last from the combination of fire and air there arose earth. In addition to the above the *avyakta*, *ahaṃkāra*, etc., which are absolutely of the Sāṃkhya system, have been connected with the *mahābhūtas*.

In the Śāntiparva (chapter 183) the order of creation of the five *mahābhūtas* is slightly different from the above. From *ākāśa* there arose water, then from water—air. Then by the friction of water and air, fire appeared. At last fire associated with air, began to churn water and now water thus connected with fire and air began to form a solid state and finally became earth.

So, apart from Brahmā, the creator and His creation and destruction, nothing of the *Mahābhārata* argues with the Vaiśeṣika system.

Anyway, the four gross elements, having brought into existence in the way narrated according to the Vaiśeṣika system, there is produced, from the mere determination (*abhidhyāna*) of the Supreme Lord, the 'great egg', from out of the fire atoms mixed up with the earth atoms. From this egg, having produced all the world and the four-faced Brahmā, the grandfather of all creatures, the Supreme Lord assigns to him the duty of producing the various creatures.[3] Being thus engaged by the Supreme Lord, Brahmā, endowed with extreme degrees of knowledge, dispassion and power, having recognized the ripeness for fruition of the Karmic tendencies of the living beings, creates, out of his mind his sons—the Prajāpatis, the Manus and the several groups of the gods, Ṛṣis and Pitṛs. The Brahmā got them endowed with knowledge, experience and age according to

their own *karma* (previous deeds). Praśastapāda is found not to have restricted himself here. He added the matter of four castes also. The Brahmā out of his mouth, created the *Brāhmaṇas* (the priest class), out of his arms—the *Kṣatriyas* (the warrior class), out of his thighs—the *Vaiśyas* (the merchant/peasant class) and out of his feet—the *Śūdras* (the labourer class). These classes also got their knowledge, experience and age according to their *karma*. After creation the Brahmā connects them with virtue, knowledge, dispassion and powers, according to their respective impressional potencies.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1.

360 days	=	1 years
3 *ṛtus* or 1 *uttarāyaṇa*	=	1 day of the gods
3 *ṛtus* or 1 *dakṣiṇāyaṇa*	=	1 night of the gods
360 *ahorātras* of the gods	=	1 year of the gods (360 human years)
12000 years of gods	=	1 *caturyuga* of the gods (43,20,000 human years)
1000 *caturyugas* of the gods	=	1 day of the Brahmā (432,00,00,000 human years)
1000 *caturyugas* of the gods	=	1 night of the Brahmā (432,00,00,000 human years)
360 *ahorātras* of the Brahmā	=	1 year of the Brahmā (311040,00,00,000 human years)

2. *ānupūrvyā vinaśyanti jāyante cānupūrvaśaḥ. MBH* (Bhīṣma 5.10)
3. *tasmiṃś caturvadanakamalaṃ sarvalokapitāmahaṃ brahmāṇaṃ sakalabhuvanasahitam utpādya prajāsarge viniyuṅkte. PPB*, p. 130

ATOMISM

The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* of Kaṇāda is the earliest basic text of the Vaiśeṣika literature. There we find both the words *aṇu* (*VS* 5.2.14) and *paramāṇu* (*VS* 4.1.7). Though much for their existence is not found in the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*, Kaṇāda offers indirect arguments to prove the atoms, (*VS* 4.1.4, 5), enumerated their qualities (*VS* 7.1.15) and specified their dimension as globuler (*parimaṇḍala*) (*VS* 7.1.26). He points out that the qualities as residing in the earth atoms are changeable by heat (*VS* 7.1.5) and also distinguishes the various uses of the word *aṇu* (*VS* 7.1.17, 18).

The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda develops the theory further by clarifying some of the main tenets of atomism. He devotes a separate section to explain the origin and destruction of the physical world, (Sṛṣṭi-saṃhāra-prakaraṇa), how things are gradually produced out of atoms after creation starts, and how they are dissolved into atoms ultimately at the time of total annihilation. The allied theory of *pīlupāka*, that chemical change due to heat, takes place not in the thing as a whole, but in every individual atom, is also treated in a separate section (*NK*, BORI, pp. 265-270).

Further subtleties and refinements of the theory and some later modifications, from the Vaiśeṣika standpoint, are mainly to be found in the Pṛthivīprakaraṇa of the *Vyomavatī, Nyāyakandalī, Kiraṇāvalī,* and *Setu*.

It is to be mentioned that the Nyāya system being kindred science with the Vaiśeṣika, contributed a lot in the development of ideas regarding atomism. In this context Uddyotakara's arguments in particular in the exposition of *NS* 4.2.17-25 appear to be extremely important and highly influential on the later Nyāya-Vaiśesika authors.[1]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. For theoretical details, a work like *Indian Atomism* and the section called "The Atomic Theory" in the *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics* may be helpful.

THE THEORY OF *PĪLUPĀKA*

The process of chemical change is another critical point of discussion of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Praśastapāda, to illustrate this, shows the different steps of what happened in the change of colour in an earthen pot and this process is naturally to be followed also in the cases of taste, odour and touch in the earthen objects.

An unbaked earthen pot is of black colour, but after it is burnt in the potter's furnace it becomes red all over, both inside and outside. This simple phenomenon has become the subject of a minute analysis. The following is the Vaiśeṣika position as presented in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, the *Vyomavatī*, the *Nyāyakandalī*, etc.[1]

When an unbaked earthen pot is put in fire, the latter either strikes hard against, or exerts strong pressure upon, the pot. In either case, the fire acts with such violence and motion upon the pot that it at once penetrates into the body of the pot and produces a violent motion in the atoms constituting the pot. The motion produces the disjunctions and those destroy the conjunctions of the atoms, which are followed by the splitting of the dyads into constituent atoms. When the body of the pot is thus completely disintegrated into atoms, a second impact (or, it may be pressure) of fire upon the isolated atoms destroys the black colour in them and reduces them to what may be called their original or natural condition. In this condition, all earthy atoms, irrespective of the bodies arising out of them, are homogeneous and possess only those original qualities which characterise the earth-substance as such (*pṛthivī-bhūta*). A third impact of fire, at this stage, produces the red colour in these atoms. Thereafter, owing to the influence of the unseen destiny (*adṛṣṭa*) of the individual soul or souls who will be benefited by the pot produced, a reverse motion is produced in the liberated and homogeneously transformed atoms, which joins them together by twos. Thus red dyads are produced. Then the combination of the red dyads eventuates in the corresponding triads, and the continuance of the process of combination ultimately results in the production of red pot of the original magnitude and shape.

It is to be noted, according to the Vaiśeṣika, the chemical change takes place in the atoms of the disintegrated pot and as these atoms are called *pīlu* so the chemical change in them is *pīlupāka* and after it the doctrine is called *pīlupākavāda*.

Anyway, what appears to an ordinary observer to be a simple change of colour in an earthy body is thus, according to the Vaiśeṣika, a long series of chemico-physical events. The chief merit of this complex hypothesis, which is also the chief inducement for resorting to it, is its strict adherence to the dictum that the quality in the effect is necessarily the outcome of the corresponding quality of the cause. This dictum is held by the Vaiśeṣika to be universal in its application. If any deviation from this rule is allowed in a single instance, there will be no check against its extension to admittedly unwarranted cases. If the quality of the product be not determined by the quality of the cause, it is not possible to explain why from a combination of blue yarns a textile of white colour is not produced. The validity of this rule shows itself in all cases that come within our experience, and there is absolutely no reason for a departure from it in the cases of the qualities produced by heat.

In the long series of chemico-physical events three things appear to be most important on which the commentators have had to argue a lot. Those three things are: (i) Why should the disintegration of the body into atoms be insisted upon? (ii) Why should a succession of impacts of fire be postulated? and (iii) Why does not the motion of the atoms for reintegration take place just on the cessation of black colour?

(i) The disintegration of a body into atoms is a necessary precondition of the emergence of a novel quality in them. The production of a new quality is possible only in a substance which is in a free state and is not inside a whole as a part of it. The colour of the yarns, for instance, is not produced after they are integrated into a textile, but before such integration takes place. The disintegration of the body is also to be inferred from the disappearance of the previous black colour. The colour of a body is destroyed only on the destruction of its substratum as is seen in the case of the colour of burnt textile. The disappearance of the colour, here, is due to the destruction of the textile. The rule holds good in the case of the colour of all composite bodies. It follows therefore, that the destruction of the black colour in the unburnt pot is possible only if its substratum, i.e. the pot, is destroyed. It may be questioned why the destruction of the colour should be posited at all, from which the destruction of the body is inferred. The answer is that a second colour cannot be produced in a body which is not divested of its previous colour. The rule is absolute, particularly when there is a natural opposition between the colours in question. There can be no combination or coincidence of red and black. If we precisely observe the incidence of colour, we are bound to hold that no two different kinds of colour can ever coincide. The instance of a variegated substance is not an exception, because the substance in question is held to possess not a multiplicity of colour but one particular variety of colour styled variegated (*citra*). To sum up, the disintegration of the body is proved by the destruction of the original colour, which again, is proved by the emergence of a new colour. The disintegration of the body is an inescapable conclusion also because the impact of fire cannot be confined to a part of the body. The reason is that, if the entire body is not worked upon by fire, the cessation of the original colour in all the parts of the body will not occur, and consequently the change of colour will not take place. If, therefore, the impact is to spread over the entire structure of the body, the contact of fire with the pot in question must be held to embrace even the constitutive atoms. If that be the necessary conclusion, then there is no reason to suppose that the body will not be disintegrated when the violent impact of a tactile substance, which is invariably the cause of disruption of composite bodies, is present in the shape of the impact of fire. Moreover, the absence of disintegration will fail to explain the emergence of a new quality which is not caused by a corresponding change of a quality in the cause.

(ii) To the second question the answer is that for a series of effects a series of causes must be postulated. The first impact of fire is necessary to bring about the disintegration of the body into atoms. The second impact of fire is necessary for the destruction of the previous colour in the isolated atoms. Apart from the question of logical necessity, it offends our common sense to suppose that a single contact of fire should persist for a length of time; fire, after all, is not a static body, and the impact of one particle of fire will necessarily be followed by that of another particle. Moreover, it is a matter of common

experience that the destructive agent never functions as a productive agent with regard to the same event. Thus, for instance, it is seen that the cause of the colour of the yarn is different from the cause of the destruction of that colour. If the productive cause be held to operate also as the cause of destruction, as a matter of rule, or, to be more precise, if the same impact of fire be both productive and destructive of colour by its very nature, then the atom will ever remain destitute of colour after the impact of fire has ceased—an absurd conclusion. But this consequence becomes inevitable because the impact of fire which destroys the previous colour and produces the second colour will also destroy the latter, it being, by its very nature, destructive and productive in one. In other words, the capacity for destruction and that for production being inherent in the self-same entity, one cannot work without calling into play the other which is believed to be its correlate. Having thus inevitably destroyed the colour produced by itself when the impact of fire will itself be destroyed, there will be no other agency to invest the atom with a fresh colour. It thus follows that the destruction and the production of colour in the atom are due, not to one and the same impact of fire, but to numerically different impacts.

(iii) In the answer to the third question it is to be said that as the assumption of colourless atoms does not explain the formation of a body having a distinct colour, so the reverse motion with a view to their recombination must be supposed to set in, only after the emergence of the red colour has taken place.

But against this theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Naiyāyikas raise a strong objection. They advocate that the change of qualities due to the action of heat, takes place in the whole body (*piṭhara*) remaining structurally intact—not in the atoms disintegrating the composite whole. This theory of the Naiyāyikas is known as the theory of *piṭharapāka*.

In favour of their own theory the Naiyāyikas put a number of arguments.

(i) We perceive a pot remaining structurally intact even when it is being burnt by fire inside the potter's furnace. When the burnt pot is taken out from the furnace, it is recognised to be the same pot that was unbaked formerly. This recognition of the identity of the baked pot with the unbaked one is not invalidated by a subsequent experience.

(ii) If the Vaiśeṣika theory of decomposition of bodies due to the action of heat be a valid account, then it will be difficult to explain how the pot maintains its position when it is put on the furnace and is undergoing disintegration due to the action of heat.

(iii) The theory of wholesale destruction and re-creation will make it extremely difficult for us to explain how the reconstituted pot should have the same magnitude and shape as the original unbaked pot.

(iv) The re-creation of the pot from the atoms into which the old pot was dissolved is supposed to take place without the help of the usual apparatus, for instance, the wheel, the staff, the measuring rod, etc., and also without the activity of the potter. But these are found to be the essential conditions for the production of a pot in the ordinary course of experience. The production of the baked pot, as in the Vaiśeṣika theory, is, therefore, nothing but a miracle, because the accepted law of causation is here given a wide berth.

(v) So it is to be realised that the fact is not properly explained by the Vaiśeṣikas. The pot, in our common experience, is found to be porous as water kept in it is found to be oozing out on the outer surface of the pot and so there is no difficulty for particles of fire

effecting entry into its structure through its pores. Therefore, the disintegration of the atoms is not to be postulated in order to justify the entry of the fire atoms inside the pot.

In answer to the above objections the Vaiśeṣikas argue in the following way:

(i) The unbaked and baked pots cannot be confirmed as identical by recognition. It is a fact that the unbaked pot is soft to touch and black in colour, while the baked one is hard and red. Their functional characteristics are also different. The unbaked pot, for instance, cannot be used in drawing water from a well, which is done with the baked pot. As the occurrence of these contradictory attributes is not possible in a self-identical substance, the baked pot must be held to be a distinct entity from the unbaked one. Moreover, recognition is not necessarily a proof of identity, as it is found to err in such cases as the flame of light and the stream of water.

Recognition, according to the Naiyāyikas, would admit the sameness of magnitude and shape in the case of a slightly mutilated pot also. When, for instance, a pot is perforated with a needle in the neck, it is believed to be the same pot in spite of the mutilation. But logically considered the pot, being deprived of a part of its body, however small, cannot be held to be the same whole. This will be manifest from the consideration of the relation of the part and the whole. The whole exists in the totality of the parts and cannot disperse with any of these parts, without losing its identity. If, therefore, there is a loss of one or two parts, it follows that the whole which existed in the total number of parts has ceased to exist, and another whole composed of a smaller number of parts has superseded it.

(ii) (iii) In answer to the second point the Vaiśeṣika is to give a very cogent explanation. The pot is not directly resolved into atoms, for that would mean its complete disappearance before the emergence of the reconstituted pot. The process of disintegration is gradual and through parts, and so also is the process of reintegration. At each stage, therefore, when some parts are undergoing destruction, fresh ones are emerging with changed qualities. The synchronism of these two processes is responsible for our failure to distinguish the reconstituted pot from the disintegrated one. This also explains why no structural or dimensional change is noticed in the reconstituted pot.

(iv) In answer to the fourth point the Vaiśeṣika observes that the objection regarding the absence of the potter and his apparatus should not present an insurmountable difficulty. In the case of the mutilated pot, the old pot has ceased to exist, and a new pot has come into existence without waiting for the potter and his operation of his apparatus. Accordingly, we must hold, the Vaiśeṣika remarks, that the creation of a new pot in supersession of an old one does not necessarily stand in need of the usual casual conditions.

(v) In answer to the Naiyāyikas' contention of porosity of the pot, the Vaiśeṣika contends that the porosity of the pot is not beyond dispute. Atoms are not porous, because they are indivisible; nor can the dyad be supposed to be porous, because that would imply that the atoms constituting the dyad were not conjoined. The conjunction of atoms in a dyad cannot admit of a gap between. It is only the composite and extended things that can be partially conjoined, thus leaving open the possibility of a gap. This is, however, impossible in the case of atoms. Nor can the conjunction of dyads in a triad be

DUALITY (*DVITVA*)

Duality along with the process of chemical change and disjunction produced by disjunction is one of the three vital topics in which the Vaiśeṣikas exerted their full intellectual strength. We find in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda, the number duality etc. as the common effect of the two or more substances.[1] No other detail is found therein. But in the available subsequent Vaiśeṣika literature, Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* deals with the duality, triplity, etc. rather in a detailed manner containing the process of their production and destruction.

It has been grossly marked that these duality etc. are produced by the knowledge of the distinguished perception (*apekṣābuddhi*) and destroyed by the disappearance of the same knowledge. Now what happens, in the whole process from production to destruction of the duality, may be put forward in a series of moments according to the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.[2] The series is as follows:

First moment	: (1) Visual contact with two substances be those either homogeneous or heterogeneous.
Second moment	: (1) Knowledge of the generality of unity arises in each of the two objects.
Third moment	: (1) A single idea of the two unities (qualities) appears (in the form of 'This is one', 'This is one'.) This is called *apekṣābuddhi* (knowledge of the distinguishing perception). (2) The knowledge of unity (i.e. the knowledge in the second moment) is about to disappear.
Fourth moment	: (1) Duality (quality) is produced in the two substrata by the two unities depending upon the *apekṣābuddhi*.
Fifth moment	: (1) Knowledge of the generality of duality appears. (2) *apekṣābuddhi* (of the third moment) is about to disappear. And (3) Knowledge of the 'duality' (number) is about to appear.
Sixth moment	: (1) Knowledge of duality (number) appears. (2) *apekṣābuddhi* disappears. (3) Due to the above disappearance the duality (number) (produced in the fourth moment) is about to disappear. (4) Due to appearance of the knowledge of duality, knowledge of the generality of duality is about to disappear. And (5) *knowledge of substance* in the form of 'two substances' is about to appear.
Seventh moment	: (1) Knowledge in the form of 'Two substances' appears. (2) Duality disappears. (3) Knowledge of duality (number) is about to disappear. And (4) due to knowledge of the substance, tendency (*saṃskāra*) is about to appear.
Eighth moment	: (1) Knowledge of duality (number) disappears due to knowledge of substance. (2) Tendency appears. And (3) due to above, knowledge of the substance disappears.

In the third moment, *apekṣābuddhi* proceeds from the notions of the generality of unity and its relationships to the objects in question.

In the fifth moment, the knowledge of duality (number) proceeds from the notions of the generality of duality and its relationships to the quality 'duality'.

In the above, *apekṣābuddhi* is said to be the cause of duality and disappearance of *apekṣābuddhi* is said to be the destruction of duality. But sometimes the destruction of the substratum also leads to the destruction of duality. In that case, the series of moments is:

First moment	:	(1) Suppose that action appears in the part of the *substratum of unity* (substance). (2) Knowledge of the generality of unity appears. (3) Disjunction is about to appear. (4) *Apekṣābuddhi* is about to appear.
Second moment	:	(1) Disjunction from other parts appears due to action. (2) *Apekṣābuddhi* appears. (3) Conjunction constituting the substance is about to be destroyed. (4) Duality is about to be produced. (5) Knowledge of generality of unity is about to disappear.
Third moment	:	(1) Destruction of conjunction due to disjunction. (2) Duality is produced. (3) Substance is about to be destroyed. (4) Knowledge of the generality of duality is about to appear. (5) Knowledge of the generality of unity disappears.
Fourth moment	:	(1) Substance is destroyed due to destruction of conjunction. (2) Knowledge of the generality of duality appears. (3) *Apekṣābuddhi* is about to disappear. (4) Duality is about to be destroyed.
Fifth moment	:	(1) *Apekṣābuddhi* disappears due to appearance of the knowledge of the generality of duality. (2) Duality is destroyed due to destruction of the substance (the whole).

In both the above cases (where in one, the disappearance of *apekṣābuddhi* is the factor to destroy duality, and in the other, the destruction of the substratum is the factor to destroy the same), *apekṣābuddhi* is found to stay for one moment more i.e. at a moment it appears. It stays for the next moment. It is about to disappear in the third moment. It disappears in the forth moment.

Anyway, in the case where the destruction of the substratum is the cause of destruction of duality, there in the fifth moment we see that *apekṣābuddhi* and duality are simultaneously destroyed. So here *apekṣābuddhi* cannot be the cause of destruction of duality. Here the destruction of the substance stands as a cause of destruction of duality.

Vyomavatī points out that even *apekṣābuddhi* and action appear in the same moment, then destruction of duality will be due to both disappearance of *apekṣābuddhi* and destruction of the substratum. The following is the series:

First moment	:	*Apekṣābuddhi* and action
Second moment	:	Duality and disjunction appear

Third moment	:	Knowledge of generality of duality appears. Destruction of conjunction.
Fourth moment	:	*Apekṣābuddhi* disappears. Knowledge of duality appears. Substratum is destroyed.
Fifth moment	:	Duality is destroyed.

Vyomaśiva also mentions the series of moments in which triplity and hundred are produced.

Now what appears to be very important is that what is the relation between the factors in the series of moments. There were two contesting opponents. One group contended that the factors are related in the relation of destroyer and destructible i.e. a knowledge appears in the first moment and it destroys the preceding in the second moment. The other group contended in favour of the relation of non-coexistence, i.e. whenever knowledge appears, it at the same moment destroys the other knowledge. Praśastapāda favours the first group. He points out the fault in the contention of the second group. That is, in the sixth moment (in the case where disappearance of *apekṣābuddhi* is said to be the cause of destruction of duality) we have seen that when knowledge of duality appears the duality is about to disappear due to disappearance of *apekśābuddhi*. If here the relation of non-co-existence would be admitted then disappearance of *apekṣābuddhi* would destroy the duality in the very moment the former is brought about i.e. at the time of knowing duality, duality is destroyed. It would lead to the event that the knowledge (of the substance) in the form of 'two substances' would not appear, because the knowledge of 'two substances' must depend upon duality, but in the case, before such knowledge of substance duality does not exist.

Now, it may be argued, that as there is the knowledge of duality, what then is the need for duality to be present before the knowledge in the form of 'two substances'? There is the instance of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra—abhūtaṃ bhūtasya*—which says that inference may be from mere knowledge of a mark, though the mark is actually absent there. We hear the human voice coming from inside a room, after a while the voice dies down, yet we infer the presence of a person inside though the mark is not there.[3] In the same way, though the duality is destroyed, its knowledge would bring about the knowledge of substance (in the form of 'two substances').

Praśastapāda does not admit the above contention. As the knowledge of 'two substances' is a qualified knowledge it is not a fact that the knowledge in question (i.e. the knowledge of *viśeṣya dravya*?) proceeds from mere cognition. The qualification constitutes the very form of that which it qualifies. It is the involving element of the qualified (*viśeṣya*) and the very cause of the idea of its own *co-existence, which discriminates other things* (*upasarjanatā*), with that thing which it qualifies. So, that which does not exist cannot be an attaching element or a cause of the idea of its own *upasarjanatā*, consequently the knowledge of the qualified cannot be possible without the connection of the qualification. So in the event of the destruction of duality in the prior moment, the next moment will not bring forth the knowledge of 'two substances'. Praśaṣtapāda now refers to a Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* (8.9)—*samavāyinaḥ śvaityāc chvaityabuddheḥ śvete buddhis te kāryakāraṇabhūte* in support of his opinion. The *sūtra* declares: The knowledge

(perceptual) of the 'white object' proceeds from the cognition of the *whiteness* inhereing in that object, and for this reason there is the relation of cause and effect, between the knowledge of the qualification and that of the qualified object. Hence the qualification cannot be regarded as absolutely absent in the knowledge of what it qualifies. So if duality is absent in the prior moment, the knowledge of the substances in combination of duality cannot arise.

So the opponents' attempt to compare the inferential knowledge with the knowledge of 'two substances' is not justified, because in the inferential knowledge, the knowledge of mark and the probandum do not appear simultaneously but the knowledge of 'two substances' is composite knowledge. In the inferential knowledge, only the knowledge of the mark is the prime factor, but in the qualified perceptual knowledge, only the knowledge of qualification is not sufficient but actual presence of the qualification is needed.

But it cannot be denied that duality actually becomes absent in the moment when the knowledge of substance appears. Then, how is it that in the absence of the duality also, the knowledge of 'two substances' appears? Is it then, that the matter of conceptual existence of duality, in the background of the knowledge of substance, as contended by the opponent, cannot be discarded? To solve the problem Praśastapāda says—No. As the duality, the substance and the two substances, are cognized so close upon each other, the knowledge, though separate, appear to be one i.e. duality and substances appear in one knowledge, and no sequence between them is noticed. There is a corroborative substance also. In the knowledge '*Ākāśa* as being qualified by sound' (*śabdavad ākāśam*) there are three cognitions coming one after the other—(1) that of sound, (2) that of *ākāśa* and (3) that of *ākāśa* being qualified by the sound.

Now the opponents give a fresh objection, viz., by resorting to the 'relation of destroyer and destructible' the production of the knowledge of substances cannot be explained. In the fifth moment, when the quality of duality appears, the *apekṣābuddhi* must be destroyed, as the *apekṣābuddhi* appearing in the third moment produces the tendency (*saṃskāra*) in the next moment and by this *saṃskāra* the *apekṣābuddhi* is destroyed in the fifth moment. And then in the sixth moment duality is destroyed. Consequently the seventh moment cannot produce the 'knowledge of two substances'.

Praśastapāda refutes the opponents' objection. The collective knowledge only can produce the *saṃskāra* and not the indeterminate knowledge. The *apekṣābuddhi*, being an indeterminate knowledge, has no power to produce *saṃskāra*. Hence the opponents have no advantage in this matter.

The relation of destroyer and destructible, in the case of duality further faces a serious objection from the opponents. If the destroyer knowledge, being present in the prior moment, destroys a knowledge in the next moment, then it is to be admitted that the two knowledges—the destroyer knowledge and the destructible knowledge—are present in the prior moment. But this is simultaneity of knowledge, which is against the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra*.

Praśastapāda refutes this objection. Non-simultaneity of knowledges, spoken of in the *sūtra*, refers to the non-simultaneity of the appearance of two knowledges, as well as

the non-simultaneity of the two, none of which is not going to be disappear. In the case where the destroyer is concerned, the simultaneous appearance of two knowledges as well as their simultaneity, none of which is going to disappear, are not found.

It is to be added here that the *Nyāyakandalī* furthermore started a lengthy debate regarding this topic against the Buddhist view. However the *Vyomavatī* restricted itself to the simple exposition of Praśastapāda's text.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *dvitva-prabhṛtayaś ca saṃkhyāḥ pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgāś ca. VS.* 1.1.23.
2. *PPB,* pp. 272-82.
3. This is according to *Nyāyakandalī* (p. 288). We find that others explain it in a different way: the action of rain which does not appear becomes the inferential mark of contact of the wind and the cloud and in this case even though the rain does not exist, yet it is the mere idea that serves as the inferential mark. But the *Nyāyakandalī* calls this explanation unjustified, because in the case of the inference, it is not the action of rain that is the inferential mark, but it is the *absence of rain* which leads to the inference; and certainly this absence is present at the time; as while the thing (rain) has not been brought about its prior negation remains intact. (*Nyāyakaṇdalī,* p. 288).

DISJUNCTION PRODUCED BY DISJUNCTION

'Disjunction produced by disjunction' is a topic in dealing with which the Vaiśeṣikas are marked for their infallible knowledge:

dvitve ca pākajotpattau vibhāge ca vibhāgaje/
yasya na skhalitā buddhis taṃ vai vaiśeṣikaṃ viduḥ//

Kaṇāda did not deal with the topic of disjunction other than showing mere similar treatment like conjunction, which can be divided into three types. By this the Sūtrakāra intended the three types of disjunction, (i) disjunction produced by the action of either of the two conjuncts, (ii) disjunction produced by the actions of both of the conjuncts and (iii) disjunction produced by disjunction.[1]

What we find in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* on disjunction, is a detailed and meticulous treatment unparalleled in the *sūtra*-text. If *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, being a summary had actually summarized this topic also from the rather detailed commentaries, we can guess how bigger the extension of the topic was there in those works. We see another thing that after making a detailed discussion of Praśastapāda's expressions on the subject, Śrīdhara says that it is not justified to discuss further in detail as his work was a commentary on a *saṃgraha* work (summary in nature).[2] So from this also we may have an idea of the extension of the topic on which the Vaiśeṣikas had left a very deep sign of their argumentative capacity. The disjunction in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* has been defined to be the basis of the idea of two things being 'disjoined'.

Anyway, the disjunction is divided into three types and those are as Kaṇāda has already mentioned in his *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*. Now 'disjunction produced by disjunction', as we find in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is further divided into two types—the thing which we cannot find in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. The types are (1) as proceeding from the disjunction of causes, and (2) as proceeding from that of the cause and the non-cause.

(1) Now the former has been explained in the following way: Suppose a produced object is in front of us. (i) Now the action is produced in a part of it. (ii) Then it produces disjunction from its other parts. It is to be noted that this disjunction is concerned with the other parts only and not with *ākāśa* etc., and when the disjunction will be concerned with *ākāśa*, it will have no relation with its parts. The reason of stating this is, until a part is inhered in a whole, the disjunction in a part can have no relation separately with other thing. That is why disjunction produced in a part does not produce the destruction of conjunction with the *ākāśa* etc. because then the conjunction is admitted directly with the whole, and nothing apart from it. Anyway, (iii) the disjunction now produces the destruction of conjunction between the active and the inactive parts. (iv) Now the produced object (whole) is destroyed, as it cannot survive without the conjunction between the parts. (v) Then the disjunction of the active part from a particular point of the *ākāśa* etc. will be produced. This final disjunction is produced by the previous disjunction between the active part and the inactive part. Hence the disjunction finally produced is called 'disjunction produced by disjunction' and it is a variety 'which proceeds

from the disjunction of the cause'. To clear it, disjunction present in the two causes brings about the disjunction of the active part, from that point of *ākāśa*—which may be in contact with the produced whole—with reference either to time qualified by the aforesaid destruction of the produced whole, or to the part independently by itself. This disjunction could never be that of a part that would be inactive, as in the case of such a part there would be no cause for such destruction. Further, as that (inactive) part could not conjoin with another part of *ākāśa* etc. the disjunction in it would become altogether purposeless. The said action of the part however does not bring about a disjunction from the point of *ākāśa* etc. as that action is past before bringing about any such disjunction. But that action does bring about the conjunction of another point of space, as action ever becomes lost in time until it has produced some sort of a conjunction.[3]

In the production of disjunction from disjunction, action also is an auxiliary cause.[4] Naracandra notes that in this type of disjunction, the prior disjunction is the non-inherent cause, and action is the auxiliary cause.[5]

(2) Now the second variety of 'disjunction produced by disjunction' is that which proceeds from the disjunctions of the cause and the non-cause. When an action takes place in the hand and without disjoining the head from any other part of the body, it disjoins it from a particular point in *ākāśa* and joins it to another point in it, we have such 'disjunctions of the cause and then non-cause'.

Here the cause is the hand and the non-cause is the *ākāśa*. Now, these 'disjunctions of the cause and the non-cause' brings about the 'disjunctions of the effect and the non-effect', with reference to that point in space towards which the action is prone to produce its effect. It means that those bring about the disjunctions of the hand (effect) and the body (non-effect). A simple example of 'the disjunction produced by disjunction' may be: The disjunction of the body from the book brought about by the disjunction of the hand from the book. Śrīdhara gives the example: as the hand disjoins from the wall etc. then we see the body also disjoins from the wall. This later disjunction is not caused by the action of the body as then the body is immobile. Nor is that caused by the action of the hand, as the action, not present in a concerned substratum, cannot be a cause of disjunction in that substratum. Hence the disjunction between the wall and the body is due to the disjunctions of the cause (hand) and the non-cause (wall).[6]

Śrīdhara here explains the matter in a great detail including references to some opponents' views which involve some questions on our understanding of the fact.

They argue: as a mater of fact, we find that the disjunction of the body from the wall, is simultaneous with that of the hand from it, and as such it is contrary to a perceptible fact to assert that these two disjunctions are in relation of cause and effect.

Śrīdhara contradicts the above. At the time of the disjunction of the hand, there is no cause present for the disjunction of the body. And as an effect is not possible without its cause and also, as the action of the hand cannot be the cause in the case concerned, the idea of simultaneity is nothing but a mistake.

The opponent objects thus: the fact of the disjunction of the body appearing after that of the hand, can be proved only by inference, while their simultaneity is apprehended by perception. Now it is important that as long as a contrary fact of sense-perception is

present, no inference can be effective, as any such inference would not lead to a conclusion which is not hindered (by sense-perception). So how can the result of sense-perception be a mistake on the strength of an inference?

Śrīdhara, now taking the help of the case of piercing the petals of a lotus, questions how the opponents will allow inference in the above case, as the sense-perception here would contradict the simultaneous piercing.

The opponent clarifies his stand: an inference, contrary to sense-perception, ceases to operate, only when the matter is decisively pointed out to be contrary to that pointed out by the inference. In the case of the lotus petals, however the matter is doubtful, as it is quite possible that the perception of simultaneity may be due to the extremely quick succession in which one petal is pierced after the other. On the contrary there is the decisive evidence universally recognised that "the needle pierces an object only when it is in direct contact with it and not otherwise." (We find that all the petals cannot be in contact with the needle, at one and the same time, so the piercing cannot be simultaneous). So, even though there is the possibility of sense-perception (which apparently receives the simultaneity of the piercing which is not a fact), the inference emerges to be fully effective and decisive on the point.

Śrīdhara now proceeds to answer on the line of the opponents. They forwarded a decisive evidence. On the part of Srīdhara also, there is the same type of strong evidence, i.e. "an action does not bring about a disjunction in a substratum which is different from its (the action's) own. This evidence is very much the case where the perceptible fact may be explained in different way. So the inferential reasoning about the sequential disjunctions becomes fully established. And it is on this account that it is regarded as discarding the aforesaid perceptible fact. Specially the inference has distinct object to operate upon, whereas the perception has no basis, being as it is, due to the extremely quick succession in which the two disjunctions appear.

That means of knowledge, which has an objective basis, is on account of the aid of that basis, stronger in its authority than another which is weaker on account of its being devoid of such objective basis. Again, whenever, a perceptible fact is said to be discarded by an inferential conclusion, the discarding is done, not by inference, but another perceptible fact upon which the propositions of the inference are based. For example, we find such discarding in the case of a man having mistaken notions of the directions (*diṅmoha*), this being admitted by all experienced persons, who declare, that in such cases "Inference is more authoritative than perception". In the case of such perceptions however, as that of the heat of fire, we find that it is not capable of being in any manner explained away; and hence, when the object has been once cognised by means of it, it can never be set aside by any inferential reasoning.

On what ground do we assume the fact of one cognition being discarded by another? When we find that while bearing upon the same object, they contradict each other. For example, a single object is apprehended by one cognition as silver, and by another as shell. It is not possible for one and the same thing to be both, as we always find silver to be something distinct from the shell. Thus, there being a contradiction between the objects of the two cognitions, we conclude that the cognitions also are contradictory, and

as such one should naturally discard the other. Discarding (*bādha*) means taking away. Now the opponent may argue: The matter appeared in the knowledge of silver continues, even after it has been recognized as shell. The actual silver is never existent. Then what is it of the previous knowledge of silver, that has been taken away by the succeeding knowledge of the shell? So taking away can be nothing more than destroying the connection (*viyojana*) of one thing with another. Thus though the silver did not exist, it did appear in the knowledge and hence it can surely be taken away by the subsequent cognition.

In answer, Śrīdhara holds that it is true that the silver appeared in the knowledge, but this appearance in the knowledge cannot be taken away, for the simple reason that it is a fully accomplished fact. Certainly, that which has once appeared, can never be reduced to the condition of the non-appeared.

Now the opponents might argue that the silver in a conch-shell, not actually existing, appears in the knowledge as if existing, and the direct contradiction of knowledge of the silver, appearing in the knowledge, is to be called 'destroying the connection'. They are to be told that the non-existence of the silver is proved by the way of 'destroying the connection', and it cannot affect the knowledge of silver. This knowledge only manifested the silver, but it did not bring it into existence. The manifestation, was duly effected by the mere appearance of the knowledge. And then what is there that could be discarded by the subsequent knowledge of the shell? It is the fact, that when the absence of silver is known, it becomes patent that the previous knowledge was of a silver that had no basic objectively reality; and it is in this way that the ideas of non-existence of silver affects the knowledge of silver.

Now the opponents might argue, that the discarding actually would mean the non-production of a resultant activity of knowledge, as whenever knowledge is regarded as false, it does not give rise to any activity. Śrīdhara is not ready to accept this explanation of the opponents, because the non-production of the resultant activity is concomitant with that of the object itself. It is not always that knowledge rests in its resultant activity, as this activity is always dependent upon the will of the person; and we often find a knowledge ending in mere indifference, and not leading to any activity at all. Even in cases where it does lead to a resultant activity, this latter is tied down to the object; and the object being in its turn tied to the knowledge, any discarding of the knowledge would invariably mean a deprival of the object, and of the resultant activity; as the deprival of the latter would naturally follow upon that of the former.

It is found that Śrīdhara argued this much against his opponents and admitted that as *Nyāyakandalī* is a commentary on a summary type work, it is unnecessary to explain more on the topic.

Anyway, the 'disjunction produced by disjunction' further involves a number of problems. Praśastapāda has already said that this 'disjunction produced by disjunction' consists in the fact that from disjunction of cause and non-cause results disjunction of effect and non-effect. And this obviously leads to the admission, that after the conjunction of the cause, there would be the conjunction of the effect.

But the above would face an objection that there would come the question of

absurdity of the whole and its parts having existences apart from one another.

Praśastapāda straightforwardly discards that type of chance explaining the fact of separate existence. In the case of external things it only means 'separate movement' of both, or of either of the two, and in that of the transitory things it means the 'inherence in distinct substrata'. In the case of the cutaneous organ and the body, there is no 'distinct movement' but they are 'inherent in distinct substrata'. And it is for this reason the relation between them is conjunction.

In the case of the atom and the *ākāśa*, however, even though they have no other substrata, yet inasmuch as each of them is capable of independent movement (there can be no inherence), and conjunction and disjunction between them become possible. In the case of the yarn and the cloth, however, both of which are non-eternal, inasmuch as they do not inhere in different substrata there is no possibility of conjunction and disjunction. In the cases of direction etc., as they have no separate movement, there is no possibility of mutual conjunction and disjunction.

Destruction of a disjunction:

A disjunction is destroyed, as it is momentary. It is momentary, because it exists only till the next conjunction. But it is to be noted that we see the conjunction between two things is destroyed whenever disjunction is produced, whereas, it is not a fact that the disjunction between two things is destroyed, whenever the conjunction between them is produced. Why? The fact behind this is it: the idea of two things being disjoined is not continuous like that of their being conjoined. Hence disjunction is regarded as momentary only on account of its existence being executed by the next conjunction. Praśastapāda says another cause of destruction of the disjunction. In some cases disjunction may be destroyed by the destruction of its substratum. How? When in a part of one of the yarns of a 'duplicate yarn', an action is produced, it brings about its disjunction from another part of the same yarn, and at that very time an action is produced in the other yarn also which is supposed to be conjoined with that yarn. Now the disjunction leads to the *destruction of the productive conjunction* of the yarn; and the action in the (other) yarn produces a *disjunction from the other* (former) *yarn*. These two constitute one moment of time. Then at the time that the disjunction (in the other yarn) brings about the destruction of the conjunction of the yarns, these also follows from that destruction of the conjunction (in the former yarn), the destruction of the yarn. And this (former) being destroyed, this follows the destruction of the disjunction of the other yarn, which has the former yarn for its substratum.

The above involves a difficulty. As the disjunction is destroyed with the destruction of the substratum in the above case, then there could be no production of the subsequent disjunction (disjunction produced by disjunction). The opponent may say, let it be whatever it may be, what is the harm? No. There would arise a major problem. Due to non-production of the subsequent disjunction there would be no removal of the former conjunction between the yarn and the *ākāśa*. So a new conjunction with another point of space would be impossible. And for this reason that there is the absence of subsequent conjunction in the form of contrary quality, the action which appeared in the first

moment would become eternal. Obviously the above action is spoken of in relation with the eternal object. How? When an action appears in the atom of the water-dyad and brings about its disjunction from another atom—at that very time there appears an action in the other atom also; and hence at the time that the disjunction gives rise to the destruction of the productive (*ārambhaka*) conjunction of the substance, at the very time the action of the other atom brings about the disjunction of the atom from the dyad; and then, at the time that disjunction produces the destruction of the conjunction of the dyad and the atom, at that very time from the destruction of the conjunction follows the destruction of the dyad. And this being destroyed, the disjunction of the dyad and the atom resting therein is also destroyed. And then, there being no possibility of the appearance of any contrary quality, there would be an eternality of the action inhering in the eternal substance atom.

Praśastapāda here tries to answer the above in the following way: disjunction here is to be admitted to come from the disjunction of the yarn from its other part. The destruction of the substratum destroys only the disjunction of the two yarns and not that of the yarn and its other parts. So from this later disjunction would proceed the other subsequent disjunction, just like the disjunction of the body and *ākāśa* following from that of the finger-tip and *ākāśa*. The action then brings about the conjunction and is destroyed. So there is no anomaly.

Praśastapāda shows another way in which a disjunction may be destroyed by the destruction of its substratum. Suppose, in the first moment, the disjunction of the yarn from its other part appears and at the same part an action appears in the same yarn. Then, in the second, from the disjunction of the yarn from its other part there follows the destruction of the productive conjunction of the yarn and at that very moment the action of the yarn brings about its disjunction from another yarn. So in the third, from the destruction of the conjunction there follows the destruction of the yarn and this destruction brings about simultaneously the destruction of the disjunction and the action inhering therein. The above is the case where the conjunction of the homogenous substances is urged.

Now Praśastapāda proceeds to show when there is conjunction of heterogeneous substances, a substance is not produced, there is a destruction of the disjunction, following from the destruction of the conjunction and the substratum of the disjunction. During weaving, there is a conjunction of the yarn with the shuttle. Now suppose the action appears in the part composing the yarn and at that very moment there appears an action in the shuttle. Then in the next moment, the action of the part of the yarn brings about its disjunction from another part of the yarn and the action of the shuttle brings about the disjunction, from *ākāśa*, of the yarn whose parts had been thus conjoined. In the third moment, from the disjunction of the parts of the yarn, there follows the destruction of the conjunction of these parts, and from the disjunction of the shuttle, follows the disjunction of the yarn from the shuttle and also that of the shuttle from *ākāśa*. In the fourth moment, from the destruction of the conjunction of the parts of the yarn there follows the destruction of the yarn; and another conjunction of the shuttle. And thus in the fifth moment from this subsequent conjunction, and from the destruction of the substratum

(the yarn), there follows the destruction of the disjunction of the shuttle from the yarn.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *VS* 7.2.11.
2. *NK*, *PPB*, p. 377.
3. *PPB*, pp. 367-72.
4. *NK*, *PPB*, p. 370.
5. *Tippaṇaka*, *NK* (Baroda), p. 372.
6. The Vaiśeṣikas admit when the action is in the hand, then the body is unaffected. The next moment is the moment when the body is affected. The same thing is effective in the *pīlupāka* theory also. When some particles in a jar become red due to conjunction with fire, it is not that the effect is only on the parts but it affects the whole. Moreover conjunction and disjunction, (and also action) are not pervasive. So those in a part do not mean their presence in the whole at that moment.

PRIORITY AND POSTERIORITY

Priority (*aparatva*) and posteriority (*paratva*) are the two qualities which are found to have attained meticulous treatment in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda. Why have these been admitted in the Vaiśeṣika śāstra? We already find some discussions in the *Kaṇādasūtras,* but in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha,* in addition to that, we find some minute time-calculation regarding thier production and destruction. This turned the topic, to be a prominent one in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

These two qualities are admitted in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy as they form the basis of the notions of 'prior' and 'posterior'.

Both of them are of two kinds: (i) due to space and (ii) due to time. Priority and posteriority which are due to space, afford ideas of particular direction and those which are due to time, afford ideas of age.

Production of both priority and posteriority due to space:

When two things exist in the same direction of the seer, then the number of conjunctions with conjuncts in the case of one thing would be larger than that in the case of other. Then taking the thing nearer to the seer as the limit, we have with regard to the other thing, which is the seat of posteriority, the notion that 'it is further removed from this'. Then on the basis of this notion, the conjunction of the thing with the further point in space, produces the quality of 'posteriority'.

Similarly, taking the further removed object as the limit, we have the notion that 'this is nearer than that', with regard to the nearer object, which is the substratum of priority. Then, on the basis of this notion, the contact of the thing with the nearer point in space produces the quality of priority.

Production of both priority and posteriority due to time:

When we come across two men one young and the other older, both existing at the present time, though occupying different points in space, then we ourselves, as observers, find in one of them (the latter) such characteristics as a growing beard, roughness of the skin, wrinkles and general looseness of skin, and then taking the younger man as the limit there arises in us with regard to the older man, the notion of the other being further removed in time. And on the basis of this notion, the contact of that person with the further point in time produces the quality of posteriority.

Similarity, when we take the older man as the limit we have the notion of his being nearer in time. And on the basis of this notion, the contact of the person with the nearer point in time produces the quality of priority.

Destruction of the priority and the posteriority:

The destruction of the priority and the posteriority takes place due to the destruction of (1) *apekṣābuddhi*[1] (idea of comparison), (2) conjunction, (3) the substance, (4) the

substance and *apekṣābuddhi* together, (5) the substance and the conjunction together, (6) conjunction and *apekṣābuddhi* together and (7) *apekṣābuddhi*, the substance and conjunction together.

1. Due to the destruction of apekṣābuddhi:

(i) When the quality of 'posteriority' has been produced, as soon as there arises a notion of generality (of posteriority, *paratvatva*).

(ii) The *apekṣābuddhi* is about to be destroyed, and the ideas of the quality of posteriority is about to be produced from the notion of the said generality and its relationship—these two occurring at one point of time.

(iii) *apekṣābuddhi* is destroyed, and the ideas of quality (posteriority) is produced; and due to destruction of the *apekṣābuddhi* the quality is about to be destroyed, and from the idea of quality and its relationships the idea of 'substance' is about to be produced—all these occupying at one point of time.

(iv) Then the idea of substance. And the quality (posteriority) is destroyed.

2. Due to the destruction of conjunction:

(i) Simultaneous with the *apekṣābuddhi* there arises an action in the substratum of the quality of posteriority.

(ii) Now action brings about the disjunction of the object from space; and from the *apekśābuddhi* the quality of posteriority appears—all these occupying one point of time.

(iii) The idea of the generality (*paratvatva*) appears; the conjunction of the object and space is destroyed—all these occupying one point of time.

(iv) Then at the time that there arises the notion of the quality, the quality itself is destroyed due to destruction of the conjunction of the object and space.

3. Due to the destruction of the substance:

(i) When an action, appearing in that part of the substance which is the substratum of the quality of posteriority brings about the disjunction of that part from the other parts of the substance, at the same time there also appears *apekṣābuddhi*.

(ii) Now at the time that conjunction is destroyed by the disjunction, the 'posteriority' appears in the substance.

(iii) Then from the destruction of the conjunction there follows the destruction of the substance and from the destruction of the substance follows the destruction of the quality of 'posteriority' inhering in it.

4. Due to destruction of the substance and the apekṣābuddhi ***together:***

(i) An action appears in that part of the substance which is the substratum of 'posteriority' and at that same time *apekṣābuddhi* appears.

(ii) The action brings about the disjunction of that part from the other parts and from *apekṣābuddhi* the quality of 'posteriority' is produced.

(iii) Then at the time that the productive conjunctions of the substance are destroyed due to disjunction, there appears the notion of generality of posteriority (*paratvatva*).

(iv) Substance is destroyed due to destruction of the productive conjunctions. And from the notion of generality follows the destruction of *apekṣābuddhi*.

Thus from the destruction of the substance and the *apekṣābuddhi* there follows the destruction of the quality of posteriority.

5. Due to the destructions of the substance and the conjunction together:

(i) When an action, appearing in that part of the substance which is the substratum of 'posteriority' (where posteriority will be produced) brings about the disjunction of that part from the other parts of the substance, at the same time there is a simultaneous production for the 'action of the lump' and the *apekṣābuddhi*.

(ii) Then the quality of 'posteriority' is produced. Due to disjunction in the previous moment there takes place the destruction of the productive conjunction of the substance. And the action in the lump brings about the disjunction of it from the point of direction. All the above pertain to one point of time.

(iii) The notion of generality appears. The lump is destroyed due to destruction of the productive conjunction of the substance in the previous moment. Due to destruction of the lump, the conjunction of the lump with the direction is destroyed.

(iv) Hence, when there appears the notion of quality of posteriority (due to notion of generality in the previous moment) at the same moment the posteriority is destroyed due to the destruction of the lump and of the conjunction between lump and direction.

6. Now due to the destruction of the conjunction and the* apekṣābuddhi *together:

(i) Quality of posteriority is produced and at that very time an action appears in the substance wherein that quality inheres.

(ii) There appears the notion of the generality (*paratvatva*). The action brings about the disjunction from a particular point of direction.

(iii) From the notion there follows the destruction of *apekṣābuddhi*, due to which posteriority was produced. And the disjunction brings about the destruction of the conjunction of the lump and the direction.

(iv) Then from the destructions of the conjunctions and *apekṣābuddhi*, there follows the destruction of the quality of posteriority.

7. Lastly, due to the destruction of the substance, the conjunction and the* apekṣābuddhi *(these three being the inherent, non-inherent and the auxiliary causes):

(i) *Apekṣābuddhi* appears. Action in a part of the lump takes place.

(ii) The action brings about the disjunction of that part from another part and at the same time the quality of posteriority is produced. Action takes place in the lump.

(iii) Now due to disjunction of the part there follows the destruction of productive conjunction of the lump. From action there follows the disjunction of the lump from a certain point of the direction. From the production of quality there arises the notion of generality.

(iv) Then due to destruction of the productive conjunction the lump is destroyed. Due to disjunction the conjunction of lump from direction is destroyed. Due to appearance of the notion of generality *apekṣābuddhi* is destroyed.

The posteriority is now destroyed due to destructions of three types of causes.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *apekṣābuddhi* is that knowledge which compares one thing with the other with regard to time and space.

PERCEPTION

Pramāṇas, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, are only two, perception and inference. Though the Vaiśeṣikas keep a close relationship with the Naiyāyikas, this difference on *pramāṇa* has created a lot of altercation between them. Again, the Buddhists who are the strong opponents of the Vaiśeṣikas are found to have followed this two-*pramāṇa* scheme just like the Vaiśeṣikas. So on this point, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists are travellers of the same way. Anyway, even the sharp arguments of the Naiyāyikas in favour of two other *pramāṇas*, comparison and verbal testimony, could in no way make the Vaiśeṣikas, as well as the Buddhists, admit those in their treatises. As a result, they forwarded their arguments in favour of the first two and also counter-arguments against the Naiyayikas' two other *pramāṇas*.

The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* does not show any interest in finding out the specific instrument of valid knowledge. It simply describes the valid knowledge as divided into four types: Perception, Inference, Recollection and Superhuman. Moreover, no attempt is found to construct the strict definitions of them, though the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* have shown their inclination towards it.

We see that Praśastapāda goes to mention the varieties of valid knowledge only and we arrive at the respective *pramāṇas* simply by discussing their instruments. However, Śrīdhara, in at least one case considers Praśastapāda's descriptive expression as the definition of *pramāṇa* of perception.[1] That which proceeds from the sense-organs is perception. This is the definition according to the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. This perception takes place in only substance, quality, action and generality and not in particularity and inherence. Of these, the perception of substance proceeds from such causes, being a gross from the existence of many parts, the appearance of manifested colour and the presence of the contact of four things, aided by such auxiliary causes as merit and the like. This perceptual knowledge is mere indeterminate form of perception. Next from this follow determinate form. It appears from the above discussion of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* that the *pramāṇa* did not go back further from the indeterminate perception. So according to the Vaiśeṣikas the perception (a *pramāṇa*) is that first-appearing indeterminate perception.[2] It is to be noted that in the hands of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the *pramāṇa* can be identified with one being a further one step back even from the indeterminate perception. This *pramāṇa* is nothing but the sense-organ. However, it is a later development.

The expression 'in a gross form' is to set aside the others such as earth, water and fire; and also to leave out atoms and dyads.

Why is there perception of three of the substances? Because they have many parts. The expression 'manifested colour' is to mean that the substance which has no manifested colour cannot be perceived, such as fire in water is not liable to be perceived. Contacts of four things are the contact of soul with mind, that of mind with the sense-organ, and that of the sense-organ with the object. Merit etc. will indicate others like demerit, direction, time, etc.

After the indeterminate perception, determinate ones proceed from the contact of the mind as qualified by (i) generalities, (2) particularities, (3) substances, (4) qualities and (5) action. The examples are an existing substance, earth, horned, white, a moving cow, etc.

Praśastapāda is found to narrate the conditions of perception of different categories.

With regard to colour, taste, odour and touch, the sensuous knowledge is brought about by means of particular sense-organs, and proceeds from such causes as—their inherence in composite substances, particularities in the qualities themselves, and the contact with the substrate of these qualities.

The knowledge of sound proceeds from threefold contact; and inhering in the air, it is known by the auditory organ only.

Number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, viscidity, liquidity, velocity and action are perceived by visual and the cutaneous sense-organs, through their inherence in perceptible substance.

Knowledge, pleasure, pain, wish, aversion, and effort are perceived by the contact of two—mind and soul.

The existence (highest generality), substanceness, qualityness, actionness and the like, when inhering in the cognizable substrata, are perceived by means of those sense-organs that perceive their substrata.

All the above are the cases of our ordinary sensuous knowledge.

After describing the perception of the ordinary people, Praśastapāda now passes to the topic of yogic perception. Yogins, according to the scriptural evidences, are known to have super-normal perception. These *yogins* are of two types—*yukta yogin* and *viyukta yogin*. We find an alternative term—*yuñjāna* for *viyukta* of Praśastapāda.

Yukta yogins can perceive the true nature of such things as their own self, as well as the selves of others, *ākāśa*, direction, time, atoms, air, mind, the qualities, actions, generalities and particularities inhering in these, and inherence. Their cognition of the above is brought about by the mind as aided by faculties born of *yoga*.

Viyukta yogins, however, can perceive the objects, minute, hidden and distant, by means of the mind through threefold contact, by the force of faculties born of yoga. The threefold contact is the contacts between soul and mind, mind and sense-organ, and sense-organ and object.

It is to be noted that *yukta yogins* perceive things only while in yogic state, but the *Viyukta yogins* can also perceive, while not in such state. This is because they have the power produced by excessive *yoga* practice.

Now, what appears to be important here to be discussed is contact (*sannikarṣa*). In the later Vaiśeṣika works like *Tarkasaṃgraha, Bhāṣāpariccheda* and the like, it is dealt with at length. There, it is divided into two: normal contact (*laukika sannikarṣa*) and the other is super-normal contact (*alaukika sannikarṣa*). This normal contact is again sixfold: Conjunction (*saṃyoga*), Inherence with the conjoined (*saṃyukta-samavāya*), Inherence with the inherent which is further conjoined (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*), Inherence (*samavāya*), Inherence with the inherent (*samaveta-samavāya*) and Connection of the attribute with the subject (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*).

The last one is named as *sambandhaviśeṣaṇatā* in the *Nyāyakandalī*.[3]

The super-normal contact is threefold: that based on a common feature (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), that based on knowledge (*jñanalakṣaṇa*), and that due to *yoga* (*yogaja*). The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* and the *Nyāyakandalī* did not say anything about this super-normal contact, though on different occasions they discussed the yogic perception or the perception like 'The sandal is fragrant'. *Yoga* is said to be a new faculty which enables a *yogin* to visualize the objects which are not perceptible by the ordinary people. But there the contact is simply the ordinary one. Later, writers made the contact by 'yogic power' a special type of contact. Moreover, the perception of a sandal-wood from a distance is perceived by us as fragrant sandal-wood. But we do not have the perceptual knowledge of fragrance. So how is such knowledge possible? The Navya-nyāya writers admit in this case, another type of super-normal contact that is based on knowledge. That is the knowledge of fragrance, works as the contact in that qualified knowledge. But this type of contact was not known at the time of Śrīdhara and obviously also of Praśastapāda.

Now we can refer to the discussion of the *Nyāyakandalī* where 'fragrant sandal-wood' has been a topic.

"Some people hold that both qualification and qualified form the substrata of a simple idea. But say others, what would these people say with regard to the case of the idea of 'fragrant sandal-wood'? For certainly the visual sense-organ cannot comprehend odour (fragrance); and the olfactory sense-organ cannot see the object (sandal-wood); and hence these two organs cannot be accepted as comprehending the relationship between fragrance and the sandal-wood, as the perception of relationship would depend upon the perception of the two factors related. As for instance, direct perception of recognition, produced by sense-action and recognition (respectively) is found to pertain to the past and the present simply on account of the power of the two causes (sense-action and recognition). In the same manner, the cognition 'fragrant sandal-wood' must be regarded as brought about by the joint action of the visual and olfactory sense-organs; and the fact of its pertaining to two objects (odour and sandal-wood) is due to the power of the two sense-organs."[4]

The answer given by Śrīdhara is as follows: "This however is not quite right; as a cognition or idea is not a thing made up of parts; if the idea were something made up of several parts, them alone could there be any possibility of one part of it being produced by the olfactory sense-organ and another by the visual one. As it is, however, the cognition is one whole, sensed by means of the two organs, and comprehending the odour as well as the substance possessing the odour. From this an undesired thing would follow, that the odour is cognisable by the visual sense-organ and the substance by the olfactory one; for the simple reason that the cognisability of a thing by an organ depends solely upon the fact of that thing being the object of cognition produced by that organ. But the mind being atomic, it could not operate upon two sense-organs at one and the same time. Hence it must be admitted that what occurs in the case in question is that the odour is at first perceived by the olfactory sense-organ; and then what the visual one does is to bring about the cognition only of the substance qualified by that odour; and thereby

it aids the previous cognition of the odour. This must be admitted by all disputants, where they like it or not."[5]

From the above it is clear that discussion is on the qualified knowledge, when a special type of normal contact takes place. But no such matter where the cognition 'fragrant sandal-wood' appears only by the contact of visual sense-organ, is taken into consideration for discussion. Hence it is clear that no such like super-normal contact was known to the authors at least up to the time of Śrīdhara.

With regard to generality-particularities, the perceptual *pramāṇa* is the mere indeterminate knowledge of them. These generality-particularities are meant for generality i.e., existence (*sattā*), and particularities related to generality i.e. substances, qualityness and actionness. The cognisables (*prameya*) here are substance and other categories (except particularities and non-existence which are already told to be not cognizable by perception). The cogniser is the soul. And the cognition is the knowledge of substance etc. We find in the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, also that there are the four ideas in the epistemology—*Pramāṇa*, *Prameya*, *Pramātā* and *Pramiti*.

When again, the knowledge of the very highest generality and generality-particularities intended then the *pramāṇa* there is the mere indeterminate form of knowledge, immediately preceding the determinate one. For this there is no other instrument of knowledge, as it is not in the form of resultant cognition.

Praśastapāda now tries to explain the whole matter in a different simple way: whatever valid and indefinable knowledge appears due to threefold contact can well be taken as perception (a *pramāṇa*). Substance and other categories are the *prameyas*, the soul is *pramātā* and the recognition of the categories as pleasant, or unpleasant or indifferent is the *pramiti*.

It is to be noted that Praśastapāda defines perception according to the etymological meaning of the term *pratyakṣa*. The threefold contact among four entities, namely soul, sense-organ, mind and the object, is already said in the *VS* 3.1.20.

NOTES THE REFERENCES

1. *akṣam akṣam pratītya utpadyata iti pratyakṣam. PDS*, p. 442.
   akṣam akṣam pratīyta prāpya yad utpadyate tat-pratyakṣam pramāṇam iti. NK. P. 443.
2. *tatra sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu svarupālocanamātram pratyakṣam pramāṇam. PPB*, p. 471.
3. *NK*, p. 463.
4. *NK*, pp. 276-7.
5. *NK*, p. 279.

INFERENCE

The inferential knowledge is that which proceeds from the knowledge of the mark. The definition in Sanskrit terminology is *liṅgadarśanāt sañjāyamānaṃ laiṅgikam*. The commentator Śrīdhara has tried to bring out different implications of the terms to make the definition infallible. The term *darśana*, though it simply means perceptual knowledge, is here used for all sorts of knowledge. As inference may take place from a mark which itself is known by an inference, but the definition of inference says that it is produced by the knowledge of a mark. But it involves an undesired thing. The knowledge of a mark produces the impression of it. So according to simple implication of the definition the impression of the mark would also be considered as inferential knowledge. But it would not be accepted. To avoid this clumsiness, Śrīdhara explains that as the definition is put in the *Buddhi* section, so impression (*saṃskāra*) which is a separate topic of discussion, cannot be accepted here. But it is to be noted that only difference of place of discussion is shown as a cause of marking the definition of inference not to be overlapped by impression. Otherwise the definition itself could not discard impression to overlap inference.

The expression *sañjāyamāna* sets aside the question of doubt (*saṃśaya*), misconception (*viparyaya*) and remembrance. The prefix *sam* in *sañjāyamāna* expresses 'true' or 'real'. As the above three cannot be 'true', hence they are being excluded. To say clearly that inferential cognition belonging to the class of 'true cognitions' is produced as pertaining to a real object is due to the fact of such pertaining to reality being in the very nature of all cognitions. Doubt and misconception pertain to that state of the object in which it never exists. Remembrance also does not pertain to the object, being, as it is, dependent upon a previous cognition.

In the Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda we find the term *laiṅgika* to mean inference. And Praśastapāda also did not deviate from it. But to define inference, Praśastapāda is found to be more particular than Kaṇāda. Kaṇāda shows the general characteristic of inference by saying 'This is of this', i.e. for example, smoke is of fire, rain is of cloud, etc.

To define an inferential mark, Praśastapāda holds that a mark is that which is connected with the probandum, is well-known to exist in that which is connected with that probandum and is excluded from that where there is no probandum at all.[1] These three characteristics of the inferential mark exactly correspond to those three, viz., *pakṣavṛtti* i.e. existence in the subject of the inference, *sapakṣavṛtti* i.e. existence in the object possessed of the property sought to be proved, and *vipakṣāvṛtti* i.e. non-existence in that wherein the probandum is known to be absent.

Śrīdhara, while explaining Praśastapāda's expression, raises some intricate issues regarding it and tries to solve those according to his own philosophical standpoint. Now, the first contentious issue is: a mark, even if it exists in a part of the *vipakṣa*, must be regarded as existent in the *vipakṣa*, similarly, of the *pakṣa* would be regarded as 'connected with the probandum'. Then the argument 'the four kinds of atoms are transient, *because of being odorous*' would be a valid argument. Because, being odorous exists in a part of the probandum i.e. the earth atoms, among the four kinds of atoms. But this argument

is not valid, because of dissimilarity. To make it clear, a *vipakṣa* is that which forms an object of the exclusion of the probandum and also of the probans. And this exclusion is possible not from the atoms taken collectively but from each of them singly; hence it is to each of the four atoms that the character of *vipakṣa* belongs.

But the *pakṣa*, on the other hand, takes all the kinds in it collectively and not singly. In the above argument only earth atoms are not desired to be proved as transient but all the four kinds of them are desired to be so. Hence all the four kinds of atoms collectively have the character of the *pakṣa*. Now if the probans does not exist in a part of the *pakṣa* (as in the above argument the probans is 'partially unknown' in the water, fire and air atoms) it is to be treated as pseudo-probans (partially unknown) like 'unknown' pseudo-probans. So this type of undesirable probans is to be discarded, as it has no relation with the probandum.

The next qualification of a mark is that it is to be well-known in that which is connected with the properties of the probandum. According to a Sanskrit expression, it is *prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite*. Taking the wordings according to their simple relation *tad* would connect *anumeya* (the probandum), but to make it meaningful 'the property of the probandum' is to be taken as for *tad*. The clause thus means 'that which is well-known as existing in the *sapakṣa*, which is the object possessed of, the property sought to be proved'. This qualification is meant to exclude the pseudo-probans like *viruddha* and *asādhāraṇa* which will be discussed in the section of pseudo-probans.

The third qualification of an inferential mark is 'total non-existence in that, wherein the property of the probandum is not present'. That is an inferential mark not existing even in a small part of the *vipakṣa* and by this, the *anaikāntika* type of probans is excluded. *Anaikāntika* is to be discussed in the section of pseudo-probans.

Though three qualifications of an inferential mark are held, yet all three may not be found in the same argument. There are three types of marks, universal affirmative (*anvayin*), universal negative (*vyatirekin*) and affirmative-negative (*anvaya-vyatirekin*). In the case of *anvayin* type of mark *vipakṣa* is not available, so in the definition of 'inferential mark', the expression 'total non-existence in that wherein the property of the probandum is not present' would be of no use. Similarly in the *vyatirekin* type of mark, all the examples would be included in the *pakṣa*. Only in the *anvaya-vyatirekin* type the three qualifications of the inferential mark would be justified. So Praśastapāda's definition of the inferential marks seems to be inconclusive.

In answer to the above contention, Śrīdhara forwards a very lengthy argument which is brilliant and meticulous.[2]

The universal affirmative mark is in the argument: the *viśeṣa* is nameable because it is knowable, like the *sāmānya*;[3] in this all things, existing and not-existing, besides the *pakṣa (viśeṣa)* is *sapakṣa*; as whoever be the cogniser, and whatever be the means of cognition, there is nothing that is either unknowable or unnameable; that which is unnameable and unknowable for every man, is absolute non-entity, like the 'horse's horn'; any such thing could not be either *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*, as it could have no character at all. Anything that exists however would be the *sapakṣa*, so the expression in the definition 'that which does not exist in its *abhāva*' would be too narrow, as in the case of the

argument in question, no negation is possible. Hence the mark (knowability) is not indicative.

Śrīdhara contradicts the above contention. The mark does not fail to fulfil the affirmative character. In the case of the existence of another the reason lies in affirmation, and such a reason can be obstructed by controversial knowledge. In the case of the argument in question, we find an affirmative relation between knowability and nameability as the one is always found where the other exists. We have never met with a contradictory case, nor is the case in question suspected. If a case of failure here is called up, or is meant to be put forward by the opponent, it is always found to have both nameablity and knowability. Nor is there any difference, for it is only when there is a *vipakṣa,* that the absence of failure of concomitance can be regarded as the condition of the reason, and not when there is absolutely no *vipakṣa.* Hence knowability is a sure indicative of nameability.

Now, the universal negative mark is in the following argument: the living body is endowed with the soul, because it has life etc. In this case everything besides the *pakṣa* is the *vipakṣa,* yet the mark is valid because it agrees with the negative concomitance. In all such substances as the jar and the like, we have found the lifelessness concomitant with the absence of soul and it produces the knowledge of obstruction of lifelessness in the living bodies. Now, this leads to soullessness. Here we may point out that as there is no instance proving the affirmative concomitance, so the argument is *vyatirekin.* All the instances proving such would be included in the *pakṣa,* so it cannot be entitled to be an instance at all.

Now, the opponent contradicts Śrīdhara's argument: the above is not right because if a thing is not known, then its negation also is not known, as a negation always pertains to some previous affirmation.

The soul is something that has nowhere been known. Under the circumstances, how can we ever be cognizant of its absence in the jar and other things?

Śrīdhara replies: the opponent's argument is invalid. Because the opponent holds that all things are devoid of soul, so in his case he is quite conversant of its absence in the jar etc. (However he then never fails to infer the living body to be endowed with the soul). On our part the soul has the due causal efficiency with regard to such effects as knowledge etc., only in living bodies. And hence finding the effect knowledge etc. absent in the jar, we naturally conclude the absence in it of the soul which is capable of producing those effects, just as the absence of smoke leads to inference, in certain circumstances, of the absence of fire capable of producing smoke.

If the opponent now argues that the soul is known to exist in living bodies, as there can be no cognition of the relationship without the cognition of the relatum. And thus there would be no need for the *vyatirekin* inference in question, as when an action has been duly accomplished, any means for accomplishing that action, appearing subsequently, ceases to have the character of the means.

No, says Śrīdhara. As, though the soul is fully known by us, it is not known to the opponent, for whom it becomes necessary to prove it by means of reasons.

Further objection is given by the opponent: there is no such restriction that it is only the non-failure of affirmation (*anvaya-vyabhicāra*), and not the non-failure of negation

(*vyatireka-vyabhicāra*), that can prove a conclusion. Then if the *vyatirekin* mark also could be admitted as a true mark, then another clause in *Praśastapāda's* definition of the true mark—'which is well-known to exist in that which is connected with that probandum' (*prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite*) would be too narrow.

Śrīdhara did not give answers from his own side. He just refers to the solution, made by some other Vaiśeṣikas. Such as some among them contend that the definition includes the purely affirmative as well as the purely negative inference, by reason of both being equally known and accepted in the same system of philosophy.

Some others explain the definition, taking the various qualifications in it, in different combinations, pointing out that the qualification 'that which is related to the object to be inferred' and 'is known to exist in that connected with that object' applies to the affirmative inference; while 'that which is related to the object to be inferred' and 'does not exist in its contrary' applies to the negative inference; and the whole definition with its three qualifications applies to the affirmative-negative inference. Whatever be the specific qualification of a variety of the marks, all the three marks has the common qualification to be the 'indicativeness of the probandum'.

It is to be noted that these three varieties of inference, *anvayin, vyatirekin* and *anvaya-vyatirekin*, were already mentioned in the *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara. The ideas behind them are absolutely the same whereas the examples are different in different cases.

The example of *anvayin* mark is: 'sound is non-eternal because it is produced'. (This is for them who admit non-eternality of everything).[4]

The example of *vyatirekin* mark is: 'This living body is not without soul, because then it would not be endowed with life, etc.[5]

And the example of *anvaya-vyatirekin* mark is: Sound is non-eternal because being characterized by generality and particularity, it is perceived by outer sense-organs, like pot etc.[6]

Praśastapāda divides inference into two kinds: *Dṛṣṭa* and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.

The *Dṛṣṭa* inference is that where 'the already known thing' (i.e. which is already known as to be connected with the mark) and 'what is to be proved' belong absolutely to the same class. For example, when one has seen the dewlap only in the body of a cow, whenever, on any subsequent occasion, he happens to see the dewlap, he infers the existence of the cow.

Now, when 'the already known thing' and 'what is to be proved' belong to absolutely different classes, the inference follows only from the concomitance of the 'generic form' of the mark with the 'generic form' of what is to be inferred. This inference is called the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. As for instance, having found that the activity of such persons as the farmer, the trader and the servants of the king, always lead to certain results, we infer that persons observing the rites of their respective castes and conditions also would attain results, even when the activity, is not found to have any visible purpose. If the inference would be, of the results of the farmers' and others' activities, in a different place and time, then it would be *dṛṣṭa* inference, as those were already seen before.

Śrīdhara shows another case of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. If anybody infers the generality of

the cow, at a later occasion in the forest, from the sight of the dewlap, and he had seen its particularity in the city at an earlier occasion, then his inference would be *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. In this case, the object known to him is only the particularity of a cow and that what is inferred is the generality of the cow, and so between these two there is absolute difference. So according to the ruling of Praśastapāda, it is a case of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference.

It is curious to note, that before Praśastapāda, there was already a three-division scheme of inference-variety in the Vaiśeṣika system modeled after the Nyāya and we get the indication of it from Vātsyāyana, the Nyāyabhāṣyakāra.

The alternative examples of the three types of inference given by him undoubtedly are according to the Vaiśeṣika system, as all the Vaiśeṣika categories are involved in exemplification. Though inferences proceeding from *kārya*, *kāraṇa* etc. are found in the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 9.18, according to the commentator Candrānanda and the mode of explanation of Praśastapāda, those are related only to the cases where the two are connected in the relation of inherence. The examples Vātsyāyana showed in favour of a Naiyāyika i.e. *kārya*, and *kāraṇa* are of two objects so related. Moreover, the way of the *kārya-kāraṇa* relationship was denied by Praśastapāda to the examples of inferences given by himself, soliciting that this type of relation had also not been recommended by *kārya*, *kāraṇa* (9.18), and hence those were other cases of inferences as for which the expression *asya idam* would be successful. So the wordings *kārya*, *kāraṇa* etc. did not stand for restriction but only for instance. Anyway, three examples given by Praśastapāda which cannot fall within the purview of specific wordings, *kārya, kāraṇa* etc. of the *sūtra* 9.18 are:

(i) The Adhvaryu priest repeating 'Om' (sound of consent) is indicative of the presence of the Hotṛ priest;

(ii) The rise of the moon is indicative of the rise in the sea and also of the blooming of the water-lily; and

(iii) The clearness of water in the autumn is indicative of the rise of the constellation of Agastya.

Śrīdhara explains the cases:

(i) It is laid down that the Adhvaryu priest should repeat 'Om' to the Hotṛ priest and to none else; hence one who is cognizant of this when he hears 'Om' repeated by the Adhvaryu, he infers the presence of the Hotṛ, who may be behind the walls; and here the Adhvaryu is neither the cause, nor the effect, nor the conjunct, nor the contradictory, nor the inherent in one of the Hotṛs.

(ii) When the moon rises, the sea swells and lilies bloom; and one who knows of these natural phenomena always infers the swelling of the sea and the blooming of the lily, 'whenever he sees the moon appear'; and the rise of the moon is not the effect of the rise of the sea etc., as the 'rising' of the moon consists only in its contact with a particular point of space, and this contact is only the effect of a certain action of the moon, and not of any action of the sea. Nor is it the cause of the swelling of the sea, or of the blooming of the lilies; because the 'swelling of the sea' consists only in the high waves in the rising

waters and the blooming consists in the separating of the petals of the flower; and both these acts can be due only to the action of certain causes that may be in close proximity concerned i.e. the water and the lily.

(iii) The clearness of water in the autumn is indicative of the rise of Agastya; because it is never found at any other time.

Here we cannot but comment a little that we may object to Śrīdhara's statement that the swelling of sea is not the effect of the rise of the moon.[7] From the Mahābhārata time, it is well-known that the rise of the moon is the cause of the swelling of the sea. So it may be an inference proceeding from the cause. Moreover, in the first case, not Adhvaryu but Adhvaryu with the sound *Om* is the mark. In the third case it may be the example of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* according to the *Nyāya*. In fact all the three examples, are not good examples of different kinds of inference, which they are supposed to exemplify. Then '*asya idam* (in *VS* 9.18) has the wide scope of including the inferences like these.

According to the two-fold division of inference, all of the three examples will fall under *dṛṣṭa* type of inference, because, the Adhvaryu, the Hotṛ, the rising of the moon, the swelling of the sea, the blooming of the lilies, the clearness of water in the autumn, and the rising of Agastya—all these are similar to those witnessed before by the person going to infer.

Now, the thing which we want to emphasise on is that Vātsyāyana's alternative explanations of *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inferences, totally correspond to the explanations of *dṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* ones. Only the examples were different.

Vātsyāyana says:

Yatra yathāpūrvaṃ pratyakṣabhūtayor anyataradarśanena anyatarasya apratyakṣasya anumānam, yathā dhūmena agnir iti.[8]

Praśastapāda says:

Tatra dṛṣṭaṃ prasiddhasādhyayor atyantajātyabhede 'numānam. Yathā gavy eva sāsnāmātram upalabhya deśāntare 'pi sāsnāmātradarśanād gavi pratipattiḥ.[9]

Śrīdhara on the above* Padārthadharmasaṃgraha *passage:

prasiddhaṃ yat pūrvaṃ liṅgena saha dṛṣṭam sādhyaṃ yat samprati anumeyaṃ tayor atyantajātyabhede sati yad anumānaṃ tad dṛṣṭam. yathā gavy eva sāsnāmātram upalabhya deśāntare gavi pratipattiḥ.[10]

Again, on* sāmānyatodṛṣṭa *inference Vātsyāyana says:

sāmānyatodṛṣṭam nāma yatra apratyakṣe liṅgaliṅginoḥ saṃbandhe kenacid arthena liṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo liṅgī gamyate. yathā icchādibhir ātmā. icchādayo guṇāḥ. guṇāś ca dravyasaṃsthānāḥ. tad yad eṣāṃ sthānaṃ sa ātmā iti.[11]

Praśastapāda in the **Padārthadharmasaṃgraha** ***says:***

prasiddhasādhyayor atyantajātibhede liṅgānumeyadharma-sāmānyānuvṛttito 'numānaṃ sāmānyatodṛṣṭam. yathā karṣaka-vaṇig-rājapuruṣāṇāṃ ca pravṛtteḥ phalavattvam upalabhya varṇāśramiṇām api dṛṣṭam prayojanam anuddiśya pravartamānānām. phalānumānam iti.[12]

Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, to explain the *Bhāṣya* position on the alternative examples, say that the inference of soul from the wish etc. should be the example of *śeṣavat* inference, which the *Bhāṣya* showed as an example of the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference. The correct example of the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is only the dependence of the wish etc., and not the dependence of the wish etc. on the soul. Due to non-availability of the Vaiśeṣika commentaries before Vātsyāyana, we are not sure whether Vātsyāyana took up the examples from any Vaiśeṣika work or not. Uddyotakara and Vācaspati criticize the contended issues, taking those as of the Bhāṣyakāra and not hinting even a little bit at the pūrvapakṣins. So if those were from the Vaiśeṣikas, then Uddyotakara and Vācaspati's criticism would be treated as objections to them.

Now in this context, speaking of the *pramāṇa* (the instrument of the valid knowledge) and the *pramiti* (the valid inferential knowledge) Praśastapāda says: The knowledge of the inferential mark (smoke) is the *pramāṇa* and the knowledge of the fire is *pramiti.* Similarly, if the knowledge of fire becomes the *pramāṇa*, then the *pramiti* will be the ascertainment of the good, medium or bad nature of the fire.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *yad anumeyena sambaddhaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite/ tadabhāve ca nāstyeva talliṅgam anumāpakam// PPB*, p. 478.
2. *NK*, vide *PPB*, pp. 486-7.
3. *viśeṣo 'bhidheyaḥ prameyatvāt sāmānyavat. NK*, vide *PPB*, p. 486.
4. *sarvānityavādinām anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt. NV*, p. 43.
5. *nedaṃ jīvac charīraṃ nirātmakam, aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgāt. NV*, p. 43.
6. *anityaḥ śabdaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣavattve sati asmadādibāhyakaraṇapratyakṣatvād ghaṭādivat. NV*, p. 43.
7. *udayo hi candrasya viśiṣṭadeśasaṃyogaḥ, sa ca candrakriyākāryaḥ, na samudravṛddhyādinimittaḥ. na cāyaṃ samudravṛddheḥ kāraṇam nāpi kumudavikāsasya, utkallolalakṣaṇāyā vṛddheḥ, patrāṇāṃ parasparalakṣanasya ca vikāsasya tatkālasannihita-kāraṇādhīnakarmajanyatvāt ityādi vācyam.*
8. *NBH*, p. 12.
9. *PPB*, pp. 507-8.
10. *NK*, *PPB*, p. 508.
11. *NB*, p. 12.
12. *PPB*, pp. 508-9.

INFERENCE-COMPONENTS

The inference for others involves some members of syllogism. The established Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, admit them to the five. Vātsyāyana refers to the ten-member syllogism[1] of some Naiyāyikas already prevalent in his time, but he discarded the five members, in excess of his own system. The members of the syllogism or inference-components in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama are proposition (*pratijñā*), probans (*hetu*), example (*udāharaṇa*), application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*). Those were accordingly also defined in the *Nyāyasūtras* starting from 1.1.33 through 1.1.39. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda, the first text of the Vaiśeṣika system similar to Nyāya, did not mention or discuss similar things, calling them *avayava* (inference-components). *VS* 9.20 states a number of synonyms of the word *hetu*. These are *apadeśa, liṅga, nimitta, pramāṇa* and *kāraṇa*. But there is no mention of other inference-components in the *sūtras*.

In the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda we find the author admit to five inference-components but their names are different from those of the Nyāya system. Those are *pratijñā, apadeśa, nidarśana, anusandhāna* and *pratyāmnāya*, whereas the number in the Nyāya system were *pratijña , hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya* and *nigamana*. Though the different terminology in some cases is adopted in the Vaiśeṣika system, it is to be noted that the denotation of the terms in the Vaiśeṣika system totally agrees with the corresponding denotation of terms in the Nyāya system. Now if the question arises about the terminology, we have only to say that the terminology is already set in between Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda, as an important matter like inference-components cannot be developed, in such late period Vaiśeṣika system, in the time of Praśastapāda. And as we have no intermediary Vaiśeṣika literature available to us, we cannot fix a time and determine a particular text in this regard. Vyomaśiva knows two systems of syllogism—two-membered and ten-membered. Of these, two-membered sylogism must be of the Buddhists.[2]

Now we may come to the details of the five inference-components. The first one is *pratijñā* (proposition). It is defined as the statement of what is to be proved and which is not against one's own philosophical system.[3] That is to say, it consists in the mere statement of the 'subject' endowed with the property sought to be proved, with a view to pointing out the 'indicative'. As for example, of a proposition: 'Air is a substance'. Here the 'statement of what is to be proved' is all right but what is the need of mentioning 'being not-contradictory to one's own philosophical system'? If anybody does such a thing willfully, he is well-aware of its consequences of being vanquished, but in a critical case, it is not always possible, to know whether it is contradictory or not to his own philosophical system. So it appears to be not much necessary. May be, if the proposition is contradictory to perception etc., it will be contradictory afterwards. But what harm is there, if it becomes a proposition at first? We see in the *Nyāyasūtra*, *sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā* (1.1.33) has no such qualification like that of the Vaiśeṣikas. Anyway, Praśastapāda gives the explanation on the significance of the qualification *avirodhi* ('not-contradictory'). The qualification serves the purpose, as the *pratijñā* may be contrary to

(i) Perception, (ii) Inference, (iii) Scriptures regarded as trustworthy by the speaker and also, it may (iv) involve a self-contradiction. For example: (i) the proposition 'Fire is not hot' would be contrary to perception. (ii) *Ākāśa* is dense, would be contrary to inference. (iii) 'The Brāhmaṇa ought to drink wine' would be contrary to Scriptures if it is a proposition made by a person having brāhmaṇical faith). Another example of this sort is 'The effect is already existent before its appearance'. It would be contrary to the Scriptures for a Vaiśeṣika, because according to his scripture, an effect is produced only when it is non-existent. And (iv) 'Word is not expressive' would be self-contradictory.

Śrīdhara contends that if by mistake one goes to prove something contradictory to perception and for that he proposes a statement, it cannot be entitled to be a proposition at all because it can never be proved. If propositions were defined only 'as the particular statement of what is to be proved' then the character of proposition would apply even to such statements as would be contrary to well-recognised facts of perception etc. It is with a view to precluding such statements that the author has added the qualification in question. The sense of all this is that the character of the real *sādhya* (probandum, what is to be proved) does not depend upon the mere whim of the debater. It belongs only to that which deserved proof and that alone is the *pakṣa* (subject) and others are only false *pakṣas*.

We can see that Praśastapāda and Śrīdhara follow the same principle of defining a probans. That is, a probans which cannot prove the probandum cannot be a probans at all and it is a pseudo-probans. Following the same argument, a proposition without having the merit of being proved cannot truly be a proposition and it is a pseudo-proposition (*pakṣābhāsa*). That is why the qualification *avirodhi* is set. As the Naiyāyikas give full stress on probans (*hetu*), they are not much concerned with qualification of the proposition. So, whether the proposition is infalliable or not, to admit it as a proposition beforehand, poses no difficulty for them.

The probans is called *apadeśa* by Praśastapāda. It consists in the statement of the 'inferential mark' (*liṅga*). We have already seen the characteristics of an inferential mark in the 'Inference' section. Praśastapāda in the present case just reminds the aforesaid definition in prose.[4] It is to be noted, that though the difference between *liṅga* and *apadeśa* is put forward in this way, it is not taken in a strict sense when the authors go on discussion.

The Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* (9.20) itself is found to have taken the terms as synonyms. Even then, it can be asserted that *liṅga* is meant for the actual thing indicative of the probandum and *apadeśa* is its verbal presentation only.

Example (*nidarśana*) is of two kinds—that which corroborates by similarity or affirmation (*sādharmyanidarśana*), and that which corroborates by dissimilarity or negation (*vairdharmyanidarśana*). The former kind consists in the recognition of the concomitance of the 'inferential mark' in general, with the 'probandum' in general. For example: "That which has action has always been found to be a substance, as for example, 'an arrow'. Here 'an arrow' is the example and it is a *sādharmyanidarśana*, because it agrees with the affirmative sequence of concomitance of the mark and the probandum.

Now the other kind of example (i.e. *vaidharmyanidarśana*) consists in the recognition of the absence of the 'inference mark' wherever there is 'absence of the probandum'. For example: 'Anything that is not a substance cannot have action', as Existence. This 'Existence' is an example and it is a *vaidharmyanidarśana* because it agrees with the negative sequence of concomitance of the inferential mark and the probandum.

In the case of 'example' also Praśastapāda put up the question of pseudo-example. Here also we can say that an example with its genuine strength can be entitled to have the name of an example and that which does not is a pseudo-example. The questions of pseudo-proposition, pseudo-probans and pseudo-example, indicate a matter that the Vaiśeṣikas were in favour of attacking all the three, to point out a flaw in an argument, in comparison with the Naiyāyikas, who in all the cases see the fault in the probans only.

Now the pseudo-examples which have been shown by Praśastapāda are the following:

We have the argument—'Sound is eternal', because it is unlimited'.[5] In corroboration of this we meet with the examples (i) the atom, (ii) the action, (iii) the bowl, (iv) the darkness or (v) the *ākāśa*, on the ground, that whatever is found to be immaterial is also eternal. We also meet with the example like (vi) that which is a substance has always been found to have action. In the above cases, we have examples respectively of the six kinds of the pseuḍo-probans by affirmation. Śrīdhara points out those pseudo-examples to be respectively

(i) the 'unknown indicative' (i.e. example not applying to the indicative mark, as the atom is limited i.e. with finite dimension).

(ii) the 'unknown subject' (i.e. example not applying to the subject, as the action is not eternal.)

(iii) 'unknown indicative and subject' (i.e. example not applying to both of the indicative mark and the subject, as bowl is neither eternal, nor limited.)

(iv) not applying to its own substratum, as nothing called darkness really exists.

(v) the unconnected, as though in *ākāśa*, both of eternity and limitlessness, are present, yet unlimited objects in all cases are not eternal. So a single example cannot prove the probandum. And

(vi) connected with the contrary, as in the argument 'Air is a substance because it is mobile' we have found all cases of mobility to be pervaded by substances; and all pervasion is so constituted, that it is restricted to that which is pervaded, and it does not belong to both the pervader and the pervaded like conjunction, which extends equally to both members of the relationship; and the reason for this peculiarity of pervasion lies in the fact that the pervader is not always accompanied by the pervaded.

Even in a case of 'equal pervasion' e.g. in the case of 'non-eternity' (*anityatva)* and 'being produced' (*kṛtakatva*), where the relation of pervasion is interchangeable (both being of equal extension), though the pervaded also has the character of the pervader, the pervasion, in either case, would rest in that which would be represented as the pervaded in that case, and not in that which would be put forward as the pervader. And it is always possible for this latter (as the pervader), to exist where the other (as the pervaded) is absent. Hence the pervasion should always be put forward as resting on the pervaded—i.e., in the case in question we should have it stated in the form 'that which is mobile is a substance' (where 'mobility' is the pervaded and 'substanceness' the

pervader)—and not as resting on the pervader, i.e. in the form 'that which is a substance is mobile'. Because the pervader 'substanceness' is not always accompanied by the pervaded 'mobility'.

Similarly to prove 'that which is non-eternal is limited (or finite)', we may meet with the examples (i) action, (ii) atom, (iii) *ākāśa*, (iv) darkness, (v) like the jar, and (vi) 'that which is immobile is not a substance'. But the examples respectively are only six kinds of pseudo-probans by negation by contraries: namely, (i) not excluded from the 'indicative', (ii) not excluded from the 'subject', (iii) not precluded from both, (iv) not applying to its own substratum, (v) non-preclusive and (vi) precluded from the contrary, respectively due to

(i) as action is not limited;
(ii) as the 'subject' eternality is not precluded from the atom which is eternal;
(iii) as neither 'limitlessness nor eternality is precluded from the *ākāśa*;
(iv) as in reality nothing called darkness exists;
(v) the following reason: Though in the jar we have the preclusion of both the subject eternality and the 'mark' limitlessness, yet as long as the arguer does not accompany the citing of the example with the general statement—'that which is non-eternal is limited'—the preclusion of the 'subject' and the 'mark' cannot be duly comprehended by the person to whom the argument is addressed; and as such the example is called 'non-conclusive';
(vi) the following reason: The statement 'that which is immobile is not a substance' is an example of the 'contrary example precluded from the contrary'. Just as the 'subject' is the pervader and the 'mark' the pervaded, so in the same manner is the 'negation of the subject' the pervaded and the 'negation of the mark' the pervader; It is a rule that the relationship of the pervaded and pervader perceived in two positive things, will be found to be reversed in the case of their negation. That is, when the pervaded is the mark of the pervader, then contrarily the negation of pervader will be the mark of the negation of pervaded. In accordance with this law, when we have the argument—'Air is a substance because it is mobile'—if we mean to show an example of the 'concomitance of contraries' we should put forward the statement—'that which is not a substance is immobile': but the example cited above is not in this form, but in the form—'that which is immobile is not a substance'. As a matter of fact, there is no such invariable concomitance between 'negation of action' and 'negation of substanceness' as is implied in this assertion: as we find in the case of *ākāśa* that, though it is immobile, yet it is a substance; hence the example in question is the contrary example precluded from contraries.

Now, the third inference-component is *anusandhāna* (application). *Anusandhāna* is the statement showing the existence of the mark in general which is found concomitantly with the probandum in general, in the example, in the probandum. i.e. An *anusandhāna* reiterates (*anusandhīyate*) the existence, in the *pakṣa* (subject), of the *liṅga* (mark) which has been shown in the example (*nidarśana*) to be invariably concomitant with the *sādhya* (probandum).

After the proposition (*pratijñā*) we had the statement of the probans (*hetu*), and the latter statement served the purpose of showing that it existed in the 'subject' (*pakṣa*), as

apart from all other things and as such had the character of the *hetu*, and it said nothing as to its existence in the subject as its qualification. The power of the mark to prove the probandum consists in its negative and positive invariable concomitance, as also in the fact of its qualifying the 'subject'. This latter fact is not expressed either by the proposition or by the statement of the probans. Thus the mark has not its necessary potency fully established, so that in the example it is pointed out as concomitant with the general qualification of the probandum and after that it has to be shown again to exist in the subject, and the statement doing it is called *anusandhāna*.

Śrīdhara again explained the above in a rather detailed manner. He says: Words are used by one person for the sake of another person. So their use would follow the best of the desires and wants of the person to whom they are addressed. When this person has heard the *sādhya* (probandum), he wants to learn the *sādhana* (the probans). But he now wants to know the capability of the probans, as a desire for the knowledge of the capabilities of a thing can arise only after the thing itself has become known. When this desire has been evinced, the other person mentioned the probans, but this statement merely mentions the probans and does not say anything as to its subsisting as a qualification in the 'subject' (*pakṣa-dharmatā*). For the simple reason that the same word could signify two things, the mere form of the probans and also the fact of its subsistence in the subject. When the person knows the probans, there arises a desire to know its capabilities. Now as a due cognition of the probandum would not be possible without the recognition of its invariable concomitance, this concomitance is expressed by means of the statement of the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum, put forward in the example. The capability of the probans being thus known, the man next wishes to know if the probans endowed with the capability subsists in the subject. After the example has been cited, it becomes necessary to recognize (*upagamena*) the fact of the probans subsisting in and qualifying the subject. And it is *upanaya*. Here Śrīdhara explains the expression which, according to the derivative meaning of the term used by the Naiyāyikas for *anusandhāna*, a term used by Praśastapāda, and naturally the Vaiśeṣikas.

The opponent may object that the very capability of being put forward as a probans, will prove the probans' subsistence in the subject, as a probans which subsists in a substratum other than subject, will not be a valid indicative.

But the above objection cannot be right because if it is, that the mere statement of probans will prove its subsistence in the subject, then the very probans would prove the invariable concomitance also, as anything not so concomitant cannot be a true reason. Hence putting forward of an example would be unnecessary.

The opponents may further object: We see that an *asādhāraṇa* pseudo-probans is found to have been shown through misconception, as a valid probans. And taking as granted that the mere fact of an indicative necessarily imply the necessary invariable concomitance, no such invariable concomitance by means of an example is put forward.

Reply of Śrīdhara here is very clear: We often find that even when the indicative (apparent) does not subsist in the subject, it is put forward by mistake, as a probans, and hence the mere fact of the probans being put forward does not necessarily imply its

subsistence in the subject. Consequently, it becomes necessary to point out that the indicative cited in the example, does subsist in the subject. And to this end the statement of the *upanaya* becomes necessary.

The opponents may say: We often find that the *asiddha* indicative (actually a pseudo-probans) through some misconception, put forward in the *upanaya* also, and as such, how could this absolutely prove the fact of the indicative subsisting the subject?

In answer to this, Śrīdhara says: We find the *asiddha* indicative often put forward, by mistake, as being invariable concomitant. But the mere statement of invariable concomitance cannot certainly prove that there is a real concomitance.

If now, the opponents say that the concomitance is ascertained in the exemplification, in accordance with the means of knowledge according to the cognition of the probans (valid), and not with the mere statement of the probans (apparent), as mere statement is very common in both the cases (in the cases of actual indicative and apparent indicative), it is to be asserted that in the case of the *upanaya* also, the fact of the probans subsisting in the subject would be ascertained in accordance with the means of valid knowledge affording the cognition of the subsistence of the probans in the subject, and not by the mere statement of the statement as *upanaya* (application).

The opponents cannot argue that the statement of the probans not being otherwise explicable follows the means of valid knowledge which prompts the probans' subsistence in the subject and therefore *upanaya* is unnecessary. Because the fact of the putting forward of the probans not being otherwise explicable, follows the means of valid knowledge affording the cognition of the probans.

If now the opponents argue that inasmuch as the statement of the probans is for a totally different purpose, it has not the capability of indicating the invariable concomitance and hence it is that this putting forward of the invariable concomitance is done by means of the example, the same argument may be applied in the case of the *upanaya* also, i.e. the example indicates the invariable concomitance between the probans in general and the probandum in general only. It cannot indicate the subsistence of the probans in the subject. It is the *upanaya* which serves this very particular purpose.

The opponents, in this situation, however, cannot further say that the purpose of the *upanaya* is now all right, but let the statement of the probans be set aside. Because, if there is no statement of the probans, there can be no idea of the indicative as proving the conclusion. As such there being no possibility of any desire on the part of the enquirer to learn of its capabilities, there would be no room for putting forward the example. Śrīdhara refers to the view of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* also in support of his own view. The *Bhāṣya* says: When the probans does not exist, whose indicative character would be shown?

The fifth inference-component is *pratyāmnāya* (conclusion). The subject having been mentioned as the object of inference, and yet not being fully ascertained as such, we have a reiteration of the proposition for the purpose of bringing about certainty in the mind of the other person. This reiteration is called conclusion. Praśastapāda's statement in this regard is *anumeyatvena uddiṣṭe ca aniścite ca pareṣāṃ niścayāpādanārthaṃ pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanaṃ pratyāmnāyaḥ*. It totally agrees to the *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.39) where *nigamana* is defined: *hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanaṃ nigamanam*.

In an argument we see that something is at first pointed out as to be proved. When it is not known quite for certainty to be such as is wanted to be proved, then—for the sake of such persons as have acquired the faculty of recognizing the truth, by means of the probans and other inference-components—we have a reiteration of the proposition. e.g. the air is a substance. It is a proposition. After applying the probans, etc. we at last reiterate: therefore, the air must be a substance. It is a conclusion.

As long as this reassertion is not made, none of the other inference-components either individually or collectively has the power to express what is meant to be expressed by it.

Here the opponents may object: The accessory details in the 'inference for the sake of others are the same as those in that for one's own sake, and the only difference is that in the case of the latter the whole argument is recalled to the mind by the person himself while in that of the former, it has to be made intelligible to the other persons. For ourselves we find the conclusion to be duly indicated and proved by the comprehension of the potentialities of the probans and for other persons also this alone should be sufficient to indicate the conclusion. It has already been shown that the mark as subsisting in, and being invariably concomitant with the subject, is justified by the probans, example, and application. Hence, this being enough for due comprehension of the conclusion, there remains nothing to be done by the *nigamana* (or *pratyāmnāya* as coined in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*).

In answer, Praśastapāda puts forward the question of justified comprehensional sequence, i.e. after proposition we set probans. The learned are now sure to remember the necessary invariable concomitance and hence to deduce the necessary conclusion. There would be no necessity of *anusandhāna* and *pratyāmanāya*. But if we see the natural sequence of our comprehension the matter is as follows.

For instance, in the first place, we have the proposition in the form 'Sound is non-eternal'—wherein we have only 'sound' mentioned as having the uncertain qualification of non-eternity. Secondly, we have the probans, in the form—'because it always follows from effort'—wherein we have the mere mention of a property calculated to prove the non-eternity. Thirdly, we have the example—in the form 'in the world all that is found to follow from effort is also found to be non-eternal, as the jar'—wherein we have merely the mention of the concomitance of the probans (in general) 'following from effort' with the object (in general), non-eternality and similarly we may have the probans in the negative way, in the form—'the eternal is never found to follow from any effort, as the *ākāśa*—wherein the absence of the object is pointed out. Fourthly, we have the application in the two forms of affirmation and negation—'sound is found to follow from effort' and 'sound is not found like *ākāśa* to be independent of effort'—wherein we have the reiteration of the probans in general, whose potentialities have been ascertained, by means of affirmative and negation, in 'sound'. And then alone fifthly and lastly, have we the certain conclusion in the form—'therefore sound must be non-eternal'.

Thus, we observe, it is only in this way that we find the last inference-component affording the desired final conclusion.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *jijñāsā, saṃśaya, śakyaprāpti, prayojana* and *saṃśayavyudāsa. NB*, p. 30.
2. *Vyomavatī* (II), p. 184.
3. *anumeyoddeśo 'virodhī pratijñā. PPB*, p. 565.
4. *yad anumeyena sahacaritam tatsamānajātīye sarvatra sāmānyena prasiddhaṃ tadviparīte ca sarvasmin asad eva talliṅgam uktam. PPB*, pp. 575-6
   cf. yadanumeyena sambaddhaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite/
   tadabhāve ca nāstyeva talliṅgam anumāpakam// PPB, p. 478.
5. *nityaḥ śabdo 'murttatvāt, PPB*, p. 600.

PSEUDO-PROBANS

In the topic of inference, Praśastapāda defined "mark as to be endowed with three qualities, (i) connection with the probandum, (ii) to be well-known as existing in that which is connected with that probandum and (iii) negation of its existence in the contrary things."[1] Absence of either one or two of these characteristics leads to form any of the three kinds of pseudo-probans, (*i*) cortradictory (*viruddha*), or (*ii*) unknown (*asiddha*) or (*iii*) dubious (*sandigdha*). Praśastapāda also acknowledges these three types of probans, to be the contribution of Kāśyapa (the celebrated Vaiśeṣikasūtrakāra Kaṇāda).[2]

Though *Kaṇādasūtra* admits three types of pseudo-probantia, Praśastapāda is found to have held four types by adding one more type of it i.e. *anadhyavasita*. Thus the pseudo-probantia are four:

(1) unknown (*asiddha*), (2) contradictory (*viruddha*), (3) dubious (*sandigdha*) and (4) unascertained (*anadhyavasita*). The fourth one, however, according to Praśastapāda is obviously admitted by Kaṇāda, though not verbally mentioned by him.

1. Unknown (asiddha): It is of four types: (a) 'Unknown to both' (*ubhayāsiddha*), (b) 'Unknown to either of the two' (*anyatarāsiddha*), (c) 'Unknown in the form wanted' (*tadbhāvāsiddha*) and (d) 'Unknown subject of inference (*anumeyāsiddha*).

(a) 'Unknown to both': It is that which is not known to both the proposer (arguer) and the opponent. Sound, for example, is non-eternal, *because it is made up of parts*. Here both the proposer and the opponent will discard the sound's being made up of parts.

(b) 'Unknown to either of the two': It is that which is not admitted by one of the contenders. E.g. Sound is non-eternal, *because it is produced*. The Mīmāṃsakas do not admit that sound is produced.

Here we may note that if the above argument is declared as invalid due to the pseudo-probans 'because it is produced'. Then the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers cannot prove the non-eternality of sound. To say the truth, it is this very argument with which they prove the above. That is why Śrīdhara is found to comment that though in fact producibility is in the sound, yet it is unknown (i.e. unadmitted) to the Mīmāṃsakas. Such a probans cannot prove the probandum until it is itself proved by some other argument.

(c) 'Unknown in the form wanted': it is fire, because of the vapour. This vapour has been put forward as a probans, smoke. But this smoke cannot be vapour, as vapour is not known in the form of smoke.

(d) 'Unknown subject-of-inference: For example, darkness is an earthy substance, because it is black in colour. As a matter of fact, there is no such substance as 'darkness', as what is perceived is mere blackness impressed upon some substance or other; consequently the argument that 'Darkness is an earthy substance because it is black in colour' affords an instance of the 'unknown subject'. The Sanskrit term of 'unknown subject-of-inference' is *anumeyāsiddha*. It is derived by the *Bahuvrīhi* compound—that probans of which the subject (*anumeya*) is not known. This pseudo-probans is also called *āśrayāsiddha*.

In this connection, Śrīdhara analyses the case in a rather broad perspective. He says:

Just as the probans is 'Unknown to either of the two, or 'Unknown to both' so in the same manner the 'Unknown subject' (*āśrayāsiddha*) also may be of two kinds—i.e. unknown to one or both of the disputants. Secondly, just as the 'probans is unknown' by one or both disputants either not knowing it, or having a doubtful knowledge of it, or having a mistaken idea of it—so in the same three ways would the 'subject' also be 'unknown'. Thirdly, in the case of probans we find that (1) it is unknown to one disputant who is not uncertain about it, simply because he has no conception of it, while to the other disputant it is 'unknown' because of his having only a doubtful knowledge of it, (2) or that to the former it is 'unknown' simply because he has no knowledge of it, while to the latter it may be 'unknown' on account of his having no right conception of it, (3) or that to the former it is 'unknown' as he has no certain knowledge of it while to the latter it is 'unknown' because of his having no knowledge of it, (4) or that to the former it may be 'unknown' because of his having a mistaken knowledge of it, while to the latter it is 'unknown' because of his knowledge of it being uncertain.

Now Śrīdhara adds two more sentences, which roughly mean the following: "All these diversities would be found in the case of the 'unknown subject' also. As for the 'unknown qualification' etc., these are included in the 'unknown to either of the two' or 'unknown to both' etc. And hence our author (i.e. Praśastapāda) does not mention them separately."[3]

Rājaśekhara quite curiously comments that the verbal meaning is easily intelligible. But the critical meaning could be made out only by the examples. And as we are the scholars—out of (Vaiśeṣika) tradition, we cannot properly know and hence did not say anything.[4]

The *Kusumodgama*[5] commentary of Sidil Brahmadeva, however, pointed out that *viśeṣaṇāsiddha*, etc. include *viśeṣāsiddha, vyadhikaraṇāsiddha,* etc.

2. Contradictory (viruddha): That which, while not subsisting in the subject of inference, does not subsist in any individual of the same class and subsists in its contradictories, is called Contradictory. It is so called because it proves something quite contradictory to the desired conclusion. The example: This animal is a horse, because it has horns. In this case we find that the horn exists in the cows, the buffaloes, but not to the horse. Hence 'the presence of the horn' would prove something totally different from the 'horse'. So proving something quite contradictory to the subject of the syllogism the probans is called contradictory.

3. Dubious (sandigdha): That, which, while subsisting in the probandum, subsists in similar things, as well as in thing contradictory to the subject, is called dubious. It is so called because it creates a doubt in the mind. For example 'This animal is a cow because it has horns.' Having horns is common to similar cows and non-cows like buffaloes.

Here doubt arises due to the existence of the probans in both subject and contrary substrata. Now this existence can be in different ways. Śrīdhara's intention is that if the probans subsists fully in subject and partly in the contrary subject; or fully in subject and also in contrary subject; or partly in both the subject and contrary subject; or partly in the subject and fully in the contrary subject, all will be the case of dubious pseudo-probans. He also gives the example of those four types. They are respectively: (i) This animal is a

cow because it has horns. (This is given by Praśastapāda himself). (ii) Sound is eternal, because it is cognizable (cognisability belongs to all things eternal as well as non-eternal). (iii) *Ākāśa* is eternal because it is infinite (infinity is such as it subsists in a few eternal and also a few non-eternal things. Infinity does not subsist in atoms.). And (iv) sound is a substance, because it is not made of constituent parts (Being made of constituent parts subsists in only a few similar substances and all contrary objects).

The *Vyomavatī* already explained this in the same way as above but gave different examples. His example for no. (iii) is 'Sound is eternal because it is not tangible'; and for no. (iv) is: 'This animal is not a cow because it has horns.'[6]

Praśastapāda in connection with defining 'dubious' pseudo-probans refers to some opponents who wanted to add a new type of 'dubious' pseudo-probans. Now who are these opponents? We find no indication of these opponents from the commentators. Anyway, their contention is that, when in any subject there is a collision of two 'contradictory' marks, there arises a doubt and it is to be treated as a separate variety of 'dubious' pseudo-probans. The example is clear: (i) The mind is finite because it has actions, like the arrow, and (ii) the mind is infinite because it is intangible, like *ākāśa*. Here in one subject the probans 'activity' and 'intangibility' leads to our doubt whether mind is finite or infinite. Now from the doubt it is clear, that it is a case of *satpratipakṣa* (counter-balance) pseudo-probans, which is found to have been admitted in the neo-logical texts. In it, we find a counter-balanced of two inferences, which, being of equal weight, are mutually destructive, but neither prevails over the other. This peculiarity of *satpratipakṣa* was well expressed by the more significant name *prakaraṇasama* (inconclusive), which Gautama gave to it. Gautama's definition of *prakaraṇasama* is *yasmāt prakaraṇacintā sa nirṇayārtham apadiṣṭaḥ prakaraṇasamaḥ* (*NS* 1.2.48). *Prakaraṇa* is an argument and its *cintā* is the curiosity (*jijñāsā*) or expectancy (*ākāṅṣā*) which is created in the course of the argument, and remains until it is satisfied by a certain and well-grounded conclusion. An inference which is inconsequential, owing to being counter-balanced (or opposed by a contrary inference of equal weight) does not remove this *prakaraṇacintā*; and hence a *prakaraṇasama* is defined as 'a *hetu* which though propounded for the purpose of giving a certain conclusion (*nirṇayārtham apadiṣṭaḥ*) leaves the expectation of a certain conclusion unfulfilled'. It is therefore *prakaraṇasama*, that is, as Vātsyāyana explains it, *prakaraṇam anativartamānaḥ* 'always remaining in the stage of a non-concluded argument'. The word *satpratipakṣa* also conveys the same sense, but rather distantly. According to the author of *Dīdhiti*[7] it must be observed that when there are two mutually destructive inferences containing the two *hetus* that are *pratipakṣa* of each other, the judgement is impeded because the two *hetus* give rise to distinct *parāmarśas* leading to quite contrary conclusions. It is needless perhaps to point out that a *satpratipakṣa hetu* is such, only so long as it is of equal weight with its contrary. As soon as the *pratipakṣa* becomes stronger by any reason, the former ceases to be a *satpratipakṣa* and becomes a *bādhita*.[8]

So from the above it is plausible that the opponents of Praśastapāda here are the Naiyāyikas or some Vaiśeṣikas who being influenced by the Naiyāyikas' argument on *prakaraṇasama* invented a new variety of the 'dubious'. Moreover, in the *Vyomavatī* and

the *Nyāyakandalī* we find that 'dubious' is called by the term *anaikāntika*,[9] by those opponents. It seems to be right to conclude that whoever the opponents may be, their arguments involve the Nyāya system.

One pseudo-probans named *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is found in the Buddhist text, e.g., the *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti. This pseudo-probans more or less conveys the same sense. Śrīdhara draws the context of it and of *prakaraṇasama* also. He points out the difference between them, that, while the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* creates a doubt in the mind and does not become the cause of doubt in the subject,[10] the *prakaraṇasama* simply fails to remove the uncertainty for the settling of which it is brought forward.[11]

Anyway, the above new variety of the 'dubious', is obviously a pseudo-probans, but it is not at all a case of the 'dubious'. It is the case of the 'unascertained' according to Praśastapāda. This we will discuss next. Some other opponents express their objection to this new variety of 'dubious' in the following way: it is a case of *asādhāraṇa* pseudo-probans. That is to say, each of the 'activity' and 'intangibility' does not create any doubt in our mind, as each leads to a definite conclusion. Then the opposition of the two should be nothing more than what is known as the *asādhāraṇa* pseudo-probans, as the two together do not subsist in any 'subject' (*sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*), apart from the mind. Just as in the case of the two qualities of invisibility and perceptibility, we find that though each of them is not an incompatible quality, conjointly they cannot exist anywhere apart from the mind. Though it is the opposition of two such properties, as are not incompatible and yet mutually contradictory, that constitutes the *asādhāraṇa* pseudo-probans, such a probans would only be a source of uncertainty.

Now, the matter being explained in this way may involve some problems. In the Scripture (i.e. Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* 2.2.18, 19), we find it mentioned, that two contrary cognitions constitute the cause of doubt. If we say the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* does not become a cause of doubt in the subject, as we have actually pointed out, then there will arise the problem of Śāstric contradiction. There is the Śāstra (*VS* 2.2. 18) '*dṛṣṭaṃ ca dṛṣṭavad dṛṣṭvā*'. It maintains that in many places, when a certain 'subject' is found to be accompanied by two mutually contradictory properties, there always arises a doubt in the mind of the observer. Such is also the common experience of many people. When we see something that resembles what we have seen, there arises a doubt. Now a specific instance can be given. In the case of the soul, we have found 'infiniteness' accompanied by 'intangibility' and we have observed the same in the case of the mind also. Now again, in the mind we find 'activity', which is seen in the atom to be accompanied by 'finiteness'. As a result, there arises a doubt in our mind whether the mind is 'infinite' or 'finite'.

Another *yathādṛṣṭam ayathādṛṣṭam ubhayathādṛṣṭatvāt saṃśayaḥ* (*VS* 2.2.19) support the concerned point of our discussion. In the case of mind we have seen that it has the property of 'activity' which we have found (in the atom) to be not incompatible with 'finiteness' (this would be *yathādṛṣṭa*); so also we have seen, to the contrary *ayathādṛṣṭa* i.e. we have found (in the soul) that it has also the property of 'intangibility' which, in its turn, is not incompatible with 'infiniteness'. From the above twofold observation (*ubhayathādṛṣṭatvāt*) there arises the doubt, as to whether the mind is finite on account of its activity, or it is 'infinite' on account of its intangibility. Thus then, if the

viruddhāvyabhicārin is rejected as a reason, being a source of doubt, then one contradicts the *sūtra*.

Praśastapāda does not admit the above explanation. According to him, doubt arises from the dual perception of objects, i.e. doubt is always produced by the perception of the dual character of an object. When both factors of the duality would be equally strong, they would contradict each other and as such it would not give rise to any ascertainment. But they could not be the cause of any doubt. As a matter of fact, in the instance cited above (i.e. the case of mind) there is no case of equal strength in the two factors of the duality, as one of the two conclusions, of the inference would always be derived from the scriptures. The *VS* (7.1.27) *tadabhāvād aṇu manaḥ* clearly contradicts the 'infiniteness' of the mind. So the case is only another variety of the 'contrary' pseudo-probans.

4. Unascertained: That which subsists in the 'subject' of the inference, but not in any other object either of the same or any other, is one that is not recognized by either contender; and as such giving rise to uncertainty. It is called 'unascertained' pseudo-probans. Though this pseudo-probans is not mentioned verbally in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda makes it clear that this pseudo-probaṇs is implied in the *sūtra, aprasiddho 'napadeśaḥ* (3.1.16).

The effect is existent (before its appearance) because it is produced. This is the argument of the Sāṃkhya philosophers. Here the 'probans' (apparent) 'because it is produced' is actually a pseudo-probans, called unascertained. Here we find that the probans does not subsist in the *ākāśa* which (a similar object) is existent, it is also not found to subsist in the sky-flower (a contrary object), which is non-existent. Therefore the probans cannot prove either the conclusion or its contradiction.

Now it may be argued that though the above case is taken as an instance of the 'unascertained' and not 'dubious', by observing its nature, it should be included in the 'dubious'. The distinctive feature of anything as said in the scripture, is to be the cause of doubt. There is the *VS, tulyajātīyeṣv arthāntarabhāūteṣu viśeṣasyobhyathādṛṣṭatvāt* (2.2.26). It maintains that the distinctive feature of a thing serves to distinguish it from the like things and contrary things; if that feature is seen in above two types of objects, there arises doubt. So the case of the Sāṃkhya's *satkārya* and the probans 'because it is produced'—is to be taken in the scope of the *VS, sandigdhaś cānapadeśaḥ*; there would be no need for admitting a fourth variety of pseudo-probans.

Praśastapāda answers that the case (of the Sāṃkhya argument), cannot go into the purview of the Kaṇāda definition of the 'dubious' pseudo-probans. The objection raised with the help of the *VS* 2.2.26 cannot be applied here, because the application of the *sūtra* is in connection with a totally different thing. The meaning of the *sūtra* is not that 'the *asādhāraṇa* probans (apparent) is the source of doubt'. The *sūtra* says—'that which is comprehensible by the auditory sense-organ is sound'. Now 'with regard to this there arises a doubt, as to whether it is a substance or a quality or an action'. This doubt is not as simple as the opponent wants it to be. The opponent says: there is doubt with regard to sound, which is perceived by the auditory sense-organ, i.e. audibility constitutes the source of doubt. And it, being a distinctive feature, when recognized, disperses all the doubts. A doubt is always due to the remembrance of two mutually contradictory

properties and such remembrance would never be possible, when a distinctive feature of the object in question has been duly recognized; specially when the distinctive feature perceived, is such as has never been perceived along with any other property.

Praśastapāda's contention against the above is the following. It is not at all like the case as described above by the opponent. The 'audibility' is not a distinctive feature of any one of the three large categories, substance, quality or action. In fact it comes to be common to all of those. Because, in each of these three, we find distinctive features (here audibility), that distinguish them from the similar as well as contrary objects. For instance, in the earth we find the distinctive feature viz., substanceness, which distinguishes it from its similar objects, i.e. other substances which are endowed with substanceness. In this way colour, or upward motion, etc. can be given as examples. Similarly in sound also, the distinctive feature of audibility is found, along with the qualityness. Consequently this feature also becomes common to substances, qualities and actions and as such it is only right to regard it as the source of doubt. As for the individuality i.e. *asādhāraṇa* character, that could never give rise to any doubt. A distinctive feature, we have found in substance in quality and in action; and in sound also we find a distinctive feature in the shape of audibility; hence the mere presence of a distinctive feature gives rise to a doubt as to which of the three things possessing distinctive feature, sound is. But if the individuality or the specific form, of an object also were the cause of doubt, then there might be doubt with regard to the six categories as well as everyone of these possess a distinct individuality; and in this way there would be no end to doubts.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *yad anumeyena sambaddhaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite/*
   tadabhāve ca nāstyeva talliṅgam anumāpakam// PPB, p. 478.
2. *viparītam ato yat syād ekena dvitayena vā/*
   viruddhāsiddhasandigdham aliṅgaṃ kāśyapo 'vravīt// PPB, p. 480.
3. *evam āśrayo 'pi iti yojanīyam viśeṣaṇāsiddhādayaḥ, anyatara-siddhobhayāsiddheṣu eva antarbhavanti iti pṛthaṅ noktaḥ, NK* (BORI), p. 566.
4. *āśrayo 'pītyārabhya pṛthaṅnoktā ityetadvākyaṃ yāvad akṣarārtho sugamaḥ. bhāvārthas tūdāharaṇair jñāyate. tāni tu vayaṃ sampradāyābhāvān na vidmaḥ iti nādiśāmaḥ. Pañjikā, NK*, p. 566.
5. *Kusumodgama, NK*, p. 566.
6. The Sampurananda edition of the *Vyomavatī* (p. 197) seems to be laconic in this portion because four types of *anaikānta* (treated as dubious) are mentioned there, but only three types of it are illustrated. So one type of them i.e. item no. (ii), is absent from the *Vyomavatī* text.
7. *san (vidyamānaḥ) virodhivyāptyādimattayā parāmṛṣyamāṇo hetuḥ, virodhiparāmarśo vā yasya parāmṛśyamānasya hetor asau satpratipakṣaḥ*. Quoted in *Tarkasaṃgraha* (BORI), p. 304.
8. *Tarkasaṃgraha* (BORI), pp. 304-5.
9. *Vyomavatī* (II), p. 197, PPB, p. 582.
10. *NK, PPB*, p. 587.
11. *Ibid*; p. 584.

ANALOGY NOT A SEPARATE *PRAMĀṆA*

The Vaiśeṣikas admit two *pramāṇas*, perception and inference, and no other. So analogy is not a separate *pramāṇa* according to them. But the two schools of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins, admit analogy as a separate one, though the nature of analogy is not the same in the above branches of philosophy. However, the only exception in the whole Vaiśeṣika literature is that Vyomaśiva admitted analogy as a distinct *pramāṇa*.

Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī*, discusses the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas among the opponents, in this regard.

Analogy as apprehended by Praśastapāda, is the description of *gavaya* by a trustworthy person through the analogy of a cow to a person who never knows it. Hence the analogical assertion of that trustworthy person, (*gavaya* is like a cow), is the *pramāṇa* to be called analogy (*upamāna*).

Here *upamāna* means the instrument of analogical cognition. It appears to be unclear, what specific system was represented by the analogy described by Praśastapāda—the Mīmāṃsakas or the Naiyāyikas? But it may be a general concept of analogy common to both the systems.

The Vaiśeṣikas do not consider the fact of knowing *gavaya* through the assertion of a trustworthy person as a result of analogy. The assertion may contain analogy, but over and above that, it is nothing but the assertion of a trustworthy person, and only this is instrumental to generate the (determinate) knowledge of *gavaya*. The assertion is the inference as the authoritativeness of the speaker leads to the generation of right knowledge (of *gavaya*) here.

Śrīdhara going to explain Praśastapāda adds some more to the opponent's views. Some ancient Mīmāṃsakas[1] hold that analogy is the assertion of the forester. Śrīdhara says that it is clearly a case of inference. That is, as the forester is a trustworthy person, so his assertion must be true and a *gavaya* is inferred according to his authoritative statement.

Some pupils of Śavarasvāmin[2] hold that when a man who knows the cow sees the *gavaya* in the forest, he remembers the cow and then he has the ideas—"my cow is similar to this animal", and it is this knowledge of similarity, that constitutes analogy (*upamāna*, i.e. analogical cognition).

[It is to be remembered that the assertion '*gavaya*' is like a 'cow' is already known before the perception of similarity of cow in the *gavaya*.] Śrīdhara contends that this knowledge of similarity is nothing but a case of remembrance. How? As substratumness (*adhikaraṇatva*) of generality in each substratum is separate, similarity resides in its entirety in each substratum i.e. *anuyogin* and *pratiyogin*, and does not extend over both members, because as a matter of fact we find that even when the cow is not in front of us, we have the idea of *gavaya*, which is in front of us in the forest, having the similarity of the cow.

If the similarity is extended over both members this would not be possible. Kumārila in his *Ślokavārttika* expresses this very contention: "Similarity, like generality, resides in its entirety in each substratum, as, we find that even when one co-relative is not seen, its

similarity in the other is duly recognised."[3]

So the knowledge of similarity cannot be admitted as *upamāna*. It is important to note, that according to this pūrvapakṣin, the declaration (*gavaya* is like the cow) has little role in *upamāna*.

Śrīdhara now extends some more arguments, to prove that similarity is apprehended in a single substratum without the presence of one co-relative, so that the similarity can be proved to be only a case of remembrance and nothing more.

Without the presence of cow, the similarity of cow may be apprehended in a *gavaya*, but it is not possible reversely, i.e. to perceive the similarity of *gavaya* in a cow before the knowledge of a *gavaya*. So though it is said that similarity rests in its entirety in any co-relative there stays the inconsistency noted above. Then what is the solution? It is to be said that in spite of the above inconsistency, it is admitted that similarity is cognized in its substratum. Just as, when the other member of a comparison is not perceived, there does not appear any such ideas as 'this is longer or shorter than that', yet when an object, with a certain dimension, comes before the person, he perceives the dimension and then meeting the other correlative at another place, the man has the idea that 'this, that I see now, is longer, or shorter, than the object I had seen before.' If the similarity in the cow were not cognized, on the previous occasion, by the mere action of the senses, and if, on the present occasion too, if it were not cognized in the *gavaya*, then there could be no such incident as that, on the perception of the *gavaya*, its similarity to the cow should be remembered, as there would not be any particularity in the cow or the *gavaya* whereby the sight of the one should recall the similarity of the other.

If now the opponent suggests that the restriction that remembrance of the same general characters are perceived in the *gavaya* as have been perceived in the cow—he is to be told that "similarity" is the state of having very common limbs and it is so called because it rests in both the correlatives. If now these commonalities of limbs are perceived by the perception of each of the substrata, then similarity would also be cognised. Hence, on the perception of the *gavaya*, the cognition of the similarity as belonging to the cow, not before the eyes at the time, could not but be a case of remembrance. And this remembrance is born of the impression aroused by the perception of another object (i.e. *gavaya*) similar to the cow.

So as it is remembrance, there can be no logical basis to call it a separate *pramāṇa*. We may argue little more. We have seen that even that which is perceived only by indeterminate perception becomes an object of remembrance. A person ignorant of using the word, whereby the perception of the object could become determinate, having seen one of the correlatives on a previous occasion, when he comes to see the other, recognizes in the latter the commonalities that he had perceived in the former.

Now Śrīdhara proceeds to describe and refute the Naiyāyika position. Though he specifically did not spell out the pūrvapakṣin, the well-known theory of *upamāna* as to be the knowledge of relation between the denoter (i.e. name) and the denoted (i.e. the named) does not create any difficulty to recognize the pūrvapakṣin.

A person first sees a *gavaya* and perceives in it the similarity of the cow. Then he remembers the declaration 'the *gavaya* is similar to the cow'. He comes to the conclusion

that 'the word *gavaya* is the name of this animal'. This knowledge of relation between the term *gavaya* and the object meant for it, is called *upamāna*, i.e. the analogical cognition. (The perception of the similarity is the *upamāna pramāṇa*.) So in accordance with the Naiyāyika view, the declaration 'the *gavaya* is like the cow' is a sentence. As this sentence gives rise to the cognition 'That which is heard of a *gavaya* is similar to the cow'—it is nothing but verbal cognition. We can show the inference in the following way: The cognition of the denotability of the animal similar to the cow, by the word *gavaya*, is purely inferential, on account of the use of the word '*gavaya*' in the case of the *gavaya* which is an animal similar to the cow. (Statement of concomitance): A word becomes expressive of that with reference to which it is advisedly used by all learned persons. (Application): The word *gavaya* is so used with reference to the animal similar to the cow, by the forester—therefore (Conclusion)—that animal is denoted by the word '*gavaya*.'

The cognition of similarity in the *gavaya* is distinctly sensuous in its character. Then as regards the cognition of the animal, as different from all other things in the world, that too is a result of sensuous cognition. As for the cognition of the relationship of the name and the named, that is a case of remembrance, being born of the impression left by the cognition of the denotability by the word '*gavaya*' (of the animal similar to cow) brought up by the previously born commonality manifested by the comprehension of similarity; it is similar to recalling the denotability by that word, of another object of the same class, as the one with regard to which the conventional significance, by the word, of the commonality has been cognised in one instance—and the impression left by which cognition is the cause of the said recalling; as the recalling is in the following form: "It was of the same animal that I had comprehended the denotability by that word, on the previous occasion, and in this", there would be no room for analogy (and as such this cannot be regarded as an instance of analogical cognition).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *ye tāvat pūrvamīmāṃsakāḥ*, *PPB* (Jha), p. 531. The term may be taken for some Pūrvamīmāṃsakas i.e. some followers of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā philosophy of Jaimini.
2. They appear to be a different school of the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas.
3. *Ślokavārttika*: Upamāna, 35.

VERBAL TESTIMONY—NOT A SEPARATE *PRAMĀṆA*

The Vaiśeṣikas, as we know, are the advocators of two *pramāṇas*, perception and inference. With the only exception of the case of Vyomaśivācārya, all the exponents of this system argued in favour of those two. If we take the opponents, against this two-member *pramāṇa* system, into consideration, we are not much wrong to assert that the Mīmāṃsakas were the chief opponents of Kaṇāda, the propounder of the Vaiśeṣika system. But Praśastapāda had two groups of opponents, the Mīmāṃsakas as well as the Naiyāyikas. So the commentator Śrīdhara had to argue to discard the verbal testimony as a separate means of valid knowledge.

Now, we may see how verbal testimony cannot be regarded as a separate instrument of valid knowledge. Kaṇāda only tells us of the two *pramāṇas* but expectably does not argue why verbal testimony and others are not *pramāṇas*. We get from Praśastapāda the proper arguments in this connection. With the help of Śridhara we may comprehend his position.

Word cannot be a separate *pramāṇa* because it is included under 'Inference'. Why? Because the process of verbal knowledge is similar to that of inferential knowledge. Just as one, cognizant of the invariable concomitance between the smoke and the fire infers, from the perception of an undoubted mark (*liṅga*) and the remembrance of another concomitance, the fire, which is not directly perceptible to the senses, so also one, cognizant of the invariable concomitance of the words and the authoritative speaker pronouncing those words, gets the knowledge from the words, being an inferential mark or indicative (*liṅga*). The concomitance may be clarified in this way that a word never denotes anything until it is known for certain that it never fails in its concomitance with such denotation, and when it does denote an object, after the unfailing concomitance has been ascertained it becomes an inferential indicative. Śrutis and Smṛtis are not authority by themselves, their authority depends upon the authoritative character of the speaker.

Against the inferential character of verbal knowledge, the opponent puts forward the objections. Śrīdhara being a versatile scholar of the Vaiśeṣika system is found to have noted all those and answered in a very judicious manner. Now we may see what those objections are. In an inference of fire we see that the subject (*pakṣa*) is the hill and the probandum is fire. In fact, the probandum is entitled to be so where it infers 'hill endowed with fire'. Now, to infer the denotation from a word, what is the subject? The denotation cannot be the subject, because then the denotation is yet to be comprehended. If now the word is said to be the subject, then what is the probandum of it? Mere 'denotability' cannot be the probandum. Because, between the word and its denotation we find no such relationship like conjunction or inherence, as we find in the case of the mountain and the fire. If any such relationship would be found between them then we would not be able to infer 'denotability' from word (i.e. in the form: the word must be with some denotation). The relation between the word and its denotation is the relation of the 'denoter' (*pratipādaka*) and the 'denoted' (*pratipādya*). And this comes after the word brings out its denotation and not before that. Nor is there any invariable concomitance, between the

word and its denotation, as there is between fire and smoke, for the simple reason that a word fails to denote a fixed meaning at all places and times. For instance, even though there is no Yudhiṣṭhira living in the present Kali age, yet we find the word Yudhiṣṭhira being used. Moreover, even though there is no Laṅka in Jambudvīpa i.e. India, yet we find Laṅkā used in India. Thus, then, the accessories of verbal cognition are of a character quite different from those of inferential cognition, and the two cannot be regarded as one and the same.

The above is the fact, that a word is not invariably concomitant with its fixed meaning all the time. Now, it is being shown that a word, is not invariably concomitant with its fixed meaning in all places. For example, the word '*cora*' denotes the cooked rice among the Deccan people, while it denotes 'thief' among the people of Āryāvarta.

But the relationship between fire and smoke never varies in this way, i.e. never varies with difference in time and place.

The opponent further objects—if the verbal cognition would be inferential cognition, then it would, like the latter, be duly cognized only when there would be present the three conditions of inference and it would not be based upon the cognition of the fact of its having been uttered by a trustworthy person. As, however the authority of verbal cognition is based solely upon the fact of its originating from a trustworthy source, it cannot but be regarded, on account of this very dissimilarity, as wholly different from inferential cognition. Now against the above, Śrīdhara gives his answer. It is a fact that, there is the inference of number ten from the raising of the fore-finger, i.e. a person infers the number ten after seeing the indicator's fore-finger raised. In this action the indicator and the other person must beforehand have known the technique that if the fore-finger is raised, number ten is to be inferred from it. So, in this case of inference, what is the subject? The number cannot be the subject, because till then it is not known. Nor can the particular position of the fore-finger be regarded as the subject, as it, i.e. particular position of the forefinger, cannot indicate itself as endowed with number then on account of the absence of conjunction or inference between the number ten, and the fore-finger indicating it. Nor is there any co-existence or coevality (= contemporaneity) between the raising of the finger and the actual number ten. How then do we account for the process of inference in this case? But the inference here is a fact. We see that in the usage of tradesmen in the cases of buying and selling, there is an unfailing concomitance between that particular position of the fore-finger and the desire of indicating the number ten.

The opponent may say that in the above case the gesture becomes indicative of the number ten through the recognition (on the part of the observer) of the intention of the person making the gesture to convey an idea of that number and this concomitance is the basis of the inference.

The same may be said with regard to verbal cognition also. At first when the word '*go*' is uttered, we come to recognize the fact that the speaker wishes to indicate a certain animal with the hump etc., because the hearer also, in his own turn, always has the intention of speaking of that animal when he utters the word '*go*'. This intention leads to the inference of the animal. The syllogistic form of the inferential argument will be in this way: "the 'subject' man is endowed with the intention of speaking of the animal with the

hump etc.,—because he is the pronouncer of the word go—like myself."

Now the opponent may argue that an untrustworthy person also has intention to indicate something, though actually the thing is not there and hence the mere presence of the intention cannot indicate the existence of the thing.

He is to be answered: if the real existence of a thing is not indicated then now could there be an indication of the things by means of the word itself? Words are often used by mistake, or with the intention of cheating.

To justify if the opponent says that the thing is cognized only when the word is uttered by a trustworthy person, it comes to the same thing as to assert that the cognition of the object is due to the intention of the trustworthy person to speak of that thing.

The opponent now puts forward further argument that though the word may be indicative of the object, yet the concomitance between the two is not infallible, as there is that between the smoke and the fire. With reference to this, it is evident, that the smoke is a mark by its natural relationship to it, but the word is not so. It becomes indicative like a gesture, only when used in accordance with a certain convention made by the wish of the persons concerned and as it becomes, through the 'intention of the person to speak' of the thing, indicative of only that thing with regard to which the said convention has been fixed. As the object having been definitely cognised, as in the case of gesture etc., only in accordance with the word as used by trustworthy persons, it is only when the word is used by the trustworthy that it has an infallible concomitance with the object, just as it is only when smoke is found to rise upwards in a continuous volume that it is indicative of fire.

The opponent here objects that all right, word is not admitted as a separate *pramāṇa*, but what is the need for it to be included in inference? It would be right, if the word would be admitted as to be the denoter of object by direct denotation. But it is an improper argument, for the simple reason that there is no such direct relation between the two, and if a word were to be denotative of an object without any relation, then there would be no restriction as to the denotation of words, i.e. any word would denote anything. Moreover, the natural relation between the two cannot be admitted, because one and the same word is used, in different countries, in different senses. Further, the words used by trustworthy persons are denotative and the other words are indicative and this type of discrimination is against our experience and is hence illogical. There is no evidence for a natural (inborn) relationship between the word and its corresponding object. What is called relationship by the opponent (Mīmāṃsaka) is a different thing. It is the denotativeness of the word as pertaining to that which is denoted. And as this denotativeness pervades over both, it is called relation by them. If the denotative capacity of the word would by a natural relation exist in the denoted object, the object would be cognized from the word, even by the man ignorant of the meaning of the word, just as well as by the person who knows the word, as in both cases, the word, the object and the relation between them would be equally present.

It cannot be said, it is only when the relationship is duly known that it becomes the means of the verbal cognition of the object, and not when it merely exists and is not known[1] because the nature of comprehension of the relation cannot be satisfactorily

explained. If it is of the form that 'such and such a thing is denoted by such and such a word', whence does this knowledge proceed? Is it from the usage of old experienced persons, and as a result the effect in the form of knowledge of the object depends upon the knowledge of relationship in the form of denotative capacity? This same knowledge, based upon the name (*abhidhāna*) and the named (*abhidheya*) when appearing in the boy sitting near older people, talking among themselves, is known as *saṃketa*, 'convention', or *vyutpatti*, 'knowledge of the word', and this through impressions left on the mind, would be the cause of the verbal cognition of the object. There is no need of assuming any other relationship.

The inborn (natural) capacity of the word, constitutes its verbal character, and the adventitious capacity constitutes the *saṃketa* with regard to it, and also the particular order in which it occurs in a sentence. The cognition of its denotation would be quite explicable through this twofold capacity. There would be no necessity for the assumption of another relationship, specially as so long as a thing can be explained on perceptible facts, there is no room for assuming imperceptible ones.

The conclusion faces a new problem. The conclusion was that there is no necessity for admitting a further relation, it being the denotative capacity. Seeing the conversation between the experienced persons, the learners will comprehend the word and the object, and afterwards with the help of impressions, they will know the object through the word. But if a word were significant only through its speaker (i.e. the intention of the speaker), then there could be no significance in the Vedic sentences, of which the speaker is not available (as the Mīmāṃsaka does not admit a speaker of the Vedas) as those are self-authoritative.

But to the Vaiśeṣikas, the absence of the speaker of the Vedas is not acceptable. It is not only ordinary assertions that signify their meanings on the strength of the trustworthy character of speaker, but the assertions in the form of the Vedic and Smṛti-type scriptures also are similarly significant. The faultiness of these is due to the deficiencies in the speaker, and is not inherent in them, like the bad smell of foul things. Anyway, there are more refutations against different objections of the opponents. And all those pertain to the self-authoritativeness or external authoritativeness of the Vedas.

It is to be noted that though the Vaiśeṣikas admit the speaker of the Vedas and the defect of words depend upon the speaker, yet word is not a separate *pramāna*. The conversation among the experienced persons build the concomitance between words and their meanings to a learner, and depending upon its remembrance, word plays the exact role to infer its meaning as smoke plays to infer the fire.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Here Śrīdhara refers to *Ślokavārttika* verse (Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, verse No. 32): *jñāpakatvādd hi sambandhaḥ svātmajñānam apekṣate/tenāsau vidyamāno'pi nāgṛhītaḥ prakāśakaḥ//*

ŚĀLIKANĀTHA—THE VAIŚEṢIKA

It has been a great loss to us that the early commentaries on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* have not come down to us. And the obvious cause of their disappearance is the extraordinary popularity of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda[1]. This *Saṃgraha* is generally called *Praśastapādabhāṣya,* though it does not fulfil the definition of a *bhāṣya*. It gives us the gist of the Vaiśeṣika speculations from the line of Kaṇāda in a systematic way. We have seen earlier that Praśastapāda wrote a detailed commentary on some ancient Vaiśeṣika *bhāṣya*. Fragments from this commentary have been preserved. Thus the additional material in this *Saṃgraha* over and above those available in the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda may be taken as the result of investigations of the Vaiśeṣika masters who come between Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda. But it is unfortunate again to say that except the small digest of Candramati we are not in possession of any other Vaiśeṣika work for several centuries after Praśastapāda. Among the commentaries on the Saṃgraha, the earliest available one is the Vyomavatī of Vyomaśivācārya which has been placed in the middle of the AD tenth century. Thus we find that the gap between Praśastapāda and Vyomaśiva is also considerable. Cinnambhaṭṭa in his commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśavamiśra quotes a passage from the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya-vyākhyāna* of Śālikanātha. The passage runs as follows: *mṛtpiṇḍa-pāṣāṇādi-lakṣaṇaḥ śarīrendriya-vyatirikto viṣayaḥ iti Śālikanāthaḥ praśastapāda-bhāṣya-vyākhyāne nyarūpayat.*[2]

The passage is connected with the line—*viṣayastu dvyaṇukādiprakrameṇārabdhas trividhaḥ, mṛtpāṣāṇādi-lakṣaṇaḥ* of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.[3] There is only one Śālikanātha known in the history of Indian Philosophy and he is the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka, author of the *Prakaraṇapañjikā*. Considering the close relation between the Vaiśeṣika and the Prābhākara schools one is tempted to identify the author of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya-vyākhyāna* quoted by Cinnambhaṭṭa with the Mīmāṃsā scholar. The Mīmāṃsaka Śālikanātha's dates have been fixed by Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya as to be the first half of the 10th century. S.S. Shastri argues that as Śālika criticizes Maṇḍana and Prajñākara and he in his own turn was quoted by Vācaspati, he must fall between AD 780 and AD 825. We here would like to rectify that Vācaspati's date cannot be Vikrama era and hence it (*vasu-aṅka-vasu-vatsara*, 898) corresponds to AD 976. So the range of time expands by 50 years. In this situation Prof. Bhattacharya's dating seems to be fairly acceptable. And most probably Śālika was Pre-Vyomaśiva.

Now we see that Vaiśeṣika materials can be gathered from the Mīmāṃsā works of this author:

Vardhamāna in the *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* attributes an unspecified quotation in the *Kiraṇāvalī* to Śālikanātha. The passage in question relates to visual perception and runs as follows:

Kecit tu saṃsargidravyatayā niḥsarad eva nāyanaṃ tejo bāhyālokenaikatāṃ gataṃ yugapad eva tadarthena saṃsṛṣṭam indriyam utpāditavad iti śākhācandramasos tulyakālagrahaṇam upapadyata iti samādhānam āhuḥ.[4] The *Prakaraṇapañjikā* of Śālikanātha seems to give a similar view in—*nāyanaraśmibhir ekībhūte 'pi bāhyatejasi*

yāvān eva tasya bhāgo 'dṛṣṭavaśenopalabdhihetutayopāttaḥ tāvān evopalabdhaya prabhavati na sarvaḥ iti na sarvopalambhe yugapac ca bhaumadhruvādidaraśanasiddhih.[5]

Again in the *Guṇakiraṇāvalīṭīkā* Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra refers to Śālikanātha in connection with the explanation of error—*uṣṇaṃ jalam iti saṃvādivyavahāre 'pi bhedāgrahasyaiva śalikanāthena bhūtatvāṅgīkārāt.*[6]

The above seems to show that Udayana recognized Śālikanātha as a Vaiśeṣika, though he did not see eye to eye with him on particular topics. As Śālikanātha belonged to a dark period in the history of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, the materials available elsewhere deserve special attention. We find him quote some *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* and at times to explain them or add some discussion on them besides he is found to refer to Vaiśeṣika tenets. We give below the Vaiśeṣika materials gleaned from the *Prakaraṇapañjikā* and the *Ṛjuvimalā*.

In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* quoted, the readings sometimes differ from the current ones.

(i) *agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyos tiryak-pavanam aṇumanasoś cādyam karmetyadṛṣṭakāritāni* (*VS* 5.2.14) *PP* (Chowkhamba), p. 53. Here Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* adds *ca* after *vāyoḥ*.

(ii) *etenaiva nyāyena ye'pi kāryakāraṇabhāva-saṃyoga-samavāya-virodhākhyān pañca sambandhān "asyedam kāraṇaṃ kāryaṃ sambandhyekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam"* (*VS* 9.18) *ityanumānakāraṇaṃ āhuḥ... PP* (Chowkhamba), p. 68. Here the *Vyomavatī* takes *saṃyogi samavāyi* for *sambandhyekārthasamavāyi* and reverses the order in *kāraṇaṃ kāryam*.

(iii) *ārṣam siddhadarśaṇaṃ ca dharmebhyaḥ* (*VS* 9.28)—*RP* (Madras), p. 285. It is followed by a discussion.

(iv) *tadāha bhagavān kāśyapaḥ—ekadravyam aguṇaṃ saṃyogavibhāgeṣvanapekṣaṃ kāraṇaṃ karma-lakṣaṇam* (*VS* 1.1.16)—*RP*, P. 270. The *Nyāyakandalī* reads *saṃyoga-vibhāgayor* and Candrānānda's *Vṛtti* adds *iti* after *kāraṇam*.

(v) *bhagavān kāśyapo vedān pauruṣeyān manyamānaḥ śabdam anumāne 'ntarbhūtam uvāca/tasyedam (? asyedaṃ) kāraṇaṃ kāryam* (*VS* 9.18) *iti laiṅgikam uktvā etena śābdam apyuktam iti* (cf. *VS* 9.19, where the reading is *etena śābdaṃ vyākhyātam*) *PP*, p. 96

(vi-vii) *tadāha bhagavān kāśyapaḥ—kāraṇājñānāt kāryājñānam* (*VS* 3.1.4) *kāryājñānāt kāraṇājñānam* (VS 3.1.5) *iti sūtradvayasyārthaḥ. RP*, p. 211 Candrānanda omits *kāryājñānam* and *kāraṇājñānam* respectively from the *sūtras*.

(viii) *kāryavirodhi karma* (*VS* 1.1.13) *RP* (in Adyar Lib. TR 77.4), *PP*, p. 184.

(ix) *taduktaṃ taireva—guṇāntara* [-] *prādurbhāvācca tryātmakamapi na iti* (*VS* 4.2.2). *RP*, p. 210.

(x) *tadāhur yogā eva—pratyakṣāpratyakṣāṇām apratyakṣatvāt saṃyogasya pañcātmakatvaṃ na vidyate* (*VS* 4.2.1). *RP*, p. 210
Candrānanda reads *pañcātmakam*. The term *Yoga* has been meant for the Vaiśeṣika. Cf. *sad akārana-van nityam* (*VS* 4.1.1) *iti yogavaco yathā.— Patraparīkṣā* of Vidyānanda.

(xi) *guṇāḥ rūparasa-*[*gandha*]*-sparṣāḥ saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyoga-*

vibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣa-prayatnaś ca/(*VS* 1.1.5). *PP*, p. 54.

Candrānanda reads rūpa° . . . °*duḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaśca guṇāḥ*. The *Nyāyakandalī*[7] reads *prayatnaśca* and agrees with Candrānanda elsewhere.

(xii) *āha bhagavān kāśyapaḥ—*

sarpirjatumadhūcchiṣṭānāṃ pārthivānām agnisaṃyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyam/ (*VS* 2.1.6). *PP*, p. 202.

Candrānanda reads *dravatā* for *dravatvam*.

(xiii) *tadāha bhagavān kāśyapaḥ—*

saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvam saṃyoga-vibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpidravyasamavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi/ (*VS* 4.1.12). *PP*, p. 79. This Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* has been introduced with *tantrāntare 'pi sūtram* in *RP* (p. 99) and again with *tad āha bhagavān kāśyapaḥ* in *PP* (p. 125).

(xiv) *tad uktam paraiḥ—*

saṃyogas tvapratiśiddho mithaḥ pañcānām/(*VS* 4.2.3). *RP* P. ( ) Here Candrānanda reads *ātmasaṃyogas tvaviprati* °

(xv) *aulukyo vā bhavatu rāddhāntaḥ—*

saṃyogād vidhāgāt śabdāc ca śabda-niṣpattiḥ/(*VS* 2.2.36). *RP*, p. 30.

The same *sūtra* is again introduced with *aulukyo vaiśeṣikīyo bhavatu rāddhantaḥ* in *RP*, p. 301.

The references to the author of the *sūtras* with the term *bhagavān* deserve special notice here.

In some cases Śālikanātha gives the subject-matter of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* in his own language:

(i) *kāraṇaguṇapūrvako hi kāryadravye vaiśeṣikaguṇārambhaḥ/RP*, p. 210 cf. *kāraṇagunapūrvaḥ kārye guṇo dṛṣṭaḥ/*(VS 3.2.40)

(ii) *nānāvyavasthānām nānābhūtāḥ pratikṣetraṃ puruṣāḥ dharmādharma-sukhādivyavasthā darśanāt/PP*, p. 159 cf. *nānā vyavasthātaḥ/*(*VS* 3.2.16)

(iii) *mahattvamanekadravyatvaṃ rūpa-viśeṣaś ca sannikarṣa iva pratyakṣatve hetuḥ/ PP*, p. 45

cf. *mahatyanekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ/*(*VS* 4.1.6)

(iv) *sadakāraṇatvam eva nityatvam/ PP*, p. 152

sadakāraṇam ca yat tadavināśi gaganavat/sadakāraṇaṃ cāyam ātmā iti vināśitvābhāvasiddhiḥ/PP, p. 157

cf. *sadakāraṇavat tannityam/*(*VS* 4.1.1) *tat* is omitted in the versions other than that of Candrānanda.

(v) *na tāvat pañcānāṃ caturṇāṃ vā sambhūya [śarīrā]-rambhakatvaṃ sambhavati/ cākṣuṣācākṣuṣadravyārabdhasya tatsamavāyino 'cākṣuṣatvāpatteḥ/yat khalu cākṣuṣācākṣuṣadravyārabdha-tatsamavetam, tanna cākṣuṣaṃ vāyuvanaspati-saṃyogavat/cākṣuṣaś ca dehaḥ/ ato na pañcabhiś caturbhir vā samārabdhaḥ, ākāśānilayor acākṣuṣatvāt// PP*, p. 143.

cf. *pratyakṣāpratyakṣāṇām apratyakṣatvāt saṃyogasya pañcātmakatvam na vidyate/* (*VS* 4.1.1)

(vi) *dravyāśrayasaṃyogavibhāgau prati nirapekṣakāraṇatvābhāvena ca guṇatva-siddheḥ/*[*jñānasya*] *PP*, p. 147
cf. dravyāśrayaguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣu akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam/ (*VS* 1.1.15)

There are several passages in the works of Śālikanātha which show close resemblance with passages of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda.

(i) *avayavabahutvamahattvapracayaviśeṣāṇām mahimaguṇakāraṇānām/ PP*, p. 24
cf. *iśvarabuddhiṃ apekṣyotpannā paramāṇu-dvyaṇukeṣu bahutvasaṃkhyā tairārabdhe kāryadravye . . . mahattvaṃ dīrghatvaṃ ca karoti/dvibahubhir mahadbhiś cārabdhe kāryadravye kāraṇa-mahattvānyena mahattvam ārabhante/ . . . pracayaś ca tūlapiṇḍayor vartamānaḥ piṇḍārambhakāvayavapra-śithilasaṃyogā-napekṣamāṇa itaretarapiṇḍāvayavasaṃyogāpekṣo vā dvitūlake mahattvam ārabhate/*
PDS (Chowkhamba), p. 471-2

(ii) *trividha eva saṃyogaḥ anyatarakarmaja ubhayakarmajaḥ saṃyogajaś ceti/PP*, p. 15
cf. sa ca trividhaḥ anyatarakarmaja ubhayakarmajaḥ saṃyogajaś ceti/ PDS (Chowkhamba), pp. 483-4

(iii) *saṃyogo hyubhayakarmajo bhavati mallayor iva/anyatarakarmajo vā sthāṇuśyenayor iva/saṃyogajo vā yathā tantuturīsaṃyogād utpannamātrasya paṭasya turīsaṃyogaḥ/PP*. p. 26.
cf. *anyatarakarmajaḥ kriyāvatā niṣkriyasya yathā sthāṇoḥ śyenena . . . /ubhaya-karmajo viruddhadikkriyayoḥ sannipāto yathā mallayor meṣayor vā/saṃyogajas tūtpannamātrasya cirotpannasya vā niṣkriyasya kāraṇasaṃyogibhir akāraṇaiḥ kāraṇākāraṇasaṃyogapūrvakaḥ kāryākāryagataḥ saṃyogaḥ/. . . bahubhyaś ca tantuturīsaṃyogasya ekaḥ paṭaturisaṃyogaḥ PDS* (Chowkhamba). p. 484

(iv) *bāhyarūpādigrahe ca sannikarṣacatuṣṭayam kāraṇam, ātmamanaḥsannikarṣo mana indriyasannikarṣo dravyendriyasannikarṣo rūpādīndriyasannikarṣaś ceti. PP*, pp. 53-4
cf. *rūparasagandhasparśeṣu anekadravyasamavāyāt svagataviśeṣāt/PDS* (Chowkhamba), p. 553

(v) *buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnādrṣṭasaṃskārāṇām navānām api vaiśeṣikaguṇānām manaḥsaṃyogenaivopapatteḥ//PP*, p. 149.
cf. *buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnānāṃ dvayor ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogād upalabdhiḥ/PDS* (Chowkhamba), p. 553.

(vi) *śabdo 'mbaraguṇa iti prāpya-kārīndriyavādinābhyupeyam/PP*, p. 173, *ākāśaguṇaḥ śabdaḥ/PP*, p. 174
cf. *śabdo 'mbaraguṇaḥ/PDS* (Chowkhamba), p. 645

(vii) *kecid gavāditulyatayā dravyaguṇakarmasvapi sattājātim aṅgīkurvanti/bhavati hi sarveṣveva sat sad iti pratyayānuvṛttir iti saṃvadantaḥ// PP*, p. 28
cf. *dravyādīnāṃ trayāṇām api sattāsambandhaḥ/PDS* (Chowkhamba), p. 121

(viii) *kāśyapīyānām jātisamavāyaviśeṣeṣu svarūpasattopādhika eva sacchabda ityabhyupagamaḥ/PP*, pp. 29-30
cf. *sāmānyādīnām trayāṇām svātma-sattvam/PDS* (Chowkhamba), p. 133

(ix) *anugataṃ hi sāmānyam ucyate/vyāvṛttaś ca viśeṣaḥ/PP,* p. 55, *anuvṛttākārāvabhāsinī hi buddhiḥ sāmānyasiddhau nibandhanam/PP*, p. 87
cf. x x *sāmānyam/taccānuvṛtta-pratyayakāraṇam// PDS* (Chowkhamba), p. 51 x x *viśeṣaḥ/te cātyantavyāvṛtti-buddhihetutvād viśeṣa eva*/Ibid; p. 55

(x) *ayam-ihapratyatvāt samavāya iti padārthavidām udgāraḥ/RP*, p. 69
cf. *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ/PDS* (Chowkhamba), p. 58
iheti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ/VS. 7.1.29

There are again some references to Vaiśeṣika categories and tenets in the works of Śālikanātha.

Prakaraṇapañjikā (p. 110) counts the six Vaiśeṣika categories—substance, quality, action, generality, inherence and particularity. It does not fail to mention that Śālikanātha as a Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka does not accept inherence as an eternal category like the Vaiśeṣikas.[8]

It further shows that some substances i.e. the *paramāṇus* of earth, water, fire and air and *ākāśa*, soul, mind, space and time are eternal.[9] Mind is like a *paramāṇu* in size. It is eternal since it is existent and at the same time is not produced from any cause. It is very swift in motion as we find it to move from one sense-organ to another in the smallest possible time.[10] Mind comes in contact with the soul due to the latter's merits and demerits earned from time immemorial.[11]

The red colour in the earthly *paramāṇus* are due to the contact with fire, technically called *pāka* (chemical action).[12]

The non-inherent cause of all the specific qualities of the soul is the contact between the soul and the mind. This contact cannot take place where either of the constituents is absent. And the mind resides inside the body.[13] Now the effect occurs when the non-inherent cause is present and hence the specific qualities of the soul are not cognized outside the body.[14]

The account amply shows that Śālikanātha had a thorough knowledge of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* and the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. It will again establish the identification of the Mīmāṃsaka Śālikanātha with the author of the commentary of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. The Vaiśeṣika materials casually touched in the Mīmāṃsā works throw some light on a dark period of the history of Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

In the *Nyāyamuktāvalī* of Aparārka on Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra* we find a quotation from Śālikanātha's *Vallabhā*: *karmaṇastvavaśyam eva pratyakṣatvam āśrayanīyam, anyathā rathatadārūḍhayoḥ anumeyakarmapakṣe pratipattibhedāsambhavāt ubhayatra saṃyogavibhāgānumitasyāpratyakṣatvāt.*[15] The passage deals with the perceptibility of *karman* and as such can be held as connected with Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. In case our presumption is right this *Vallabhā* in all probability may be identified with the commentary on *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Vide the section "The Problem of the immediate successors of Kaṇāda upto Praśastapāda".
2. *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā*, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, p. 211.
3. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (Chowkhamba ed.), p. 196.
4. *Kiraṇāvalī* (BI), p. 288.
5. *Prakaraṇapañjikā* (Chowkhamba), p. 45.
6. *Rasasāra*, p. 100.
7. *Nyāyakandalī* (GOS), p. 38.
8. *samavāyaṃ ca na vayaṃ kāśyapīyā iva nityam abhyupema/PP*, p. 26.
9. *kiṃcid dravyaṃ nityam, paramāṇvākāśātmamano-dikkālādirūpam/PP*, p. 84
10. *paramāṇuparimāṇaṃ manaḥ/*
    tacca sadakāraṇatvān nityam/
    āśusañcāri ca tat/āśutarendriyādhiṣṭhānadarśanāt/PP, p. 157.
11. *tasya ca manaso 'nādidharmādharmāpekṣaḥ kṣetrajñena saṃyogaḥ/ PP*, p. 157.
12. *pārthivānām aṇunāṃ śyāmatvaṃ pākapadāvedanīyāgni-saṃyogenaiva nirvartitam iti/PP*, p. 152.
13. *sarvātmaguṇānām ātmamanaḥ-sannikarṣo 'samavāyikāraṇam/sa ca saṃyoga ātmamanovirahеṇa anyatra na vartate/manaś ca śarīrāntaram avatiṣṭhate/ PP*, p. 157.
14. *yatraiva cāsamavāyikāraṇam tatraiva kāryam iti na bahirdeham ātmano guṇopalambhaḥ/PP*, p. 158.
15. *Nyāyasāra* (S.S. Shastri ed, Madras), p. 160.

VYOMŚIVĀCĀRYA

Of the three available commentaries on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, Vyomavatī* was the oldest. The commentary is named after its commentator Vyomaśiva. He was probably a śaiva teacher from the south and was definitely the leader of a distinct school of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. He must have commanded a great influence on contemporary and subsequent authors. Udayana respectfully referred to him as ācārya.[1] However Śrīdhara calls Vyomaśiva an unschooled commentator of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.[2]

Very little is known about the date of Vyomaśiva. Some scholars identified Śivāditya with the Vyomaśiva. But it has been proved wrong since Śivāditya flourished even after Udayana who again is one century later than Śrīdhara who criticized Vyomaśiva.

From Rājaśekhara's *Pañjikā*, a subcommentary on Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī,* it is clear that on a number of occasions Vyomaśiva was refuted by Śrīdhara. From the quotations and names, no authors later than Dharmakīrti and Kumārila are apparently found in the *Vyomavatī*. This suggests Vyomaśiva's date to be the end of the seventh century. But Prof. B.K. Matilal says,[3] "Vyomaśiva preceded both Śrīdhara and Udayana." But he apparently criticized some views of Bhāsarvajña. Thus he must be placed between Bhāsarvajña and Śrīdhara. According to D.C. Bhattacharya "*Vyomavatī* was patronised by a Malava king called Śrīharṣa, grandfather of the famous Bhojadeva. Thus his date should be in the range of 948-72 AD ... There is also a suggestion in Vardhamāna's gloss on Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī,* according to which *Vyomavatī* could be placed before Vacaspati I. But this remains to be proven."

Vyomaśiya was a pupil of a very great scholar, who must have written some texts to refer Buddhist views. He pays respect to his teacher many times in his text, but never mentions his name. For example, regarding the *trairūpya* doctrine of Dignāga, there are two views: one that reads an *eva* (only) in all the three statements to clarify the ambiguity in the predication, and the other that rejects such reading. Vyomaśiva supports the second view and comments that his teacher has elaborately discussed the point.[4] The other topics his *guru* dealt with are the nature of the whole, proofs of God, refutation of momentariness, definition of perception, refutation of Sāṃkhya, verbal testimony, the number of instrument of knowledge and the like.[5]

Vyomaśiva calls the Praśasta's work clearly as a *saṃgraha* but at the same time he knows it as a *bhāṣya* also.

Vyomaśiva, as a Vaiśeṣika author, held some so-called unorthodox views. For instance he accepted, probably under the influence of Bhāsarvajña, the Naiyāyika, that verbal testimony is an independent means of knowledge.[6] Although Praśastapāda's text leaves no doubt about the fact that verbal testimony is to be included under inference, Vyomaśiva offers an ingenious interpretation to support his own view.

It may be noted in this connection that the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 9.19 *etena śābdaṃ vyākhyātam* ("In this manner, the verbal testimony is explained.") is ambiguous enough to accommodate both views: inclusion of verbal testimony under inference and counting verbal testimony as an independent *pramāṇa*.

"Vyomaśiva mentions *Padārthasaṃkara* as the name of the work which he cites twice in support of his interpretation and which is not the same as the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda. He quotes from Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*, Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya*, Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* and Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*".[7]

Vyomaśiva mentions many Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* but three quotations identified to be the *sūtras* have not been properly traceable to any known source. They are:

1. *viramya vyāpārābhyupagamena "śabdakarmabuddhyādīnāṃ viramya vyāpārāsambhavād" (?) iti sūtravirodhāt. Vyomavatī* (I), p. 58
2. *"smṛtir vāsanākhyāt" (?) iti sūtram darśayati. Vyomavatī* (I), p. 153
3. *tathā ca sūtrakāreṇāpyuktam—"rūpādiṣu spārśanaṃ jñānam iti kasmāt na bhavati iti tadabhāvāt" sparśatvasāmānyasyābhāvāt ... Vyomavatī* (II), p. 19. This third one may be an indication to the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* (4.1.11) *tadabhāvād avyabhicāraḥ*.

Vyomaśiva refers to a great number of the earlier exponents apparently of the *Kaṇādasūtras* and also of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* but it appears to be quite impossible to discover any great personality with the help of them.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *viśeṣaguṇavattvāt pṛthivyādivad ityācāryāḥ, Kiraṇāvalī* (BI), p. 350. *ācāryāḥ vyomaśivācāryāḥ, Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*, p. 350.
2. *NK* (BORI), p. 357.
3. *A History of Indian Literature*, Ed. J. Gonda, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, B.K. Matilal, 1977, p. 68.
4. *Vyomavatī* (II), P. 149
5. Ibid (II), pp. 130, 140, 171, 173.
6. Ibid (II), pp. 174-5 *ataḥ śabdasyāptoktatvena prāmāṇyān nānumāne 'ntarbhāvaḥ,* Ibid (II) p. 171.
7. EIP (II), p. 426.

VYOMAVATĪ

From the fragmentary portion at the beginning of the text, Vyomaśiva is found to refer to the fashion in which the *sūtras* were composed by Kaṇāda. Through the grace of Maheśvara (i.e. Śiva) the sage Kaṇāda acquired the knowledge of the six categories and composed the *sūtras*. As these were brief, and beyond the understanding of the people, Praśastapāda gave an exposition of their contents. Kaṇāda's treatment of the categories intended to help people in getting final release (mokṣa), which is a prosperous state when the nine qualities of the soul are annihilated. It must therefore be understood, that this system concerns itself with the means of attaining final release and does not deal with the three other pursuits of life, which are accomplished with little effort. One who gets correct knowledge of the six categories is required to meditate on it. Continuous meditation will remove the erroneous cognition along with their products such as hatred. Then there results the cessation of activities, upon which merit and demerit do not any longer arise. Whatever be the results, those still left over, will be destroyed by experiencing them. Then the stage of final release comes into being.

The views of several schools about the nature of final release are reviewed here.

The first view is that Brahman's nature is bliss and the soul gets it in the released state. This is baseless, as there is no means such as body, or mind etc. during the stage of final release to enable the soul to have the enjoyment of bliss. The word "bliss" is to be taken in the figurative sense, to mean absence of pain.

According to the second theory, final release consists in discrimination between matter and spirit. This view is to be rejected, as the basic concepts of matter and spirit maintained by the Sāṃkhya school which holds this theory, are untenable.

The third theory is maintained by the idealistic Buddhists who hold that final release consists in the use of knowledge which is free from likes, dislikes, etc. due to reflection on the instability of the world. This theory cannot be maintained, as the soul and the world are established to be stable.

The Jainas hold a fourth theory, according to which an imperishable body is acquired during the state of release by reflecting upon the non-exclusive (*anekānta*) nature of things. A theory like this is to be rejected, since a non-exclusive nature cannot lead to a state of a decisive nature such as release.

According to the fifth theory, which is held by the Advaitins, the individual soul gets lost during the released state in the supreme soul by realizing that the soul is only one. This theory cannot be maintained, as the knowledge that the soul is only one and the world illusory cannot be helpful in attaining the released state.

The sixth theory, which declares that the state of release is characterized by śabdādvaita (word-monism) and is the theory maintained by the grammarians, cannot be accepted since it cannot be proved that all except the word is illusory.

The last theory referred to declares that through the grace of Śiva the impure prosperity in which the soul finds itself gets destroyed and then the soul acquires the qualities of Śiva. This theory, which was held by schools of Śaivism such as Pāśupata

Śaivasiddhānta, and others, does not stand to reason, as the qualities of one soul cannot be acquired by another.

Six categories are mentioned by Praśastapāda. Negation is not mentioned along with these, as its position is subordinated to those of the positive categories. It is only when a positive object is known that its absence can be apprehended.

In the word *tattvajñāna* ("knowledge of reality") *tattva* is to be taken as the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the substantive *jñāna*. *Tattva* means accurate and accuracy is the characteristic of certain judgements. In this way erroneous cognitions can be kept aside from being included under *tattvajñāna*.

The discussion on the relation between the part and the whole in the *Vyomavatī* follows.

How do the parts and the whole become related to each other? If the whole is said to exist partially in the parts, then the whole must have some parts not covered by it and would cease to be the composite whole. Then it must be taken to exist in different regions. In such a case the whole cannot be apprehended as a unit. Actually, what is cognized is only a conglomeration of parts such as colour, taste and so forth. Substance and quality, etc., the parts of things, cannot therefore have independent existence. Differences between them are not apprehended. So the apprehensions of objects has to be admitted as constituting reality.

Answer: This theory which is put forward by the Buddhists cannot stand, since there is correlation (*pratisandhāna*) between the judgements of two qualities apprehended by two separate sense-organs. This co-relation would be without a base if there were no object like a substance to which they could belong.

The Buddhist may say that the apprehension of an object can only be of the non-propositional (*nirvikalpaka*) type. The apprehension of the "parts", i.e. the thing's qualities, are contributed by conceptual constructedness (*vikalpa*) in the perceptual judgement, which arises subsequently. This can be proved to have been caused by the recollection of the traits of the object already perceived. Both non-propositional and propositional judgements of perception must therefore be held to arise from the object possessing the characteristic features. Otherwise the judgement concerning the whole object would depend completely on the nature of the words which denote it, which is absurd. So the propositional judgement of perception must be admitted to arise as soon as the contact is effected between the sense-organs and the object. The differences between the two kinds of judgement—propositional and non-propositional—are due to the differences in the accessory conditions that help in producing these judgements. And the fact that the two kinds of judgements are different, is sufficient to prove that objects are not without qualities; they have parts and each of them, or at least most of them, are cognized by more than one sense-organ. These parts are found to exist in one and the same composite whole.

The number of substances is no more than nine. Shadow (*chāyā*) is not an independent substance, for a shadow is only whose shade is cast there and whose movement creates the impression of movement.

The definitions offered by Praśastapāda for the various categories and their

subdivisions are analysed and explained. The case of the definition of inherence may be cited here. Praśastapāda defines inherence as the cause of a judgement that something of a given kind is "here", and it is said to be a relation between inseparable things, as well as between things related to each other as container and contained. The first part of the definition, Vyomaśiva explains, as having the function, of excluding from the definition, a case such as seeing a village from a distance and seeing the trees as located there also. However, we do not say that the trees occur "here"—i.e. as a property of the village—and so this is not a case of inherence. As for the second part of the definition, a bird flying in the sky and the sky are related to each other, but inherence cannot be the relation since they are not related to each other as container and contained. The *vadara* fruit and a basin have the relationship of container and contained, but are not inseparable; thus the third part of the definition.

Qualities and motions inhere in a substance and when all of them are destroyed, inherence continues to exist; it is not produced anew. It does not have a substratum other than the individuals (*vyakti*) which it relates.

The earth is proved to have variegated colour (*citrarūpa*). This agrees with Uddyotakara's comment on *NS* IV.2.12, above.

The existence of atoms is proved by inference. A composite whole must have parts of a size smaller than that of the whole. However, there is an end to this process; otherwise infinite regress would result. The point at which the regress is cut off, demarcates the size, known as "atomic" (*paramāṇu*).

The earthly body is made up of only one element which is the material cause for it. It cannot be a product of all five elements (*pañcabhautika*) because in that case it would be required to show the presence in the body of the specific and individual qualities of all these elements such as white colour which is brilliant, touches of the hot, cold and lukewarm kinds, and so on, and also the qualities formed through the application of heat and those not so formed. The particular features of the triads formed through the atoms of more than one element forming the constituent dyads could not be explained. Moisture, heat, motion, and space, which are the results of the operations of the elements, are not always apprehended in bodies of the earthly type. Their occasional apprehension is to be explained by admitting earth as their material cause and the other four elements as other kinds of causal factors. In this sense the term *pāñcabhautika* might be reinterpreted to accord with our theory.

There is a lengthy discussion on the nature of air. Air is perceived through the cutaneous sense. This judgement takes the form "the chill wind blows", "the hot wind blows". This cannot be a case of inference since the middle term in an inference is to be remembered after the rise of subsumptive reflection (*parāmarśa*) and it does not rise here. Nor can this be a case of verbal testimony, since no words are involved here. Vyomaśiva quotes *VS* 4.1.6 as laying down the conditions of perceptual judgements. These conditions are that the object perceived must have large (*mahat*) size, have parts, and have manifested colour. Vyomaśiva remarks that these conditions apply fully in certain cases, but only partially in others. They apply fully in those cases where both the cutaneous and visual sense-organs operate. In other cases, possession of manifested

colour cannot be a condition. In the case of the soul, for example, only one condition, namely large size, is available, due to which it is perceived only by the internal sense but not by the visual sense, for which large size and possession of parts constitute the conditions. On the other hand in the case of earth etc., all three conditions stand. During the night, fire is perceived even from a distance because of its prominent colour. Though possessed of large size and parts, mountains are not perceived at night since colour is wanting in them. But when there is external light the mountains are perceived even from far away. Little importance is attached here to large size.

While dealing with *ākāśa,* Vyomaśiva refers to the need for offering more than one kind of evidence to prove a certain conclusion. This does not constitute any defect in the methods of debate and discussion. A few arguments are sufficient to convince some people, while others require more.

There is a detailed discussion about negations. While positive existents have certain features marking them, negations have no such features. Apprehension becomes possible only through their dependence on the positive existents. The judgement which arises about the negation of a jar on the ground is produced by a sense-organ. It depends for its arising upon the ground that is qualified by the negation of jar. If the apprehension of the ground, bereft of jar, were not due to the negation, then such a judgement should arise even when the jar is present there. Hence the apprehension of the negation of a jar is itself the non-apprehension of the jar, and is not merely negation of apprehension. The *Vyomavatī* features a detailed treatment of the non-inherent cause. The function of this cause is to bring about an effect in that which is near to or related to it, by inhering in the same substratum. The non-inherent cause is of two kinds: (i) called *laghvī,* where it (the inherent cause) inheres in the same substratum as its effect does, (2) called *bṛhatī,* where it inheres in the same substratum as the inherent cause of the effect does.

An example of the *laghvī* variety is the case, where one sound causes another. Both the non-inherent cause (the first sound) and the effect (the second sound) inhere in the same substratum, namely *ākāśa*. Here, however, the first sound cannot produce an effect anywhere; it must produce its effect nearby—thus the restriction in the original explication of this kind of cause in the previous paragraph. Merit and demerit are non-inherent causes of the *laghvī* sort.

For an example of the *bṛhatī* kind, Vyomaśiva offers the colour of the thread which help to produce the colour of the cloth woven from those threads. Here the colour of the threads inheres in the threads, and the inherent cause of the effect, namely the cloth, also inheres in the threads.

The first kind is called *laghvī,* "light" and the second *bṛhatī,* "heavy" because the first involves a simpler or more direct relationship than the second does. Colour, taste, smell, touch which is neither hot nor cold, size and viscidity are always of the second, "heavy" kind when they function as non-inherent causes. So also are the numbers above one. The number one, and separateness-of-one-thing, are always of the first kind when they function as non-inherent causes.

Since negations are not found to inhere anywhere they have non-inherent causes. However, they do have instrumental causes.

The effects of chemical action (*pāka*) take place in earth atoms only. Conjunctions with fire are of varied kinds, as is borne out by their varied effects. The Vaiśeṣika system believes that a motion has several parts lasting normally for five moments. The process of change is a sequential one marked by the gradual rise of conjunctions and disjunction and of new qualities after the destruction of the previous ones. Calculations are made to fix the time it takes for a substance to undergo a change in qualities due to chemical action. Vyomaśiva maintains that it takes nine moments for the new quality to be produced.

The elements have eternal numbers, while earthly products have non-eternal numbers. The highest number is said to be *parārdha*, that is 10^{14}. Vyomaśiva offers an elaborate explanation to show how the judgements of numbers are produced by enumerative cognitions.

While dealing with the four kinds of size, it is said that the sizes of triangular, quadrangular and circular objects are only the results of particular arrangements of the component parts and so are not independent kinds of sizes. But even when there is dim light and the particular arrangement of the parts is not noticed, pillars and other things appear as long or tall, etc. So the short and long, etc., sizes must be admitted as distinct kinds. By sub-dividing the large and atomic sizes into eternal and non-eternal, the number of sizes can be taken as six.

The size of an atom is called "atomic-size" (*paramāṇu-parimāṇa*), the size of a dyad is called "dyadic-size" (*dvyaṇuka-parimāṇa*). The size of a triad is large (*mahat*). Two atoms, when they combine together to form a dyad, can only give rise to two atomic-sizes and not to a dyadic-size. Similarly, dyadic-size in the three dyads can produce only three dyadic-sizes, not large-ness. Thus in these cases the size of the causes cannot produce the size in the effects. Therefore duality (*dvitva*) is considered to give rise to the size of the dyad, and triplicity (*tritva*) to that of the triad. Duality and triplicity can only be produced by the enumerative cognitions of a person who can cognise the number of the atoms and dyads. Such a person can only be God, or, conceivably, a *yogin*.

While interpreting the two-fold classification of doubt as external and internal, Vyomaśiva cites *NS* I.1.23, and explains that cases of doubt arising from apprehension based on the possession of a certain thing when we can understand the object in more than one way, are to be classed as external doubt, while cases been apprehended and failed to be apprehended in an object are to be called internal doubt. The basis for internal doubt lies in the apprehension and non-apprehension, getting in turn apprehended by the internal organ. Vyomaśiva justifies this, criticising the *Nyāyabhāṣya* commentary on this *sūtra*. The division into three kinds of doubt, on the strength of the *sūtra* in question, must be given up, since the twofold classification is justified on the ground that some of the cases in the fivefold distinction are instances of doubt based on perception while others are based on non-perception.

Vyomaśiva produces a clever reading designed to suggest that Praśastapāda's authority is not unequivocally favourable towards the inclusion of verbal testimony under inference. On this reading Praśastapāda meant to say that all instruments of knowledge except verbal testimony are to be included under inference. Vyomaśiva admits that the

more obvious reading—that verbal testimony should be classified as a kind of inference—is also possible.

Vyomaśiva says that there are subdivisions of the four kinds of *asiddha* fallacy Praśastapāda lists. He says that all these subvarieties fall under one or another of the main four. Some say that some of them, e.g. a fallacy called *tadbhāvāsiddha* and one called *anumeyāsiddha*, belong under inference for oneself, rather than inference for others. Vyomaśiva rejects this, holding that the same fallacies of the *hetu* may arise in either of the two kinds of inference.

Vyomaśiva finds four subvarieties of *viruddha*, namely

(a) Where the *hetu* occurs in a part of the *vipakṣa*;
(b) Where a *sapakṣa* is known, but the *hetu* pervades *vipakṣa*;
(c) Where no *sapakṣa* is known and *hetu* pervades *vipakṣa*;
(d) Where a *sapakṣa* is known and *hetu* occurs in a part of *vipakṣa*.

Likewise, he offers four varieties of the *anaikāntika* or *sandigdha* fallacy:
(a) Where the *hetu*, while pervading *sapakṣa*, occurs in a part of *vipakṣa;*
(b) Where the *hetu* occurs in a part of *sapakṣa*, but pervades *vipakṣa*;
(c) Where *hetu* occurs in parts of both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*;
(d) (*pakṣatrayavṛtti*).

Praśastapāda, in discussing the *sandigdha* fallacy, remarks that if one actually had a case where there were two contradictory *hetus* of equal authority one would not have this kind of fallacy; one would not even have a case of doubt, for in such a case no definite proposition could be formulated. Does Praśastapāda aim, by speaking of "two contradictory *hetus*", to classify such a case under *viruddha*? No, says Vyomaśiva; he means precisely that this is not a case of *viruddha*. Vyomaśiva thinks of it as a kind of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* case.

In commenting on memory, Praśastapāda remarks that recollection must have for its object a thing that has passed away from the time when it operated (*atīta*). This does not, however, mean that the object must have been destroyed. It may still exist, but not at the same place as when the original perception, which produced the memory, grasped it. Therefore *atīta* must be taken to mean that recollection has as its object, something the experience of which has passed. But does this mean that memory has an object? No, says Vyomaśiva. It does not function with respect to external objects by itself, for the sense-organs are inoperative; the object remembered may no longer exist at all.

Inherence is perceptible by indeterminate perception, e.g. when one judges the conjunctions among the parts of a whole.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The excerpts from "*Vyomavatī*" in *EIP*(II), pp. 427-453 are taken here.

ŚRĪDHARA AND HIS *NYĀYAKANDALĪ*

Next after Vyomaśivācārya, Śrīdhara is the renowned Vaiśeṣika commentator on Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. The name of his commentary is *Nyāyakandalī*. From its colophon[1] we come to know that in the Southern Rāḍha country there was a village named Bhurisṛṣṭi, wherefrom our commentator hailed. The village has been identified with modern Bhursut in Howrah district of West Bengal. Śrīdhara's parents were Baladeva and Acchokā or Abbokā,[2] and Bṛhaspati, a brahmin of Vandyaghaṭi section was his grandfather.[3] Pāṇḍudāsa, belonging to a Kāyastha caste, was his patron-cum-student.[4]

Śrīdhara flourished in AD 991 which is known from his own statement, that he wrote his *Nyāyakandalī* in '913 Śaka era.'[5] He composed four works—a Vedānta work entitled *Advayasiddhi*, a work of Mīmāṃsā entitled *Tattvaprabodha*, a work called *Tattvasamvādinī* and the present work *Nyāyakandalī*.[6] Except the *Nyāyakandalī* all the other three works are lost.

Though nothing more about Śrīdhara's personal history is known, we can have some more assessment from his writing about his career as a philosopher. The great honour paid to Kumārila makes us to think that Śrīdhara belonged to the Kumārila school.[7] Śrīdhara mentions Nyāyabhāṣyakāra[8] and Nyāyavārttikakāra[9] but there is no testimony that he knew Tātparyaṭīkākāra Vācaspati—though it was possible for him. In fact, Śrīdhara and Vācaspati—none of them knew one another.

The term *Nyāyakandalī* means 'the *kandalī* in the form of *Nyāya* (syllogistic arguments)'. But what is kandalī? Mallinātha in his commentary *Sañjīvanī* on *Meghadūta* 1.31 (*kandalī cānukaccham*), cites the *Śabdārṇava* sentence: *droṇaparṇī snigdhakandā kandalī bhūkadalyapi*. From it, we now *kandalī* has a synonym, *bhūkadalī*, and most probably it is a type of shrub. *Medinī* lexicon says: *kaladhvānau kandalī tu mṛgagulma-prabhedayoḥ*. So here also *kandalī* is said to be a type of shrub with its other meaning of a type of deer also.

The *Nyāyakandalī* proves its writer's full acquaintance, with and erudition in the śāstras like Patañjali's Yogaśāstra, Kapila's Sāṅkhya Śāstra, Kumārila's works, Akṣapāda's Nyāyaśāstra, Maṇḍanamiśra's works, the Buddhist philosophy particularly of Dharmakīrti and the like. Apart from these *Kandalī* is full of information about the earlier authors introduced by *kaścit, kecit, anye, apare, eke,* etc. In a number of cases Vyomaśiva, the earlier Vaiśeṣika commentator, has been contradicted by Śrīdhara who never mentions him by name. We have discussed the topic in detail in the next section.

Among the opponents of Śrīdhara, Maṇḍanamiśra occupies a prominent position. In the context of self-authoritativeness of the verbal statement, Śrīdhara sought the support from Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*.[10] Maṇḍana's another work *Vibhramaviveka* also has been referred to in connection with ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) form of knowledge. The verse line is *niścite na khalu sthānāv ūrddhvatvena viśerate*.[11]

Potency (*śakti*) does not work if it is not in its substratum. Support has been sought from *Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍana who says *tadāhitatvāt tasya śaktiḥ*.[12]

In all the above three cases, Śrīdhara is found not to be against Maṇḍana, but here is a case where Śrīdhara contradicts him. Maṇḍana in his *Sphoṭasiddhi* said: Impressions give rise to the ideas of only those things by the character whereof they are themselves impressed; and hence it is not right to accept the idea of any other thing to be brought about by them.[13]

Udayana being a Vaiśeṣika ācārya sharply contradicts in *Kiraṇāvalī* a number of Śrīdhara's views.

The following are some of the special views of Śrīdhara:

(i) The darkness is not a separate substance and also it is not the negation of light. That the darkness is the negation of light is well-known and established view of the Vaiśeṣikas. There is also the supporting Vaiśeṣika *sūtra, drvya-guṇa-karma-niṣpatti-vaidharmyād bhā'bhāvas tamaḥ* (5.2.21). But the interpretation according to Śrīdhara is this "as darkness is apprehended only when there is the negation of light so that the very negation of light, is darkness is a popular expression.[14] According to him, darkness is the quality (black colour) of earth."

(ii) On the question of possibility of salvation, the logicians argue: "Whatever comes into being successively is perishable, like the wheel of fire, thus the series of sorrows in the self finally gets cut off because it is a series like the series of flashes constituting lamplight". Śrīdhara, however, does not accept it since he thinks there is a counter example to be found in the series of colours belonging to atoms of earth, which he takes to be an endless series.[15]

(iii) Śrīdhara is in favour of contact between two substances (like monkey and tree) as whole, not in parts, i.e. contact according to him is locus-pervading.[16]

(iv) He "is of the opinion that qualities do not arise in a substance until a moment after the substance has come into existence (at the earliest), and likewise, since the cause of the destruction of a colour is the destruction of the substance in which it inheres (except in cooking), the quality persists for a moment after the substance is destroyed. He seems to be motivated in this doctrine by the extreme importance, the Naiyāyikas place upon keeping quite separate substances and their properties. Śrīdhara seems to be driven by this, to allow qualities a fleeting existence without any loci, which goes against the ordinary Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine, yet his position is so, in later works, e.g. the *Tarkabhāṣā*".[17]

Saṃgrahaṭīkā mentioned in the *Nyāyakandalī* (pp. 279, 377) has become a matter of concern as to what it actually refers to. Gopinath Kaviraj thinks that *Saṃgrahaṭīkā* is another name of the *Nyāyakandalī*. But V. Varadachari identifies it as the *Vyomavatī*.[18] But it is for certain that Kaviraj's view is correct. The meaning of the concerned places is clear, Śrīdhara does not want a detailed discussion, as it (the *Nyāyakandalī*) is a commentary (*ṭīkā*) on a summary (*saṃgraha*) referring to Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.

Dharmottara (750-810, according to Frauwallner) has once been referred to and criticized by Śrīdhara.

The *Nyāyakandalī* has been one of the chief source books of the great logician Udayanācārya. In a small neo-logical tract named *Upasargavicāra*, Śrīdhara's views have been explained and refuted.[19] Kandalīkāra's explanation of some topics appear to have

been followed as a standard text. For example, in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, a section of Bauddhadarśana (Abhyaṅkara ed. pp. 20-2) and the *Nyāyakandalī* Anumāna section (pp. 479-490) may be taken up for comparison.

There is no doubt that *Kandalī* presupposes a throbbing culture of the Vaiśeṣika studies in Bengal. But we are helpless to get a picture of this early period. However, we have come to know that Bengal already gave birth to a Vaiśeṣika scholar Śālikanātha. Perhaps it would not be wrong then, that the rich tradition of the Vaiśeṣika system which was carried on by Śrīdhara, was also shared by Śālikanātha. Anyway, we may suppose one more century after Śrīdhara for a glorious period in Vaiśeṣika studies therein. The advent and grand success of Udayana and his *Kiraṇāvalī* in Mithila, completely stopped the study of *Kandalī* in Bengal, as the Bengalee scholars began to study the Mithila texts and exerted all strength to comment upon those. Lastly, to add, the *Vyomavatī* and the *Kandalī* attempt to present the Vaiśeṣika as an independent philosophical school. Udayana treats it as a support to neo-logic, of which he was the founder. From Udayana onwards the seven categories replace the Nyāya *prameyas*. Earlier Vaiseṣika was a supporting adjunct to the Nyāya. Udayana effected a complete merger, denying independent existence for the Vaiśeṣikas.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *NK* (BORI), p. 699.
2. Vide colophonic verse Nos. 5, 6 of *NK*.
3. Vide colophonic verse No. 4. Though some good editions have the reading *vṛhaspatir iva*, it must be *vṛhaspatir iti*. BORI edition of *NK* supplies the correct reading.
4. *NK* (BORI), p. 701.
5. *NK* (BORI), p. 701.
6. Vide *NK* (BORI), pp. 19, 208, 356.
7. *VNNC*, p. 7.
8. Vide *NK* (BORI), pp, 555, 589, 626.
9. Vide *NK* (BORI), 535, 570, 605.
10. *NK* (BORI), p. 513.
11. Vide *NK* (BORI), p. 598.
12. *NK* (BORI), p. 620
13. Vide *NK* (BORI), p. 617:
    saṃskāraḥ khalu yadvasturūpaprakhyā-vibhāvitaḥ/
    phalaṃ tatraiva janayantyato 'rthe dhīr na kalpyate//
14. *NK* (BORI), pp. 21-6.
15. *NK* (BORI), p. 9.
16. *EIP* (II), pp. 114-5.
17. *EIP* (II), pp. 118-9.
18. *EIP* (II), p. 485
19. *VNNC*, p. 6.

ŚRĪDHARA'S CRITICISM OF VYOMAŚIVA

Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī* has been admitted as a valuable treasure in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, or broadly speaking in the whole of Indian philosophy. In this commentary, the views introduced with *eke, anye, apare, kecit,* etc. are profuse in number. Lucky as we are, at least one commentary i.e. Rājaśekhara's *Pañjikā* on it tries its best to identify those in a faithful manner. And from it, it has been revealed, that a number of views among them are of Vyomaśiva. From them we come to know that Śrīdhara could not bear with Vyomaśiva in the least. He designated him as unschooled (*aśrutavyākhyātṛ*), because the latter invented the meaning according to his own intelligence.[1] Moreover, to Śrīdhara, Vyomaśiva is not at all a sound scholar, and that is why he fails to grasp the intention of ācārya (Praśastapāda) like a blind man, and falters at every step.[2] Śrīdhara uses the epithet *tārkikāḥ* about Vyomaśiva sarcastically (i.e. a bad logician).[3]

Anyway, Śrīdhara controverts Vyomaśiva in his *Nyāyakandalī* many times mentioning often Vyomaśiva's name. In the light of the *Pañjikā* we can easily find them out, and verify with Vyomaśiva's own writing. The following are the views along with Śrīdhara's answers.

1. Praśastapāda in the initial verse of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha,* mentions *praṇamya hetum īśvaram*. Here *praṇamya* means 'after saluting'. This simple meaning is admitted by Vyomaśiva.[4] But according to Śrīdhara the purpose here cannot lie in such a simple action, it is Praśastapāda's proposition admitting god as an auxiliary cause of the world.[5]

2. To prove the existence of salvation Vyomaśiva puts forward a syllogism: The series of nine special qualities of the soul ceases absolutely, because it is a series; Anything called a series is found to have been ceased absolutely, just like the series of light rays emitted by a lamp. It is similar to that series, so it must cease absolutely.[6] Śrīdhara notes, the series of pains in place of nine special qualities of soul, while mentioning the *pūrvapakṣa*.[7]

Śrīdhara contradicts Vyomaśiva's argument. It is directly contradicted by the example of the series of the colour etc. of the earth atoms which are never destroyed. Śrīdhara is inclined to seek support from Upanisadic text "*aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ priyāpriye na spṛśataḥ*" (He is without a body, pleasure and pain do not touch Him). And in this context he argues a lot to achieve his own objective.[8]

3. Some thinkers contradicted the thesis that darkness is a substance, in this way: if darkness (black in colour) would be a substance, it would create obstruction to other objects, because a substance having colour invariably has touch, and further a tangible object must offer an obstruction.

This 'some' as identified by Rājaśekhara, is the reference to the Naiyāyika or Vyomaśiva.[9] But the corresponding portion of the *Vyomavatī* appears not to lead to the above argument.[10] Anyway, the argument against the darkness, forwarded by others, is not satisfactory to Śrīdhara. And after a long argument he decided the darkness to be a quality of earth.[11]

4. Under the *PDS* passage "The character of being an effect (*kāryatva*) and that of being non-eternal (*anityatva*) belong only to substances, qualities and actions that have

causes,"[12] Śrīdhara cites the views of some who understood the meaning of 'the character of being an effect' as to be 'inherence in the cause of one's own" or "inherence in 'Existence' prior to non-existence".[13] Here Rājaśekhara identifies the opponent philosophers as Vyomaśivapāda.[14] It means that both the views regarding the meaning "the character of being an effect" are of Vyomaśiva. But we find, in the corresponding portion of the *Vyomavatī*, that the second view is not of Vyomaśiva. And Vyomaśiva himself mentioned it to be the view of some other interpreters.[15]

Śrīdhara, contradicting both of the views, says, that as none of them apply to 'destruction' which is as good an effect as anything else, the definitions fail to hit the target. And according to him, "the character of being an effect" is the fact of its having its existence (manifestation or appearance) dependent upon the action of a cause and as such this definition is found to apply to all effects.

5. In the same context of the *PDS* passage, Śrīdhara cites a view of one opponent philosopher, who defines "the character of being non-eternal" as to be "the liability of production and destruction".[16] Rājaśekhara identifies this opponent philosopher to be "Vyomaśiva".[17] In fact Vyomaśiva, admits it in a slightly technical way in his work. Non-eternality is the existence of a substance which is limited by two negations, prior and posterior. Obviously this turns out to be the same with Śrīdhara's citation of Vyomaśiva's view.[18]

But there is not much in this definition as prior non-existence (which is non-eternal) is never produced. The common people also call it (i.e. the prior non-existence) non-eternal.[19]

According to Śrīdhara, "the non-eternality consists of the destruction of the particular form of the things".[20]

6. Under the *PDS* sentence "The character of subsisting in substances belongs to substances, qualities and actions, with the exception of the eternal substances".[21] Śrīdhara contradicts Vyomaśiva's explanation of the above.[22] The latter explains: *PDS* has already said that *āśritattvam ca anyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ*[23] and again here it is said *dravyāśritattvaṃ ca anyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ*. The former rule pervades the latter because according to former "the character of being dependent upon something else belongs to all things except the eternal substances." All things, quite naturally include substances, qualities and actions also. So the latter passage *dravyāśritattvam* etc. would be a useless repetition. But as the condition is made by the term *dravya*, so *dravyāśritattva* (character of subsisting in substance) associates with three categories, substances, qualities and actions.[24]

The above is not at all satisfactory according to Śrīdhara. Subsistence in substances could belong to generality and the rest also; and hence the *PDS* sentence in question could not be rightly taken as showing a point of similarity between substance, quality and action only. So the proper explanation could be given in the following manner. In the clause *anyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ* the word *dravya* should be taken as an indication to include also the ultimate particularities of them as they (i.e. particularities) reside in the *dravyas*. Hence the eternal substances as well as the particularities are being set aside. *Dravyāśritattva* is to be explained as *dravye eva āśritattva* i.e. subsistence in substance

alone. By this, generality and inherence are set aside, because they do not subsist in substance alone, but they subsist in quality and action also. Hence here the similarity of the three i.e. substance, qualities and actions, is shown in the *PDS* sentence.[25]

7. One of the similarities between generality, particularity and inherence is said to be *buddhilakṣaṇatva* (i.e. having cognitive faculty as their sole indicator), in the *PDS*.[26]

Vyomaśiva gives three derivations of the word *buddhilakṣaṇatva*.[27] One of them is *buddhyā lakṣyante.* Śrīdhara citing the above reference to Vyomaśiva argues that according to the opponent's interpretation "these are cognized by the means of cognitive faculty" would overextend to the substance, quality and action also, because these also are cognized by the cognitive faculty.[28] And then the difference of the generality etc. from the substance, quality and action could not be shown. So the proper interpretation would be "as having cognitive faculty as their sole indicator" (*buddhir eva lakṣaṇam = pramāṇam yeṣām te buddhilakṣaṇāḥ*).

Vyomaśiva argues for another indication made by the very words *sāmānya* etc. in favour of their *buddhilakśaṇatva*. He says the very words *sāmānya* etc., are subject to any particular indicator from among the knowledge of inclusion (*anugatabuddhi*) and exclusion (*vyāvṛttabuddhi*) and the knowledge 'this is in that' (*ihabuddhi*).[29]

8. Regarding multi-coloured objects Vyomaśiva accepts several variegated colours extending only over certain parts of the object. Śrīdhara just touches Vyomaśiva's view[30] but the latter in his work brings forward a lengthy argument in favour of his own.[31]

Śrīdhara does not accept Vyomaśiva's view. If the colour does not extend over a substance, there would be no colour in a cloth where two threads are yellow and blue; as the colour of either of these two constituent threads could bring about the 'variegated colour'. So, according to him, the two colours give rise to a single 'variegated' colour.[32]

9. Vyomaśiva accepts the perceptibility of air on the evidence of direct perception 'the air is blowing'.[33]

Śrīdhara contradicts the view. As in all direct perception that we have through the tactile organ, it is only 'touch' that is felt, and nothing else. As for the cognition of the 'blowing of air', it is got at by means of inference, which through the force of habit, appears even in the absence of any remembrance of invariable concomitance and other factors necessary in the inferential process, it is similar to our perception by the eye of the shaking of trees etc. (The action in fact is an inferable matter). Anyway, Śrīdhara's discussion, in this regard is rather lengthy and full of subtle arguments.[34]

10. In the context of time, Śrīdhara argues that 'Time is an essential entity, without which nothing could be produced. *Ākāśa* is not produced because of its absolute existence. Man's horns cannot be produced because of its absolute non-existence. Hence the only production that would be possible would be that of something, which has prior non-existence (*pāk asattā*). If there were no time, the word 'prior' would have no meaning, and as such the said qualification of the non-existence of the object to be produced, not being available, there would be nothing else, that would make it an object of production, as distinguished from *ākāśa* and man's horns. And thus we would have no production at all.

But here the question arises, how could any actual cognition be qualified by time, which is an imperceptible entity?

Vyomaśiva tries to give the answer here: the cognition of non-existence in time is a qualified cognition. In this cognition the factor of time is just like the sense-organ. It does not qualify cognition as a stuff qualifies in the cognition "This person is with a stuff".[35]

But according to Śrīdhara, it has no potentiality, because as cognition, consisting as it does, of pure consciousness, it can have no peculiar cause, apart from the relationship of the object.

Hence Śrīdhara proceeds to offer his own reply: in the old and the young, we find that there is a difference in their bodily cognitions; as a cause of this difference we infer the connection of time; and it is after this inference, that we have an idea of their being qualified by time; and inasmuch as the cogniser of both the young and the old is one and the same person, there can be nothing incongruous in the fact of the qualifying adjunct (time) being cognized by means of cognition (inference) other than that of the objects (old and young) themselves. As instance of diverse means of knowledge coalescing in their functions, we have such notions as 'this sandal is fragrant' where the sandal is seen by the eye, and the fragrance is inferred. Here the Mīmāṃsakas' cognition of 'This earth is without the jar' may be compared too.[36]

11. The atoms as atomic in dimension have no shortness and the *ākāśa* as ubiquitous, has no length. This view is of Vyomaśiva.[37] Śrīdhara showing a little distaste for the above view, cites the view of some others (*anye tu...*). Rājaśekhara identifies that the view introduced by *anye tu* is of the author (Śrīdhara) himself.[38] Śrīdhara is rather in favour of admitting dimension in both atom and *ākāśa* on the evidence of the usage, 'extreme shortness' and 'extreme length' in their cases respectively.[39]

12. Conjunction is said to be 'functioning independently' (*nirapekṣa*) in the production of substances. Here Vyomaśiva explains 'functioning independently' as 'not standing in need of a subsequently appearing cause'.[40] We see that after conjunction of the final thread the cloth is produced, and not before it (i.e. conjunction). So in producing the cloth, conjunction does not depend on any posterior causal factor.

But this meaning of the word *nirapekṣa* or *anapekṣa* has no recommendation from Śrīdhara.[41] 'Functioning independently' actually means 'not standing in need of any further cause, except its own substratum and auxiliary cause'. If Vyomaśiva's explanation is followed it would lead to an undesired result. The conjunction would function independently, in the case of production of qualities also. That is, the final conjunction between atoms and fire, required to produce the chemical quality, would not depend on anything, after the destruction of the dark colour of the unbaked jar. But in fact the conjunction depends upon the heat of the fire. Praśastapāda also ruled the dependent functioning of the conjunction.[42]

13. Now about the 'conjunction due to conjunction'. Vyomaśiva explains: suppose a hawk sits on the top of a dead tree trunk. So the first conjunction takes place between the hawk's legs and the top of the trunk. Then from it another conjunction appears and that is the conjunction between (the whole of) the hawk and (the whole of) the trunk. This second conjunction is the 'conjunction due to conjunction'. As such, the 'conjunction due

to conjunction', is the later conjunction of the two wholes, due to former conjunction of the parts 'due to action'.[43]

But it cannot be admitted by Śrīdhara. Conjunction must be admitted between one active 'whole', and another 'whole'. If this is not accepted, then, inasmuch as the parts also would be 'whole' in comparison with their own constituent parts, the 'conjunction born of action' among wholes would become altogether impossible. And then it would become necessary to deny, the activity of all wholes. Or to set aside the definition of action, as 'the independent cause of conjunction and disjunction'.[44]

14. The 'conjunction due to conjunction' has been admitted in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. But it apparently contradicts the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra guṇāś ca guṇāntaram ārabhante*, as according to Vyomaśiva the *sūtra* means: the qualities (i.e. more than one quality) bring about another quality; and in the 'conjunction due to conjunction', one conjunction brings about another conjunction. The *sūtra* then does specify more than two qualities as being productive of a quality, and that specification is with reference to those qualities that belong to the cause, and produce the effect, qualities homogenous to themselves, and it does not refer to all qualities.[45]

Śrīdhara sharply reacts with the above explanation. The *sūtra* never gives such a restricted meaning. It states simply that the quality becomes a cause of another quality, and does not specify whether one or two of them can produce another quality. So the opponent's explanation is nothing but his own unheard of invention.[46]

15. Praśastapāda defines disjunction as *prāptipūrvikā aprāptiḥ* (the separation of two things that have hitherto been in conjunction). Now, does this previous presence mean 'causality' or 'mere existence'? Vyomaśiva contradicts 'mere existence' and supports 'causality' of conjunction to create a conjunction as, if there is the absence of conjunction, along with the (existence of) action, there is no production of disjunction and if there is conjunction along with action, there is production of the same. So causality of the conjunction, must be admitted for the disjunction. Hence conjunction precedes not just in the form of a mere existence, but precedes as cause.[47]

But the above is not acceptable to Śrīdhara. To him, it is only an antecedent. If conjunction were the cause of disjunction, then as soon as the two constituent molecules of a substance would come together, this conjunction, being endowed with the causality towards disjunction, would bring this latter about, and thus there being a disruption of the molecules, no existence would be possible for the whole composite substance.[48]

16. In the section on disjunction, Praśastapāda says that disjunction between finger and *ākāśa* creates the disjunction between body and *ākāśa*. Here Vyomaśiva argues that the body is not the effect of the fingers. So fingers cannot be taken as a factor in the disjunction between body and *ākāśa*.[49] In this case the hand in fact from which the direct effect 'body' appears, is to be taken into consideration. So from the disjunction between hand and *ākāśa* there appears the disjunction between the body and *ākāśa*.[50] In the *Vyomavatī*, we find that Vyomaśiva tries to interpret the exact word *śarīra* as *hasta* (hand). Hence in his explanation, the argument stands as 'disjunction between finger and *ākāśa* produces disjunction between hand and *ākāśa*.'[51] This virtually makes no difference from Śrīdhara's account of the *pūrvapakṣin* in the matter.

Śrīdhara contradicts this explanation. Vyomaśiva's argument does not serve any purpose. The hand also cannot be said to be the direct component cause of the body. But it is the same cause of the arm. If the hand be regarded as a component of the body, on the ground of the latter pervading equally over all its parts, then, on the same ground, the finger would also be a component of the body, as it is the aggregate of all the different member, the hand, the finger, etc., that is recognized as the body.[52]

17. Praśastapāda defines the inferential mark as that which is related to the object to be inferred and is known to exist in that endowed with it and not existing in its contrary.[53] Here in the definition, no such restriction can be justified. So, as a mark in the method of difference alone is a true mark. Thus the expression "(that) is known to exist in that which is connected with that object" would be narrow. Here some suggest the solution. The Vaiśeṣikas have to take help from the kindred system Nyāyaśāstra. That is, only-affirmative and only-negative marks, which are admitted in the Nyāyaśāstra are to be adopted in the Vaiśeṣika śāstra.[54] It implies that Praśastapāda's definition here is only meant for affirmative-negative mark and not the other two mentioned above. Rājaśekhara identifies the opponents to be Vyomaśiva and others.[55]

The above explanation is not justified. As, Śrīdhara says, according to their own explanation, the definition may be applied in different combinations. That is, the qualification 'that which is related to the object to be inferred and is known to exist in that endowed with it' applies to the affirmative inference; while 'that which is related to the object to be inferred, and does not exist in its contrary' applies to the negative inference; and the whole definition applies to affirmative-negative inference. The character of 'proving what is to be proved' applies to all the three kinds of inference; and it serves as the common definition of all inference; just as of all means of right knowledge the common definition is laid down as 'that which affords the cognition of the true object'.[56]

18. One of the vital differences between Śrīdhara and Vyomaśiva is that Vyomaśiva admits the verbal testimony as a separate *pramāṇa* but Śrīdhara does not. In fact, Vyomaśiva's view is against the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of two *pramāṇas*.

Śrīdhara mentions the opponent's view (of the existence of verbal testimony as a separate *pramāṇa*)[57] and this opponent is identified by Rājaśekhara as Vyomaśiva.[58]

The objection is as follows. In an inference, what is cognized is a certain object qualified by the probandum (*sādhya* i.e. property to be inferred). But in the case of the inference of the denotation from the word, no such object can be found. The denotation itself, could not be this 'object', as it is not known at the time. If the word be regarded as that 'object', then what would be its probandum? Mere 'denotability' could not be this probandum, as between the word and its denotation, we cannot detect any such relationship as that of conjunction or inherence, which is perceptible in the case of the mountain and the fire. And hence, the word as qualified by the denotation, could not be the object to be inferred, as the only relation that there is between the word and its denotation, is that of the denoter and the denoted; and this comes after the word has signified the object, and not before that signification. Nor is there any strict unfailing concomitance between the word and its denotation, as there is between fire and smoke;

for the simple reason that we do not find the both appearing at one and the same place and time, i.e. the word is often heard, without the hearer having any idea of the object signified by it, and the object is known, even without its significant word being known. For instance, even though there is no Yudhiṣṭhira living in the present Kali age, yet we find the word *yudhiṣṭhira* being used. Even though there is no Laṅka in Jambudvīpa (India), yet we find the word *Laṅka* used in India. Thus then, inasmuch as we find the accessories of verbal cognition to be of a character quite different from those of inferential cognition, the two cannot be regarded as one and the same.

Moreover, verbal cognition cannot be regarded as the same as inferential cognition, because of the fact that in different countries one and the same word signifies different things. And thus there is no such invariable concomitance between the word and its denotation, as there is between smoke and fire. For instance, the word '*cora*' is found among the people of the South, to be used as a name for cooked rice, though among the people of Āryāvarta (India to the north of the Vindhya range) it is used for thief. If verbal cognition were the same as the inferential, then it would, like the latter, be duly cognized only when there would be present, the three conditions of inference and it would not be based upon the cognition of the fact of its having been uttered by a trustworthy person. As, however the authority of verbal cognition is based solely upon the fact of its originating from a trustworthy source, it cannot but be regarded, on account of this very dissimilarity, as wholly different from inferential cognition.[59]

Śrīdhara contradicts the above and according to him invariable concomitance does not always mean natural concomitance as in the case of smoke and fire. If due to prolonged use the concomitance grows between two things, in that case also the mark can easily lead to the inference of other. And the example he has given is 'when the fore-finger is raised, there appears an inference of number ten with regards to the things not present at that time and place. In this case too, the number is not the subject (*dharmi*), as it is not known. Nor can the particular position of the fore-finger be regarded as the subject, as it is something that is being made cognizable at the time, and as such having no other relationship with the number ten, could not indicate anything qualified by that number. Nor is there any coevality or co-extensiveness between the raising of the finger and the ten things. And yet we find that in the usage of tradesmen there is an unfailing concomitance between that particular position of the fore-finger and the desire of indicating the number ten. Here the gesture may be taken as the indicative. And the observer must have had the recognition of the intention of the person making the gesture. The same may be said with regard to verbal cognition also. When the word "*go*" is uttered, we come to recognize the fact that the speaker wishes to indicate a certain animal with the hump etc. This recognition is due to our having found, that the utterance of the word "*go*", in its own turn, is preceded by an intention of speaking of that animal and this intention leads to the inference of the animal.

The word "*cora*" is as expressive of the thief as of cooked rice. We have no reason for making any such distinction, in regard to the former, that the word is denotative, while with regard to the latter, that it is only indicative. Then again, even among the

Āryas the verbal cognition of what is denoted by the word "cora" is preceded by a definite inferential indicative—because it is a cognition produced by the word "*cora*",—like the cognition produced by the word "*cora*" among the people of the South, in which latter case both the opponents admit the fact of its following upon an inferential indicative. Nor is there any evidence for an inborn relationship between the word and the object denoted by it.

More argument has been made by Śrīdhara, but we would not like to enter into any more subtleties.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *NK* (BORI), p. 360.
2. *NK* (BORI), p. 359.
3. *Pañjikā*, p. 19.
4. *Vyomavatī* (I), p. 12.
5. *NK* (BORI), p. 8.
6. *Vyomavatī* (I), p. 2.
7. *NK* (BORI), p. 17.
8. *NK*, pp. 17-9.
9. *NK*, 32, *Pañjikā*, P. 30.
10. *Vyomavatī* (I), p. 21.
11. *NK*, pp. 32-6.
12. *kāryatvānityatve kāraṇavatām eva. PDS, Vide NK*, p. 59.
13. *prāgasataḥ sattāsamavāyaḥ*. NK, p. 59.
14. Ibid; p. 59.
15. *abhūtvā bhavanam ityeke. Vyomavatī* (I), p. 38.
16. *NK*, p. 60.
17. *Pañjikā*, p. 60.
18. *Vyomavatī* (I) p. 38.
19. *NK*, p. 60.
20. *svarūpavināśa eva anityatvam. NK*, p. 60.
21. *dravyāśritattvaṃ ca anyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ. PDS, Vide NK*, p. 62.
22. *NK: kascit; Pañjikā: kaścid iti vyomaṣivaḥ; Vide NK*, p. 62.
23. *PDS*, Vide *Vyomavatī* (I), p. 31.
24. *NK*, p. 62, cf. *Vyomavatī* (I), pp. 39-40.
25. *NK*, p. 62.
26. Vide *NK*, p. 64.
27. (i) *buddhir lakṣaṇam yeṣām*; (ii) *buddhyā lakṣyante* [*ye*]; and (iii) *buddhir viśeṣaṇāntaropacaritā lakṣaṇam iti. Vyomavatī* (I), pp. 40-1. The first two according to Vyomaśiva do not materially differ.
28. *NK*, p. 64.
29. *Vyomavatī* (I), p. 40.
30. *NK*, p. 90.
31. Vyomavatī (I), pp. 64-66.
32. *NK*, p. 90.
33. *NK*, p. 127, cf. *Vyomavatī* (I), p. 90.
34. *NK*, pp. 127-32.
35. *NK*, p. 167, cf. *Vyomavatī* (I), pp. 122-26.

36. *NK*, pp. 167-8.
37. *NK*, p. 333, cf. *Vyomavatī* (I) p. 52.
38. *NK*, p. 333.
39. *NK*, p. 333.
40. *NK*, p. 348, cf. *Vyomavatī* (II) p. 64.
41. *NK*, p. 348.
42. *PDS*, Vide *NK*, p. 346.
43. *NK*, p. 359, *Pañjikā*, p. 357; cf. *tathāhi śyena-sthāṇusaṃyogaḥ karmaṇā saṃyogena ca janyate. Vyomavatī* (II), p. 67.
44. *NK*, p. 359.
45. *NK*, p. 361, *Pañjikā*, p. 360, cf. *Vyomavatī* (II), p. 69.
46. *NK*, p. 361.
47. *NK*, p. 371, cf. *Vyomavatī* (II), p. 76.
48. *NK*, p. 371.
49. *PDS*, Vide *NK*, p. 390.
50. *NK*, p. 391.
51. *Vyomavati* (II), p. 91.
52. *NK*, p. 391.
53. *yad anumeyena sambaddhaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite/tadabhāve ca nāstyeva tallingam anumāpakam//PDS*, Vide *NK*, p. 467.
54. *NK*, p. 475, cf. *Vyomavatī* (II), 149.
55. *Pañjikā* p. 486.
56. *NK*, p. 475-6.
57. *NK*, pp. 499-500.
58. *Pañjikā*, p. 500.
59. *NK*, p. 499-500, cf. *Vyomavatī* (II), pp. 164-75.

COMMENTARIES ON THE *NYĀYAKANDALĪ*

The *Nyāyakandalī* of Śridharācārya is, as we know, in the true sense, a scholastic commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* and is considered to be an invaluable treasure of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. But this work could not create a school of its study, though many of the subsequent philosophers knew the views of Śrīdharācārya. Udayana, in particular noted and refuted some of Śrīdhara's views. We knew until recent times, of only a single attempt by Padmanābhamiśra (16th cen.), to write a commentary on the *Nyāyakandalī*. It was *Nyāyakandalīsāra*. MM Vindhyeswariprasad could procure a copy of it and noted the initial verse from it in the introduction of his edition of the *Nyāyakandalī*.[1] From this verse it is known that the scholars like Vardhamāna did not compose any commentary on the *Nyāyakandalī*, but *Padmanābha*, having studied it from his father composed one such commentary.

It is a good news to us that the two Jaina scholars and a scholar probably from South India wrote three commentaries on the *Nyāyakandalī*:

(i) The *Ṭippaṇa* of Naracandra Sūri

(ii) The *Pañjikā* of Rājaśekhara Sūri, and

(iii) The *Nyāyakusumodgama* of Śiḍila Brahmadeva, appearing to be hailing from South India.

(i) The *Ṭippaṇa* of Naracandra Sūri: Out of the three commentaries mentioned above, the *Ṭippaṇa* of Naracandra is the oldest one. Naracandra was a pupil of Devaprabha Sūri of Harṣapuriya of Maladhāri Gaccha. Devaprabha Sūri was the author of several Jaina works, such as *Pāṇḍavacarita*—a verified Jaina version of the *Mahābhārata*. He also wrote a commentary on the *Anargharāghava Nāṭaka* of Murāri. Naracandra also wrote a *Ṭippaṇa* on the same play and extended his exegetical activity of the *Nyāyakandalī*. He also wrote a Prākṛit grammar called *Prākṛta-prabandha* and some other Jaina works, like *Kathāratnākara, Caturviṃśati-stotra, vastupāla-praśasti* and metrical portions of the two of the Girṇāra Inscriptions of Vastupāla. *Kathāratnākara* was written specially to please his great pupil Vastupāla, whom he had taught grammar, literature and logic—the traditional three *vidyās* of Gujarat in that age. His work on astrology, viz. *Jyotiḥsāra* became so popular that it was known as Naracandra. Pṛthvīdhara was a teacher of Naracandra in Nyāyadarśana. Naracandra died in Vikrama Saṃvat 1287 which corresponds to AD 1231.

The *Ṭippaṇa* is a short running commentary on the *Nyāyakandalī*. It opens with a benedictory verse and then elaborates Śrīdhara's discussion on Maṅgalavāda. Gradually the commentary touches the points like the meaning of the words *Kaṇāda*, *Mahodaya* and *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. In course of discussion, he passed a few satirical remarks against the Mīmāṃsakas and Buddhists and pointed out the mistake even in the writings of Vyomaśiva.

Darkness (*tamas*) is not a separate substance, but then, what is it? *Nyāyakandalī* has its own view to prove darkness as a quality (colour) of earth and it is perceived when

there is absence of light. *Ṭippaṇa* being a commentary on it, quite surprisingly, did not point out this peculiar view of Śrīdhara. On the contrary *Ṭippaṇa* proves definitely that darkness is nothing but the absence of light—a well-known theory of the Vaiśeṣika as well as Naiyāyikas.

In course of discussion about the division of qualities, *Nyāyakandalī* makes a casual reference to the generality of 'Dharmādharma' and also of the generality *saṃskāratva*. The *Ṭippaṇa* discusses this topic in detail and concludes that if there is no *pramāṇa* for proving *adṛṣṭatva* generality, there cannot be a *pramāṇa* to prove *saṃskāratva* generality. *Ṭippaṇa* keeps the problem of *adṛṣṭatva* generality open. Thus logically, from the Vaiśeṣika point of view, the problem remains unsolved, because the Vaiśeṣikas do not accept *adṛṣṭatva* as a generality but accept *saṃskāratva* as same at the same time.

Naracandra, though as a rule faithful to Śrīdhara, does no longer hold back to find out the discrepancy and to solve it. In Īśvarasiddhi prakaraṇa, he removes all the logical fallacies of an inference put forth by Śrīdhara, with an ingenious modification. The same trend can be seen in the chapter of *Ātmā*. Here *Nyāyakandalī* tries to prove that the *caitanya* i.e. consciousness does not belong to the body. For this, *Nyāyakandalī* gives an inference with *bhūtakārya* as a *hetu*. But this *hetu* is fallacious. *Ṭippaṇa*, therefore comes to the rescue of this inference. It splits *bhūtakāryatva* into two *hetus* viz. *bhūtatva* and *kāryatva* and states that *bhūtatvāt, kāryatvāt ca ityarthaḥ, militasyāhetutve vyabhicārābhāvāt*.

Ṭippaṇa, as its title says, is an annotative commentary. In spite of its nature of precision, it has achieved success, mainly due to its lucidity and faithfulness. Naracandra's mastery over dialectics can be seen in his refutations of the arguments presented by opponents like the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists. The discussions on *Kṣaṇikavāda, Citrarūpa, Apekṣābuddhi, Hetvābhāsa* and *Pramāṇasamkhyā* deserve special mention in this regard. *Karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *samavāya* are found to have been treated in a hurried way in the *Ṭippaṇa*. In spite of its fault of being too brief, in the topics on *karma* etc. the positive and logical approach in the commentary is praiseworthy and hence, it is quite appropriate that Naracandra made a very sound impact on the later commentators of the *Nyāyakandalī*, like Rājeśekhara and Śiḍila.

Lastly, we would like to mention, that we have a handwritten copy of the Varanasi manuscript of Naracandra's *Ṭippaṇa* with the help of which, the same text so far printed can be successfully improved.

(ii) The *Pañjikā* of Rājaśekhara Sūri: Rājeśekhara, a versatile Jaina scholar, is well-known to us for his works like *Prabandhakoṣa, Syādvādakārikā, Ratnāvatārikā-pañjikā, Kautukakathā, Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya, Antarakathāsaṃgraha, Dānaṣaṭtrimśikā and Nyāyakandalīpañjikā.*

He was the pupil of Śrī Tilaka Sūri and belonged to Harsapuriya Gaccha. In this Gaccha was the celebrated Abhaya Sūri, the disciple of Śrī Jayasiṃha Sūri. In this lineage came the great Hemacandra. Śrī Vibudhendramuni was his disciple. Śrī Municandra was the disciple of Śrī Candra Sūri who, in course of time, became the teacher of Śrī Devaprabha Sūri. Śrī Naracandra Sūri was the disciple of Śrī Devaprabha Sūri. Śrī

Narendraprabha was the disciple of Naracandra, in whose lineage was Sūri Śrīpadma, who was the teacher of Śrī Tilakasūri. Rājaśekhara was the disciple of Śrī Tilakasūri.[2] It is to be noted that the readings of the colophonic verse of *Pañjikā*, as noted by Peterson and those as noted in BORI edition of *Pañjikā*, differ in some minor cases. A verified text of this portion may be prepared for better understanding with the help of them.

Rājaśekhara was a scholar of the 14th century, which is known from the colophon of his work *Prabandhakoṣa*.[3] However, MM Vindhyeswariprasad Dwivedi[4] noted that Rājaśekhara having learnt *Kandalī* from Śrī Jinaprabha, composed his *Pañjikā* in 1226 Śaka era. But it appears to be incorrect.

Rājaśekhara seems to be fairly conversant with the Vaiśeṣika school. Many stories are told to explain the meaning of Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school. Rājaśekhara records an interesting tradition, in the beginning of the *Pañjikā*, according to which God himself being pleased with the penances of the founder, appeared before him in the form of an owl and taught him the six categories. Hence this system is called Aulukya. Rājeśekhara also refers to four commentaries on *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* by name.[5] It is also interesting to note that he thinks that Pakṣilasvāmin, Nyāyabhāṣyakāra (i.e. Vātsyāyana) was none other than Cāṇakya.[6]

It is an established fact that the Jainas, in general, very faithfully represent the opponent's views. With Rājaśekhara, it is once again proved. From the index of BORI edition of *Nyāyakandalī* it is clear that he excels in identifying different views referred to in the *Nyāyakandalī*.

The utility of the *Pañjikā* lies in its faithful presentation of the views expressed by Śrīdhara. Rājaśekhara tries to explain as many concepts of Śrīdhara as possible. He, therefore, gives *Pratīkas* i.e. the initial words of a sentence, from the *Kandalī* in abundance. He never starts or enters or becomes a party to any new discussion. *Pañjikā* is, therefore, an important and well-balanced gloss on the *Kandalī*, creating a sort of clarity of comprehension. That he offers mainly alternative readings, indicates his acquaintance with a number of manuscripts of the *Nyāyakandalī*.[7]

Mention of Various authors and schools—like Jaiminīyas, Prābhākaras, Maṇḍanamiśra, Uddyotakara, Dharmakīrti, Vyomaśiva, Bhūṣaṇakāra, Udayana and others in *Pañjikā* is enough indicative of Rājeśekhara's comparative attitude and understanding in the śāstras.

(iii)The *Nyāyakusumodgama* of Śiḍila Brahmadeva: Śiḍila Brahmadeva was a Brāhma Bhūpati. He belonged to the solar race and was the son of a king named Ituṅgola.[8] The peculiarity of this name suggests a southern origin. Hence it may be presumed that Śiḍila was a king of some Southern state.[9] His mother was a daughter of Parvata(!) He was also a Mahāmaṇḍaleśvara, a brave warrior and at the same time a master in the dialectical discussions. He was the lord of both the learned Paṇḍitas and brave heroes.[10]

Śiḍila presents an elegant commentary on the *Nyāyakandalī*. He seems to have really mastered the art of dialectics as claimed by him. He explains explicitly, a number of topics discussed by Śrīdhara. For example, in Maṅgalavāda, he presents a series of arguments to prove that *maṅgala* has the potentiality to remove all obstacles. Similar are his discussions

on the definition of *pṛthivī*, creation and dissolution, time, soul, the process of chemical change and the inference for other's sake.

Śiḍila, unlike the other two commentators, ventures to initiate fresh discussions. He has also his own method. He first prepares a suitable ground by anticipating a possible pūrvapakṣa and then presents Śrīdhara's thesis to refute it. Śiḍila seldom quotes scholars or commentators other than those already mentioned by Śrīdhara himself, the only exception being the mention of Śrīvallabha.[11]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *upadiṣṭā gurucaraṇaiḥ aspṛṣṭā vardhamānādyaiḥ/kandalyāḥ sārārthas tanyate padmanābhena//*Vide *VNNC*, pp. 265-6.
2. Vide colophonic verses of *Prabandhakoṣa and Nyāyakandalī-pañjikā.*
3. *Śaragaganamanumitābde* (1405). It is certainly the Vikrama era. Hence corresponds to 1349 AD as the date of the composition of *Prabandhakośa.*
4. Vide Introduction, *Nyāyakandalī*, ed. MM Vidhyeswariprasad Dwivedin.
5. *NK*, p. 2.
6. Ibid, p. 6.
7. *NK*, pp. 68, 81, 106, 142 etc.
8. Initial verse of *Kusumodgama.*
9. *NK*, Introduction, p. xii.
10. Colophon of *Kusumodgama.*
11. *NK*, p. 81.

UDAYANĀCĀRYA

Udayana (AD 11th century) was the foremost Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika author of Mithila. So sharp was his argument and so great was his versatility that he secured a position in the learned world which was quite enviable. From the 12th century onwards he was looked upon as the greatest exponent of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines and was the main target of all scholars of the opposing camps.[1]

To determine the date of Udayana some scholars take into consideration "*tarkāmbarāṃka*" found in a manuscript of *Lakṣaṇāvalī* and it is 906 (Śaka era) which corresponds to AD 984. But the date must have been a mistake for "*tarkasvarāṃka*" i.e. 976 Śaka era which corresponds to AD 1054. Prof Bhattacharya quite elaborately proves that the date of Udayana can never fall in the tenth century due to a number of facts noted below":[2]

Date of Śrīharṣa is intimately related to that of Udayana and we shall discuss the problem at this place with up-to-date materials. Śrīharṣa's date can be fixed within narrow limits from this following evidence. Towards the end of the *Khaṇḍana* (p. 1327), he respectfully mentions the name of the (Kashmiri) rhetorician Mahimabhaṭṭa in the following verse:

doṣaṃ vyaktiviveke 'mum kavilokavilocane/
kāvyamīmāṃsiṣu prāptamahimā mahimā 'dṛta//

Mahimabhaṭṭa, who came after Abhinavagupta (AD 1015) and before Mammaṭa (c. AD 1100), must have been living about A.D. 1050 and was probably a native of Kashmira. The earliest date that can, therefore, be assigned to Śrīharṣa is AD 1075. This dismisses any attempt (cf. IA. 1913, p. 83) to place Śrīharṣa earlier. On the other hand, the earliest author, who quoted from Śrīharṣa's *Naiṣadhacarita*, is Mahendra Sūri, a disciple of the famous Jaina polymath Hemacandra (AD 1088-1172). In his commentary on the *Anekārthasaṃgraha* of Hemacandra, he quoted many passages of the *Naiṣadha* as illustration, e.g. under II. 18 (p. 8 of extracts from the commentary in Zachariae's edn., 1893), II. 56 (p. 13), II. 274 (p. 43), II. 299 (p. 47), II. 303 (ibid), II. 527 pp. 77), IV. 155 (p. 173 and IV. 339 (p. 184). This commentary, which was published in the name of author's teacher Hemacandra, was written 'soon after' the latter's death (ibid, Preface p. XIII). Śrīharṣa, as a native of Bengal, and a protégé of the king of Kānyakubja, could not be supposed to have commended the respects of foremost scholars of Western India, unless he was at least an exact contemporary of Mahendra's guru, Hemacandra, or slightly senior to him. None of the authorities, cited by Mahendra, as far as can be ascertained, belong to the latter half of the 12th century AD Śrīharṣa must, therefore, have written his works in the second quarter (AD 1125-50) of the century during the reign of Govindacandra of Kanauja (AD 1104-54), whose patronage of the poet is definitely stated by a commentator named Gadādhara. Śrīharṣa, probably, started his literary career with small tracts like *Amarakhaṇḍanam* (Madras Ms. No. R 1595) and *Dvirūpakoṣa* (ibid. R 1607) with a view to enrich his vocabulary. Kṣīrasvāmin, in his commentary on the *Amarakoṣa*, quotes a line from Śrīharṣa *saṅghātamṛtyur-mārako marirmārī ca devatā* (II.

6. 58). This is evidently from the *Dvirūpakoṣa* or a similar work of the poet. Kṣīrasvāmin was quoted by Vardhamāna in the *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* (Eggeling's edn., pp. 306 and 430), which was composed in AD 1140. These early tracts of Śrīharṣa will have, therefore, to be assigned to the first decade of the century in the very beginning of the reign of Govindacandra. It is possible that the poet in his very old age enjoyed the patronage of (Vijayacandra), AD 1169, and Jayacandra, the son and grandson of Govindacandra. But the statement of Rājaśekhara Sūri that the poet wrote in the reign of the latter prince, need not be taken as literally true; Rājaśekhara could not correctly record the name and relation of Jayacandra in the *Prabandhakoṣa*. Besides the *Naiṣadha* and the *Khaṇḍana*, Śrīharṣa is known to have written many more works, mentioned by himself at the end of the several cantos of his poem. One of them is *Sthairyavicāra* mentioned at the end of Canto IV of the *Naiṣadha*. It appears that the editor of a Vedānta work *Brahmavidyābharaṇam* (published at Kumbhakonam) had access to copies of this long-lost work, from which he cited in the introduction the following important (introductory) verse:

sriharṣakṛtau sthairyavicāraprakaraṇe—
tantrair duryantramantrair api budha-janatāgādhabodhāpamṛtyoḥ
tantrair duryantramantrair api budha-janatāgādhabodhāpamṛtyoḥ
kṛtyodyatkrūradhārāparuṣataramater guptanāmnaḥ śarāroḥ/
ceṣṭābhiṣṭambhakānāṃ prativibudhasabhotkhāta-jaitradvajānām
ājānajñānabhājāṃ vibhavam abhidadhe cidvilāsākhyabhūmnām//

Śrīharṣa herein glorifies the powers of one Cidvilāsa, who frustrated the black acts of a Tāntrika named Gupta. Cidvilāsa was by tradition the pontiff of the Kāmakoṭi shrine of Kāñcī, and his encounter with, and the subsequent conversion at the hands of the great Khaṇḍanakāra is recorded in a work named *Puṇyaślokamañjarī* also cited in the same introduction (cf. *khaṇḍam khaṇḍam akhaṇḍa-khaṇḍanakṛdādyauddaṇḍyam uddaṇḍavāg* . . .). The traditional date of Cidvilāsa, according to the records of the shrine, is 4268-4301 of the Kali era (AD 1167-1200), which is about half a century too late for Śrīharṣa. Śrīharṣa also wrote a work named *Śivaśaktisiddhi* (see canto XVIII). This book was accessible to the above editor, who quoted the following stanza from it:

tenaivānyatrāpi—

kṣoṇīstrīmaṇiratnakāñcīvikacatkāñcīpadod yadrasa-
śrīkāmāsanapāsavāsitamahāsattvo 'pyasattvacyavaḥ/
prasphūrjaccidacidvilāsa-vadumāsomārdhacūdālayor
aikyoktāv iha bhāratiṃ madayatāṃ śrīcidvilāso mama//

Here again Cidvilāsa of the Kāmakoṭi shrine of Kāñcī is referred to in glowing terms and invoked for inspiration in the book which had for its subject the identity of Śiva and Śakti. The editor identifies this Cidvilāsa with Advaitāṇanda, the author of the *Brahmavidyābharaṇam*. But the identity seems to be quite unwarranted. Whether this Cidvilāsa is to be identified with Śrīharṣa's *Guravaḥ* cited by him in *Khaṇḍana* (Chowkh. ed. p. 1316) cannot be determined at the present state of our knowledge.

Among the three royal panegyrics written by Śrīharṣa, all of them unfortunately remaining undiscovered, the Vijayapraśasti (mentioned at the end of canto V) was upon

Vijayacandra, the son of his patron Govindacandra of Kanauj. We quote in support the gloss of one of the oldest commentators on the *Naiṣadha* named Śrīvaṭeśvara from a very old palm leaf copy (stopping at canto XI) preserved in the V.R. Museum, Rajshahi (Ms. No. 809):

Vijayacandrasya yā praśastiḥ kavinā kṛtā, tatra rājño jivitatvād vā gauravād vā śriśabdaḥ prayujyate.

According to another commentator Gopinātha the *Vijayapraśasti* was a panegyric to the Gauda king Vijayasena (L. 1639: *Vijayasenanāmno gauḍeśvarasya*). But this seems hardly possible as Śrīharṣa wrote a separate *Gauḍorvīśakulapraśasti* (canto VII), which was more likely in praise of the Sena kings. Śrīharṣa's connection with the court of Vijayasena, however, may be taken as a fact. His connection with another royal court is proved by another panegyric the *Chindāpraśasti* (canto XVII). But the *Arṇavavarṇana* (canto IX) was not a royal panegyric (*praśasti),* as is sometimes interpreted by scholars; it must have been a small lyric poem describing the ocean (cf. Śrivatsa's note *samdṛbdham sandarbhīkṛtam granthitam iti yāvat arṇavasya varṇanam yena*).

Now we are confronted with the question about the length of time which intervened between Udayana and Śrīharṣa. As early as AD 1884, MM Vindhyesvariprasada discovered a definite answer to the question, which seems to have escaped the notice of scholars. On the strength of a *Naiśadhaṭīkā* by one Bhagīratha he stated that Śrīharṣa's father Śrīhīra had an academic contest with Udayana. In other words Udayana was older than Śrīharṣa by only one generation (vide Introd. to Vaiśeṣikadarśana, Śrāvaṇa 1941 V.S., p. 26). Unfortunately the actual words of the commentator were not quoted. The commentary named *Guḍhārthadīpikā* is by far the most extensive, ever written on the *Naiṣadha*; a fragment of it dated 1629 Śaka (probably revised by the commentator himself) is now preserved in the Sarasvati Bhavana (vide Introd. to the *Tārkikarakṣā*, pp. 30-31). The colophon proves that Bhagīratha wrote it at the court of Raja Jñānacandra of Kūrmācala, (AD 1698-1708) under whom and under whose son Jagaccandra (AD 1708-20), he wrote several other works. At the end of Canto I of this *Bhāgīrathī* commentary there is a rushing flow of most fanciful etymologies of names of Śrīharṣa and his parents (fol. 83). One such etymology of the name Śrīhīra, who was the father of Śrīharṣa, runs: *yad vā hi niścayena īrtte udayanācāryāt svayaṃ kampate hīraḥ/supsupā iti samāsaḥ/śriyā yukto hīraḥ śrihīraḥ/śākapārthivādiḥ/īr gatau kampane/*Another etymology, equally fanciful, of the name Śrīharṣa runs: *yad vā harṣate snihyati pitrorājñayā udayanācāryasya parābhavakaraṇe prītimān bhavati harṣaḥ/harṣ snehane/pacādyac/* ... Bhagīratha incidentally records here two small portions of an important tradition, that Udayana defeated Śrīhīra in the debate and Śrīharṣa avenged the defeat at the request of his parents. Bhagīratha is a very recent author; he evidently derived his information from some of many earlier commentaries consulted by him.

One of the earliest and most learned scholiasts of the *Naiṣadha* was Cāṇḍu paṇḍita, whose commentary was composed in 1353 V.S. (i.e. AD 1296-97). At the very commencement, Cāṇḍu Paṇḍita categorically stated that Udayana in a conquering campaign challenged Śrīharṣa's father in a debate and defeated him. Śrīharṣa, as faithful son, avenged the defeat by meeting Udayana's argument's in the *Khaṇḍana*. The exact words of Cāṇḍu paṇḍita are: *prathamaṃ tāvat kavir vijigīṣukathāyāṃ svapituḥ*

paribhāvakam udayanam atyamarṣaṇatayā kaṭākṣayan tadgranthagranthīn u(d)-granthayitum khaṇḍanam prāripsu ... mānasam ekatānatām āninprivate// (Des. Cat. of Mss., B.O.R.I., Poona, Vol. XIII, Pt. I, p. 481). It should be carefully noticed that both Cāṇḍu paṇḍita and Bhagīratha (who might have based his etymological speculation on the words of the former) mention the fact of Udayana's personal conflict with Śrīharṣa's father directly without the least suspicion about its veracity. But unlike Bhagīratha, Cāṇḍu paṇḍita is more definite about the manner of Śrīharṣa's revenge, which took the form of a literary retort instead of a personal contest. It is interesting to note further that, according to Cāṇḍu Paṇḍita, Śrīharṣa's greatest ambition in life was to write this great refutation and he acquired all his talents (through devotions of the mystic *Cintāmaṇimantra*) with that end in view. It is substantially proved in our opinion by the fact that in his 'very angry' mood Śrīharṣa nowhere refers to Udayana by name, in the *Khaṇḍana*.

Śrīharṣa's conflict with Udayana was a common story current in the Indian seminaries. The editor of the *Khaṇḍana* with *Śāṅkarī* has recorded an incident, that Śrīharṣa debated directly with Udayana, who lived to answer Śrīharṣa's arguments in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*: (Introd., pp. 6-7). These floating traditions have little historical value, but the definite incident of Śrīharṣa's father, Śrīhīra's defeat at the hands of Udayana recorded in a commentary of the *Naiṣadha* within a century and a half from Śrīharṣa and exactly corroborated in later commentaries, forms the kernel of truth behind them all. It is possible to fix roughly the time of this historic debate between Udayana and Śrīhīra. It could never have taken place before AD 1050 and probably took place in the decade AD 1075-85 when Śrīharṣa was a mere boy.

Under the above computation Udayana's date of birth would fall about AD 1025 and his period of activity would cover the last half of the eleventh century (AD 1050-1100). This is confirmed by a large volume of evidence which is summarized below:

(1) Udayana's feeling of great diffidence expressed at the commencement of the *Pariśuddhi*, which was one of his last works, proves that he was removed by some length of time from Vācaspati. The feeling of great and almost aweful reverence for Vācaspati persists throughout the *Pariśuddhi* and two magnificient verses are here being quoted:

svacchāḥ svabhāvaśucayo 'tiśayena gurvyo durbandha-durdhara-durāgraha-duḥkhabhāvyāḥ/
ṭīkāgiro viṣadapāradavipruṣo vā yeṣām vaśe nanu vaśe jagadeva teṣām//
anabhyāsajñeyāt śrutivivaragarbheṣu laghutaḥ
mukhagrāhyānmandaiḥ kusumasukumārāt prathamataḥ/
manaḥ śrīmadvācaspativacanavinyāsavisarāt
trasatyādyapyetanmuhuriva muhur nirvṛtamapi//

It may be surmised, therefore, that Udayana was about three generations later than Vācaspati, whose date has been fixed by us as the latter half of the AD 10th century. At the present state of our knowledge it is impossible to refer the date 898 of Vācaspati's *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* to the Vikrama era[1] and that Śaka date (corresponding to AD 976-77) falls about a century before the flourishing period of Udayana under the above scheme.

(2) Udayana's date is most intimately related to that of Jñānaśrī, who was directly controverted by him in his very first work, *Ātmatattvaviveka*. And the date of Jñānaśrī is fixed beyond any dispute in the Tibetan works. He was an exact contemporary of

Dipaṃkara Śrījñāna, surnamed Atīśa. . . .Atīśa (who was born not in AD 980 but in AD 982-3) left for Tibet at the age of 59 in March AD 1041 (I.H.Q. VI, p. 159). Just three years before (i.e. in AD 1038) the king of Tibet sent Nag-tsho (Vinayadhara) to Magadha for bringing Atīśa; the elaborate account of his mission, which has been published, bears on the face of it a stamp of veracity so rare in ordinary works of the type. The Tibetan learnt on arrival, that among the eminent paṇḍits under Atīśa, one of the foremost was Ratnakīrti. In a grand assembly at Vikramaśila held soon after his arrival, the Tibetan saw among others, two teachers of Atīśa, viz. Vidyākokila and Naropānta 1.c.p. 18). [Naropānta is otherwise called Nāropā and Naropant.] Atīśa consulted oracles in various places at Vajrāsana and acted according to the instructions of 'Ācārya Jñānaśrī' (p. 20). Sometime after (i.e. in AD 1039) Naropānta came on his last visit to Vikramaśīla; "he leaned on the right arm of Atīśa while Jñānaśrimitra helped him with his left arm". (p. 21) Naropānta died soon after in the South. This definitely proves that Atīśa and Jñānaśrī were the two towering figures of Vikramaśīla at that time, though both of them were younger in age to Naropānta. Jñānaśrī was then evidently retired, succeeded by his distinguished pupil Ratnakīrti. Like Atīśa he was presumably living still in AD 1050 and, as we have stated before, Udayana probably wrote the *Ātmatattvaviveka* about this time (say within (AD 1050-60) when Jñānaśrī was still alive.

(3) Udayana on the one hand was one full generation (i.e. about 40 years) later than Jñānaśrī and on the other senior to Śrīharṣa by the same period of time and both these pieces of evidence happily combine to settle his date within the last three quarters of the eleventh century (AD 1025-1100)".

Udayana wrote two prakaraṇas, *Ātmatattvaviveka* and the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and two *Lakṣaṇa* works, *the Lakṣaṇamālā* (Nyāya) and the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* (Vaiśeṣika). His Commentaries on the *Tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati I, *Nyāyasūtra* (Chapter V) and the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* are respectively called the *Tātparyapariśuddhi,* the *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa* and the *Kiraṇāvalī.* The order of the works, as determined by Prof. Bhattacharya, is as follows:

1. *Lakṣaṇāvalī*
2. *Lakṣaṇamālā*
3. *Ātmatattvaviveka*
4. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*
5. *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa or (pra)-bodhasiddhi*
6. *Nyāyapariśuddhi or Tātparyapariśuddhi*, and
7. *Kiraṇāvalī*

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Deva Sūri (AD 1086-1169), Śrīharṣa (fl. 1125-1150) and the like.
2. *HNNM*, pp. 46-54.
3. Vācaspati's *jarannaiyāyika* is identified as Jayanta (*Pariśuddhi*, p. 215). Jayanta flourished at the time of Śaṅkaravarman of Kashmir (883-902). If Vācaspati's date would be taken a Vikrama era, he would be placed before Jayanta which is quite impossible.
   According to the Re'u-mig of 'Jam-dbyaṅs bzad-pa, Atīśa started for Tibet in 1037, the very year when Nag-tsho arrived to invite Atīśa.

KIRAṆĀVALĪ

Kiraṇāvalī is the most scholarly commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda. Though the commentator could not complete it, it attained high fame in the scholastic world of Indian Philosophy.

The text breaks off in the midst of the section on *Buddhi* in the second part of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. More than a third of even this section remain unexplained, what of the other advanced section. There is not even the word "*iti*" at the end of the extant portion. So it was at a recent time, that the scholars believed the author could complete only upto what he had written, probably due to his sudden death. Vardhamāna, being one of the sincere and meticulous commentators, set the colophonic verse *yastarkatantraśatapatra* . . . etc and the last statement is *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa*. He is obviously right to make such a comment that it is the end of his writing. But he is silent about the unnatural ending of the *Kiraṇāvalī* text. So we ask, is it only up to the *Buddhi* portion, that he could write? Certainly not. A further portion of the text has recently been brought out. It covers up to the enumeration of the three *saṃskāras* of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. This new portion has been appended to the GOS edition of the *Kiraṇāvalī*, edited by Dr. J.S. Jetly, in 1971. It is found after a careful study and comparison, of the newly found portion with the previously-found portion, that there is no difference of language and style. Udayana's marked style of brevity is present here. So we can safely accept the new portion as to be from Udayana's pen. However, it is curious that no reference from this portion is found anywhere. Perhaps this portion had been missed by the Maithila scholars due to some unknown causes.

Anyway, *Kiraṇāvalī*, became an important Vaiśeṣika text. The two important authors, one Bhāsarvajña, commentator of the (*Nyāya*)*bhūṣaṇa* and the other Śrīdharācārya, the commentator of the *Nyāyakandalī* were of special value to Udayana as we find them quoted and refuted four times[1] and at least eight times[2] respectively in the *Kiraṇāvalī*.

According to Vardhamāna, Udayana cites a view of Śālikanātha, who wrote a commentary named *Vallabhā* on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.[3]

Kiraṇāvalī criticizes Dharmakīrti's inference of 'colour etc. from taste'.[4] Apart from this, the Buddhists were referred to for criticism in many a place.[5] The theory of *apoha* has been mentioned.[6]

We come across a number of opponents' views in *Kiraṇāvalī* which could not be identified by the commentator Vardhamāna. They are as follows.

1. Viscidity (*sneha*) is not the quality of water, as it is not found like oil in water. Nor is it the specific quality of the earth, as it does not pervade the whole earth. So it is a generality-particularity found in clarified butter, oil, fat etc.[7]

2. The visual organ is not a sense-organ which reveals an object by getting it, because it takes the object not connected with the substratum of the sense-organ. A sense-organ which reveals its object by getting it, is always found to do so, when the object is connected with the substratum of that sense-organ. As for example, gustatory sense-organ. The visual organ is not like it.[8]

3. Touch does not exist in earth.[9]

The following are the contents of the *Kiraṇāvalī* in brief.

Six categories have been mentioned, omitting negation, in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. Udayana thinks 'negation' was a well-established category even in the early Vaiśeṣika system, since its existence was implied by the early Vaiśeṣikas' talk about production and destruction of entities as well as the discussions concerning the dissimilarities of other categories.

Salvation: Salvation is the total cessation of suffering.

Darkness: According to some, darkness is a substance because it has a colour, dark colour, and it has motion. Udayana says, darkness is simply the negation of light and thus belongs to the category of negation. According to Śrīdhara, darkness, though not a substance, is a special kind of colour, a positive entity, because we always have a positive awareness of darkness. Udayana says no. Nobody can apprehend darkness without a prior apprehension of light, and awareness of darkness thus can never be shown to be kind of "positive" apprehension.

Generality: Existence (*sattā*) is the highest generic property or generality. A generality is a natural, not "accidental" or "external" (*anaupādhika*) property of things. If in an individual we find two class properties co-existing, then these two class properties can be generic properties only when one class is totally included in the other.

The cause and effect relation is usually determined by generalities. When an entity *a* causes an entity *b*, the property of being the effect of *a* is limited by the generality in *b*. Using this general principle Udayana tries to establish that substanceness is a generality.

The following are the impediments to a property's claim to be a generality. (i) A proper generality cannot belong to only one individual. (ii) If a generality is found in all and only those individuals where another generality is found, then they must not be construed as two distinct generalities. (iii) The same individual or individuals cannot be the substratum of two generalities unless one of them is totally included within the other. (iv) The category generality cannot be said to possess another generality because of the *infinite regress* to which that would lead. (v) If by our admission of a generality in an entity we run counter to the arguments by which that very entity was posited, we should give up that claim. (vi) Inherence combines a generality with an individual, but inherence itself cannot be combined by a further inherence; hence there is no generality in inherence.

The property of being elemental (*bhūtatva*) is not a generality. If something possesses such (sensory) qualities as are apprehensible by an external sense-organ it becomes elemental. But then why should the property of being elemental not be regarded as a universal property?

Answer: Because of the third impediment mentioned in the previous paragraph. The property of being material (*mūrtatva*) is similarly not a universal property. Being "material" means having possession of a limited, non-ubiquitous dimension.

Particularity: A particularity is not just a quality (*guṇa*), because we cannot discover, as we can in the case of qualities, a universal property occurring in a number of particularities.

Inherence: Inherence is permanent combination. One relation is said to occur in the

other by inherence, and this occurrence is natural, not conditioned by any "external" or "accidental" factor.

That generalities exist cannot be proved in the way we can prove, for example, that a substance like a mountain exists. Its proof solely depends upon our cognition of the same pattern in many things. A generality is eternal, i.e. is never an effect. If a generality like cowness could be produced through the production of a cow, then cowness would be numerically different in each cow, and then it would no longer be called a generality.

Particularities are also eternal, since eternal substances are distinguished from each other by their particularities. If the particularities did not exist, the eternal substances would lose their distinctness.

Atomic constituents: An earthy substance of ordinary dimension such as a pebble, can be divided into parts and those parts into further smaller parts, but this process of division cannot go on for ever. This process comes to a stop when we reach the element having the smallest dimension or magnitude, the elements called atoms. If the process did not come to a stop we would have to admit that a mustard seed and a mountain are both made out of innumerable parts or constituents and since there would be no difference in the numbers of their constituents they should be of the same dimension.

Time: One teacher (Vyomaśiva according to Vardhamāna) has said: The notion of oldness in an aged body (compared to a young body) is due to the body's connection with a comparatively larger number of movements which reside in the sun, but the old body in question lies far away. Thus, a ubiquitous substance, time, is posited to connect the sun's movements with the body in question. Although a soul or *ākāśa* is ubiquitous, they cannot account for the connection that is required here, since both of them are substrate of some sort of special quality (*vaiśeṣika guṇa*) (i.e. the soul is the substratum of judgement, and *ākāśa* is the substratum of sounds).

Udayana is wary of this argument. Both a soul and *ākāśa* cannot just by their presence transfer the movements of the sun to the distant old body because they cannot transfer anything from any object to another object. Thus, the blue colour of a thing at Varanasi cannot be transferred to a crystal ball at Pāṭaliputra although the souls and *ākāśa* are supposedly connected with both the objects. Time is posited as a substance whose particular function is that of transferring the large number of movements of the sun from the sun to the old body in question, and that is why the body is called old compared to a young body to which only a smaller number of movements of the sun could be transferred.

Direction: The spatial position of an object has in fact to be explained in terms of its different connection with the sun rays. And thus, as above, a necessary substance, place, is pointed to account for the connection of the sun rays with the other distant, medium-sized object.

Quality: It is admittedly difficult to distinguish the group of twenty-four qualities from motion (*karma*). Bhāsarvajña denies that there is any distinction. Udayana defends the distinction. Motions are something we directly apprehend as movements. A motion produces two opposite results—conjunction and disjunction of bodies. None of the twenty-four qualities has this power to produce opposite results. A substance might produce such

a chain of results; for example, conjunction of finger with tree causes conjunction of hand with tree—here tree is a substance which is the cause where conjunction and disjunction is produced. A substance is distinguished from a motion in that the substance can produce the said results only when dependent upon some motion, while motion can produce them independently. A sensory quality is not identical with the object or substance that has it. Blue colour is different from blue-coloured thing. Some say: a quality like colour is produced along with its substratum, the pot etc., and is destroyed when the substance is destroyed. Udayana rejects this view. Accordingly to the Vaiśeṣikas, there is a logical (also temporal) sequence between the production of the substratum (cause), i.e. the pot, and the production of the colour of the whole pot. The colour of the pot is a caused event, a product of which the pot is the inherent cause. Thus, the pot must have preceded, at least by a moment, the production of the colour of the whole pot.

Some hold the theory of *piṭharapāka*. This theory maintains that when an earthen body, a clay pot, is baked, the body gets some new qualities such as its new colour. The previous colour is destroyed and the new colour is generated, while the body remains intact.

Others hold the theory of *pīlupāka*. This theory maintains: when the earthen body is baked, the previous body (i.e. the whole) is dissolved into atom because of the body's conjunction with fire particles, and these atoms come into conjunction with fire, when the atoms get new qualities such as a new colour (red colour). Then out of the combination of these atoms (whose qualities have changed) we get a new body, a red pot.

The philosophical motivation behind this view is this: we can thus safely maintain the distinction between the quality and the substance that has the quality. And this distinction will help us to understand the nature of the soul as distinct from its qualities.

Fire atoms are extremely light, weightless, and have impulse (*vega*) and hot touch. The impact of these atoms can very well break the body that is being baked. Further conjunction with fire helps to segregate the body out of the combination of the atom. Splitting of a solid body in contact with fire is sometimes perceptible. Shrinking of a body in fire also indicates that we have got a new body out of the constituents of the old body.

Number: Bhāsarvajña rejects the notion of number as a separate quality. For him, unity or oneness means identity of a thing, and diversity, such as twoness, is the distinctness of the nature of things. Udayana rejects this view. Identity of a thing is unique to itself, but the notion of unit is found in each different thing at the same time. Thus we say "one pot" and "one cloth". The identity of a pot is different from the identity of a cloth, but both appear to have the property *oneness*, i.e. the property of being counted as one, and distinctness is not the same thing as diversity, such as twoness and threeness.

Some say: the number two and other numbers are general property like *potness*. Even if you accept two as a quality, you will have to accept *twoness* as general. Thus it is simple to accept twoness as a general property rather than in addition to a quality.

Udayana says no. It is not contradictory to accept two as a quality and another entity as *twoness,* the generality common to different qualities of two. Besides, if *twoness* were a general property present in any two substances it should be subsumable under *substances* or *existence*. But in fact twoness appears to be co-extensive with substancehood. Two co-

existensive properties cannot be construct as two different general properties.

Or, Udayana says, number is a quality which accounts for our counting objects.

Two or duality is generated by enumerative cognition (*apekṣā-buddhi*) i.e. a type of judgement in which we cognise objects separately but put them together at the same time. "This is one (and) that is one" is the verbal expression of an enumerative cognition. *Two* is thus a transitory quality; it is destroyed as soon as the enumerative cognition (which being a judgement cannot persist very long) is destroyed. Udayana criticises Śrīdhara's view and some other views regarding this point.

The judgement "there are two things" is generated at the very moment which two, the quality, is destroyed. But this leads to the question whether the qualities (*viśeṣaṇa*) can be destroyed and appear at the same time as the objective in a judgement (viz. the judgement "there are two things"). Udayana says it is all right. An adjective *x* or *y* is that which is the delimitor of *y* as well as co-existent with *y* in the same substratum. It is not necessary that the adjective *x* be physically present when we have the cognition "*y* is qualified by *x*". To cognize perceptually that some person is qualified by the name Devadatta we do not have to perceive the name through our sense-organ.

Śrīdhara says: the notion of *two* arises out of a simple enumerative cognition; the notion of three arises out of the notions of *two* and *one*; the notion of *four* is likewise to be explained. Udayana rejects this view because it would be difficult to explain in this manner the origin of the notion of many (*bahutva*) in such judgements as "there are many trees here".

Dimension: The dimension of an atom cannot cause anything, not even another dimension. The number of atoms causes the dimension, a destructible dimension, in the dyad. The dimension of some object depends not only upon the dimension of its constituents or upon the loose conjunction of its constituents but also upon the number of constituents in some cases. Out of five meat balls of the same dimension two produce a meatball which is smaller in dimension than the meatball produced by the other three.

Separateness: Bhāsarvajña holds that quality of *being separate* is identical with difference which is otherwise called *mutual negation*. Udayana disagrees. "A pot is not a cloth" is not synonymous with "a pot is separate from a cloth". The use of the ablative (*kaṭāt*) in the second case indicates the distinction between their meanings. Even possession of non-identical properties (*vaidharmya*) is not the same as the quality of *being separate*.

Conjunction: Conjunction is central to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of creation. Conjunction between parts causes a body, a conjunction between fire and earth particles gives rise to a new colour in the body. Loose conjunction between parts causes a new dimension, a *bigger* one. Impact, pushing and throwing, which are just varieties of conjunction, generate motion. Since the theory of momentariness of everything, as well as the theory of momentary modification, is not acceptable to the Vaiśeṣikas, the quality *conjunction* is an essential postulate for them to account for creation and destruction of objects.

Disjunction: Bhāsarvajña thinks that disjunction is just absence of conjunction, not a separate quality. Udayana says no. When out of two bodies in conjunction, one is

destroyed, we may say that the conjunction is also destroyed, but nobody would say that the bodies have been disjoined. The destruction of a quality may be caused either by the appearance of an opposite quality in the same substratum or by the destruction of the cause of the first quality. Now, when due to a motion in the finger the conjunction between the finger and the tree is destroyed, the conjunction between the hand and the tree would not be destroyed, because the hand is not in motion. The motion of the finger exists in the finger and the conjunction of the hand with the tree exists in the hand, and thus, the motion and the conjunction not being co-present in the same substratum, they cannot be related by way of being the destroyer and the destroyed. To avoid this absurd consequence we have to accept an opposite quality, viz., disjunction, which appears in the hand and thereby destroys the conjunction between the hand and the tree. The motion in the finger causes disjunction of the finger from the tree, which in its turn causes disjunction of the hand from the tree, and this disjunction destroys the conjunction between hand and tree.

Bhāsarvajña might argue: motion can destroy the said conjunction even if it is not occurent in the same substratum. Udayana finds no reason to narrow the scope of the rule that a quality can destroy another quality provided the two qualities are co-present in one substratum.

(Spatial) Priority and Posteriority: These should not be regarded as two qualities, says Bhāsarvajña. "Other object lies near" means that it has a comparatively small number of conjunctions (apparently among the intervening space-calibrations) and "an object lies far" means that it has a large number of conjunctions.

Udayana says no. The required small or large number of conjunctions can also be described to the person with regard to whom the object is near or far. But the notion of "being near" or "being far" arises with regard to the object only.

Judgement: *Tarka* is reasoning through counterfactual conditionals. *Tarka* is more than a doubt (*saṃśaya*) but something less than a certitude. Why was it not mentioned by Praśastapāda? Udayana says that, because *tarka* is a variety of error (*viparyaya*).

Error: Error is due to the non-apprehension of difference. Udayana rejects this view in favour of the Nyāya view that error is due to the apprehension of a different property in a given substratum.

Perception: In the case of direct or pure sense perception (*ālocana*) the object may be grasped as such along with its universal property. But determinate (*savikalpaka*) perceptual judgements should be preceded by a cognition or conception of the qualifier. Nobody apprehends something to be a horned object without a prior cognition or conception of the horn. The Buddhists say, construction (*vikalpa*) is not perception in the proper sense of the term. It is at the level of imagination, comparable to the imagination of non-existent pairs in the horizon by a person suffering from an eye disease. Udayana rejects this view on the ground that universal properties, substances, etc. are real entities, not fiction.

Inference: Invariable concomitance or *vyāpti* means a relation without any non-essential condition. How is this relation ascertained?

According to Dharmakīrti, determination of identity, as well as of the cause and

effect relation leads to the determination of pervasion or concomitance. Udayana says that this is true only when the inferential relation is limited to either identity (i.e. class inclusion) or causal relation. But the inferential relation in a good many cases may be neither. If we infer tomorrow's sunrise from today's sunrise, there does not seem to be any casual relation between them. The Buddhist has himself admitted that though the taste and the colour of a piece of fruit are not related as cause-and-effect, one can be inferred from the other all the same.

Condition (upādhi): It is a "condition vitiating an inferential relation", one which pervades the probandum (*sādhya*) but does not pervade the probans (*hetu*). The pervasion relation is usually grasped by external perception. Since the recollection of names is possible through other means, we do not need, in many cases, to have a non-provisional perceptual judgement preceding the perception of pervasion.

Verbal-testimony: With regard to verbal testimony we have first to decide whether it gives rise to true judgements or not. Udayana says, that it does. Otherwise statements of facts in language would be impossible. Although there is no natural relation between a word and its object, a word can *express* an object.

But our judgement deriving from verbal testimony are actually a kind of inference. The inference in question here is as follows. These word meanings (*padārthaḥ*), "objects", (presumably in a sentence) are mutually related, because memory of them is occasioned by hearing words which are syntactically related and semantically compatible.

The Naiyāyikas think that verbal testimony is a separate means of knowledge, not inference. They argue that the sense of the probandum in the above inference cannot be explained. If it is meant that the objects are mutually related in actuality, then it would follow that a falsehood uttered by an untrustworthy person would be true. To answer this criticism of the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas insert a qualification in the problem, viz. being uttered by a trustworthy person. They hold that verbal testimony is only a kind of inference.

Question: Is the validity of a judgement intrinsic or extrinsic? Answer: Validity is not a natural property, and hence not a proper universal, because it can be subsumed neither under judgementhood (*jñānatva*) nor under existence (*sattā*). Validity is a *conditioned* property. It arises in a judgement not automatically but due to some condition, external to the group of causal conditions, that produces the judgement in question. The opponent (a Mīmāṃsaka) says that as soon as a judgement is generated, its validity (if it is valid, that is) is also generated, by the same causal condition. Thus validity is intrinsic. But the lack of validity in a judgement is due to some defect (*doṣa*) in the causal situation. Udayana says no. If the lack of validity is due to the presence of some defect, validity would then be due to the absence of that defect. One cannot neglect this as merely a negative argument because the said defect may appear in the form of an absence (viz., non-cognition of the specific property in the case of doubt, which is an invalid judgement), and thus the absence of such a defect would be a positive condition. So, Udayana concludes, validity is extrinsic because in our first judgement about a new object it is possible to entertain a doubt with regard to the validity of that judgement. If validity were intrinsic, the arising of such a doubt would not be possible.

Comparison: The statement, "A *gavaya* is like a cow", helps us to identify the object *gavaya* and to call it by the name "*gavaya*". The opponent says: here the similarity known from the statement become a means of knowledge by which we are able to call the *gavaya* a "gavaya". Hence it is a separate means of knowledge. Udayana says no. Since it is wrong to construct from the said statement, that the essence of a *gavaya* is to be similar to a cow, we are forced to construct the essence of a *gavaya* as *gavayaness*, a property which is indicated (through secondary meaning—*lakṣaṇā*) by the phrase "like a cow". Thus the statement itself is the means of knowledge here and this, as we have seen, is only a variety of inference.

Negation: Negations are sometimes perceived and sometimes inferred. For example, the negation of pot is perceived on the ground because the senses are in conjunction with the ground while we have the judgement "there is no pot on the ground". Sometimes negation, e.g. of Caitra in that room, is inferred from the probans that Caitra is not perceived while the interior of the room, is perceived. The Mīmāṃsakas say that this last is not an inference because the reason, non-perception of Caitra, is not actually a property of the subject (*pakṣa*). The purported inference, thus a separate means of knowledge, say the Mīmāṃsakas, is called non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*). Udayana rejects this view. Non-apprehension is a property of the soul which cognizes the subject. Thus the reason is not entirely disconnected from the subject. So, the process of inference shown above is faultless. The ground, which lacks pot, determines the non-apprehension of pot.

How can a negation be in conjunction with the sense-organ to make the perception of negation possible? Udayana says that the capability of a sense-organ is actually determined by what we perceive through it. If a particular sense-organ is responsible for our perception of the counterpositive, a pot, it is also responsible for our perception of the corresponding negation.

The negation of pot is a separate entity, not identical with the ground where the negation appears. If the judgement "there is a pot on the ground" is interpreted as reporting that the ground is characterized by the presence of a pot, then the judgement "there is no pot on the ground" may be likewise interpreted as reporting that the ground is characterized by negation of pot. The presence of a pot is just a pot, which is the counter-position of the negation of pot.

There are two main types of negation, relational negation and mutual negation. Relational negation may be of three types, prior negation, posterior negation and absolute negation. The negation of pot on the ground is an absolute negation because we cannot say that the pot and the ground can be absolutely in conjunction. An absolute negation is without origin and destruction and therefore is eternal like a generality (or universal property).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Kiraṇāvalī* (Chowkhamba ed.), pp. 43, 160, 192, 856.
2. *Kiraṇāvalī* (BI), pp. 58, 60, 94, 104, 110, 112, 224, 622, as studied in *VNNC*, pp. 8-10.

3. *Kiraṇāvalī* p. 288, for the name of Śālika's commentary, see Aparārkadeva's commentary on the *Nyāyasāra*.
4. *na caitat sat kīrtter anumataṃ yad resena rūpānumāne anyathopāyam āha. Kiraṇāvalī* (BI), p. 559. *rupāde rasato gatiḥ*, *PV*, 3.8.
5. *Kiraṇāvalī* pp. 289, 520, 530, 577.
6. Ibid., p. 534.
7. Ibid., pp. 270-1.
9. Ibid., p. 286.
10. Ibid., p. 216.

COMMENTARIES ON THE *KIRAṆĀVALĪ*

The Vaiśeṣika commentary *Kiraṇāvalī* was tremendously successful in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika field of Indian philosophy. Its sharp argument and the neo-logical language surpassed all other earlier commentaries on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* and in fact, it became the fulcrum of Vaiśeṣika knowledge of the neo-logical scholars in Mithila and Bengal. As the scholars took to its study there grew a vast literature of its commentary and sub-commentary right up to 19th century.

The peculiarity of *Kiraṇāvalī* studies by the commentators is that the two chapters of the book (*dravya* and *guṇa* sections) were commented upon as if they are the commentaries of two separate books. We may mention this in the case of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. As the work is divided into four chapters, so the commentaries on them got separate existence. Not only that, even small sections in a chapter were also separately commented upon and were circulated and the manuscripts were called by different titles—though all were the commentaries on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Anyway the commentaries on the *Kiraṇāvalī* may now be mentioned in the following way.

1. *Dravyakiraṇāvalīvilāsa* by Divākaropādhyāya (1200–1250). The commentary is on Dravya section only, but it is lost.

In *Dravyakiraṇāvalīprakāśa*, Vardhamāna mentions the views of *eke* and *anye*. Pragalbhācārya in his commentary on this *Prakāśa* clearly identifies Prabhākara (not the celebrated Mīmāṃsaka ācārya Prabhākara) as *eke* and Divākara as *anye*. It is a faint indication of a commentary by Divākara on *Kiraṇāvalī*. Now in *Nyāyanibandhoddyota*, Divākara's best work on Udayana's *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, a line *vyākhyānāntarāṇi dravyakiraṇāvalī-vilāse kṛtānyasmābhiḥ* (*Nyāyanibandhoddyota* ms. in the Asiatic Society, Bengal, fols No. 1-2) confirms that Divākara wrote a commentary, at least on Dravya section of the *Kiraṇāvalī. Pragalbha in his Dravyakiraṇāvalīprakāśaṭīkā* mentions Divākara's views about 50 times.[1]

2. A commentary on *Kiraṇāvalī* by Prabhākaropādhyāya. Prof. Bhattacharya[2] is quite sure on the evidence of some statements made by Pragalbhācārya just mentioned above that Prabhākara composed a commentary on the *Kiraṇāvalī*.

3. *Kiraṇāvalīṭīkā* by Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra (c. AD 1225). The commentary on both the sections has been discovered. It is important to note that the commentary by Vādīndra on *Guṇakiraṇāvalī* had been edited by G. Kaviraj under the title of *Rasasāra* which can by no means be a title of that work. The actual title of the work is *Haraprasāda-kiraṇāvalī-darpaṇaka* which has been discovered from by Vādīndra, another magnificient work *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* (or *Vaiśeṣikavārttika*).[3] The commentary on *Dravya-kiraṇāvalī* has been printed in the Bibliotheca Indica Series.

4. *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* by Vardhamāna (fl. 1350-1375). That it has been commented upon by a number of scholars is proof of great success of the work. We will discuss later in this very section the series of commentaries that arose from it. This *Prakāśa* is also called *Upāya* and is frequently mentioned as *Dravyopāya* or *Guṇopāya* for the respective two sections of the work.

5. *Kiraṇāvalīniruktiprakāśa* by Śaṅkaramiśra (AD 1400-1490). It is extant only in name. We find its mention in the author's other work *Kaṇādarahasya* (p. 177).

6. *Kiraṇāvalībhāskara* by Padmanābhamiśra (c. 1563).

7. *Kiraṇāvalīṭīkā* by Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (fl. 1550-1590). The manuscripts of this *ṭīkā* is available in different libraries but they are fragmentary. The commentary was undoubtedly very large and explanatory. It appears to be difficult for anyone to collect those and make an edition from so many scattered manuscripts. However an appreciable attempt was made by G. Shastri who published maximum available portions of Dravya section from Sanskrit University Varanasi, in 1981.

8. *Dravyakiraṇāvalīparīkṣā* by Rudra Nyāyavācaspati (1600-1660). The manuscript of the commentary is preserved in Bikaner (R.L. Mitra Catalogue, p. 546). Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya had collected a copy of it and thoroughly examined it. It is on the original *Kiraṇāvalī* and not on Raghunātha Śiromoṇi's *Dravyakiraṇāvalī-dīdhiti* (*VNNC*, p. 85).

Rudra wrote a commentary on *Guṇadīdhiti* also. Vindhyeswariprasad in the Preface of his edition of *Kiraṇāvalī* had quoted the beginning and ending of the *Guṇadīdhitiparīkṣā*.

Guṇānanda and many other logicians of Navadvipa wrote small commentaries on *Kiraṇāvalī* and it indicates extensive study of Udayana's text there.

We have already mentioned that of the sub-commentaries on the *Kiraṇāvalī* Vardhamāna's *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* has been successful to create a line of commentaries of its own. We may now give a list of them in the following way.

(i) *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśaṭīkā* on both sections—of Pragalbhācārya (fl. 1470). Pragalbha's *Dravyakiraṇāvalīṭīkā* was discovered by Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya in Navadvipa Library. It was a palm-leaf manuscript written in Bengali script. In the folio No. 106, line 1, Pragalbha promised to discuss 'action is not produced in a substance already acting' in his *Guṇopāyaprakāśa*.[4] But as no manuscript of Pragalbha's commentary on Guṇa section of *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* has been so far discovered, no confirmed idea about its composition is available to us.[5] That the concerned commentary of Pragalbha was called *Prakāśa* is known from his own statement '*guṇopāyaprakāśa*'. *Upāya* is another name of Vardhamāna's *Prakāśa*.

(ii) *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśavivṛti* only on *dravya* section—of Rucidatta (c. 1505). It has been published in Bibliotheca Indica Series.

(iii) *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśaṭippaṇī* only on *dravya* section—of Jaleśvara Vāhinīpati Mahāpātra Bhaṭṭācārya (16th cen.). It is found to have been mentioned in his *Śabdālokoddyota* (Sarasvati Bhavan Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ms. No. 358, fol 50). But no information of the actual manuscript of the text is available to us.[6] The commentary appears to be an annotation on *Dravyaprakāśa*.

(iv) *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśadīdhiti* on both sections—of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (fl. 1500-1540). Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti* on *Guṇakiraṇāvalī-prakāśa* is available in print. Complete text has been published in Kashi Sarasvati Bhavan Granthamala. But *Dīdhiti* on *Dravyakiraṇāvalī-prakāśa* is almost lost. That Vindhyeswariprasad got a single copy of it is known from the preface of his edition of *Kiraṇāvalī*. It was a note-type text and contained only 700 grantha. Rudra Nyāyavācaspati in his *Dravyakiraṇāvalīparīkṣā* has

quoted Dīdhitikāra's line on four occasions.[7]

(v) *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśaviveka*, only on dravya section—of Pakṣadhara (c. 1500). It is available only in manuscript form.[8]

(vi) *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśavimala* only on dravya section—of Balabhadramiśra (1500-1550). A fragmentary manuscript of Balabhadra's *Dravya-(kiraṇāvalī)-prakāśa-vimala* is preserved in Pune (Ms. No. 754 of 1884-7, fols 70). The complete text must have been voluminous because the last folio of the manuscript covered only the 89th page of the *Dravyaprakāśa* of the Bibliotheca Indica Series. Balabhadra quotes a number of *Dravyapragalbhī's* lines in his commentary. Balabhadra's son Padmanābha, in his *Vardhamānendu* mentions his father's commentary (*Balabhadrī*) on a number of occasions as 'the rest in Balabhadrī' (fol. 2/2) or 'the details in *Balabhadrī*' (fol. 31/1). Padmanābha in his *Setu* (a commentary of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*) quite clearly mentions this commentary of his father.[9] *Balabhadrī* is a scholastic work and according to Prof. Bhattacharya it is the best commentary on *Dravyaprakāśa*. Practically by the familiarity and honour of this text in academic society the *Dravyapragalbhī* (a commentary by Pragalbha on *Dravyaprakāśa*) was discarded.[10]

(vii) *Vardhamānendu*, a commentary only on *Dravya* section of *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*—of Padmanābhamiśra (c. 1563). It is available in a complete manuscript at Pune (No. 166 of A. 1882-83). It is a beautiful commentary on *Dravyakiraṇāvalīprakāśa*.

(viii) *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśaprakāśikā* on both sections—of Bhagīratha Thakkura (C. AD 1500). Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura was the disciple of Pakṣadharamiśra. He was the elder brother (second in line) of Maheśa Ṭhakkura, the Raja of Darbhanga. His commentaries on *Dravyaprakāśa* and *Guṇaprakāśa* are available in munscript form. These two works, i.e. *Prakāśikās* are also called *Megha* (*Dravyamegha* and *Guṇamegha*) after Bhagīratha's nickname 'Megha'. *Guṇajalada* is another name of *Guṇamegha*.[11]

(ix) *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśaṭīkā* on dravya section and *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśavivṛti* on *Guṇa* section—of Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa (1550). The first one is very rare. Prof. Bhattacharya found a few leaves of it in a place.[12] *Guṇaprakāśavivṛti's* first portion is easily available. From this portion, it is supposed that the volume of the commentary was very large.

(x) Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara (according to *EIP:* 1420, according to Prof. A.L. Thakur and Umesh Misra: around 1500) probably wrote a commentary on *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*. "A doubtful reference in volume IV of *New Catalogus Catalogorum* mentions a single manuscript of a commentary on Vardhamāna's *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* (described on p. 156 of that volume to "Śeṣa-gaṅgādhara"), which we assume is a misprint.[13]

Of the commentaries on the *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* the *Dīdhiti* of Raghunātha became a further source book in *Kiraṇāvalī* studies and it flourished with a number of commentaries written on it. Important is the matter that the commentators on *Dīdhiti* touched only the *Guṇa* section of it and not the *dravya* section. It may be the cause behind this that the neo-logicians did not find any material to exercise their sharp arguments in the *dravya* section but the *guṇa* section appeared to them a fully suitable field of displaying their erudition.

The commentaries on the *Guṇakiraṇāvalīdīdhiti* are the following:

(i) *Guṇadīdhitiṭīkā*—of Kṛṣṇadeva Sārvabhauma (1500-1570). It is still undiscovered. In the *Kusumāñjali-kārikāṭīkā* of Trilocanadeva the existence of the concerned *Ṭīkā* is confirmed.[14]

(ii) *Guṇadīdhitiṭīkā*—of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa (1515-1600). It was discovered in Navadvipa and it was complete in 105 fols.[15]

(iii) *Guṇadīdhitiṭīkā*—of Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (1550). A major part of this commentary is easily available in manuscript form in different manuscript libraries.

(iv) *Guṇadīdhitiprakāśa*—of Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya Cakravartī (16th cen.) Easily available in manuscript form. Prof. Bhattacharya affirms it to be the best work of the commentator.[16]

(v) *Guṇadīdhitivivṛti*—of Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana (17th cen.). Easily available in manuscript form.

(vi) *Guṇadīdhitiparīkṣā*—of Rudra Nyāyavācaspati (1600-1660).

It is to be mentioned here that the *Guṇarahasya* of Rāmabhadra is an original text on *guṇas* though its title appears to be a commentary on *Guṇakiraṇāvalī*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *VNNC*, p. 12.
2. *VNNC*, p. 13.
3. *KN*, p. 135.
4. *karmavatī yathā na karmotpadyate tathā guṇopāyaprakāśe vakṣyate* (*Dravyakiraṇāvalīprakāśaṭīkā* of Pragalbha, fol. No. 106).
5. *VNNC*, pp. 12, 252-3.
6. *VNNC*, p. 43.
7. *VNNC*, p. 85.
8. *EIP* (*VI*), p. 11.
9. *asmatpitṛcaraṇaviracitavarddhamānaprakāśasya ca vimalanāmnaḥ tātparyam avadheyam iti. Setu*, p. 117.
10. *VNNC*, p . 261.
11. *HNMM*, p. 172.
12. *VNNC*, p. 157.
13. *EIP* (VI), p. 382.
14. *VNNC*, p. 115.
15. *VNNC*, p. 135.
16. *VNNC*, pp. 270-1.

GOPĪNĀTHA AND HIS *PRAŚASTAPĀDABHĀṢYA-BHĀVA-PRAKĀŚIKĀ*

After the composition of the extremely successful commentary, *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayana, on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, and of another excellent summary *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Śrīvallabha just after the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*-model, the study of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* itself came to a halt. Yet out of sporadic effort to write a commentary on this main sourcebook of the Vaiśeṣika study; its two-three commentaries were written at a later time and the *Praśastapādabhāṣya-bhāva-prakāśikā* of Gopīnātha is one of them. The manuscript of the commentary is preserved in the Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library (R. 4185). It covers only the Dravya section of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* although the volume of the commentary is not too small. Author's birthplace and other particulars are not available. His father named Nārāyaṇa was a Mīmāṃsā author referred to at several places in the text.[1] The copy of the manuscript which is with us though legible frequently contains gaps in the matter. Anyway, the beginning of the commentary runs thus:

kṣīrāmbho ....
madhye toyaṃ vikaca-vadanāmbhojam āvirbhavantam/
autsukyena slathitamathana-vyāpṛteḥ śārṅgapāṇeḥ
līlāpāṅga-sphuritam amitaṃ maṅgalaṃ nas tanotu//
yadbuddhi-vaiśadyam apeta-mohaṃ śāstreṣu tattvaṃ viṣayīkaroti//
nārāyaṇo yaḥ parayā svabhaktyā taṃ tātam īḍyaṃ praṇamāmi nityam//
dīkṣitāśeṣaśāstra ..../
bhāṣyabhāvaprakāśo 'yaṃ gopīnāthena tanvate//

The commentary ends with the salutation to Jagannātha and Girīśa (i.e. Mahādeva) in the colophonic verses which run thus:

yaḥ sākṣātkurute samādhiṣu sadā nārāyaṇākhyaṃ maho
yad-vyākhyā-viśadīkṛtaṃvijayate tajjaiminīyaṃ matam/
yaḥ somādhvaradīkṣito vibhu-jagannāthaḥ samujjṛmbhate
prāśastyaṃ vyāvṛṇod amuṣya tanayo bhāṣyaṃ kṛtiprītaye//
praśastabhāṣya-bhāvārtha-prakāśo 'yaṃ mayā kṛtaḥ/
anekatamasi dhvaste saṃcarantu sukhāḥ [*?sukhaṃ*] *budhāḥ//*
śrīlakṣmīsiṃho 'vatu māṃ lakṣmī-sambhoga-lālasaḥ
tadvaktra-candrikā-pāna-cakorāyita-locanaḥ/
girīśo 'vatu māṃ nityaṃ girīśa-vasatau rataḥ
girīśa-tanayākrānta-girīśārcita-vigrahaḥ//

References to the texts like *Kiraṇāvalī* (p. 13), *Vārttika* (? *Nyāyavārttika*) (pp. 17, 260), *Sābdamaṇi* (probably *Tattvacintāmaṇi* on Śabda section) (p. 65) are found in the commentary. Maharsi (Kaṇāda, the Vaiśeṣikasūtrakāra) is found to have been mentioned (pp. 43, 254, 259, 272) and his *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* to have liberally been quoted (pp. 102, 259).

Gopīnātha also touches the Buddhist side, e.g. the verse of Dharmakīrti (*Pramāṇavārttika*, Pratyakṣa 200) runs thus in the commentary (p. 120):

ekaṃ cet citratā kasmāt citraṃ ced ekatā kutaḥ/
tasmād ekaṃ ca citraṃ cetyetat citrataraṃ mahat//

Quite interesting is the matter that this verse has been variously composed in other Vaiśeṣika texts like *Vyomavatī* or *Nyāyakandalī* by changing only the sequence of the words therein:

citraṃ tad ekam iti ced idaṃ citrataraṃ tataḥ/
yady ekaṃ tat kathaṃ citraṃ citraṃ ced ekatā katham// (Quoted in *Vyomavatī* (I) p. 64)

ekam ca citraṃ cetyetat tacca citrataraṃ tataḥ// (Quoted in *Nyāyakandalī* (Durgadhara), p. 76).

na yāti na ca tatrāsīd na cotpannaṃ na cāṃśavat/
jahāti pūrvaṃ nādhāram aho vyasanasaṃtatiḥ// is another verse quoted from Dharmakīrti's (*Pramāṇavārttika*, Svārtha 152-3).

Last of all, what is to be mentioned is that Gopīnātha takes the help of some of the pnemonic verses of the Vaiśeṣika interest, though they are very few in number. The verses are being noted below for example:

ādyam āpādakaṃ vyāpyaṃ sādhyam āpādyam antimam/
tatra cāpādakābhāva āpādyabhāva-sādhanaḥ// (p. 39)
saṃyukta-samavāyena jalīyaṃ kṣīra-tailayoḥ/
dravatvaṃ ghṛta-jatvādau svakīyam vahniyogajam// (p. 114)
rūpatva-vyāpya-śuklatvā-bhibhavo 'gnau prakāśake/
dahyamānasya kāṣṭhāde rūpasannidhikāritaḥ// (p. 157)

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. ICPR copy of the ms. (pp. 1-275) ibid, pp. 39, 114, 157.

JAGADĪŚA TARKĀLAṂKĀRA AND HIS *SŪKTI*

Of the commentaries on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda the *Sūkti* is a very late commentary by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra, a neo-logician of Bengal of the 16th century AD Jagadīśa is one of the four great commentators of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. One popular verse runs thus:

guṇopari guṇānandī bhavānandī ca dīdhitau/
sarvatra mathurānāthī jāgadīśī kvacit kvacit//[1]

Though it exposes that Jagadīśa's commentary on Guṇa section of the *Dīdhiti* (*Guṇakiraṇāvalī-prakāśa-dīdhiti*) was taught at some places while the commentaries of Guṇānanda, Bhavānanda and Mathurānātha were rampant, it is a fact that the unprecedented popularity of Jagadīśa's commentary gradually drove the others written during a hundred years after Śiromaṇi, into oblivion. And this may undoubtedly be considered as an example of his unparalleled achievement. Anyway, his *Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā*, a grammatico-philosophical work also brought him great fame. Some more of his personal history has also been discussed in the section of *Tarkāmṛta*. The *Sūkti* is the least known work of Jagadīśa and in no way goes after his erudition. This led MM Kālipada Tarkācārya, the editor of *Dravyasūkti*, to suppose that the *Sūkti* has been the first work of Jagadīsa.[2] The *Dravyasūkti* i.e. the *Sūkti* only on the Dravya section, has been printed so far and this is because the advance portion except a few leaves on Guṇa has not been discovered in manuscript.[3]

The *Dravyasūkti* is found to have been called by different names, such as *Dravyabhāṣyasūkti, Bhāṣyasūkti, Dravyabhāṣyaṭīkā* and *Padārthatattvanirṇaya*. Jagadīśa's style of writing is marked with brevity as well as deep sense of implication. In comparison with this general style, the style of writing in the *Sūkti* appears to be an exception. The style here is undoubtedly inferior to the excellent, but the concise one we meet with in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā*.

Traces of the indebtedness of Jagadīśa for his *Sūkti* to *Kiraṇāvalī* and *Nyāyakandalī* are palpable. Thus the method of his predecessors is followed by him, and statements made in those books are quoted here, sometimes as authority, to support his statements and sometimes for the sake of refutations.[4]

MM Tarkācārya notices an important feature of the text that in the case of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* themselves, readings adopted by him are, in some places, different from those usually accepted and to be found in works like *Praśastapādabhāṣya* etc.[5] It is evidently felt that in Bengal or in Mithila, the *Upaskāra* reading of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* was in vogue, but in *Sūkti* the reading of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* sometimes varies from the *Upaskāra* also. Some such cases are noted below:

(i) *Sūkti* reads *VS* (6.1.7): *ātmāntaraguṇānām ātmāntaraguṇeṣv akāraṇatvāt.*[6] *Upaskāra* reads: *ātmāntaraguṇānām ātmāntare 'kāraṇatvāt. Candrānandavṛtti* reads: *āmtmaguṇeṣv ātmāntaraguṇānām akāraṇatvāt.*

(ii) *Sūkti* reads *VS* (9.22) as *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogāt saṃskārācca smṛtih.*[7] Both Candrānanda and Śaṅkaramiśra read: *saṃyogaviśeṣāt for saṃyogāt.*

(iii) *Sūkti* reads *VS* (3.2.16): *nānātmāno vyavasthātaḥ*.[8] This reading appears to be admitted by both *Vyomavatī* and *Kandalī*, whereas Candrānanda and Śaṅkara omit the portion *ātmanaḥ*.

(iv) *Sūkti*[9] follows the *Upaskāra* reading of *VS* 7.1.22, *bibhavān mahān ākāśas tathā cātmā*. Candrānanda, however, admits it as two *sūtras* by separating *tathā cātmā*.

(v) *Sūkti* cites two other Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* on Time: *kāraṇe kālaḥ* and *kāraṇe kalākhyā*.[10] Though *Upaskāra* holds *kāraṇe kālākhyā* a part of a longer *sūtra* 2.2.9, the *Sūkti* possibly knew it as a separate *sūtra* and it corresponds the Candrānanda reading.

(vi) *Sūkti* records the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* stating the causes of priority and posteriority.[11] It agrees with the *Upaskāra* reading (7.2.22).

Now in the conclusion, we may say that when the study of *Kiraṇāvalī* (a commentary on *Praśastapādabhāṣya*) and the corresponding *Dīdhiti*, grasped the whole sphere of the Vaiśeṣika śāstra, the effort of writing a new commentary undoubtedly appears to be a special interest of Jagadīśa himself as a beginner in that text.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *VNNC*, p. 166.
2. *PPB* (with *Sūkti*) (Sanskrita Sahitya Parishat), pp. 21-2.
3. Govt. Sanskrit College preserves a few palm-leaves of the Guṇa section of the *Sūkti*.
4. *PPB* (with *Sūkti*), pp. 11, 135 (Intro., p. 18).
5. Ibid., Intro, pp. 18, 19 fn.
6. Ibid., p. 188.
7. *PPB* (with *Sūkti*) p. 189.
8. Ibid., p. 189.
9. Ibid., p. 189.
10. Ibid., p. 164.
11. *PPB* (with *Sūkti*), p. 164.

PADMANĀBHAMIŚRA AND HIS *SETU*

Padmanābhamiśra (AD 16th century), the son of Balabhadramiśra, was endowed with a rare genius and immense intellect in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. He was mainly a dweller of Kashi but his academic life was spent in different royal courts outside Kashi. He was not a Maithila, as some believe. Anyway, with a huge volume of commentaries and some original works Padmanābha is a resplendent figure in the field of Indian philosophy. The works he composed are the following:

1. *Vīrabhadracampu* (a poetical work) narrating the heroism of Vīrabhadra, son of Rāmacandra, the Baghela king.
2. Śaradāgama (a work on poetics), a commentary on *Candrāloka* of Jayadeva. Is the title *Śaradāgama-manoramā* (? as mentioned in *Setu*, p. 82).
3. *Durgāvatīprakāśa* (a Dharmaśāstra work).
4. *Khaṇḍanaprakrama* (a Vedānta work).
5. *Setu*, a commentary on *Praśastapādabhāṣya.*
6. *Nyāyakandalīsāra* (a summary on *Nyāyakandalī*). Probably lost.
7. Kiraṇāvalībhāskara, a commentary on Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī.*
8. *Vardhamānendu*, a commentary on *Dravyakiraṇāvalīprakāśa.*
9. *Vardhamānendu* (probably a commentary on *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*), undiscovered.
10. *Līlāvatyanunaya*, a commentary on *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Śrivallabha.
11. *Rāddhāntamuktāhāra* and its auto-commentary *Kaṇādarashasya*. The former is lost.
12. *Pratyakṣacintāmaṇi-parīkṣā.*
13. *Anumāna-maṇi-parīkṣā.*
14. *Śabda-parīkśā.*
15. *Bhūsaṇa-vinyāsa*, Undiscovered.
16. *Pakṣadharoddhāra.*
17. *Alaṃkārabhāskara* (referred to in *Setu*, p. 82).
18. *Kāvyaprakāśa-prakāśa* (referred to in *Setu*, p. 82), and
19. *Ekāvalīvivaraṇa* (referred to in *Setu*, p. 82).

The Vaiśeṣika works of Padmanābha are six in number. The commentaries on *Nyāyakandalī, Kiraṇāvalī* and *Nyāyalīlāvatī* and the auto-commentary *Kaṇādarahasya*, will be discussed in their relevant section. Here we would like to discuss *Setu* which is a direct commentary on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya.*

The *Setu* of Padmanābha is a scholastic commentary on only the Dravya section of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. It became famous also by the title *Vīravarīya*. In the colophon Padmanābha pays tribute to Akbar. The purpose of composing this commentary, as expressed in the colophonic verse (No. 3) was to train his brother who probably lacked sufficient comprehension in his father's works. *Setu* is probably the last work of our author.

Setu is packed with the views of numerous authors and works. But Pragalbhācārya, who was the teacher of Padmanābha's father was exceptionally mentioned only once (p. 43). Anyway, some of the authors and their works mentioned in the *Setu* are: Cintāmaṇikṛt (i.e. Gaṅgeśa, pp. 9, 62, 63, etc.), Vardhamāna (pp. 42, 166, 117, 134, 149, etc.), Pakṣadhara (p. 67, etc.), *Kiraṇāvalī* (pp. 38, 57, 146 etc.), Vādīndra (p. 153), etc. The views of different systems of philosophy are frequently referred to in the commentary, e.g. Naiyāyika (pp. 3, 132 etc.), Mīmāṃsaka (pp. 8, 191, 363 etc.), Prābhākara (pp. 42, 70, 80, etc.), Sautrāntika (p. 106), Yogācāra (p. 106), Mādhyamika (p. 106), Digambara (p. 107), Nāstika (p. 217), Sāṃkhya (p. 217), Vedānta (p. 217), etc. Padmanābha mentions his father's views at a number of places (pp. 6, 23, 60, 87, 93, 117 etc.).

Padmanābha, in his *Setu*, mentions some of his own works also, such as *Vardhamānendu* (*Setu*, p. 136), *Kiraṇāvalībhāskara* (*Setu*, p. 136), *Kaṇādarahasya* (sic, *Setu*, p. 35). On one occasion he mentions a commentary of his father on *Bauddhādhikāraprakāśa* of Vardhamāna (*Setu*, p. 378). This reference is important at least to know the existence of Vardhamāna's work and a commentary of Balabhadramiśra thereon. Unfortunately both the works have been lost.

Padmanābha supported Śrīdhara's view on darkness (*Setu*, p. 42).

He champions his father's views on the interpretation of secondary meaning (p. 6), on salvation (p. 23), on three types of causes (p. 60) and on some more other occasions.

One Candra mentioned by Padmanābha (*Setu*, p. 105) admitted eleven categories, *dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, saṃkhyā, samavāya, sādṛśya, śakti, krama, upakāra* and *saṃskāra*. This Candra belonged to a Prābhākara sect. Prof. Bhattacharya draws our attention in his *VNNC* (p. 9) to one Mahāmahopādhyāya Candra who was a writer of two *nibandhas* named *Amṛtabindu* and *Nayaratnākara*, following Prābhākara philosophy. In certainty Candra mentioned by Padmanābha is none other but Mahāmahopādhyāya Candra.

Padmanābha mentions different sects of Jainas (p. 107) such as Kṣapaṇaka, Śvetāmbara, Ārhata, Nīlāmbara, Raktāmbara, Carmāmbara, Barhāmbara and others.

The discussion connected with Inherence, Soul and some others shows Padmanābha's versatility in Indian philosophy and acumen in its exposition.

Profuse Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* have been utilised in the *Setu*.

CHAPTER III

Vaiśeṣika Tracts

LAKṢAṆĀVALĪ OF UDAYANA

The *Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayana is a tract of a special sort which may be designated as a *lakṣaṇa* work, i.e. a tract containing only the definitions. It shows interest mainly in the style and character of the definitions of the key Vaiśeṣika notions not in their content, which does not usually deviate from accepted tradition. It is the earliest extant *lakṣaṇa* work having influenced the later Vaiśeṣika authors to a great extent. It has been referred to in authoritative works like the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* attributed to Mādhavācārya.

The salient features of the work are as follows:

1. The definitions of the categories and in some cases a few alternative definitions of them have been suggested, e.g. in the cases of substance, soul, etc.

2. Though the text shows the sign of overall simplification, the definitions of time, number, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, etc. are very complicated with phraseology in comparison with the respective definitions in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.

3. Brief examination on some topics has also taken place in the work, e.g. darkness, gold as a fiery substance and touch.

4. It has given *abhāva* an independent place in the Vaiśeṣika categories.

A number of commentaries on this tract were written. That by Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara (A.D. 1500) called by *Nyāyamuktāvalī* was edited by Pt. Surendralal Goswami and published from Varanasi in A.D. 1900. The second commentary available in print (Darbhanga, 1822 Śaka) is the *Lakṣaṇāvalīprakāśa* by Viśvanāth Jha. The commentary of Mādhava Somayājin is reported to exist as a manuscript. The *Lakṣaṇāvalīprakāśa* of Keśavabhaṭṭa (sixteenth-seventeenth century A.D.) of the famous Laugākṣi family has also been published from the Mithila Institute in 1963.

Keśavabhaṭṭa was a famous scholar and poet having a number of works to his credit which include: (i) *Sāṃkhyatattvapradīpikā*, (ii) *Mīmāṃsārthaprakāśa*, (iii) *Nyāyacandrikā*, (iv) *Tarkadīpikā*, (v) *Padārthacandrikāṭippaṇi*, and (vi) *Saptapadārthaprakāśa*, undiscovered (referred to in the *Lakṣaṇāvalīprakāśa*, p. 1) alias *Śivādityaprakāśa* (referred to in the *Nyāyacandrikā*, p. 19).

ŚEṢA ŚĀRṄGADHARA AND HIS *NYĀYAMUKTĀVALĪ*[1]

Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara was the teacher of Śeṣānanta. His time is rather controversial. On the basis of the manuscript dating 1459, he was supposed to have born in 1420, but Umesh Mishra suggests the date of Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara around 1578. He is the author of *Tarkacandrikā* (Baroda ms.) and the *Nyāyamuktāvalī* (a commentary on Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvalī*). A commentary on *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* is also found to have been ascribed to him.

Being a commentary *Nyāyamuktāvalī* effectively explained Udayana's position with reference to Śrīvallabha, Vādīndra, Vādivāgīśvara and others. It is worth noting that although the answers of the Vaiśeṣika side against the Advaitins are extremely rare, Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara is most probably one who in his *Nyāyamuktāvalī* tries to contend Citsukha while defending the Vaiśeṣika position. Some of the contentions of Śeṣa are given below.

1.Citsukha : The substance qualified by the first moment is without quality altogether; so the definition under-extends.

Answer: But in Vaiśeṣika a moment is not substance.

2. Citsukha : Is the absolute negation of quality-possession one or many? If it is one, self-dependence emanates and if many, confusion will arise as to whether it is all or only some negation that are to be taken into account and the result will be over-extension.

Answer : No, since the substratum of absolute negation of possession of one quality may without harm be the substratum of the possession of some other quality. As for the first alternative, which is not the Vaiśeṣika view, the self-dependence which emanates is of no harm since it does not vitiate the origin or apprehension of the substance.

Objection : Not being a substratum of the absolute negation of possession of quality = absolute negation of an absolute negation = possession of quality. So the definition still fails to apply to the substance at its first moment.

Answer : We do not accept the equivalence of the absolute negation of absolute negation with the counterpositive.

3. Citsukha : The visual organ, like the tactile organ, can grasp coloured things even in the absence of external light.

Answer : The example is faulty, as the tactile organ does not grasp colours.

4. Citsukha : The opponent's objection, viz. that particles of darkness do not generate (*anārambhaka*), because they are without tangibility, like the internal organ, is vitiated by an obstruction, viz. the uselessness of the other organs.

Answer : No, for no matter whether negation of inherence-causality of substance or mere non-generatingness be taken as the probandum (in the inference), the presence of an obstruction cannot be maintained. For the absence of generation can be inferred in a different way : the substratum of the absolute negation of tangibility cannot generate, because it is that kind of substratum, like the internal organ.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *EIP* (VI), pp. 382-88

SARVADEVA AND HIS *PRAMĀṆAMAÑJARĪ*

Sarvadeva's *Pramāṇamañjarī* is an important Vaiśeṣika text which has come down to us although we have no definite information regarding the author's date and other activities. Pattabhirama Sastri, the editor of the *Pramāṇamañjarī*, infers the date of the author to be the fourteenth century of the Vikrama era, but Jinavijaya Muni supposes it to be much earlier. *Pramāṇamañjarī's* style of writing is quite ancient and Śivāditya's *Saptapadārthī* and Sarvadeva's *Pramāṇamañjarī* are Vaiśeṣika texts of the same type where seven categories instead of six have been dealt with. The earliest manuscript of the *Pramāṇamañjarī* which has been discovered from Kashmir by Bühler is said by him to have been written in the eleventh century A.D. So as the manuscript of the *Pramāṇamañjarī* is found to have been written in the eleventh century A.D., composition of the text must have been earlier. On the above ground Jinavijaya Muni is in favour of dating the text towards the end of the tenth century A.D.[1]

Sarvadeva appears to be an inhabitant of Kashmir and because of this the work took some additional time to go round in other places of India. *Pramāṇamañjarī* is found to have been referred to for the first time in the *Nyāyapariśuddhi* of Veṅkaṭanātha, a Vedānta scholar of A.D. 1267-69.[2] Here two other works which have been mentioned together are *Śrīmahāvidyā* and *Mānamanohara*. *Śrīmahāvidyā*, as we are quite convinced, is *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* of Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra and *Mānamanohara* is a Vaiśeṣika treatise by Vādivāgīśvara. We are lucky enough that both the texts have been efficiently edited and are now easily available to us.

We have already seen that Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra is a commentator of Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī*. The name of this commentary is *Haraprasāda-kiraṇāvalī-darpaṇaka*. So Vādīndra of *Śrīmahāvidyā*—being obviously the same and identical with Vādīndra of *Kiraṇāvalī-darpaṇaka*—must be posterior to Udayana. Again, Vādivāgīśvara, the author of *Mānamanohara*, cites from *Nyāyamakaranda*, and *Mānamanohara* in its own turn has been discussed in *Nyāyaratnadīpāvali*. Sri Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka, the author of *Nyāyamakaranda*, flourished around A.D. 1100 and the author of *Nyāyaratanadīpāvali*, Śrī Ānandānubhava, about A.D. 1150. So Vādivāgīśvara must have flourished between 1100 and 1150 A.D.[3] As the three texts are mentioned together and the two of them are more or less of the same period, the third one probably must not be a text of a far distant time. Hence it might not be wrong to accept *Pramāṇamañjarī* as a text of a period contemporary to Udayana. We know that Udayana flourished in A.D. 1050-1100. Hence Sarvadeva's date might be around A.D. 1050. And even then the date of the Kashmiri manuscript of the *Pramāṇamañjarī* to be of the eleventh century does not face any grave challenge.

Pratyagrūpa Bhagavān or Pratyaksvarūpa Bhagavān, who wrote the *Nayanaprasādinī* commentary on Citsukhācārya's *Tattvapradīpikā*, mentions Sarvadeva and his *Pramāṇamañjarī*[4]. So from the literary evidences of the *Nyāyapariśuddhi* (a commentary on the *Nyāyasāra*), and *Nayanaprasādinī*, it is clear that *Pramāṇamañjarī* was a well-known text to the South Indian scholars of philosophy.

The important feature of the *Pramāṇamañjarī* is that it shows an old style of dealing

with the subject. The topics dealt with in the text must have been according to the *Praśastapādabhāṣya,* but the author's novel observation sometimes evokes plaudits of the scholars. Anyway the topics discussed are as follows.

The categories have been at first divided into two sections : *Bhāva* and *Abhāva*. *Bhāva* is divided into six : 'substance' etc. It is a notable point that Sarvadeva did not mention even the names of all categories assuming that the reader of this book at least knew them. In the subseqúent cases also Sarvadeva followed this style. Without enumerating the names of the substances, he only says—"Earth etc."[5] Without mentioning the names of the qualities, he only says, "That (i.e. quality) is divided into 24, with colour etc."[6]

The substances earth, water, fire and air have been defined one by one with their subdivisions relating to body, sense-organs and other material objects. Other substances, like *ākāśa*, time, direction, soul and mind have also been defined with mention of the qualities belonging to them, such as *ākāśa* is endowed with six qualities, sound etc.; time and direction, each having five qualities have been dealt with, with the proofs of their existence and characteristics. Human soul is endowed with fourteen qualities, knowledge etc. Mind is endowed with eight qualities, number and others.[7]

All the qualities have been discussed. In course of explaining knowledge (*buddhi*, a special quality), Sarvadeva following the tradition divides it into right knowledge and wrong knowledge. The first is again divided into two : direct and indirect (*pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*). The latter, i.e. Indirect, is called *laiṅgika*. The normal perception (*pratyakṣa* excluding *yogi-pratyakṣa*) has been divided and specifically designated as determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*).

The pseudo-probans is called *liṅgābhāsa*. It is a bit peculiarly divided into six varieties : *asiddha*, *viruddha*, *anaikāntika*, *asādhāraṇa*, *bādhitaviṣaya* and *satpratipakṣa*. *Bādhitaviṣaya* is *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*. It is clear from the above division that the author synthesises the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems in this regard. Anyway, definitions and illustrations of the pseudo-probans have been given. The author advises one to enquire more in the *Bhāṣya* (i.e. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*)[8]. According to Advayāraṇya (a commentator of the *Pramāṇamañjarī*), the present work is a type of Saṃgraha work (digest) and that is why more detail is not expected in it.[9]

Other *bhāva* categories like generality etc., along with *abhāva* (negation) have been dealt with very precisely. With all the above, *Pramāṇamañjarī* clearly appears to be a further summary of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya,* in a neat way.

Through Pattabhirama Sastri's edition of the *Pramāṇamañjarī* we come to know at least three beautiful and complete commentaries on the main text. They are :

1. *Pramāṇamañjarī-ṭīkā* by Balabhadramiśra
2. *Pramāṇamañjarī-ṭippaṇa* by Advayāraṇyayogin, and
3. *Bhāvadīpikā* by Vāmanabhaṭṭa.

Balabhadramiśra was a Bengalee Naiyāyika and was an outstanding scholar in the first half of the sixteenth century. In the coronation ceremony of Akbar, thirty-two Hindu mahāpaṇḍitas were graced, fifteen out of them were the logicians and the sixth one was this Balabhadramiśra.[10] Balabhadra's father was Viṣṇudāsa Tripāṭhī and mother Mādhvī.[11]

Balabhadra studied this *Pramāṇamañjarī* from his preceptor and this preceptor, as identified by Dr. Bhattacharya,[12] was Pragalbhācārya. But nothing is known about the personal history of two other commentators. However, Vāmanabhaṭṭa mentions his father—Tulasīkṛṣṇa.

Regarding the chronology of the three commentaries, the learned editor has his own observation which appears to be important here. Balabhadra refutes a number of opponents' arguments by referring them as *'kecit'* and *'kecana'*. That those arguments are found in the commentaries of Advayāraṇya and Vāmanabhaṭṭa lead us to set Balabhadra posterior to them. And now of the two, Vāmanabhaṭṭa more or less follows the very commentary of Advayāraṇya. It is the special feature between them that the commentary of Advayāraṇya is detailed and that the Vāmanabhaṭṭa is its summary. Vāmanabhaṭṭa mentions the year of composition of his commentary to be 1385 śaka[13] which corresponds to A.D. 1463. Therefore the first commentator is Advayāraṇya, the second Vāmanabhaṭṭa and the third Balabhadra.[14]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Preface, p. 3, *Pramāṇamañjarī* (Rajasthan Puratattva Mandir), 1953
2. *Śrīmahāvidyā-mānamanohara-pramāṇamañjaryādi-paṭhita-vakrānumānasyāpi tathātvam. Nyāyapariśuddhi,* (Chowkhamba), p. 278.
   Śrīnivāsācārya identifies, in his *Nyāyasāra* commentary on the *Nyāyapariśudhi, Śrīmahāvidyā*, etc. as the names of the texts.
3. *Mānamanohara* (ed. Yogindrananda), Introduction, p. 11.
4. *Śrīvallabha-vādivāgīśvara-sarvadevānām. Nayanaprasādinī,* See *Tattvapradīpikā* (ed. Yogindrananda), p. 333
5. *Pramāṇamañjarī,* p. 3.
6. Ibid., p. 40.
7. Ibid., pp. 28, 33, 37 and 39.
8. Ibid., p. 65.
9. *Pramāṇamañjarī-ṭīkā* of Advayāraṇya, See *Pramāṇamañjarī,* p. 66.
10. *VNNC,* p. 259.
11. Colophon, Balabhadra's *Pramāṇamañjarī-ṭīkā.*
12. *VNNC,* p. 260.
13. *Śake bāṇa-gaja-tri-candra-gaṇite verṣe.* Colophonic verse of *Bhāvadīpikā.*
14. *Pramāṇamañjarī* (Jayapura), Preface, p. 6.

VĀDIVĀGĪŚVARA AND HIS *MĀNAMANOHARA*

Vādivāgīśvara is the renowned author of the Vaiśeṣika tract *Mānamanohara*. He is an inhabitant of South India as we can prove from indisputable facts available to us. In the *Mānamanohara* the texts like *Iṣṭasiddhi* and *Nyāyamakaranda* are quoted and in its own turn the *Mānamanohara* has been quoted or criticised in the works of Ānandānubhava, Citsukhācārya, Pratyaksvarūpa Bhagavān, Ānandajñāna, Mādhavācārya, Ānandapūrṇa, Veṅkaṭanātha, Śrinivāsa and others.[1] We notice that all of these texts and authors are from South India. So there is little doubt that Vādivāgīśvara was a South Indian. Moreover, the sarcastic language used by Ānandānubhava indicates that he had some personal acquaintance with Vādivāgīśvara. Ānandānubhava was an inhabitant of Karṇāṭa so Vādivāgīśvara[2] also was most probably from that region.

From the benedictory and the colophonic verses of the *Mānamanohara* it is evident that the author was the devotee of Śiva as well as of Śakti. Ānandānubhava calls him 'Vāmamārgānusārin' meaning Tāntrika or even calls him a drunkard.[3] Vādivāgīśvara wrote another work, named *Nyāyalakṣmīvilāsa*, which has been mentioned in his own work *Mānamanohara*.[4] But this (*Nyāyalakṣmīvilāsa*) appears to be lost.

The *Mānamanohara* (p. 44) refers to the *Nyāyamakaranda* and in its own turn has been referred to in the *Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī* (p. 339). Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka, the author of the *Nyāyamakaranda* flourished at about A.D. 1100 and Ānandānubhava, the author of the *Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī*, at about A.D. 1150. So Vādivāgīśvara appeared between them, that is, during the first half of the twelfth century.

The *Mānamanohara* (p. 34) quotes from *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman who can be placed in the period around A.D. 850-1050. Ānandabodha admitting him as his preceptor says : *"etad evoktam gurubhiḥ—nānyatra kāraṇāt kāryam na cet tatra kva tadā bhavet"*. The sentence starting with *nānyatra* etc. is found in the *Iṣṭasiddhi* (p. 145). Hence the time of Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka may fairly be taken as to be the last quarter of the eleventh century. This text must have taken a time of at least twenty-five years to be well-known to the scholars by which time Vādivāgīśvara came by it and studied it.

Citsukha (1220-1225) vehemently criticized the *Mānamanohara*. He very much used the work of Ānandānubhava—*Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī*. Therefore Ānandānubhava is earlier than Citsukha. That Vādivāgīśvara is earlier than Ānandānubhava has just been shown. On these grounds also Vādivāgīśvara's time must have been the first or the second quarter of the twelfth century.

By the above observation, we may safely conclude that A.D. 1100-1150 is the most justified time for Vādivāgīśvara.

The *Mānamanohara* is divided into ten sections.[5] They are the following :

(i) Siddhi prakaraṇa (section on establishment of existence of some categories). It contains the establishment of God, the whole and the atoms.

(ii) Dravya prakaraṇa (section on substance). Nine substances are described.

(iii) Guṇa prakaraṇa (section on quality). Twenty-four qualities are defined.

(iv) Karma prakaraṇa (section on action). Five types of action are defined.

(v) Sāmānya prakaraṇa (section on generality). Detailed verification of intermediary generalities has taken place in this section.

(vi) Viśeṣa prakaraṇa (section on particularity). Particularity discussed in a nutshell.

(vii) Samavāya prakaraṇa (section on inherence). Inherence is established.

(viii) Abhāva prakaraṇa (section on negation). Four types of negation have been defined.

(ix) Itara-padārtha-nirākaraṇa prakaraṇa (section on refutation of other categories). Potency (*śakti*), similarity (*sādṛśya*) etc. have been refuted.

(x) Mokṣa prakaraṇa (section on salvation). Salvation in the form of negation of pains is advocated.

Now coming to say something about the characteristics of the *Mānamanohara* the first notable point is that Vādivāgīśvara starts with a syllogistic argument to establish each and every category, and lastly gives the final definition of them and the syllogistic argument follow a specific style starting with *vivādādhyāsitaḥ*. We find this type of argument in other earlier works also such as Vācaspati's *Tātparyaṭīkā*, Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī* and so on.[6] Precision of writing is found everywhere in the work.

The salient features of the work may be noted as follows:

1. The Buddhist arguments against God, whole and atom are briefly noted and answered in the first section. In the third section, identity of quality and qualified—a well-known theory of the Buddhists—is refuted.

2. *Akhyātivāda* (the theory of non-apprehension) of Prābhākara has been refuted.[7]

3. On the occasion of defining soul the Vedānta view of the soul to be identical with knowledge and to be absolute one (*akhaṇḍa*) has been sternly criticised.[8]

4. Darkness is nothing but negation of light.[9]

5. Only two members of five inference-components are favoured.[10]

6. Verbal testimony, analogy, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* are refuted.[11]

7. Bhāsarvajña does not admit action as a separate category but declares it as the twenty-fifth quality.[12] Udayana in his *Kiraṇāvalī* half-heartedly supports the position.[13] But Vādivāgīśvara vindicates the position of Kaṇāda by establishing action as a separate category by dint of its new definitions.[14]

8. Different generalities are established by at least twenty-seven syllogistic arguments in the fifth section.

9. The *Mānamanohara* is probably the second available Vaiśeṣika tract where negations are discussed as a prominent category for the Vaiśeṣikas, *Saptapadārthī* being the first work to make the negation formal.

10. *Jñātatā* (state of being known), *viśiṣṭatā* (qualifiedness), *viṣayaviṣayībhāva* (relation between the object and that endowed with the object) and nature of the Sāṃkhya philosophy are refuted.[15]

11. Salvation in the form of pleasure (Ānandamokṣavāda) has been criticized.[16]

12. In *Saptapadārthī*[17] we find *citrarūpa* and *citrarasa*, but in *Mānamanohara rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha* and *sparśa*—all these four may be *citra*.[18]

Almost all the independent works in the Vaiśeṣika system follow the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda. The work like *Saptapadārthī* follows Sūtrakāra. The *Mānamanohara* also follows the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* like the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. Yet, at some places the differences from the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* are clearly noticed in the *Mānamanohara*.

1. On the occasion of the definition of soul, Vādivāgīśvara establishes the plurality of

the soul by refuting unity of it. But Praśastapāda did not play such a role. And it is this reason for which Ānandānubhava calls the author of the *Mānamanohara*, a Vedānta-despiser.

2. Kaṇāda defines darkness : *dravya-guṇa-karma-niṣpatti-vaidharmyād bhā'bhāvas tamaḥ* and *tejaso dravyāntareṇāvaraṇācca* (*VS* 5.2.21, 22). The latter means that darkness has the divergence from a *bhāva* category like *dravya* (substance) etc., hence it should be considered as an *abhāva* (negation). Our realization also follows that where the light does not reach due to obstructing substances, there only darkness is realized. Though Praśastapāda is silent about darkness, Vādivāgīśvara commits it as negation of light. The latter also mentions the view of Śrīdhara in this regard.

3. Praśastapāda divides *avidyā* (false knowledge) into four types *saṃśaya, viparyaya, anadhyavasita* and *svapna*. But in the *Mānamanohara, saṃśaya* and *anadhyavasita* are not practically different from each other, vacillating knowledge being present in both according to him and hence the division is not much justified. Similarly both of *svapna* and *viparyaya* are nothing but the confirmation of false knowledge. So here also the division is not justified. And regarding this opinion if is observed that Vādivāgīśvara points out a similar attitude with Bhāsarvajña.[19]

4. Praśastapāda admits five inference-components, but Vādivāgīśvara, only two.

5. Though *abhāva* is not conspicuously discussed in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, it is discussed in the *Mānamanohara*. In fact, Udayana, Śivāditya and others already supplied the clear concept of *abhāva* and it is evident that Vādivāgīśvara followed these earlier ācāryas.

6. Other categories like *Śakti, Sādṛśya, Jñātatā* were refuted by Śivāditya. So the *Mānamanohara* is more influenced by the *Saptapadārthī* than the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *MM*, Intro pp. 9-10.
2. *sa ca karṇāṭadeśīya ityasya vyavahārād avagamyate. Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī*, Introduction, p. 27.
3. *Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī*, pp. 339-41.
4. *MM*, pp. 47, 101.
5. *MM*, Introduction, p. 12.
6. Vide *NVTT*, p. 344, *NK*, p. 90.
7. *MM*, p. 75.
8. Ibid., p. 37.
9. Ibid., p. 49.
10. *aṅge ca dve eva vyāpti-pakṣadharmate. MM*, p. 85.
11. Ibid., pp. 91, 95, 97 and 100.
12. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 158.
13. *Kiraṇāvalī* (BI) p. 402.
14. *ādyavibhāgāsamavāyikāraṅajātīyaṃ karma. MM*, p. 113.
15. *MM*, pp. 137, 138 and 139.
16. *MM*, p. 143.
17. *Saptapadārthī, p. 26.*
18. *MM*, p. 56.
19. Śivādityamiśra partly agrees with Bhāsarvajña in this regard. Cf. *tarkasvapnau saṃśayaviparyayāv eva, Saptapadārthī*, p. 31.

ŚRĪVALLABHĀCĀRYA AND HIS *NYĀYALĪLĀVATĪ*

The *Nyāyalīlāvatī* is one of the few original classics of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It is also sometimes treated as a neo-logical work. It is composed by the celebrated Śrīvallabhācārya. Rājaśekhara in his commentary *Pañjikā* on the *Nyāyakandalī* mentioned four commentaries on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. The fourth one, as he mentioned, is the *Līlāvatī* by Śrīvatsācārya. Guṇaratnasūri (A.D. 1409) also followed Rājaśekhara and mentioned the treatise *Līlāvatītarka* of Śrīvatsācārya. Though no Vaiśeṣika author having same name is found and the available *Līlāvatī* (i.e. *Nyāyalīlāvati*) is not a commentary on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* in the way we understand a commentary like *Nyāyakandalī* on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, the *Nyāyalīlāvati* of Śrīvallabhācārya in most probability is the *Līlāvatī*, mentioned by Rājaśekhara and Guṇaratna because if the latter (i.e. *Līlāvatī* of Śrīvatsa) at all existed we could strongly believe to get at least some references to it in the vast *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* text and commentary literature. Moreover, the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* though not exactly the commentary on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* in the strict sense of a commentary explaining the lines of the text, it covers almost the same grounds as the latter covers. The *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is rightly treated by the commentator Śrīdhara as a 'Padārthapraveśa', i.e. Introductory treatise[1], while in *Nyāyalīlāvatī* we find the elaboration of the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika system being the prime function of the Vaiśeṣika scholars ever since the date of Praśastapāda. It may be the cause due to which the Jaina authors accepted the *Līlāvatī* as a commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. However authorship of the book is still a debatable question. It is not clear whether the author was Śrīvatsācārya or some one else. It is possible that the style of writing misled one to read the name in such a way. Or the Jaina authors knew Śrīvallabhācārya by the name of Śrīvatsācārya. For example, Jaina author Siṃhasūri knew the famous Dignāga by the name of Dinna[2]. Anyway, the author is somewhere mentioned as Vallabha but he is surely Śrīvallabha and not simply Vallabha. Vādīndra[3] calls him by that correct name. Citsukhī[4] mentions him under the name of Śrīvallabha. All the known commentaries on this *Līlāvatī* attribute it to Śrīvallabha. Rājaśekhara[5] also knew the name of the author beginning with a Śrī'.

Now we turn to the questions of date and place of birth of this author. Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya[6] in course of determining the date of Śrīvallabhācarya gives the following arguments :

"Śrīvallabha has not given the well-known epithet 'Ācārya' to Udayana, from whom he was not much removed in time. On pp. 37-40 he has cited the views of a scholar, partly of the same school, with whom however he disagrees, who quoted the Ṭīkā (i.e. the *Kiraṇāvalī*, vide Guṇa part, p. 184 : Rasasāra, p. 22 and Guṇa prakāśa, p. 48 in his support. We should, therefore, place him about two generations after Udayana in the second quarter of the twelfth century A.D. late in the reign of Nānyadeva. His definition of *vyāpti*, as is well-known, is cited and refuted by Gaṅgeśa in the section on pūrvapakṣa (B.I. ed., p. 83 and *Līlāvatī*, p. 496). But he was not cited anywhere by Śrīharṣa who was his close contemporary. On the other hand, a pre-Gaṅgeśa scholar of Mithila named

Prabhākaropādhyāya commentated on his work perhaps for the first time. Many authors of the thirteenth century A.D. like Vādīndra (A.D. 1225) and Citsukha (A.D. 1200), not belonging to Mithila, have spoken of him respectfully by name. It is untenable, therefore, to place him after A.D. 1175. It should be mentioned here that Pratyagrūpa, commentator of Citsukha in one place (*Citsukhī*, Nirn. ed., p. 326) refers to the *Līlāvatī* as a 'recent' work. Pratyagrūpa's date is about A.D. 1350."

Rajendra Prasad Sharma, the learned editor of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* (Rajasthan University edition), is a bit specific about Śrīvallabha's date to be between A.D. 1100 and A.D. 1175. In this connection we would like to draw the attention of Prof. Sharma to a small matter. He has rightly utilized Vardhamāna to determine the date of Śrīvallabha but the date of Vardhamāna must not be A.D. 1178 or A.D. 1250 as printed in the book.[7] Because, even Gaṅgeśa, father of Vardamāna cannot be placed before A.D. 1300 by any means. Prof. Bhattacharya has efficiently proved it with a series of arguments.[8] So Vardhamāna's date is obviously fourteenth century A.D. and not earlier than that.

Śrīvallabha undoubtedly belonged to Mithila. In the first place, from the earliest times it was commented upon by Maithila scholars of the front rank like Prabhākara Upādhyāya, Vardhamāma and Vaṭeśvara and when Vardhamāna categorically states that in the first prayer verse and the second introductory verse the author had respectively referred through *double entendre* to his father Puruṣottama and his beloved wife Līlāvatī, there is not the remotest chance that the pedigree of a 'foreign' author could come within his knowledge so directly. Only a Maithila scholar's family details could be recorded by Vardhamāna in that manner. In the second place, Śrīvallabha incidentally refers to a reigning monarch in the following elegant passage:

Yadi ca gaganam ātmā ca anyadharmeṇa anyam avacchindyāt kāśmīravarttinā kuṅkumarāgena kārṇāṭacakravartti-(lalanā)-karakamalam avacchindyāt.[9] The passage is cited in the *Nyāyamuktāvalī*[10], a commentary on Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvalī* by Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara, who made it more elegant by adding the word *lalanā*. It is also reproduced in the *Citsukhī*[11] and in the *Upaskāra*[12] of Śaṅkaramiśra in a modified form. It was evidently inspired by a passage of the *Kiraṇāvalī* in the same section of *kāla*.[13] Cinnambhaṭṭa[14] mentioned it as "*kāśmīra-kumkuma-rāngena karṇāṭaka-deśa-gata-sakala-padārthoparañjaka-vatprasaṅgāt*", and also localized it[15] by mentioning Vijayanagari and Virūpākṣa instead. A notable point in this connection cannot be kept aside that Mithila was under the rule of a 'Karṇāṭa' dynasty for two centuries and a half (from about A.D. 1100 to A.D. 1350), which was the most glorious period in the cultural and social history of Mithila. The most illustrious among the kings of the dynasty was its founder Nānyadeva (A.D. 1094-1147). If the *Bhūparikramāṇa* (fol. 18b) and the *Puruṣaparīkṣā* of Vidyāpati are to be believed this monarch 'of the Karṇāṭa family' (*karṇāṭakula-saṃbhava*) was still alive in the reign of Jayacandra of Kanauja (vide *Yuddhavīrakathā*). There is hardly any doubt that Śrīvallabha was referring to this monarch of Mithila in the above passage. We would be careful that the reference is to a 'Karṇāṭa' family and not to the 'Karṇāṭa country'.[16]

In the example of 'intuition' (*ārṣajñāna*) Srīvallabha refers again to a local monarch Śālivāhana, who was not, however, a *Cakravartin*' (overlord) but only a *nṛpati*. That this is a reference to a living monarch is proved by the author's assertion that the incident

known through intuition tallied with facts, Śaṅkaramiśra explains that it is an example of knowledge at a distance in position, not in time.[17]

Śrīvallabha frequently mentions Vārānasī with which he was apparently quite familiar. In one reference, he seems to have recorded his personal experience that a pupil's brain improved sweetly from sips of Gaṅga water at Vārāṇasī after tasting myrobalan. He must then have studied at Vārāṇasī and from early times, Maithila students had maintained communication with that great centre of Indian culture and religion.[18]

From the quotation found in Vardhamāna's *Anvīkṣānaya-tattva-bodha* it is gathered that besides the *Līlāvatī* Śrīvallabha wrote a commentary on the fifth chapter of the *Nyāyasūtra*, the most intricate part of the system. But it is lost. Vardhamāna who has referred to the same view of Śrīvallabha, as found in the quotation mentioned above, in his *Pariśiṣṭaprakāśa*, under the caption *kecid āhuḥ*. Moreover, it is likely that Śrīvallabha wrote a separate tract named *Īśvarasiddhi* cited by himself *yathā caitat tathā asmābhir api Īśvarasiddhāv uktam*. Prof. Bhattacharya thinks that the reference to this *Īśvarasiddhi* does not seem to be the small section on Īśvara in the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* where the relevant topic is not traceable.[19]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *NK* (BI), pp. 667, 687, 697.
2. *NNA*, pp. 63, 72, 96, 690.
3. *Rasasāra*, p. 92
4. *Citsukhīṭīkā* (Bombay ed.), pp. 196, 198, 230, 298-99 etc. more than a dozen times.
5. *HNNM*, p. 55.
6. Ibid., pp. 60-1.
7. *NL* (Rajasthan University ed.), Introduction, pp. 7, 19.
8. *HNNM*, pp. 99-104.
9. *NL*. P. 290.
10. *Nyāyamuktāvalī* (Vangavasi ed.), p. 41.
11. *Citsukhī* (Nirn. ed.), p. 322
12. *Upaskāra* under *VS* 2.2.10.
13. *Kiraṇāvalī* (Varanasi ed.), p. 116 : *anyathā vārāṇasīsthitena nīlena pāṭalīputrasthitasya sphaṭikamaṇer uparañjanaprasaṅgāt.* cf. *Upaskāra* under *VS* 2.2.6.
14. *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā*, p. 228.
15. Ibid, p. 228.
16. *HNNM*, pp. 58-59.
17. Ibid., p. 59.
18. Ibid., p. 60.
19. Ibid., p. 61.

NYĀYALĪLĀVATĪ

The *Nyāyalīlāvatī* was by far the best Vaiśeṣika treatise in the medieval period, and of course the most intricate one. It outshone the more or less elementary treatises of Sarvadeva (*Pramāṇamañjarī*), Vādivāgīśvara (*Mānamanohara*) and Śivādityamiśra (*Saptapadārthī*). Like the works of Udayana on the one hand and that of Gaṅgeśa on the other, the intricacy of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* attracted the best intellects of Mithila ever before the times of Gaṅgeśa and it enjoyed the privilege in being the post-Udayana work before Gaṅgeśa to rank among the immortal classics of neo-logic.

The text stands as an unparalleled example of the śāstra where examination is the main criterion. Śrīvallabha himself states the characteristics of his work in the second benedictory verse :

dravyaṃ nākulam ujjvalo guṇagaṇaḥ karmādhikam ślāghyate
jātir viplutim āgatā na ca punaḥ ślāghyā viśeṣasthitiḥ/
sambandhaḥ sahajo guṇādibhir ayam yatrāstu satprītaye
sānvīkṣā-naya-veśma-karma-kuśalā śrīnyāyalīlāvatī//

Thus critical examination of the *anvīkṣā-naya*, i.e. the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, takes place in this text. According to Vātsyāyana the śāstra proceeds through three ways : Enumeration (*uddeśa*), Definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and Examination (*parīkṣā*). Śrivallabha after letting the first two ways go with the earlier Vaiśeṣika treatises composed his treatise chiefly targeting the third way i.e. Examination. And the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* is in fact unique in this class of literature.

The *Līlāvatī* elaborates the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika system. We would like to note them in a rather detailed way separately a little later. The remarkable feature regarding the composition of the work which we would like to mention here is that the work, in spite of its having insipid subject-matter of the categories, is not devoid of the lucidity of language. The scholars are sometimes really delighted with the language of *Līlāvatī*, of which only two examples are given below :

Yadi vā śaradi vimala-jalada-vyūha-nirargala-vigalad-amalajala-bhāra-dhārāsāra sañcāri-nabhastala-nihita-vimala-bhājana-sambhṛtam apagatavividhopādhi-vyādhi-sambhedam amṛta-drava-pratīmam ānanda-janakam ambho 'nubhūyate. NL, pp. 143-4.

Na cāyam jvalanavad-ūrdhva-gamana-sīlo vātyādau śukaśukādi-nāda-visadṛśa-megha-saṃghaṭṭa-jātīya-vātyāghāta-śabdānumāne avaśyonneya-parasparāhater evodgamano-papattau svabhāva-kalpanānavakāśāt. NL, pp. 178-9.

The contents of the Nyāyalīlāvatī

The *Nyāyalīlāvatī* deals with the topics of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Divided into four broad chapters, the work is further divided into seventy-five smaller sections. The four chapters are : (1) Chapter on classification (*vibhāga*), (2) Chapter on divergences (*vaidharmya*), (3) Chapter on similarities (*sādharmya*) and (4) Chapter on the process (*prakriyā*).

The first chapter comprises seven main sections : (1) examination of the enumeration of the categories, (2) examination of classification of the substances, (3) examination of the classification of the qualities, (4) examination of the classification of the actions, (5) examination of the classification of the generalities, (6) examination of the particularities, and 7. examination of the inherence.

The examination the classification of the substances contains the following sub-sections : (1) examination of earth, (2) examination of the whole, (3) examination of water, (4) examination of fire, (5) examination of air, (6) examination of the sense-organs, (7) examination of the body, (8) examination of the objects (*viṣaya*), (9) examination of the process of creation and destruction, and to all annihilation of the world, (10) examination of the god, (11) examination of the atoms, (12) examination of *ākāśa*, (13) examination of time, (14) examination of direction, (15) examination of the soul of the living beings, and (16) examination of the mind.

The examination of the classification of the qualities contains the following smaller sections : (1) examination of number, (2) examination of dimension, (3) examination of separateness, (4) examination of separateness in relation of two objects, (5) examination of conjunction, (6) examination of conjunction having its nature of non-pervasiveness, (7) examination of disjunction, (8) examination of priority and posteriority, (9) examination of knowledge. This ninth section has a number of sub-sections like the examinations of (i) doubt, (ii) mis-conception, (iii) indecision, (iv) dream, (v) perception : (a. yogic perception, b. indeterminate knowledge, c. determinate perception) (vi) inference, (vii) invariable concomitance, (viii) debate, (ix) consideration (*parāmarśa*), (x) rejection of verbal testimony, (xi) rejection of comparison, (xii) rejection of presumption (*arthāpatti*), (xiii) rejection of possibility (*sambhava*), (xiv) rejection of tradition, (*aitihya*), (xv) rejection of negation (*abhāva*), (xvi) salvation, (xvii) syllogism, (xviii) pseudo-probans, (xix) remembrance, (xx) *Ārṣa* type of knowledge. (10) examination of weight, (11) examination of liquidity, (12) examination of viscidity, (13) examination of tendency, (14) examination of merits and demerits, (15) examination of sound, and (16) examination of rules regarding the classification of the qualities.

The second chapter contains five main sections : (i) examination of divergent properties, (2) examination of special divergent properties, (3) examination of definition of the categories, (4) examination of the definition of a substance, and (5) examination of the definition of a quality.

The third chapter contains two main sections : (1) objections against similarities of the six categories, and (2) solution to the above.

The fourth chapter contains ten main sections : (a) production of dyad, (2) process of chemical change, (3) process of production and destruction of numbers above one, (4) process of production and destruction of dimension, (5) process of production and destruction of separateness relating to two, (6) process of production and destruction of conjunction, (7) process of production and destruction of disjunction, (8) process of production and destruction of priority and posteriority, (9) process of production of knowability and (10) process of production and destruction of tendency.

The Refutation of the Opponents by Śrīvallabha

It is one of the chief characteristics of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* that it contradicts the opponent's view at about every step. After refuting the Cārvāka's view, Śrīvallabha establishes the invariable concomitance and the generality (pp. 491-95). He refutes the two-inference-component scheme of the inference for other's sake and the validity of remembrance of the Jainas (pp. 620-28). The establishment of the existence of the individual soul and of the atoms and the refutation of the momentariness are prepared against the Buddhists (pp. 321-22). A volley of objections is cast against the Mīmāmsā theories of *Jñātatā* (knowability) (pp. 860-62), *śakti* as a distinct category (pp. 54-61), *upamāna* as a distinct *pramāṇa* (pp. 537-38), *arthāpatti* (presumption) (pp. 539-42) and *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) (pp. 547-50). *Sambhava* (possibility) and *aitihya* (tradition), which are two distinct *pramāṇas* admitted by the *Purāṇa*-followers have been refuted in this text (pp. 542-44). Nyāya doctrine also is not allowed to stay unexamined. The verbal testimony is refuted (pp. 526-30). The theory of Piṭharapāka also has been contradicted (pp. 831-34). Bhāsarvajña's view regarding *paratva* and *aparatva* has been pulled down (pp. 405-06).

Udayana admits the knowledge of *gavaya* through secondary implication in the statement *'go-sadṛśa'* (similar to cow). He also analyses the invalidity of the verbal testimony in the *Kiraṇāvalī*. Both the above views are refuted by Śrīvallabha in his *Nyāyalīlāvatī* (pp. 38, 39, 533-34 and 404-05). Bhāsarvajña's views on the numbers like duality and on some others are contradicted (pp. 283, 356, 357, 404, 405, 425 and 856).

Śrīdhara innovated a new theory on darkness claiming it to be the imposed blue colour over the earth. It was contradicted in the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* (p. 450).

Tutātita (i.e. Kumārila) is mentioned along with Kīrti (i.e. Dharmakīrti). Śrīvallabha contradicts their opinions regarding the absence of any omniscient person (p. 480).

The *Tattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati is cited with approval on the refutation of comparison (p. 533).

On salvation, the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* cites the views of a few opponents without specifically mentioning their names. One such is of Bhāskara (the Vedāntin) and it is identified by Vardhamāna as to be the Tridaṇḍīmata while Śaṅkaramiśra clearly says the view concerned here is of Bhāskara (p. 583).

The process of annihilation of the world has been narrated in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. *Nyāyalīlāvatī* mentions its contradiction by some opponent (p. 220). But no identification of this opponent is made by Vardhamāna or Śaṅkaramiśra.

Some opponents contradicted the distinct substanceness of God (p. 239). But we find no identification of these opponents in *Prakāśa* or *Kaṇṭhābharaṇa*.

Other Notable Features

Besides the above major characteristics of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* there are some more striking features which appear to be important. They now may be noted as follows:

1. The first chapter of the book, i.e. Padārthavibhāga-pariccheda, forms a great bulk extending up to p. 731 of the Chowkhamba edition of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*.

2. Śrīvallabha displayed his originality by adding three small chapters at the end respectively elaborating dissimilarities (*vaidharmya*), similarities (*śādharmya*) of the categories and process (*prakriyā*). It is a new attempt that Śrīvallabha tried to elaborate the objections against the different similarities of the categories. The existence of different qualities in the categories although needed to be proved in their respective sections of categories, the *Sādharmya* section has special importance to reassert those qualities in protest against the *controversies*. e.g. proving of velocity of mind, direction and time being cause of each and every effect; oneness and ubiquity of the *ākāśa*; etc.

3. The *Nyāyalīlāvatī* cites[1] the *Pariśuddhi* passage of Udayana who flings at the scholars of Bengal for their incorrect pronunciation of the three sibilants still prevailing in Bengal.[2]

4. The term *Ṭīkā* is found to have invariably been applied to the *Tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, but Śrīvallabha as a protagonist of the Vaiśeṣika in a manner paid his tribute to Udayana by using the term *Ṭīkā*[3] for the *Kiraṇāvalī* instead.[4]

5. A passage of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* runs thus : *tad iyam anāmnātatā bhāsarvajñasya yad iyam ācāryam api avamanyate/tathā ca tad-anuyāyinas tātparyācāryasya siṃhanādaḥ—saṃvid eva bhagavatī ityādi.*[5] Here the scholars were found to beat about the bush to identify this 'ācārya' mentioned by Śrīvallabha in the above passage. Padmanābha in his *Anunaya* commentary takes this ācārya as Kaṇāda and his follower (*tadanuyāyiṇaḥ*) as the expert in Kaṇāda's views. Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya[6] pointing out the mistake of Padmanābha suggested that here 'ācārya' should better be taken for Praśastapāda. But we would like to accurately identify this ācārya with Uddyotakara and his follower is Tātparyācārya who is none else but Vācaspatimiśra I. We find the latter's statement *saṃvid eva bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam* belonging to the *Tātparyaṭīkā* under *NS* 2.1.36.[7]

6. Vyomācārya mentioned in the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*[8] must have been Vyomaśiva, the writer of the *Vyomavatī* commentary on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.

7. The clear deviation from the Vaiśeṣika tradition in the matter of choosing the five terms of the inference-components is seen in the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. The Vaiśeṣka terms were *pratijñā, apadeśa, nidarśana, anusandhāna* and *pratyāmnāya*. But in the *Līlāvatī* the five terms are *pratijñā, hetu, dṛṣṭānta, upanaya* and *nigamana*—exactly as in the *Nyāya śāstra*. However, there is *dṛṣṭānta* instead of *udāharaṇa*. The *Kaṇṭhābharaṇa* also noted that in the text *pratijñā ādi* indicates the inference-components in the *sūtra* of the great sage (Gautama) : *pratijñā-hetūdāharaṇopanaya-nigamanāny avayavāḥ* (*NS* I. i. 32).

Influence of the Nyāyalīlāvatī on the Navya-nyāya and the Vedānta authors

Śrīvallabha, being anterior to Gaṅgeśa, the propounder of the school of neo-logic, has deeply influenced the latter. In fact, the author appears to be the pathfinder of the Tattva-cintāmaṇikāra in some cases. Analysing the material provided by Śrīvallabha, Gaṅgeśa consolidated his position in the field. Prof. Sharma[9] has shown some cases where the

above fact comes true. In connection with the final definition of the invariable concomitance Vardhamāna writes in his *Prakāśa* commentary :

yat sambandhitāvaccedaka-rūpavattvam yasya tasya sā vyāptiḥ/ tathā hi dhūmasya vahnisambandhitve dhūmatvam avacchedakam dhūmamātrasya/ vahni-sambandhitvāt vahnes tu dhūmasambandhena vahnitvam avacchedakam dhūmasambandhini gatatvāt (na hyaptiprasaktam avacchedakam saṃyogādau tathātvadarśanāt.) kintu ārdrendhana-prabhava-vahnitvam (dhūma sambandhitāvacchedakam) tādṛśam ca vyāpyam eva/yadvā yatsamānādhikaraṇānyonyābhāva pratiyogi yadvan na bhavati tena samam (tasya) sāmānādhikaraṇyam// (*Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa*, p. 498).

This position exactly is found in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, (p. 601). It proves that the view of the Nyāyalīlāvatikāra had been taken up or explained by Gaṅgeśa. Likewise, in the case of *tarka* section the matter is striking. In the *Rahasya* of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Mathurānātha exposes the whole matter

1. *nāpi kārtsnyena sambandho vyāptir iti lakṣaṇam līlāvatīkāravyāpti-lakṣaṇam iti.* (*Sāmānyalakṣaṇaprakaraṇa*, p. 285)

2. *yattu pākādau ityādinā vicārito viṣayo līlāvatyabhimataḥ.* (*Sāmānyalaṣaṇaprakaraṇa*, p. 284)

Similarly, in the Śabdakhaṇḍa also, Gaṅgeśa refutes the invalidity of the verbal testimony of the Līlāvatīkāra "*yogyatāsattimattve sati samsṛṣṭārthaparatvāt tat-para-sannidhimattvād vā*" (*NL*, p. 527). *Rahasya* (p. 98) exposes this.

In the school of Vedānta philosophy also, Śrīvallabha's influence was quite deep. Citsukha and his commentator Pratyaksvarūpa Bhagavān mentions Śrīvallabha as many as forty-two times. Anyway, Svami Yogindrananda in the Introduction (p. 29) of his edition to *Citsukhī* writes :

In the eleventh century a Vaiśeṣika ācārya Śrīvallabha was born in Mithila. By this the Advaita world confronted with a great panic. The *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of that author is obviously mature and full of *prameyas*. At the sight of its growing popularity Citsukhācārya refuted it with his utmost strength. It is a fact that if the portion containing refutation of the *Līlāvatī* is taken out of the *Tattvapradīpikā*, the rest will remain resembling nothing but a copy of Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka's *Nyāyamakaranda*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Śuklādi-vyāvṛtti-nibandhanas tu nīlādi-vyavahāraḥ śaṣayor iva savyavahāro gauḍānām .... ityādi tātparyaśuddhāv udayanaḥ*, *NL*, p. 445 (Some *NL* mss. have different readings *śaṣayor iva savyavahāro.*) *śaṣayor savyavahāro gauḍānām. Tātparyapariśuddhi*, p. 324.
   It is difficult to understand in view of different readings of texts which one of the three sibilants as the Gauḍas use, was noted by Udayana and refuted by Śrīvallabha.
2. *NL*, p. 57.
3. *NL*, pp. 38 and 39.
4. *HNNM*, p. 57.
5. *NL*, p. 358.
6. *HNNM*, 58.
7. *NVTT*, p. 351.
8. *NL*, p. 834.
9. *NL* (Rajasthan University ed.) Introduction p. 17.

COMMENTARIES ON THE *NYĀYALĪLĀVATĪ*

The *Nyāyalīlāvatī* is tremendously successful with a vast commentary literature on it. It attracted, as we have already mentioned, the best talents of both Mithila and Bengal. Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya (in his *VNNC*) and Prof. Rajendra Prasad Sharma (in his *Nyāyalīlāvatī* edition from Rajasthan University) inform us of a number of commentaries and sub-commentaries, the account of which is given below after a careful comparison :

1. *Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa* of Vardhamāna Upādhyāya (fl. A.D. 1350-1375). The commentator is the son of the celebrated neo-logician of Mithila, Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. The commentary has been published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.

1.1. *Nyāyalīlāvatī-prakāśa-dīdhiti* of Raghunāta Śiromaṇi (fl. A.D. 1500-1540). The commentator is a founder of Bengal school of neo-logic and is famous for his revolutionary theories on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Fragmentary mss. are available in Kashi Sarasvati Bhavan and also in libraries in Mithila and London.

1.1.1. *Rahasya* or *Māthurī* of Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (fl. 1550). The commentator is the pupil of Ramabhadra Sarvabhauma. Many fragmentary portions of the commentary are available in different repositories. The commentary must have been a voluminous one.

1.1.2. *Dīdhiti-viveka* of Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgīśa (end of the sixteenth century A.D.). Best work of Guṇānanda. Ms. available in London (I.O., I, p. 666). Sharma informs that Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgīśa (1700), pupil of Madhusūdana Ṭhakkura wrote one *Viveka* on *Dīdhiti* which is available in Kashi Sarasvati Bhavan as well as in Mysore and Lahore.

1.1.3. *Śiromaṇi-tīkā* of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa (fl. A.D. 1550-1575). Available in India Office Library (I. O., Cal. I, p. 688, 58 fols. Fragmentary). Sharma informs of *Dīdhitiviveka* of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa, the complete manuscript of which is available in Kashi Sarasvati Bhavan.

1.1.4. *Dīdhiti-ṭīkā* of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra (A.D. 1560-1600). A fragmentary copy of this rare treatise was found by R.L. Mitra in Shantipur (Nadia district of West Bengal.) (L. 1203, 27 fols). The beginning of the text runs thus :

karpūra-kunda-kumuda-kailāśadhara-sodaram/
vighna-vidhvaṃsakaṃ dhāma namāmaḥ śaivadaivatam//
kaṇabhakṣa-muneḥ pakṣarakṣa-vinyasta-vasanaḥ/
vacāṃsi jagadīśasya cintayantu vicakṣaṇāḥ//

Another fragmentary copy (beginning and ending available) was procured by Prof. Bhattacharya.

1.15. *Dīdhiti-ṭippaṇa* of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra. Its manuscript is preserved in Sanskrita Sahitya Parishat (Ms. No. 3562, fols. 1-16).

1.1.6. *Dīdhiti-parīkṣā* of Rudra Nyāyavācaspati (A.D. 1600-1660). The commentator was the eldest son of Vidyānivāsa and was a Mahāpaṇḍita among the Bengali Paṇḍitas in Kashi. Ms. available in Kashi (Ms. No. 623).

1.1.7. *Prakāśa* or *Dīdhiti-ṭīkā* of Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya (sixteenth century A.D.), son of Devīdāsa and grandfather of Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāsāgara. Mss available in Tanjore (p. 4573-5) and in Kashi Sarasvati Bhavan. Sharma mentions of two separate commentaries by Rāmakṛṣṇa (according to his book ref. Nos. 1.1.4 and 10).

1.2 *Viveka* of Pakṣdharamiśra (A.D. 1500). Mention is made at I.O. Cat I, p. 668. Sharma mentions it to be on direct *Nyāyalīlāvatī* and not on *Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa*.

1.3 *Vilāsa* of Rucidatta (A.D. fifteenth century). Discovered (R. 5124). Prof. Bhattacharya categorically mentions it as a commentary on *Prakāśa* of Vardhamāna. (*VNNC* p. 27). But Sharma notes it to be a direct commentary on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* and tells of its manuscript which is available in Madras.

1.4 *Prakāśikā* or *Vivṛti* of Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura alias Megha Ṭhakkura (1505). It has been published from Nirnaya Sagar Press in 1915.

1.5 *Vardhamānendu* of Vācaspati II (A.D. 1400-1475). It is not available. Dhundhiraja Shastri mentioned the name in the preface of his edition of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. Sharma mentions it as a separate commentary on *Nyāyalīlāvatī* and not Prakāśa of Vardhamāna.

1.6 *Rahasya* of Mthurānātha Tarkavāgīśa. A manuscript of it is available in Calcutta Sanskrit College Library (ms. No. 455), and also available in London and Lahore.

1.7 *Ṭīkā* of Rudra Nyāyavācaspati (A.D. 1600-1660). This commentary is a direct commentary on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* and *Prakāśa* of Vardhamāna and not on *Dīdhiti*, ms. available in Kashi (No. 611).

2. *Darpaṇaka* of Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya (1400), son of Jagannātha Upādhyāya. Treatise mentioned in *Dravya-viveka* of Pakṣadhara. Ms. undiscovered.

3. *Kaṇṭhābharaṇa* of Śaṅkaramiśra (A.D. 1400-1450). The commentator was the son of Bhavanātha and pupil of Raghudeva Nyāyālaṃkāra. Text available in print in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.

4. *Pragalbhī* of Pragalbhācārya (A.D. 1450). The commentary still undiscovered. Prof. Bhattacharya checked one ancient mutilated commentary of *Nyāyalīlāvatī-dīdhiti*, in Navadvipa and discovered two citations of Pragalbhācārya. According to him those must have been Pragalbha's *Nyāyalīlāvatī* commentary.

5. *Anunaya* of Padmanābhamiśra (C. 1563). The commentator was the son of Balabhadramiśra. The commentary is preserved in the Adyar Mss. Library. Ms. No. 40. B. 26. Sharma informs that some portions of the text was printed in the *Journal of Adyar Library* (VIII, 1944, pp. 111-16).

6. *Rahasya* of Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa. It is a separate commentary on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. Fragmentary manuscripts are available in London, Thiruvanantapuram as well as Shantipur (West Bengal).

Apart from the above, Sharma mentions five other commentaries which were the direct commentaries on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. They are noted below :

(a) *Vyākhyā* of Rudra Bhaṭṭācārya who was mentioned in the *Nyāyasāra* by Mahādeva Paṇḍita (1800). Ms. available in Lahore library.

(b) *Bhāva-pariccheda* of Mahādeva Paṇḍita, son of Lakṣaṇadeva (resident of Dharmapur). Information found in *Nyāyasāra* (p. 5), printed in the Pandita Patrika, Varanasi.

(c) *Vilāsa*. Written by Mahādeva Paṇḍita.

(d) *Vyākhyā* of Śaṅkara Bhagīratha Paṇḍita. Available in Mysore.

(e) *Rahasya* of Śrīnivāsa, author of *Nyāya-siddhānta-tattvāmṛta* (as mentioned in its edition from Madras, pp. 6, 18). We have no information of its availability.

ŚIVĀDITYAMIŚRA AND HIS *SAPTAPADĀRTHĪ*

The name of the great Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika author Śivādityamiśra now lives through his elementary Vaiśeṣika treatise *Saptapadārthī*. Though his two other treatises *Nyāyamālā* and *Hetukhaṇḍana* have been discovered, his three other treatises[1] among which one is *Lakṣaṇamālā*, Śivāditya's *magum opus*, appear to be lost.

Śivāditya undoubtedly flourished between Udayana (A.D. 1025-1100) and Vādīndra (c. 1225). To fix this date Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya argues that Gaṅgeśa who very rarely names his predecessors made an exception in the case of Śivāditya, who is cited by name in the section on *Nirvikalpaka* :

Vyāvarttanīyam adhitiṣṭhati yaddhi śākṣād
etadviśeṣaṇamatau viparītam anyat/
daṇḍī pumān iti viśeṣaṇam atra daṇḍaḥ
puṃso na jātir anudaṇḍam asau ca tasya//[2]

It may be taken as a typical illustration of the style and consummate scholarship of Śivāditya exhibited in his lost works which seem to have been both in prose and verse. Gaṅgeśa's own views on the intricate point, the definitions and function of *Viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*, were based on a passage from *Kiraṇāvalī*[3] of Udayana respectfully quoted and explained by him. We may add here that if the passage would have been written by Udayana actually targeting Śivādītya some commentator could have certainly discovered it. Moreover, the extant *Nyāyamālā* of Śivāditya is based on *mahāvidyā* syllogism. This undoubtedly developed in post-Udayana period.

To fix the upper limit of our concerned author it is to be mentioned that Vādīndra in his *Mahāvidyā-viḍambana*[4] assails Śivāditya. The latter's array of intricate definitions earned for him the epithet of a 'follower of the new crooked path'. In addition, Citsukha in the second chapter of *Tattvapradīpikā* explains a dozen quotations of Śivāditya.[5] Among those, one (p. 237) is particularly important. Citsukha refers to it as a 'crooked course' of the 'modern' which is really an elaboration of Udayana's works, and anonymously quoted by Gaṅgeśa in the very beginning of the Upādhivāda.[6]

In *Nayanaprasādinī*, Pratyaksvarūpa clearly mentions the *Lakṣaṇamālā* of Śivāditya and it may fairly be understood that the citations or views found in *Citsukhī* are from that *Lakṣaṇamālā*, with the matter that those citations or views are not of *Saptapadārthī*. *Lakṣaṇamālā* according to Prof. Bhattacharya must be a treatise based on *mahāvidyā* syllogism.[7]

Vardhamāna in his *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha*[8] and Jānakīnātha in his *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī* have quoted Śivāditya's views.[9]

The model of *Saptapadārthī* is found to have been followed in the later period of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. The most important works of that line were the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśavamiśra, *Tarkakaumudī* of Laugākṣī Bhāskara, *Tarkāmṛta* of Jagadīśa, *Bhāṣāpariccheda* attributed to Viśavanātha and *Tarkasaṃgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa.

As its title implies, *Saptapadārthī* reviews the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. Though seven categories are admitted in the Vaiśeṣika system, all other Vaiśeṣika scholars

before Śivāditya explain their śāstra as of six categories according to Kaṇāda's scheme. Śivāditya is perhaps the first to make seven categories official.[10] The *Saptapadārthī* may well be considered as a lakṣaṇagrantha, i.e. a work mainly containing the definitions (of the categories and sub-categories). The characteristic of the definitions given in the text is that those are always connected with their respective generality of category wherever possible. For example, a substance is (i) what has inherent in it, the generality of substanceness or (ii) what has qualities in inherent relation with it or (iii) what is itself an inherent cause.[11] A quality is (i) what has, inherent in it, the generality of qualityness, (ii) what is not of the nature of motion while possessing generality and (iii) which is not capable of being an inherent cause.[12] An action is what has, inherent in it, the generality of actionness and the non-inherent cause of the first conjunction and disjunction.[13] Earth is that which has the generality of earthness, and which has smell in relation of inherence with itself.[14] Colour is that which has the generality of colourness and which is cognized by the visual organ alone.[15] Throwing upwards has the generality of throwing-upwardness and is action which is the cause of conjuction with the upper-region.[16] In this way connecting generality in the definitions has become a style throughout the work.

In comparison with Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, Śivāditya's work gives rather simpler definitions of the categories, at least in the case of qualities. For example, in the case of the definition of quality :

saṃyogajanya-saṃyogāsamavāyi-samavetatva-rahita-saṃyogā-ṣaṃyoga-samavetavān guṇaḥ or *vibhāgāvibhāga-samaveto vā guṇaḥ. Lakṣaṇāvalī,* p. 16; *guṇastu guṇatvajātiyogī jātimattve saty acalanātmakatve sati samavāyikāraṇarahitaś ca. Saptapadārthī,* p. 49.

In the case of the definition of number :

pṛthaktvāsamaveta-sarvānyonyābhāva-samānādhikaraṇaika-dravya-samaveta-samavetavatī saṃkhyā. Lakṣaṇāvalī, p. 19. *saṃkhyātva-sāmānyavatī saṃkhyā. Gaṇanā-sādhāraṇakāraṇam saṃkhyā. Saptapadārthī,* p. 37.

Śivāditya recognizes an independent seventh colour like the variegated colour (*citrarūpa*)[17] and also an independent seventh taste (*citrarasa*).

The sorrows are of twenty-one varieties,[18] already told by Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika*.[19]

There are three varieties of inference only—affirmative, only-negative and affirmative-negative.[20] Five inference-components are *pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya* and *nigamana* (i.e. as in the Nyāya philosophy).[21] The definition of *upādhi* shows a close resemblance to that given by Udayana. The definition in *Saptapadārthī* is *upādhiś* ca *sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāpī,*[22] and the same in *Kiraṇāvalī—sādhya-vyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvam upādhiḥ*.[23]

Śivāditya admits only two *pramāṇas* like the Vaiśeṣikas as usual. The chapter on *anumāna* is treated in a brief and comparatively lucid way.[24]

Pseudo-probantia are six in the *Saptapadārthī* : *asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika, anadhyavasita, kālātayapadiṣṭa* and *Prakaraṇasama*. It is an amalgamation of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, because the two are obviously of the Nyāya system while *anadhyavasita* is admitted nowhere but in the Vaiśeṣika only. The number of the pseudo-probans being six is an instance of the author's own innovation and analysis.

The other things in the work may be briefly noted in the following manner.

Sūtras 1-55 comprise Uddeśaprakaraṇa and the rest, i.e. 56-163, Lakṣaṇaprakaraṇa.

The seven categories are well-known—substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence and negation.

There are three kinds of time : origination (*utpatti*), maintenance (*sthiti*), and destruction (*vināśa*.)

Eleven directions are mentioned as divisions of space (*dik*) : East, south-east, south, south-west, west, north-west, north, north-east, lower, upper and middle.

Efforts are divided into prescribed (*vihita*), prohibited (*niṣiddha*) and indifferent (*udāsīna*).

Generalities are either *jātis* or *upādhis*. Existence, substanceness, qualitiness are offered as examples of *jātis*. Cookingness is an *upādhi*. Similarity (*sādṛśya*) is a generality of the *upādhi* type.

Knowledge of the reality of the categories is the cause of salvation. Reality has the form of not being superimposed upon (*anāropita*). Knowledge of reality is direct experience (*anubhava*) and has four kinds of mark : hearing (*śravaṇa*), thinking (*manana*), meditation (*nididhyāsana*) and immediate awareness (*sākṣātkāra*). Salvation is the absence of pain together with the posterior negation of false judgements which are the cause of pain. This negation is produced by right knowledge.

Right knowledge depends on definitions. A definition differentiates its object from everything else by specifying a mark which has only-negative concomitance.

Time is the abode of the non-inherent cause of priority and posteriority produced by the movements of the sun and which is not an abode of the priority and posteriority themselves. Direction is similarly defined except that in its case the priority and posteriority are not produced by the sun's movements.

Judgement is the light (*prakāśa*)residing in the soul.

Tendency (*saṃskāra*) is that which produces in its substratum the condition in which it was at its production.

A moment (*kṣaṇa*) is a time limited (*avacchinna*) by a motion related to a prior negation of a disjunction which is not producing another disjunction.

Maintenance (*sthiti*) is the occurrence of a thing. It is the possession of a nature free from the negation of its own prior negation. Or, it may be said to be that which is related to the prior negation of its own effect.

Valid inference consists in knowledge of the *hetu* as qualified by pervasion and *pakṣadharmatā*.

Pervasion is the relation between the pervader and substratum of the pervaded qualified by negation of any *upādhi*.

Tarka is the reduction (*prasañjana*) of an undesired pervader. This reduction consists in the assertion of the negation of the opponent's position through showing other negations by parity of reasoning.

Sleep occurs when the internal organ, not having merit born of *yoga*, resides in a place without a sense-organ.

Ordinarily pleasures of life are dependent on effort. Heavenly pleasure however,

does not depend only on effort.

Being limited (*mūrtatva*) is having dimension limited by this-muchness (*iyattā*).

Particularities inhere in eternal substances.

Being a substratum (*adhikaraṇatva*) is having a general resident. Ubiquity (*vibhutva*) is being in contact with all material substances. Separable connection (*yutasiddha*) is the relation between things which are found to be two. Inseparable connection is the relation of substratum and substrate (*ādhārādheya*) between things which are not found to be two.

The concluding verse of the text is *saptadvīpā dharā yāvad yāvat sapta dharādharāḥ/ tāvat saptapadārthīyam astu vastuprakāśinī//*(May this treatise the *Saptapadārthī* expose the nature of things as long as the earth with the seven insular continents and the seven principal mountains last).

Commentaries on the Saptapadārthī

Saptapadārthī has as many as five important commentaries. They are the following :

(i) The commentary of Jinavardhana Sūri (A.D. 1415).

(ii) *Mitabhāṣiṇī* of Mādhava Sarasvatī (A.D. 1523). Edited with *Saptapadārthī*—by Tailanga Rama Sastri, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benaras, 1893, with introduction.

(iii) *Padārthacandrikā* of Śeṣānanta (before A.D. 1608). Edited with *Saptapadārthi*—by V.S. Ghate, Poona, 1909, with introduction and notes. Śeśānanta was the son of Śārṅgadhara.

(iv) *Śiśubodhinī* of Bhairavendra.

(v) *Sandarbha* of Balabhadramiśra. Balabhadra was the father of Padmanābhamiśra (sixteenth century), the author of *Kiraṇāvalībhāskara*, etc.

"Of these the *Mitabhāṣiṇī* is the clearest and shows considerable philosophical acumen. As Winter remarks[25] it is written by a true philosopher, who in some places differs from Śivāditya, which according to Winter is rather rare among commentators."[26] The *Padārthacandrikā* is often verbose, but ingenious. As Winter remark, he often gives more words than light but is valuable.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Hetukhaṇdna*, reference to two other works—*Upādhivārttika* and *Arthāpattivārttika* both of Śivāditya have been found.
2. *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Pratyakṣa paṛt, BI ed., pp. 829-30. The verse therein is wrongly printed as prose.
3. *KV*, pp. 201-2.
4. *Mahavidyāviḍambana*, 74, 79, 109, and 117.
5. Identified in *Nayanaprasādinī* of Pratyaksvarūpabhagavān, pp 180, 183, 192-3, 195, 200, 237, 295-6, 309, 323, 327-8. See *Citsukhī*, Nirnaya Sagar ed, 1915.
6. Vide *HNNM*, p. 62. The particular passage of Śivāditya is ascribed by Ānandapūrṇa to Nārāyaṇa-sarvajña (See *Khaṇḍanaṭīkā*).
7. *VNNC*, p. 9.

8. *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha* (Allahabad), p. 66.
9. *HNNM*, p. 63.
10. *EIP* (II), p. 643.
11. *SP* (Calcutta), p. 48.
12. Ibid., p. 49.
13. Ibid., p. 50.
14. Ibid., p. 51.
15. Ibid., p. 55.
16. Ibid., p. 62.
17. Ibid., p. 26.
18. Ibid., p. 45.
19. *NV*, p. 2.
20. *SP* (Calcutta) pp. 77-8.
21. Ibid., pp. 79-80.
22. Ibid., p. 74.
23. *Kiraṇāvalī*, p.
24. *SP* (Calcutta) p. xii.
25. Dr. Augustus Winter wrote a Latin introduction in the edition of *Saptapadārthī* published by Bonn University. See *Saptapadārthī*, Gurumurthi, Introduction, p. lxxiv.
26. *SP* (Gurumurthi), p. lxxiv.

ŚAṄKARAMIŚRA AND HIS *KAṆĀDARAHASYA*

Kaṇādarahasya of Śaṅkaramiśra is a very useful Vaiśeṣika manual of moderate length fortunately published at Varanasi (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 48, 1917). Śaṅkara gives here a complete survey of all Vaiśeṣika doctrines after the manner of Praśastapāda. The tradition of making a summary actually started with *the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. It is important to note that it is the summary-tradition which became pre-eminent in the later Vaiśeṣika literature, e.g. *Saptapadārthī*, *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, etc. Commentary-tradition was broken after the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* of Praśasta in the Vaiśeṣika system. The Nyāya system also produced a number of summaries regarding their doctrines, e.g. *Tārkikarakṣā*, *Tarkabhāṣā*, etc. But the Nyāya always is alive in its commentary-tradition, e.g. *Nyāyasūtras, Bhāṣya, Vārttika, Ṭīkā, Pariśuddhi,* and *Prakāśa*. Anyway, the *Kaṇādarahasya* has been successful in its objectives and purposes. Though Śaṅkara has not indicated his sources, it is clear that he wrote after consulting all up-to-date works on the subjects. The fling at the Gauḍas for their incorrect pronounciation of the three sibilants is exactly borrowed, for instance, from the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. One fault in Śaṅkara's academic erudition that he wrongly described three views of the *Vyomavatī* (a commentary by Vyomaśivācārya on *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha*) to the *Kandalī*,[1] each of them refuted by Udayana. Śaṅkara has punctuated the manual with many *kārikās* drawn from various sources.[2] He betrays the influence of his age by waxing eloquent whenever a Gaṅgeśa brand topic crops up, e.g. Vyāptivāda and Upādhivāda.[3] Like an orthodox Vaiśeṣika, Śaṅkara divided the book into six sections without adding one on negation.[4]

The following is a brief summary of the work :

Substanceness, qualityness, etc. are defined in the terminology of neologic. For instance, substanceness is the property of that which is not the substratum of the absolute negation of a quality. Absolute negation of a quality is that absolute negation whose counter-positiveness is limited by qualityness, which is to say that qualities can never be absent in their substrata, namely, substances.

Quality is a category which possesses a generality, lacks a mobile nature and is not the substratum of dimension (*parimāṇa*).

The author adopts the "only-negative" (*kevalavyatirekin*) method of proving that earth has odour as its special quality, citing as justification the dictum "the purpose served by a definition is to prove that the object to be defined is distinct from others or to account for drawing references to the object itself".

Fourteen qualities of earth are enumerated. Some are proved to be apprehended by perception, others by inference. Śrīvallabha (author of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*) is quoted as viewing weight as perceptible, though the Vaiśeṣika school takes it to be apprehensible only by inference.

Fire is said to be of four kinds. One is sunlight whose colour and touch are manifested. The second is that of the eye, in which both colour and touch are unmanifested. The third kind is the fire in heated oil, etc., only the colour of which is not manifested. And the fourth kind of the fire of the moon and of gold, where touch alone is not manifested.

For visual perception both colour and touch must be manifested. This is the view of Tātparyācārya (i.e. Vācaspatimiśra I).

There are five kinds of names or ways of naming. First is through comprehending each individual falling under a term, e.g., "Devadatta". Second is *pāribhāṣikī*, or *taṭastha*. The example is *ākāśa* which is known as such by being the faculty by which sound is known. The third is the case of *pācaka* (cook)—the activity of cooking (a notional activity) is included in the awareness produced by the *pācaka*. The fourth is where the name *go* (cow) is given because the thing possesses cowness. Fifthly, a name is given because of a restricted rule (*saṅkocaniyama*) relating to its cause, e.g. the name *svarga* (heaven) is assigned to something which is caused by pleasure restricted by lack of relating to frustration.

Time and direction are distinct. Though each of them is single, different times and directions are due to obstructions. The difference between time and direction is this—the particular divisions of time, such as present, etc., continue to have the same applicability, that is, present time is the present time for all people at that time. But the eastern direction—or any other direction—is eastern only for the particular person concerned and not for all.

Motion in the mind must be admitted in order to account for its contact with the various sense-organs during the waking state and with the veins (*nāḍī*) to account for deep sleep and for certain activities during the waking state. The desire of the soul to know certain things, deep meditation, and *adṛṣṭa* of the soul causes this motion in the mind. The soul's effort causes this motion. The mind moves in the tubular vein called *manovahā*. This motion creates speed when there is speed, the mind is struck or impelled by its contact with the vein, which has touch and speed. The mind then comes into contact with the sense-organs which can grasp the desired object. This becomes possible only when the mind is admitted to be atomic in dimension.

Darkness has no objective existence. It is only the negation of light. For example, darkness is known in a cave through the recollection of light which is that darkness' counter-positive. The negation of light, which is darkness, may be a prior, posterior or absolute negation as the case may be.

The discussion of the theory of chemical change in the text is very elaborate. There is a difference of opinion among Naiyāyikas about the time it takes for a dyad to change colour through chemical processes.

1. Some say it takes nine moments :
   (i) through the motion of and consequent disjunction between the constituent atoms the dyad is destroyed,
   (ii) the blue-colour inherent in each atom is destroyed,
   (iii) a red-colour is produced in each atom,
   (iv) motion in the atom is produced,
   (v) this (motion) in turn produces disjunction of the atom from the particular portion of direction, and so
   (vi) disjunction of the atom from that portion, and
   (vii) contact between the two atoms, which yields

(viii) the dyad and

(ix) lastly in the ninth moment the red-colour of the atom.

2. A second account introduces a moment, between (iii) and (iv) above, at which the motion of the atoms mentioned under (i) is terminated leading then to (iv), the motion of the atoms leading to renewed contact. Thus the total number of moments taken on this second view is ten.

3. Still a third account finds eleven moments.

4. On still another account there are five moments in the process :

(i) the process leading to the destruction of the dyad through the disjunction of one atom from the other,

(ii) destruction of the blue-colour in one atom, together with the destruction of the previous contact between the two atoms,

(iiii) production of the red-colour in the atom together with contact with the other atom,

(iv) production of the dyad, and

(v) production of the red-colour in the dyad.

5. A fifth counting involving six moments, a sixth involving seven moments, a seventh involving eight or nine moments, and an eighth involving two, three or four moments are further distinguished.

Application of heat must not be taken to be uniform, as in that case the effect of heat will also be only of one kind. Heat travels fast. One kind of fire is impelled to move on by another. If a particular kind of fire is admitted to destroy a colour and is also taken to continue to function then the atom which has lost its colour through that heat would remain colourless when that heat is lost. If the same heat were to give rise to a colour, that colour might not be red.

Separateness is distinct from mutual negation. Neither *vaiśiṣṭya* nor *vaidharmya* can be treated as equal to separateness.

Conjunction resides in more than one substance and does not pervade its substrate (the conjoined substances). Or, conjunction may be admitted to be pervasive of its substrate. Its substrate appear to be conjoined only in certain of their parts, and that is what is meant (in the first option) by absence of pervasion-in-substratum. Or, while conjunction between the parts is apprehended conjunction between the composite whole is also apprehended; but when those parts which are not conjoined are found to be not in conjunction the composite wholes are likewise discovered not to be in conjunction, and it is in this sense that conjunction is said to have partial pervasion.

The nature of the contact (*sannikarṣa*) in the three kinds of extraordinary perception is explained. In the case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* perception the contact is a particular qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa*). Yogic perception is a different sort of contact. In the case of *jñānalakṣaṇa* perception the contact is being a qualifier of what is inhered in by what is in contact (*saṃyukta-samavāya-viśeṣaṇatā*).

Several definitions of invariable concomitance are offered. Some of them are as follows :

1. Invariable concomitance is a relation that does not wander.[5]

2. It is a relation between one thing and another which does not exist without it.[6]

3. Or, it is a relation insofar as it is complete.[7]

4. Or, it is the having a common substratum with which *sādhya* which is not counterpositive of an absolute negation which has a common substratum with a *hetu* whose substratum is other than the counterpositive.[8]

5. Or, it is a relation not depended upon an extraneous condition.[9]

On the definition of extraneous condition (*upādhi*), the author reviews the views of the author of the *Ratnakośa* Maṇikaṇṭha, and also the views of some other texts. Udayana's definition is held to apply to cases of equi-pervasion. Pseudo-probans is classified into three kinds : (i) Unestablished (*asiddha*), (ii) Contradictory (*Viruddha*) and (iii) Dubious (*Sandigdha* or *savyabhicāra*).

Āśrayāsiddhi is subdivided into two types : *Āśrayasvarūpāsiddhi* and *āśrayaviśeṣaṇāsiddhi*. The first is illustrated by "the sky-lotus is fragrant, as it is a lotus", here the nature of the substratum of the *hetu* is not established. An example of the second is adopting inference to prove something which is established through perception; here there is neither doubt regarding the qualifier of the substratum of the *hetu*, nor a desire to prove it. This type of case is known as proving what is already accepted. The author of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* held the uncertain (*anadhyavasita*) is to be an independent (fourth) type of pseudo-probans. Śaṅkaramiśra equates "Dubious" with *anaikāntika*, and shows that there is room for doubt in each of the three cases of deviation. The pseudo-probans called "Sublated" is shown to come under either dubious (*anaikāntika—sandigdha*) or unestablished (*Āśrayāsiddha*). Counter-balanced (*satpratipakṣa*) gets included under *Vyāpyatvāsiddhi*. So they are not independent pseudo-probans. *Aprayojaka* is not an independent pseudo-probans; it falls within *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*. Śaṅkaramiśra refers to his *Tattvacintāmaṇi-mayūkha* and *Vādīvinoda* for details.

Śaṅkaramiśra shows that verbal testimony (*śabda*), comparison (*upamāna*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), negation (*abhāva*), tradition (*aitihya*), probability (*sambhava*) and script (*lipi*) are not independent instruments of valid knowledge but are to be brought under inference. Incidentally, the author refers to the concept of *upamāna* as held by Śabarasvāmin, as well as his concept of similarity and rejects both of them.

While dealing with invalid knowledge (*avidyā*) the author discusses the nature of doubt, which is of only two kinds—one rising from things having the same features, the other from things having opposed features and not three or five kinds.

Under the topic of error (*viparyaya*), Śaṅkaramiśra explains the various theories of error and supports *anyathākhyāti*. In general, teachers (*ācāryas*) say, erroneous cognition is said to be of two types : in one, what is remembered is superimposed, and in the other, the superimposition is of something directly experienced. They are stated to have held the view that similarity between the object superimposed and its substratum is grasped by bringing the object superimposed in the first type. The Nyāyācārya (i.e. Udayana) is stated to have held that this view of "teachers" is available also in the second type.

A single impetus is present in the arrow shot into the air, and it continues until the arrow falls down. The Naiyāyikas hold that impetus produced in the arrow by an act gives rise to motion which in its turn produces another impetus which produces a further

motion which again produces another impetus, and so on.

An impression (*bhāvanā*) is a dispositional tendency produced by the experience of objects seen, listened to and experienced. It is a specific quality of the soul, and produces remembrance and recognition. In some cases, it is removed by a judgement opposed to the particular judgement which gave rise to it. Sometimes, those who get drunk lose the dispositional tendencies already formed in them. Intense pain also removes them. Tendencies produced in previous births get aroused in subsequent births at the sight and thought of things similar to those which had given rise to their formation.

Merit is defined and illustrated with a number of examples. It is destroyed by the knowledge of reality. It must be admitted here that those dispositional tendencies which have not borne fruit in the case of an enlightened soul can be made to bear their fruits through the creation of additional bodies by yogic power. They are to be experienced at any cost.

Demerit is got rid of by experiencing pain, as well as by proclaiming it and by acts of expiation. Prior negation of pain must be admitted, as that is borne out by the steps taken in advance to avoid pains. Otherwise those precautionary steps to ward off future evils could not be explained. Some scholars hold that expiatory acts are undertaken with a view to getting fully qualified for enjoying the fruits of merit.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *KR*, p. 81, 82 and 86; *HNNM*, p. 10; cf. *Vyom* pp. 488, 494 and 502.
2. *KR*, pp. 7, 23, 25, 26, 47, 88, 93, 98, 100, 109, 123, 152 and 163.
3. *KR*, pp. 93-100.
4. *HNNM*, p. 140.
5. *avyabhicaritaḥ saṃbandhaḥ*. *KR*, p. 94.
6. *avinābhāvasaṃbandhaḥ*, Ibid, p. 94.
7. *kārtsnyena saṃbandhaḥ*. Ibid, p. 95
8. *pratiyogi-viruddhasamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāva-pratiyogi-sādhya-sāmānādhikaraṇya*. Ibid, pp. 95-6.
9. *anaupādhikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ vyāptiḥ*. Ibid, p. 97.

RAGHUNĀTHA ŚIROMAṆI AND HIS *PADĀRTHAKHAṆḌANA* ALIAS *PADĀRTHATATTVAVIVECANA* OR *PADĀRTHATATTVANIRŪPAṆA*

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (A.D. 1455/60-1500), a talented Bengalee Naiyāyika from Navadipa had shaken the Indian philosophical world by writing a number of works quite revolutionary in views and theories from the traditional ones. His arguments and subtle logic overwhelmed others. His commentaries on different Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika treatises are known by the sub-title *Dīdhiti*. The Vaiśeṣika commentaries are *Dravya-prakāśa-dīdhiti*, *Guṇa-kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa-dīdhiti* and the *Nyāyalīlāvatī-prakāśa-dīdhiti*. They have been discussed in the relevant places, i.e. the first two in the context of the *Kiraṇāvalī* and the rest in the context of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. Besides, Raghunātha wrote some original tracts such as *Ākhyātavāda, Nañvāda, Padārthakhaṇḍana*, etc. Among them the *Padārthakhaṇḍana* is a Vaiśeṣika tract where Raghunātha showed signs of his revolutionary views in the field.

Having the talent to found a new school Raghunātha, in his small original tract, has created a new way later giving the long-standing *padārtha*-classification with the help of critical analysis. He does not admit that the number of the *padārthas* is fixed. The argument in favour of this view is that every distinct knowledge is the mark to prove the existence of different category. And by this, earth (*bhūtala*) and substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) are different categories. Anyway, the distinguished views of Raghunātha in the *Padārthakhaṇḍana* are the following :

1. Direction and Time are not categories distinct from God.
2. *Ākāśa* also is not a category distinct from God and God lacks ubiquity.
3. The internal organ is not distinct from the atom (triad according to Raghunātha).
4. The existence of the minutest atom (*paramāṇu*) and dyad cannot be proved. Triad (*trasareṇu*) is the lowest stage of dimension.
5. Separateness is not a separate quality.
6. Priority and posteriority are not qualities distinct from conjunction etc.
7. There is no category named particularity (*viśeṣa*) other than the five *bhāva* category.
8. Variegated colour (*citrarūpa*) is not a distinct variety of colour.
9. Colour, taste, smell, touch and action are not pervasive (*avyāpyavṛtti*).
10. The negation of the absolute negation is not something like existence but is distinct.
11. Moment, *svatva, śakti, kāraṇatva, kāryatva*, number, *vaiśiṣṭya*, and *viṣayatā*, etc. are the categories distinct from quality etc.
12. Inherence is not one and inherenceness is *akhaṇḍa upādhi*.

The *Padārthakhaṇḍana* had created a new enthusiasm in the neo-logical school and many Naiyāyikas of Navadvipa ventured to improvise new thoughts and new arguments

in support of them. In this way the *Padārthakhaṇḍana* may well be considered as the best tract of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.

A verse supporting this is the following :

śiromaṇi-kṛtaṃ ratnam padārthānāṃ hi khaṇḍanam/
vidvajjanaiḥ sadā dhāryaṃ maulair divyaprakāśakam//

That is the *Padārthakhaṇḍana* is a gem created by Śiromaṇi and the learned should always honour it which reveals divine things by original thoughts.

COMMENTARIES ON THE *PADĀRTHAKHAṆḌANA* (*PADĀRTHATATTVAVIVECANA* OR *PADĀRTHATATTVANIRŪPAṆA*) OF RAGHUNĀTHA ŚIROMAṆI

The *Padārthakhaṇḍana* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi has been commented upon by a number of neo-logicians. They are the following :

1. *Padārthatattva-vivecana-prakāśa* of Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma (A.D. 1525-1575). The famous verse saluting his father is

tātasya tarka-sarasīruhakānaneṣu cuḍāmaṇer dinamaneś caraṇau praṇamya/
śrīrāmabhadrasukṛtī kṛtināṃ hitāya lilāvaśāt kimapi kautukam ātanoti//

The commentary has been printed from Kashi.

2. *Padārthakhaṇḍana-vyākhyā* of Govinda Bhaṭṭācārya Cakravartti (A.D. 1600). The commentator follows Rāmabhadra in a number of places. Mss. are available in the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

3. *Padārthakhaṇḍanaṭīkā* of Rudra Nyāyavācaspati. The commentator is the eldest son of Vidyānivāsa. Mss. are available in London (I.O., p. 627). Very small commentary.

4. *Padārthatattvāloka* of Viśvanātha Siddhāntapañcānana (seventeenth century A.D.). The commentator is the son of Vidyānivāsa. The commentary commends Viśvanātha's erudition in different śāstras. Mss. are available in the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

5. *Padārthakhaṇḍana-vyākhyā* of Raghudeva Nyāyālaṃkāra (seventeenth century). Raghudeva was the disciple of Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa. From some identification in the commentary (*maduktānām = nyāyenoktānām; pūrvapaṇḍitaiḥ = vācaspatimiśrādibhiḥ*) it appears that *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* represents the controversy of navya-nyāya against the prācīna-nyāya and not against the Vaiśeṣika.

6. *Padārthakhaṇḍanavivṛti* of Mādhavacandra Tarkasiddhānta (middle of the nineteenth century A.D.) The initial verse runs thus

yo viṣṇave trijagataḥ praṇidhāya bhāraṃ
svābhīṣṭayā girijayā kutukī sadaiva/
devaṃ tameva praṇipatya padārthatattve
śrīmādhavo vitanute vivṛtiṃ subodhām//

Prof. Bhattacharya (*VNNC*, p. 220) asserts that the final attempt to write a commentary on Śiromaṇi's original tract is seen with the above text of Mādhava.

7. A commentary on *Padārthakhaṇḍana* by Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgīśa was reported in H.P. Shastri's Report, 1901-02 to 1905-06, p. 9, but no manuscript of it has yet been traced (*VNNC*, p. 215).

KAṆĀDA TARKAVĀGĪŚA AND HIS *BHĀṢĀRATNA*

The history of the Vaiśeṣika study in Bengal has been once more glorified with Kaṇāda Tarkavāgīśa. He was an inhabitant of Khānākul (in Kṛṣṇanagar) and his descendants were still living as Prof. Bhattacharya asserted in 1952.

In the first benedictory verse of his *Bhāṣāratna,* he salutes Cūḍāmaṇi. But who is this Cūḍāmaṇi? It is found that he cites a number of views from Jānakīnātha Bhaṭṭācār yacūḍāmaṇi's *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī.* One such quotation is attributed to "his perceptor" by Kaṇāda but Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma mentions that very quotation as of "his own father" (Jānakīnātha). So Cūḍāmaṇi mentioned by Kaṇāda is none but Jānakīnātha. Now there is no doubt that Jānakinātha was the preceptor of Kaṇāda. In *Bhāṣāratna* Kaṇāda mentions his other work named *Tarkavādārthamañjarī* but the work is long lost.

In his *Tattvacintāmaṇiṭīkā,* in the Inference section, Kaṇāda salutes Sārvabhauma instead of Cūḍāmaṇi. Prof. Bhattacharya asserts that though there are a number of quotations attributed to his "guru" in the work, this is not Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma because the quotations as attributed there to his "guru" cannot be traced in Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma's *Ṭīkā* on the Inference section of *Tattvacintāmaṇi.* He, however, said that the source of those quotations might have been *Maṇimarīci,* a commentary (on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*) by Jānakinātha. This *Maṇimarīci* has not come down to us.

Bhattacharya infers that Kaṇāda perhaps started his study under Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma in Navadvipa and when Vāsudeva went to Puri he concluded his study under Cūḍāmaṇi in the same place. So if his year of birth is roughly taken between A.D. 1460-1470, the time of his career as an author may fairly be taken as A.D. 1510-25. So, the hearsay that Kaṇāda was the classmate of Raghunāth Śiromaṇi is not totally baseless. In the *Tattvacintāmaṇiṭikā* Kaṇāda quotes a number of Dīdhitikāra's (i.e. Raghunātha) passages.[1]

Bhāṣāratna entertains the seven Vaiśeṣika categories at the base. It divides at first the categories into two broad divisions, positive (*bhāva*) and negative (*abhāva*). The first one is six-fold, substance, etc. and the next is negation. In the definitions of different categories the motive of simplification is noted, e.g. the definition of Inherence.

It is defined as that which appears in apprehension like "cloth is inhered in the yarns", and the like. The well-known *Bhāṣya*-definition is not here taken into consideration.

Bhāṣāratna also takes sometimes the definitions in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha.* These are accepted verbatim, e.g. *Pṛthivītvābhisambandhāt pṛthivī iti bhāṣyam*[2] *ākāśakāladiśām ekaikatvāt aparajātyabhāvāt pāribhāṣikyas tisraḥ samjñā bhavanti ākāśaṃ kālo dig iti/ aparajātyabhāvāt dravyatva-vyāpyajātyabhāvāt,*[3] etc.

The view of Dīdhitikṛt regarding the perceptibility of generality up to the triad of a water atom, is noted.[4] That Dīdhitikṛt accepted nine qualities of the supreme soul is also noted in the *Bhāṣāratna.*[5]

Though at the time of enumeration of the *pramāṇas,* four of them (perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony) are mentioned, Kaṇāda Tarkavāgīśa has also

discussed the Vaiśeṣika view regarding the last two, necessity of which has been discarded after them.

The *Bhāṣāratna* has also been commented upon. Kālīpada Tarkācārya, a versatile scholar of the neo-logic, has written a commentary named *Ratnalakṣmī* on it. It is compact with the quotations from Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī*, Śridhara's *Nyāyakandalī*, Varadarāja's *Tārkikarakṣā*, Viśvanātha's *Bhāśāpariccheda* and also with many other neo-logical views. It is to be mentioned that the commentator is an editor of the *Bhāṣāratna*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Summary from *VNNC*, pp. 108-11.
2. *Bhāṣāratna*, p. 11, cf. *PDS*, p. 84.
3. Ibid., p. 32, cf, *PDS*, p. 153.
4. Ibid., p. 19.
5. Ibid., p. 41.

BHĀṢĀPARICCHEDA AND ITS COMMENTARIES

A Vaiśeṣika text written in verse form which became very popular in the *padārtha* studies all over India is the *Bhāṣāpariccheda*. It deals with seven Vaiśeṣika categories: substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence and negation in 168 verses. The author of this treatise also wrote an elucidative commentary (*Vṛtti*) on the verses and it is known as *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* or in short *Muktāvalī*. The success of this treatise chiefly depended on its simple pnemonic form of verses and of *Muktāvalī*—on its clear analysis of the Vaiśeṣika topics. Though it deals with four *pramāṇas* and five pseudo-probantia and therefore is called a treatise of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika syncretic school, the Vaiśeṣika categories have been explained in great detail covering almost the volume. Moreover since the scheme of the treatise does solely follow the Vaiśeṣika scheme of seven categories, it may legitimately be considered here as more a Vaiśeṣika text than a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika one.

Now, regarding the authorship and date of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* we want to put forward a very surprising discovery of Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya. All over India Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, the son of Kāśīnātha Vidyānivāsa is known as the author of the above treatise. But the author of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and its commentary *Muktāvalī* is not at all Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana. The actual author of those two is Kṛśṇadāsa Sārvabhauma, a Mahāmahopādhyāya paṇḍita of Navadvipa. The evidence in support of this provided by Prof. Bhattacharya may thus be summarised as follows :

(i) A number of manuscripts of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* show clearly the name of Kṛṣṇadāsa as its author. The manuscripts of the text and the commentary from Ramamala library of Kumilla, another manuscript of only *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, a manuscript in the Asiatic Society (No. 10799 R), and many other have been checked by Prof. Bhattacharya.[1] In all the cases Śrī Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma-bhaṭṭācārya was found to be the author in the colophons. Though some of them possessed Viśvanātha's name they are very few in number and the name therein was rectified in the name of Kṛṣṇadāsa. However, one manuscript of paṇḍita Raghumaṇi Vidyābhūṣaṇa had actually the name of Kṛṣṇadāsa but rectified as Viśvanātha. In addition to Bhattacharya's findings we may refer to some more manuscripts of *Bhāṣāpariccheda-muktāvalī* which also show Kṛṣṇadāsa's name as the author, for example, the manuscript of Burdwan University (ms. No. 1613) and the manuscript of Sanskrit Sahitya Parishat (ms. No. 3629).

(ii) The oldest available commentary on *Muktāvalī* is *Ullāsa*. The manuscript is available at Puna Library (No. 301 of 1895-1902). It was written by two persons. The last folio records the date of copying as 1533 śaka i.e. A.D. 1611. The writer of this *Ullāsa* is Viśvanātha who is totally different from Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana. Ullāsakāra, in some places quotes earlier explanations (fols. 2/1, 5/2, 40/1) and notes one or two different readings of serious nature in the *Muktāvalī* (fol. 61/1). *Dinakarī* quotes from *Ullāsa* and *Raudrī* admits them. *Raudrī* commentary (written by Rudra Tarkavāgīśa) was written in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. It is quite impossible that Rudra living in Navadvipa wrote a commentary on Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana who was a resident of

Kashi and a follower of a different school and above all was his contemporary. Moreover, Rudra explained the new reading of *Muktāvalī* and from this it is evident that Viśvanātha, the writer of *Ullāsa*, who explained the ancient reading was not too close to Rudra in time. *Ullāsa*, therefore, must have been composed between A.D. 1575 and 1600. *Ullāsa* leaves the evidences that there were other commentaries also. So *Muktāvalī* cannot have been composed later than A.D. 1550. We know that Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana wrote his *Gautamasūtravṛtti* in 1556 śaka i.e. A.D. 1634 which was his old age. So in 1550, if he was at all born, Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana could never have crossed his childhood.

(iii) Prof. Bhattacharya had seen a very old manuscript of the *Muktāvalī* written in Maithila script. The date inscribed there may be counted according to the year of establishment of the Siddha Kāmeśvara family in Darbhanga. Then the date of copying it falls in the third quarter of the sixteenth century. So it is doubtful whether Viśvanātha Pañcānana even crossed his childhood at that time.

(iv) It may be argued that Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana and Viśvanātha, the writer of *Ullāsa* is one and the same person. But it is totally wrong. Nyāyapañcānana in all his works mentions his father's name, whereas Ullāsakāra Viśvanātha was independent in the śāstric world as he expresses *'māmakīnaḥ panthāḥ'* (fol. No. 3/2, 19/2), etc.

(v) Moreover, Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana gives the example of *Upamāna Pramāṇa* in his *Gautamasūtravṛtti* as *"iyam oṣadhi viṣaharaṇī ityupamityā viṣayīkriyate* (on *NS* 1.1.6). The example of *'idam'* corresponds to all *Bhaṣya, Vārttika*, etc. But the example given in *Muktāvalī* in this regard is different. The *upamiti* must be in the form *gavayaḥ gavayapadavācyaḥ* and not in the form *ayaṃ gavayapadavācyaḥ*. So it is found that the example of *idam* has been discarded. This opinion is according to Vācaspati II. So Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana and the writer of *Muktāvalī* is not one and the same person.

So, Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma is the writer of *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and *Muktāvalī*. Viśvanātha is the writer of *Ullāsa*. And Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana does not come in the picture of *Bhāṣāpariccheda*-related literature. This is the conclusion of Prof. Bhattacharya.

The *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with *Muktāvalī* is divided into five sections comprising Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa, Anumānakhaṇḍa, Upamānakhaṇḍa, Śabdakhaṇḍa and the concluding section Guṇanirūpaṇa. *Muktāvalī* is an auto-commentary full of analysis entirely drawn from the earlier texts the relevant portions of which have been quoted and explained by the commentators.

The popularity of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with *Muktāvalī* gave rise to a number of commentaries on it. We now may note them in the following manner.

(i) We have already mentioned of the *Muktāvalī-ullāsa*[2] by one Viśvanātha. This commentary further proves the existence of a few more earlier commentaries on *Bhāṣāpariccheda-Muktāvalī* but those have not come down to us. Anyway, *Ullāsa* touches the original very little but explains the scholastic vādas such as evakāravāda (fol Nos. 7-9), citrarūpagrantha (referred to in fol. No. 27/1), tejograntha-rahasya (60/1), sannikarṣavāda (referred to in fol. No. 64/2) etc. These enlarged the volume of the commentary.

(ii) The commentary named *Raudrī*[3] was composed by Rudra Tarkavāgīśa, the grand

son of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa. An inhabitant of Navadvipa, Rudra was the scholar of mid-seventeenth century. *Raudrī* is the only commentary by a Bengalee author which has been discovered in complete form.

(iii) A commentary of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda-Muktāvalī* was written by Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa, a scholar of South India. Mahādeva's contribution ends somewhere in the Śabda section. The name of this commentary is *Prakāśa*. This incomplete commentary was completed by Mahādeva's son Dinakara Bhaṭṭa. Though the commentary was the composition of two scholars it was generally called after Dinakara as *Dinakarīya*. The commentary contains the different topics discussed by Gadādhara and others.

(iv) Apart from the above, the sub-commentary on *Dinakarīya* named *Rāmarudrī* is worthy of being mentioned here. The name of the commentary takes after the name of its author Rāmarudra Bhattacharya. Though the name appears to be a popular Bengalee name, the author was actually a South Indian. This Rāmarudra Bhaṭṭācārya, son of Rāmeśvara, wrote the commentary *Taraṅginī* up to the Śabda section of *Bhāṣāpariccheda-Muktāvalī*. The remaining portion was commentated upon by Rājeśvara *Śāstri* Draviḍa.

(v) Another commentary on *Bhāṣāparicceda-Muktāvalī* is *Subodhinī*, written by Gośrī-bhūpāla-rāma-varma-parikṣit Mahārāja.

(vi) Rāya Narasiṃha Paṇḍita wrote a commentary on *Bhāṣāparicceda-Muktāvalī* by the name of *Prabhā*.

(vii) Rāya Narasiṃha's pupil Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī wrote an incomplete commentary on *Bhāṣāparicceda-Muktāvalī*. Its name is *Mañjuśrī*.

(viii) *Mahāprabhā*[4] is a commentary written by Candramaṇi Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. The commentator was the paṇḍita in the court of Punjab-kesari Ranjit Singh. It may be assumed that Candramaṇi wrote this commentary in the court of Ranjit Singh and for that reason it was not circulated in Bengal. Candramaṇi's other name was Trilocana. He had the same *gotra* with Candranārāyaṇa and was also the pupil of the latter. Idilpur in Bengal was the native village of Candramaṇi. Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya[5] writes that Candramaṇi undoubtedly gave up the popular world and in Kāśī took lessons on Nyāya from Candranārāyaṇa and from Kāśī he went to Lahore. After the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839 he returned to his own native village with a number of his western pupils.

Candramaṇi's *Mahāprabhā* is a very scholastic work. Many citations in the work from different works are found but those works were not current in Bengal.

Gopinatha Kaviraja notes[6] that a commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* was written by Trilocanadeva, pupil of one Rāma, a professor of Nadia. The name of the commentary was *Locanī* after the author's name. In the footnote Kaviraja writes : "Aufrecht notes that this work is based on an earlier commentary on the *Muktāvalī* by Madhusūdana, named *Mahāprabhā* (Cat. Cat., III, p. 89)." Prof. Bhattacharya clearly declared that this *Mahāprabhā* of Madhusūdana is an absurd entity.[7]

(ix) Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha of the Deccan School wrote a commentary named *Nyāyacandrikā* on the *Bhāṣāparicceda*.[8]

(x) A modern commentator from Bengal is Pañcānana Śāstrī. The name of the commentary is *Muktāvalī-saṃgraha*. The commentator was an inhabitant of the Mālañca village of Medinīpur district of West Bengal. His parents were Śrīnāthacandra and

Gaṅgādevī and teachers, MM Phaṇibhuṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa and Yogendranātha Tarka-sāṃkhya-vedānta-tīrtha. Pañcānana completed his commentary in A.D. 1947 (*graha-sat-vasu-candrāṅke śakābde .... muktāvalīsaṃgraho 'yam ... pūrṇatāṃ gataḥ*, Colophon, *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Calcutta edition, 1377 Vaṅgābda). He strongly favours Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana as the author of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and *Muktāvalī*. The commentator utilises almost all the pioneers of the Indian philosophy.

Aufrecht's Catalogus Catalogorum records some more other commentaries on the *Bhāṣāpariccheda-Muktāvalī*. A few of them are the following :

(i) *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī-paryāyakrama*, Lahore. No author is mentioned.

(ii) *Nyāyamanoramā* by Kṛṣṇadatta.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *VNNC*, p. 117.
2. Mss. preserved in Puna, No. 301 of 1895-1902.
3. Kashi Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika mss. No. 880. Some fragmentary mss. of this treatise are also available elsewhere.
4. Kashi Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ms. No. 881, 40 fols. Incomp.
5. *VNNC*, p. 245.
6. Gleaning, p. 75.
7. *VNNC*, p. 245.
8. Gleaning, p. 81.

RĀMABHADRA SĀRVABHAUMA AND HIS *GUṆARAHASYA*

Rāmabhadra (1525-1575), a great Naiyāyika of Navadvipa is well-known with his commentary on *Kusumāñjali-kārikā*. His *Nyāyarahasya* is a voluminous commentary on the Nyāya-sūtras and this is his best work. Rāmabhadra's father was Jānakīnātha Bhaṭṭācārya-cūḍāmaṇi.

Guṇarahasya is an excellent prakaraṇa of Rāmabhadra. It contains the examination of qualities. A manuscript of the tract is found to have been preserved in the Sanskrita Sahitya Parishat Library (Ms. No. 3630) and it has forty-seven fols. *Guṇarahasya* is not the commentary on Udayana's *Guṇa-kiraṇāvalī*. The text starts with the verse :

vaṃśī-madhura-ninādair mohita-gopāṅganācittaḥ/
gāyad-gopaśiśūnāṃ madhye nityaṃ harir jayati//
cūḍāmaṇes tārkikānāṃ putrair guṇarahasyakam/
rāmabhadra-sārvabhauma-bhaṭṭācāryair vidhīyate//

The spread of a scholastic text like this gradually came to a stop when *Anumānadīdhiti* got a momentum. In the middle of the seventeenth century A.D., Mādhavadeva (South Indian author of one *Nyāyasāra*, settled in Kashi) wrote a commentary on *Guṇarahasya* named *Guṇasāramañjarī*.[1]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *VNNC*, pp. 124-25.

RĀDDHĀNTAMUKTĀHĀRA AND *KĀṆĀDARAHASYA*[1]

Rāddhāntamuktāhāra, and its auto-commentary *Kāṇādarahasya*, are the Vaiśeṣika works of Padmanābhamiśra (sixteenth century A.D.), the worthy son of Balabhadramiśra. We have given some of Padmanābha's personal history in the section "Padmanābhamiśra and his *Setu*". That *Rāddhāntamuktāhāra* was a versicle composition containing eighty-one *kārikās* is known from its auto-commentary as the text is unfortunately lost. *Kāṇādarahasya* is available in manuscript (Puna ms. No. 86 of 1866-68, 22 fols., date of copying : 1586 Śaka). The introductory verses (second and third) of the auto-commentary run thus :

stamberamaśrayanīyam bhramarakulaṃ dānapānaramaṇīyam/
pradyotamānagaṇḍasthala-maṇḍala-maṇḍanam jayati//
aracayya prayatnādyair ihaikāśītikārikāḥ/
ācārya-padmanābhena vyākhyā samprati tanyate//

Some historical data collected from *Kāṇādarahasya* may be noted below : Padmanābha mentions Pragalbha, Pakṣadhara and others as their preceptors (fols. 2/1). *Pratyakṣakhaṇḍanabhūṣaṇa* is another work of Padmanābha (fol. 2/2). Vardhamāna worte an exposition on *Bauddhādhikāra* (fol. 7/1) and *Gauḍīyarāddhānta* (fol. 15/1).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *VNNC*, p. 266.

JAGADĪŚA TARKĀLAṂKĀRA AND HIS *TARKĀMṚTA*

The study of Anumāna chapter of the *Dīdhiti* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi spread in Navadvipa in no time and gradually to different corners of India. The bulk of commentary literature grown on it created a new school of the neo-logic. At present we cannot assess properly the enormous dimension it assumed within a hundred years after Śiromaṇi. When Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra's commentary on the *Dīdhiti* got a good reception, this huge literature disppeared by degrees. This calibre of Jagadīśa is uncomparable. At the end of Anumāna section, Jagadīśa speaks of his contribution. "The significance of the *Dīdhiti* is now revealed by the effort of Jagadīśa while it was in the dark in spite of endeavours of innumerable paṇḍitas of hundred years".

Jagadīśa's *gotra* was Kāśyapa. His connection was with *Yajurveda* in respect of the Vedic affiliation and he was from a western Vaidika family. Their social rites were guided by the Maithila customary rules. Jagadīśa was the son of grandson of Sanātana Miśra, the father of Viṣṇupriyā (the second wife of Śrīcaitanya). Various histories of Sanātana Miśra are found in the Vaisṇava texts. But admitting the list of family-members, preserved in Jagadīśa's descendants as authentic, Prof. Bhattacharya proceeds to unravel the genealogy of Jagadīśa. Vaṭeśvara Miśra's son was Sanātana, the latter's son Mādhava Miśra had a son Yādava Vidyāvāgīśa (a Naiyāyika). Yādava had five sons—Rāmacandra Bhaṭṭācārya, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra, Ṣaṣṭhīdāsa Nyāyavāgīśa, Lakṣmaṇa and Vāṇīnātha. The very line of Jagadīśa was able to illuminate the family and the talent was retained for a long time. Jagadīśa had two sons, Raghunātha and Rudreśvara. Rudreśvara's son Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgīśa was the commentator of *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*. Raghunātha wrote a small commentary on the original *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. This Raghunātha is different from Raghunātha Tarkavāgīśa who was the author of *Sāṃkhyatattvavilāsa* and *Āgamatattvavilāsa*. Jagadīśa's son Raghunātha had no other title other than 'Bhaṭṭācārya'. Raghunātha had two sons Rādhānātha Tarkavācaspati and Rāma Tarkavāgīśa. Rādhānātha had two sons—Śivaprasāda and Nārāyaṇa Nyāyavāgīśa. Of these two sons the latter had two sons—Śyāmasundara Tarkabhūṣaṇa and Rāmavallabha Vidyāvāgīśa. Rāmavallabha was a learned man and showed his erudition in the debate with Jagannātha Tarkapañcānana of Tribeni.

Jagadguru (the preceptor of the world) was the highest title in a teacher's life. Navadvipa abounded with Mahāmahopādhyāyas but 'Jagadguru' was for a chosen few. Jagadīśa was a 'Jagadguru' holder. It appears that the chief Naiyayika in Navadvipa was endowed with this title.

The year of Jagadīśa's birth falls between A.D. 1540 and 1550 and the time of writing of texts and commentaries was A.D. 1580-1600. In A.D. 1610 Jagadīśa was most probably in his last stage of life. Anyway, one seeking detailed information about it may go through Prof. Bhattacharya's discussion in this regard where he furnishes a lot of evidence in his work *Vaṅge Navyanyāya Carcā* (pp. 170-72).

Jagadīśa composed the commentaries on all the four sections of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. This commentary of Jagadīśa is known by its sub-title *Mayūkha*. His other works on

Nyāya are the commentaries on *Pratyakṣa-dīdhiti* and *Anumānadīdhiti* and *Nyāyādarśa*. His works on Vaiśeṣika are the commentary on the *Lilāvatīdīdhiti, Dravyasūkti, Guṇasūkti* and *Tarkāmṛta. Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* is his another work on grammaticophilosophy.

Of the Vaiśeṣika primers the *Tarkāmṛta* is a treatise to be mentioned here which attained great fame in the intellectual circle of Bengal logicians. It is well-known that the famous Bengal logician of the sixteenth century, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra, composed it and almost all the manuscripts of the *Tarkāmṛta* testifies to this. But it is curious to note that some of its manuscripts proclaim that Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya is its author. Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya had one such manuscript.[2] Sanskrita Sahitya Parishad of Calcutta also has one manuscript of the *Tarkāmṛta*[3] which contains the same thing.

Tarkāmṛtataraṅginī is a commentary on the above work. The only copy of it is found to have been preserved in the Kashi Sarasvati Bhavan Library (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ms. No. 785). It is composed by Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgīśa. In this commentary also, the commentator Kṛṣṇakānta claims the authorship of the *Tarkāmṛta* for the great grand-father Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya. He writes : "I am now going to comment upon the *Tarkāmṛta*, a treatise composed by my great grand-father."[4] Kṛṣṇakānta was the nephew (from the sister's side) of Jagadīśa. So his claim cannot be ignored.

The *Tarkāmṛta*[5] deals with the following matters :

At first the seven categories are divided into two broad sub-divisions—*bhāva* (positive categories) and *abhāva* (negative categories). *Bhāvas* are six-fold : substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence.

Substanceness, qualityness and actionness are generalities. Generalityness etc. are not generalities, they are *upādhi* (vicious condition). The substances are nine : earth water, fire, air, *ākāśa*, time, direction and mind. *Ākāśa*-ness, time-ness, direction-ness are *upādhi* and the rest i.e. earthness etc. are generalities.

The treatise now deals with the qualities in the substances. And lastly a saṃgraha verse is given:

Vāyor navaikādaśa tejaso guṇāḥ
jalakṣitiprāṇabhṛtāṃ caturdaśa/
dikkālayoḥ pañca ṣaḍeva cāmbare
maheśvare 'ṣṭau manastathaiva ca//

Air has nine qualities, fire eleven, water, earth and soul have fourteen each, direction and time, five each, *ākāśa*, six, and god and mind, eight each.

A few other additional characteristics also are noted for some of them, e.g. earth, water, fire and air are twofold—atomic and gross. *Ākāśa*, time and soul are ubiquitous. And mind is atomic.

Now the topic of eternal and non-eternal substances is treated. Next comes the topic of perceptible and imperceptible substances.

In the production of a substance there are three types of causes, inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇa*), non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi kāraṇa*) and auxiliary cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*). The common causes to every produced entity are god, his knowledge, will and effort, the prior negation, time, direction and virtue and vice.

The *pramāṇas* to prove the existence of different substances are put forward in a series in the section of substance. In the case of perceptible substances perception is the

pramāṇa whereas in the case of supersensory substances the *pramāṇa* is inference. So the ultimate atoms and the dyads (both being supersensory) are apprehended by inference and the triads are perceptible. *Ākāśa* and air are inferable with the help of sound and touch respectively. The existence of air is inferred in this way : this peculiar touch does not reside in the three substances earth, etc. but it must reside in a substance as it (the former) is a quality. Now as any other substance cannot be the substratum of air, a substance called *vāyu* (air) is therefore inferred. To justify the knowledges like 'It is prior' (*apara*) and 'It is posterior' (*para*), time is admitted. There are two kinds of *paratva* and *aparatva*, one is time-led and the other is direction-led. Time-led *paratva* and *aparatva* prove the existence of time.

Direction is proved by the direction-led *paratva* and *aparatva*. It may be made clear that direction-led *paratva* and *aparatva* involve the knowledge like 'It is far' and 'It is near'. It may be argued that where there is the need of admitting direction, *ākāśa* may serve the purpose. The auther of the treatise says that as *ākāśa* is proved by the *pramāṇa* proving the qualified (*dharmigrāhakapramāṇa*) in the way of substratum of sound, so again it cannot be indicated by the movement of the sun.

The (produced) substances are destroyed in two ways, (i) due to destruction of the non-inherent cause and (ii) due to destruction of the inherent cause. A dyad is destroyed due to destruction of conjunction between the two atoms. The conjunction here is the non-inherent cause. On the other hand, a pot is destroyed due to destruction of any of its parts (*kapāla*). This part is the inherent cause of the pot.

Time and direction can be the substratum of everything in *kālika* and *daiśika* relations respectively.

Quality is a much-discussed topic in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Similarities and divergences in the qualities are discussed in the very Kaṇāda's *Sūtras*, Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* etc. In the concerned treatise also there is no exception in dealing with them and in fact the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* has faithfully been followed. The qualities are twenty-four, colour etc. Further varieties of colour etc. and their substrate substances are enumerated. The particular qualities are colour, taste, smell, touch, viscidity, natural liquidity, sound, knowledge, pleasure, pain, wish, aversion, effort, virtue, vice and impression. The common qualities are number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, weight, artificial liquidity, impulse (*vega*) and elasticity (*sthitisthāpaka*). It is to be noted that priority and posteriority are left out in the list of the common qualities in the edition we have taken up. But these must be included as the process of their production is discussed. In the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* also we find the mention of them. Moreover, the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* does not enumerate the elasticity in the list of common qualities. Sounds barring the initial and the final ones are perceived.

The production of qualities in the earth is specially termed as *pākajotpatti*, (the production of chemical qualities) i.e. the qualities which are produced by the conjunction of fire. By the conjunction of fire with black pot the red colour is produced in the pot after the destruction of black colour. This is the Naiyāyika view. The Vaiśeṣikas contend : when the chemical action takes place the atoms by the conjunction of fire turn red and then

when the pot is produced the red colour appears in the pot according to the colour of the inherent causes, i.e. atoms.

Now, serially dimension, conjunction, and disjunction are discussed.

Knowledge is divided into two kinds, remembrance and apprehension. Remembrance again is divided into two, valid rembrance and invalid remembrance. Apprehension also is divided into two, valid apprehension (*pramā*) and invalid apprehension (*apramā*). *Pramā* is fourfold, perceptual, inferential, compared and verbal. Invalid apprehension also is fourfold : doubt (*saṃśaya*), error (*viparyaya*), dream (*svapna*) and indecision (*anadhyavasāya*). The definitions and examples of the above types of knowledge are given.

Tendency is divided into three varieties : Impulse (*vega*), impression (*bhāvanā*) and elasticity (*sthitisthāpaka*). Sound is threefold : one—produced by conjunction, second—produced by disjunction and the third—produced by sound itself. The processes of expansion of sound have been mentioned : one is like waves and the other like buds of the *Kadamba* flower.

Weight (*gurutva*), artificial liquidity and viscidity are discussed.

Actions are five. The initial action is produced by conjunction called *nodana* i.e. soundless conjunction. Consecutive actions are produced by motion.

Generality is of three types, one of higher pervasion, the other is of lower pervasion and the third one is of intermediary pervasion. For example, existence (*sattā*) is highest pervading generality as it resides in substance, quality and action—the bigger place for a generality. Potness (*ghaṭatva*) is the generality of lower pervasion. Finally, substanceness is the intermediary generality, because it is, on the one hand, lower than existence and on the other, higher than potness. The well-known verse of Udayana containing the cases where the generality is not admitted, is found to have been quoted :

Vyakter abhedas tulyatvam saṃkaro 'thānavasthitiḥ/
rūpahānir asambandho jātibādhakasaṃgrahaḥ//

If there is the existence of only one object i.e. no second of that is possible, then in that case the generality is not admitted. If two generalities are similar to one another, then either of them is admitted to be a generality e.g. *ghaṭatva* and *kalasatva* cannot be separate generalities, as both connote the same thing, the essence of a pot. If two generalities clash with each other, i.e. two reside in one and again each of them resides in one where the other is absent, e.g. *bhūtatva* (materiality) and *mūrtatva* (finiteness). In an earthen pot both of them reside. But in *ākāśa*, though there is *bhūtatva*, *mūrtatva* is absent there. Further generality in the generalities is not admitted because it would lead to *regresus ad infinitum*. In the final atoms of the four *bhūtas* and the other eternal substances the categories called *viśeṣa* (particularity) is admitted. There generality is not admitted. If it would be admitted the nature of *Viśeṣa* would be shattered. Anyway, generality is eternal and resides in more than one entity in relation of inherence.

Particularities reside in the eternal substances and are final.

Inherence (*samavāya*) is eternal relation where there is no relatum. In view of this definition *svarūpa* relation and conjunction are set aside. The knowledge like 'Here in pot is potness' proves the existence of inherence. According to the Naiyāyikas inherence is perceptible, one and eternal.

Now, the treatise raises doubt about darkness, gold etc. whether they are substances and about idleness etc. whether they are qualities. Those are answered : darkness is the negation of fire, and gold is the fire itself, whereas idleness is the negation of effort.

Negation is primarily divided into two—negation of relationship (*saṃsargābhāva*) and reciprocal negation (*anyonyābhāva*). The first one is further sub-divided into three : prior negation, posterior negation and absolute negation.

Perception is two-fold : Indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*). Connection (*sannikarṣa*) is two-fold : normal (*laukika*) and supernormal (*alaukika*). Normal connection is further six-fold and supernormal three-fold. In each case of the above, illustration is added.

The theory of validity (*prāmāṇyavāda*) is noted in brief.

In the section of inference, process of its production, invariable concomitance, five inference-components, three types of inference, a vicious condition (*upādhi*) and pseudo-probans are discussed in a brief and conspicuous way. Of the comparison and verbal testimony the latter gets a rather lengthy treatment as it deals with some the grammarians consult.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The discussion is made after *VNNC*, pp. 165-72.
2. *"iti mahāmahopādhyāya-kṛticūḍāmaṇi-rāmakṛṣṇa-bhaṭṭācārya-kṛtaṃ tarkāmṛtaṃ samāptam. śakābda 1673."* *VNNC*, 216.
3. *Tarkāmṛta*, Sanskrit Sahitya Parishat Ms. No. 3610.
4. *prapitāmahakṛte granthe bhāvavyākhyocita mama/*
   atas tarkāmṛtagranthavyākhyāvān prayate 'dhunā// fol. No. 2 (*VNNC*, p. 216)
5. *Tarkāmṛta*, ed. Anjaneya Shastri, Padmavati Prakashan, Andhra Pradesh, 1992.

BHĀSKARA AND HIS *GUṆARATNĀVALĪ*

Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya[1] informs us of one Bhāskara, the pupil of Balabhadramiśra (1500-1550) who wrote a Vaiśeṣika tract in 278 *kārikās*. Its name is *Guṇaratnāvalī* (Kashi Sarasvati Bhavan, Ms. No. 908, fols. 10). In the colophon the writer introduces himself :

balabhadramiśra-caraṇāmbujadvaye praṇidhāya cittam iha bhāskaro 'karot/
guṇaratnarājim akhileśatoṣadāṃ pramude satāṃ bhavatu sā manīṣiṇām//

Bhāskara wrote excellent praise to his preceptor in four verses in the same colophon :

yad-vāgvilāsaṃ sahasānubhūya vācaspatir vākpatitābhimānam/
jahāti lajjābhara-mantharātmā namo'stu tasmai balabhadranāmne//
yena dvijānāṃ hṛdayāndhakāraṃ vijñāna-dīpena kubuddhirūpam/
vināśitaṃ paṇḍitamaṇḍanāya namo'stu tasmai balabhadranāmne//
yeṣāṃ nitāntaṃ rasanāgraraṅge sarasvatī tāṇḍavam ātanoti/
sadarpa-vidvajjana-vṛndavandyān namāmy ahaṃ tān balabhadramiśrān//
yad-askhalat-saṃskṛta-nīra-pūrair ākṣālite cetasi vāḍavānām/
padārthatattvaṃ hi cakāstv analpaṃ namāmy ahaṃ tān balabhadramiśrān//

Prof. Bhattacharya asserts that Bhāskara composed this *Guṇaratnāvalī* during the lifetime of his preceptor.

The very title of the tract suggests that it deals with the twenty-four Vaiśeṣika qualities alone. The author salutes Śiva in the first benedictory verse. Though the tract is composed in verse but Bhāskara mentions and analyses in it the views of others as if it is a prose tract. A few examples of them may be cited below :

tasmān nīlādikaṃ nityam iti keṣāṃcid āśrayaḥ (verse no. 27), *sa tu ṣaḍvidha eva syāt kecit saptavidhaṃ viduḥ* (verse no. 35), *anuṣṇāśīta-*[*sparśaṃ*] *tu sparśaṃ necchanti kecana* (verse no. 57), *necchanti caramaṃ kecit kutarkāvilabuddhayaḥ* (verse no. 91) and so on.

Colour has been the very first topic of discussion in the tract and it is done in detail with the introduction of two chemical processes, Pīlupāka and Piṭharapāka. That the author admits variegated colour (*citrarūpa*) is indicated when he asserts : *citraṃ rūpaṃ hi necchanti kecin mūḍhatvam āśritāḥ* (verse no. 15). The author contends that the water of Kālindī, though it appears to be blue, is not really so (verse no. 19). The topic of knowledge leaves ample sign of author's clear admittance of the four *pramāṇas* and thorough knowledge of them (verse nos. 69-81). Five inference-components are accepted by the author (verse no. 73). Weight (*gurutva*) was admitted only in two categories, earth and water (verse no. 93). It is an example that the people were quite ignorant about the weight of air. Last of all, what we must point is the author's ignorance of the basic history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. His straight-forward assertion is that "I will define twenty-four qualities which have been mentioned in the Gautama śāstra" (verse no. 2). Twenty-four qualities are not of Gautama's śāstra but of Kaṇāda's śāstra.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *VNNC*, p. 262.

ANNAMBHAṬṬA AND HIS *TARKASAṂGRAHA*

Annambhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṃgraha* is a manual of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Besides the admittance of the four *pramāṇas* and a few other related matters of the Nyāya system, the present text largely contains the theories and doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika system. There are seven categories like substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence and negation and their sub-categories comprising nine substances, twenty-four qualities, and five actions dealt with in the same mode as in a Vaiśeṣika text. Anyway, the Vaiśeṣika categories and sub-categories have been the main subject-matter in many other manuals like *Tarkasaṃgraha* but only the *Tarkasaṃgraha* came out as a most popular manual which has been in use in all parts of India.

Despite the widespread popularity of the work, much is not known about its author.[1] Whatever appears about him in R.B. Godbole's "Dictionary of Modern History of India", is not warranted. Moreover, Godbole has left no chance of examination for the later scholars as he did not mention the source of his information. Anyway, whatever he said is as follows.

Annambhaṭṭa was a Tailang Brahman by birth and resided in a village named Garikapada, formerly in the possession of Nizam Ali. He lived in the fifteenth century at the time of the Calukyas, studied Nyāya at Kaundinyapura or Kondu Vidu for twelve years and became a famous Naiyāyika. He established a college for teaching Nyāya in his native town where he instructed his pupils in a graduated series of Nyāya works consisting of *Tarkasaṃgraha, Tarkadīpikā, Siddhāntamuktāvali* and *Gādādharī*. He had many children none of whom survived him, and is said to have travelled out of his village only once in his life when he visited the shrine of Mallikārjuna at the advanced age of 55.[2]

In the statement of Mr. Godbole, the main thing i.e. the date of Annambhaṭṭa is not rightly noted. From Annambhaṭṭa's teaching *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* and *Gādādharī*—as stated by Mr. Godbole, it is clear that Annambhaṭṭa was posterior to both Gadādhara and Viśvanātha (the supposed author of *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*). Gadādhara survived from 1604 to 1709 (acc. to Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya) and Viśvanātha in sixteenth-seventeenth century. It is to be noted that Prof. D.C. Bhattacharya attributes the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* to Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma,[3] a Naiyāyika of a century earlier than Viśvanātha and not to Viśvanātha. Though, then the time of the composition of *Muktāvalī* would go a little back (specifically not after 1550), the computation of time relating to Annambhaṭṭa would not support Mr. Godbole's account as to his time. Thus mainly on the basis of Gadādhara's time Annambhaṭṭa can never be anterior at least to the middle of the seventeenth century. However, Bodas[4] having discussed the dates of different commentaries on the *Tarkasaṃgraha* reaches the conclusion : "The period from A.D. 1625 to A.D. 1700 is neither too long nor too short to cover one life time, and if we can place Annambhaṭṭa between these two terminii the result ought to be regarded as pretty satisfactory under the present circumstances".

Another of Mr. Godbole's statements, viz., that Annambhaṭṭa travelled only once in his life time, is contradicted by a tradition embodied in a well-known couplet that has

passed into a proverb, *kāśigamana-mātreṇa nānnaṃ-bhaṭṭāyate dvijaḥ* meaning that a man does not become a great scholar like Annambhaṭṭa simply by going to Benaras. If the verse refers to the author of the *Tarkasaṃgraha* he must have visited and studied at Benaras. The proverb would also show that he became famous for his learning at a very early period, a conclusion which is strengthened by the fact that his works became very popular and have been in use as elementary text books in all parts of India.

So Mr. Godbole's account is not reliable on vital issues.

Annambhaṭṭa is a comparatively modern writer. He belongs to the class of manual writers, who mostly flourished after the sixteenth century and whose chief aim is to simplify the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems by pruning all superfluous technicalities out of them, and bringing them within the comprehension of the beginners. Annambhaṭṭa rarely refers to any previous writer or work that might enable us to fix his age accurately. He, however, notes the controversy about *vyāpāravat kāraṇa*, first started by Raghunātha, the author of *Dīdhiti*; while in another passage of the *Dīpikā*, he seems to quote directly from the *Dīdhiti*, for the sentence *pratiyogitāvacchedakāropya-saṃsarga-bhedād eka-pratiyogikayor apyatyantābhāvānyonyābhāvayor bahutvam*[5] appears to have been taken from a corresponding passage in the *Dīdhiti*. The line of the *Dīdhiti* runs thus : *ekapratiyogikayor apyatyantābhāvānyonyābhāvayoḥ pratiyogitāvaccheka-dharma-pratiyogitāvaccedaka-saṃsargabhedād bahutvam.*[6]

The story of Annambhaṭṭa teaching Gadādhara's work in his college—as noted by Godbole—derives support from another tradition, according to which the *Tarkadīpikā* was specially composed for the use of those who could not understand Gadādhara's larger work and came to be called *Bāla-gādādharī* on account of its being an epitome of the erudite commentary of the great schoolman. It may therefore be fairly presumed that Annambhaṭṭa was junior to Gadādhara but not too much because a manuscript to the commentary *Tarkacandrikā* dates 1644 śake i.e. 1722 A.D. And by this time it is not impossible for Annambhaṭṭa to be posterior to Kṛṣṇadāsa also (the author of the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*).

Annambhaṭṭa was the son of Tirumala, who is styled 'Ācārya' and whose name is preceded by the honorific title of 'advaitavidyācārya' in the colophons of some of the works of Annambhaṭṭa. Tirumala, father of the author, appears to have been a Ṛgvedic Smarta Brāhmaṇa, learned in the Vedānta philosophy and descended from a great scholar named Rāghava who performed a *Soma* sacrifice.[7] It is not known whether Tirumala wrote any work, but several authors of that name are mentioned by Aufrecht.[8]

Annambhaṭṭa appears to have been a versatile scholar for he has left works on at least four sciences, namely, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, Vyākaraṇa, and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. Besides the *Tarkasaṃgraha* and the *Tarkadīpikā*, Aufrecht mentions the following works as having been composed by Annambhaṭṭa (i) the *Mitākṣarā*, (ii) *Tattvabodhinī-ṭīkā*, (iii) *Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa-prakāśa* and (iv) *Subodhinī-sudhākara*, otherwise caled *Rāṇakojjivinī*. Of these the first is a short commentary of Bādarāyaṇa's Brahmasūtras and is undoubtedly written by the author of the *Tarkasaṃgraha*, since it has the same colophon as found in some other manuscripts. As to the other three nothing can be said with certainty.[9]

The second appears to be a commentary on some work named *Tattva-bodhinī*, and Aufrecht marks it as a Nyāya work, apparently on the authority of Oppert. Aufrecht does

not, however, mention any Nyāya work with the title *Tattva-bodhinī* and possibly both he and Oppert were misled. Bodas[10] says that they knew only three works bearing the name *Tattva-bodhinī*, namely a commentary on *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka* by Nṛsiṃha, a Tāntrika work by Kṛṣṇānanda, and thirdly, a commentary on Bhaṭṭoji's *Siddhānta-kaumudī*. So Annambhaṭṭa's *Ṭīkā* may be a commentary on either the first or the last. Or it is also possible that a manuscript of Annambhaṭṭa's *Vivaraṇoddyotana*, presently to be mentioned, has been mistaken by Oppert for an independent work of this name. The third work *Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa-prakāśa*, may be the work of Vardhamāna Upādhyāya and not of Annambhaṭṭa at all. The fourth is said to be a commentary on *Rāṇaka* or *Nyāya-sudhā* of Somésvara which in its own turn is a commentary on the *Tantra-vārttika* of Kumārila. Besides these, Aufrecht and Hall mention two other works on grammar called *Kātyāyana-prātiśākhya-vyākhyāna* and *Mahābhāṣya-vivarṇoddyotana* written by an author named Annambhaṭṭa. The author of the first of these was a pupil of Sumaṅgala and may or may not be the same as the son of Tirumala. But the second work *Vivaraṇoddyotana* also called *Bhāṣya-pradīpoddyotana* which consists of notes on Kaiyyaṭa's commentary on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* can now be safely ascribed to the author of the *Tarkadīpikā*. Two manuscripts of a fragment of this *Uddyotana* are mentioned in Hulzsch's Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss in Southern India (vol. I, p. 66), the colophon at the end of which tallies exactly with that found at the end of the *Dīpikā* and *Mitākṣarā*.[11] Another work of Annambhaṭṭa is also heard and it is *Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka-siddhāñjana*.[12]

Annambhaṭṭa thus appears to have been a versatile writer, since he has written at least three works on Nyāya, one on Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, one or two on Vedānta, and two if not three on grammar. Annambhaṭṭa is also said to have had an elder brother Rāmakṛṣṇabhaṭṭa who wrote *Siddhānta-ratna*, a commentary on Bhaṭṭoji's *Siddhānta-kaumudī*.

Of all the works of Annambhaṭṭa, only the *Tarkasaṃgraha* and the *Dīpikā* appear to have attained wide celebrity. They are the most popular works of their kind, and they have been for several generations used as text-books for beginners. The *Tarkasaṃgraha* is a model work, because it combines in a remarkable degree the three essential qualities of a good manual, namely, brevity, accuracy and lucidity. It was intended to supply an easy compendium of the main principles of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, and the author has done his work admirably. He generally adheres to Gotama's view with respect to matters coming under logic proper, i.e. in the sections treating Buddhi and its sub-divisions but follows Kaṇāda in the rest of the book.

Instances of specific borrowings in the *Tarkasaṃgraha* are too numerous to mention. Many of his definitions of categories and their sub-divisions he copied literally from the scholium of Praśastapāda, e.g., those of *dravya, rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparśa, saṃkhyā, parimāṇa, viśeṣa* and several others. Sometimes he adopted the emendation suggested by Śrīdhara, and sometimes he rejects Praśastapāda's definition in toto in favour of a modern one, e.g., in the case of *ātmā* and *buddhi*. Occasionally he borrows even long passages from Praśastapāda, e.g. the passage beginning with *sā dvividhā*.[13] He also appears to have borrowed largely from the writings of Śrīdhara, Udayana and Śivāditya, as well as the principal writers of the Nudea school, Raghunātha and Gadādhara—who in their own turn developed their system from the great Maithila Naiyāyika Gaṅgésa.[14]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Consulted the article "Annambhaṭṭa and his works" in *Tarkasaṃgraha* (BORI, 1974), pp. LIII-LXIII.
2. *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. LIII.
3. *VNNC*, p. 117.
4. *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. LV.
5. *Tarkasaṃgraha*, pp. 62-3.
6. Ibid., p. 367.
7. *iti śrīmad-advaitavidyācārya-śrīmad-rāghava-somayāji-kulāvataṃsa-śrīmat-tirumalācāryavaryasya sūnunā annambhaṭṭena kṛtā svakṛta-tarka-saṃgrahasya dīpikā sampūrṇā. Tarkasaṃgraha*, pp. LVI, 67
8. *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. LVII.
9. Ibid., p. LVII.
10. Ibid., p. LVII.
11. Ibid., LVII-LVIII.
12. Ibid., pp. LVII-LVIII.
13. Ibid., p. 6.
14. Ibid., p. LX.

COMMENTARIES ON THE *TARKASAMGRAHA*

Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā or *Tarkadīpikā*—auto-commentary, printed at various places.

Siddhānta-candrikā or *Siddhānta-candrodaya* by Śrīkṛṣṇa Dhurjaṭi Dikṣita, printed at Benares. Śrīkṛṣṇa wrote his commentary about that time for the instruction of Rājasiṃha, son of King Gajasiṃha, who flourished in A.D. 1774.

Tarkacandrikā or *Prabhā* by Vaidyanātha Gadgil. Ms. in Deccan College Library. This Vaidyanātha is probably identical with Tatsat Vaidyanātha, the pupil of Nāgeśa and the author of a commentary on his *Uddyota*. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa is known to have been invited to a grand sacrifice in 1714 by Savai Jayasiṃha, and his pupil Vaidyanātha may therefore have written his commentaries in the next decade. (*Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. LV).

Nyāya-bodhinī by Govardhana Miśra, printed by N.S. Press at Bombay.

Padakṛtya by Candrajasiṃha, printed by N.S. Press at Bombay.

Tarkasaṃgraha-tattvaprakāśa by Nīlakaṇṭha. It is also known as *Nīlakaṇṭhī*.

Nīlakaṇṭha appears to be a recent author. According to Pandit Mukunda Jha of Darbhanga he was a son of Rāmabhaṭṭa surnamed Paṇi of Kauṇḍinya gotra and was born in Andhra country. In his later years he lived at Benaras and died in 1840. His son Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha who also lived and died at Benaras wrote a commentary, *Bhāskarodayā*, on Nīlakaṇṭha's *Prakāśa*. (*Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. LXI).

Nirukti or *Paṭṭābhirāmaṭippaṇi* by Paṭṭābhirāma or Mādhava-paṭṭābhirāma, printed in 1915 at Madras (W).

Tarkasaṃgraha-candrikā by Mukundabhaṭṭa Gadgil, printed by N.S. Press at Bombay.

Tarkasaṃgraha-vyākhyā or *Vākya-vṛtti* by Meruśāstri Godbole, printed in 1915 at Madras (W).

Tarkasaṃgraha-ṭīkā by Anantanārāyaṇa.

Tarkaphakkikā by Kṣamākalyāṇa.

Nyāyārtha-laghubodhinī by Govardhana Raṅgācārya.

Tarkasaṃgraha-ṭīkā by Gaurīkānta.

Nirukti by Jagannāthaśāstrī.

Nyāya-bodhinī by Śuklaraṅgācārya.

Tarkasaṃgraha-ṭīkā by Rāmanātha.

Tarkasaṃgraha-taraṅgiṇī by Vindhyeśvarīprasād.

Tarkasaṃgraha-ṭīkā by Viśvanātha.

Tarkasaṃgraha-ṭīkā by Hanumān, son of Vyāsa.

Tarkasaṃgraha-vyākhyā by Murāri.

Tarkasaṃgrahopanyāsa, author unknown.

Tarkasaṃgraha-ṭīkā, author unknown.

Tarkasaṃgraha-śaṅku, author unknown.

Nyāya-candrikā, author unknown.

Commentaries on Tarkadīpikā

Tarkasaṃgraha-dīpikā-prakāśa or *Nīlakaṇṭha-prakāśikā* by Nīlakaṇṭhaśāstrin, author

of *Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-ṭīkā*. This *Prakāśikā* is again commented on by Rāmabhadra Bhaṭṭa. Printed at Bombay, Benaras and Madras.

Rāmarudrīya by Rāmarudrabhaṭṭa, printed at Madras (W).

Nṛsiṃhaprakāśikā or *Nṛsimhīya* by Rāya Narasiṃha, printed at Madras (W).

Paṭṭābhirāmaprakāśikā. It ends abruptly at *Vāyu*. Printed at Madras (W).

Bhāskarodayā, commentary on Nīlakaṇṭha. By Lakṣmīnṛsiṃha, son of Nīlakaṇṭha. Printed by N.S. Press at Bombay (R).

Tarkaphakkikā by Kṣamākalyāna, pupil of Jinalābhasūri who wrote his commentary on both *Tarkasaṃgraha* and *Tarkadīpikā* in 1772 A.D.

Suratakalpataru by Śrīnivāsa.

Ṭīkā by Gaṅgādharabhaṭṭa.

Ṭīkā by Jagadīśabhaṭṭa.

Tattvārtha-dīpikā by Bādhulaveṅkaṭaguru.

RAGHUDEVA NYĀYĀLAṂKĀRA AND HIS *DRAVYASĀRASAṂGRAHA*

Raghudeva Nyāyālaṃkāra is a famous Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholar of the seventeenth century. His name has been cited in *Aṣṭasāhasrī-vivaraṇa* of Yaśovijaya (JASB, 1910, p. 468) and he himself signed in a deed of settlement in 1657. Raghudeva was the disciple of Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa. His (Raghudeva's) works were circulated outside Bengal. The works composed by him are (i) *Tattvadīpikā*, (ii) *Niruktiprakāśa*, (iii) *Kusumāñjali-kārikā-vyākhyā*, (iv) *Dravyasārasaṃgraha*, (v) *Ākhyātavādaṭīkā*, (vi) *Nañvādaṭīkā* and (vii) *Padārthakhaṇḍana-vyākhyā*. *Dravyasārasaṃgraha* and *Padārthakhaṇḍana-vyākhyā* are two Vaiśeṣika works. We have already discussed *Padārthakhaṇḍana-vyākhyā* in the topic "Commentaries on the *Padārthakhaṇḍana*". Here we would like to give a small introduction to his independent Vaiśeṣika work *Dravyasārasaṃgraha*. It is an excellent work on the substance. The title appears for the text to be a commentary on *Dravyakiraṇāvalī* but it is not so. The text records the substance of the Vaiśeṣika tenets starting from Maṅgalavāda upto Mind. Hall (Index, p. 68) mentions a text entitled *Kaṇādasūtravyākhyāna*. Prof. Bhattacharya supposes that it is not a separate work but a fragmentary portion of the very *Dravyasārasaṃgraha*. The text is available only in manuscript form (Kashmir ms. Jammu catalogue, p. 147, Asiatic Society ms. III. A. 9, 92 fols., Ms. is also available elsewhere).[1]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *VNNC*, p. 279.

JAYARĀMA NYĀYAPAÑCĀNANA AND HIS *PADĀRTHAMĀLĀ*

Of the Bengalee Naiyāyikas who attained great fame in Benaras, a seat of Sanskrit learning outside Bengal, Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana is a noted one. He flourished in the seventeenth century A.D. One can feel from the writings of two of his non-Bengalee pupils, how great the fame was of their preceptor. Janārdana in his commentary named *Mañjarī* calls him Jagadguru (the preceptor of the world) and at the end of the commentary writes : "I always salute my great preceptor Jayarāma in whose tongue the goddess of learning dances. Having learnt from him the whole Nyāyaśāstra I compose this commentary."[1] Another pupil of Jayarāma, Laugākṣi Bhāskara praises his preceptor Jayarāma : "He travelled the end of all śāstras and his victory (*jaya*) thrived (*rāma*) by defeating the opponents."[2]

Jayarāma was a prolific writer on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.[3] Besides, he also wrote on grammar and rhetoric.[4]

The Vaiśeṣika treatise *Padārthamālā*[5] is on the establishment of the seven Vaiśeṣika categories, e.g. substance, qualities, action, generality, particularity, inherence and negation. Though the work has naturally discussed many other neo-logical topics like *evakāra, śakti, sādṛśya, vaiśiṣṭya, kāraṇatā* etc. the seven categories have been the core subject-matter.

Another Vaiśeṣika work which is a commentary by him is also worthy of mention here. It is the *Vivṛti* on *Guṇadīdhiti* which is a commentary (*Dīdhiti*) by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi on *Guṇakiraṇāvalīprakāśa*. *Prakāśa* is a common title of the commentaries written by Vardhamāna. *Guṇakiraṇāvalī* is a commentary by the celebrated Udayana on the Guṇa section of Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha*. Anyway, the manuscript of *Guṇadīdhiti-vivṛti*, as informed by Prof. Bhattacharya, is available at many places.[6]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *natvā janārdanavyāso jayarāmaṃ jagadgurum.*
   narīnartti ca jihvāgre yasya vāgdevatā parā/
   gurum taṃ paramaṃ naumi jayarāmābhidhaṃ sadā// Cited in *VNNC*, p. 280.
   nyāyapañcānana-śrīmajjayarāma-mukhāmbujāt/
   śrutvā nyāyam aśeṣaṃ tu kṛtir eṣā mayā kṛtā// Cited in *VNNC*, p. 281
2. *śrīmatā sakala-śāstra-pāraṅgamatva-janita-tejo-viśeṣavatā tattadvādi-nirāsa-prasutajayo rāmate 'smin iti anvartha-jayarāma-saṃjñāvatā... Padārthamālāprakāśa* (Kashi ms.), fol 4 (Cited in *VNNC*, p. 281)
3. (i) *Guḍārthavidyotana* on *Anumānadīdhiti*, (ii) *Guṇadīdhitivivṛti*, (iii) *Ākhyātavādavyākhyā*, (iv) *Nañvādavyākhyā*, (v) *Kusumāñjalikārikā-vyākhyā*, (vi) *śabdālokarahasya*, (vii) *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā* and (viii) *Padārthamālā*.
4. (i) *Kārakavāda*, (ii) *Samāsavāda* and (iii) *Kāvyaprakāśaṭīkā*.
5. Tanjore Cat. pp. 4462-3; Asiatic Society ms. III. A. 32; Govt. Collection of the Asiatic Society further has a separate manuscript.
6. *VNNC*, p. 280.

LAUGĀKṢI BHĀSKARA AND HIS *PADĀRTHAMĀLĀPRAKĀŚA*

In the seventeenth century A.D. Varanasi thrived with a scholar named Laugākṣi Bhāskara. He was the pupil of the celebrated Bengalee Naiyāyika Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana. Bhāskara was not a Bengalee. Anyway, Jayarāma wrote a Vaiśeṣika treatise named *Padārthamālā* and on this a detailed commentary named *Padārthamālā-prakāśa* was written by this Bhāskara. Prof. Bhattacharya informs us of a number of manuscripts of *Padārthamālā-prakāśa* available at Kashi, Tanjore and other places.[1]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *VNNC*, p. 281.

KAUṆḌA BHAṬṬA AND HIS *PADĀRTHADĪPIKĀ*

The *Padārthadīpikā* is a Vaiśeṣika tract of medium length by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, the nephew of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. The latter flourished toward the end of the sixteenth century A.D. So on the basis of it Kauṇḍa must have flourished about 1650. Kauṇḍa's father was Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa and he (Kauṇḍa) was a resident of Varanasi. Though the scope here permits us to note the career of Kauṇḍa as a Vaiśeṣika author, we should not fail to mention his true genius as a grammarian. His *magnum opus* was the *Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa*. It is a commentary on the verses of Bhaṭṭoji's *Vaiyākaraṇa-matonmajjana*. "Kauṇḍa provided in his work of 1630 refutations of rival theories of meaning proposed by other schools, principally the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā."[1] He also composed an abridgment known as *Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa-sāra*. He is also credited with a *Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhānta-dīpikā*. So he is out and out a grammarian. *Tarkapradīpa* and *Tarkaratna* are other two works on Nyāya also attributed to him.[2]

The tract is just like the *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā*. Categories have been divided into two, positive and negative. Negative category is 'Negation'. Mīmāṃsakas have been contended in the topics of air[3], mind[4], darkness[5], conjunction[6] and the like.

The Nyāya theories of pīṭharapāka[7] (the theory of cooking of a pot etc. taking place even when they remain intact as a whole and not reduced to atoms), Analogy to be a separate type of *pramāṇa*[8], and the like have been refuted.

He touches the *Tārkikarakṣā* verse enumerating the different *pramāṇas* admitted by different schools of Indian philosophy.[9]

As the author hails from a Vaiyākaraṇa family, his bias towards the grammatical exposition of verbal testimony is well suited. And he refers to his *Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa* for further information.[10]

The author just like Annambhaṭṭa expresses his motive to write the *Padārthadīpikā*—as to make intelligible to the novices :

bālabuddhi-prakāśārthaṃ padārthānāṃ pradīpikā[11].

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *EIP* (V), p. 21
2. Ibid., p. 255.
3. *Padārthadīpikā*, p. 5.
4. Ibid., p. 7.
5. Ibid., p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 13.
7. Ibid., p. 10.
8. Ibid., pp. 26-9.
9. Ibid., pp. 16-7.
10. Ibid., p. 39.
11. Ibid., p. 51 Colophonic verse.

VEṆIDATTA AND HIS *PADĀRTHAMAṆḌANA*

A new tract named *Padārthamaṇḍana*[1] from the pen of Veṇidatta, a scholar of the seventeenth century has again increased the treasure of Vaiśeṣika literature by showing a sign of some innovative attitude in the field. About the author's personal life we know nothing, but some information of his ancestral lineage is available to us from a few verses.[2] The author's ancestor Mahīdhara alias Mahīdāsa was born in Ahicchatra in Gurjara (modern Gujarat). He was the devotee of Narasiṃha and his *gotra* was Vātsa. After being frustrated with this world he came to Varanasi and composed some treatises[3]. That he belonged to the sixteenth century is known from the colophons of some of his works.[4] His son was Kalyāṇa who again was the father of one Lakṣaṇa. This Lakṣaṇa in 1621 copied one manuscript of *Anādidīpaṭīkāvivaraṇa*. His son was Bhaṭṭa Vīreśvara who was the father of Veṇidatta. According to the calculation on the strength of the statement of Kṛṣṇadāsa[5] (Veṇidatta's son) and with the help of the mention of Vikrama Samvat in some of the manuscripts written by Veṇidatta himself[6] his (Venidatta) time falls in the second half of the seventeenth century or may it be extended up to the first quarter of the eighteenth century A.D.

Veṇidatta was a prolific writer. Apart from the *Padārthamaṇḍana* about which we will discuss in detail his other treatises so far available to us are the following :

1. The *Alaṃkāracandrodaya*
2. *Muktivimarśa*
3. *Parāmarśavimarśa*
4. *Tarkadundha-dhvaṃsana*
5. *Nyāyasiddhānta-rakṣāmaṇi*
6. *Annapūrnāṣṭaka-stotra*
7. *Tarkasamaya-khaṇḍana*
8. *Bhedajayaśrī*
9. *Nirvikalpabhaṅga*
10. *Yuktivarūthinī-vikalpavikṣepavyākhyā*
11. *Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅginī-kaṇṭakoddhāra*, and
12. The *Āsvādasundara-prakaraṇa*.

The very title of the tract *Padārthamaṇḍana* means the 'Establishment (*maṇḍana*) of the categories (*padārtha*)', actually justifying the title in establishing the Vaiśeṣika categories which had been refuted by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, the sharp-sighted Bengal logician in his *Padārthanirūpaṇa*. Unlike the *Tarkasaṃgraha* and similar other tracts the *Padārthamaṇḍana* puts forward a new arrangement of the categories. Some notable characteristic features of the work may now be mentioned in the following way.

1. The Vaiśeṣika tract or other larger Vaiśeṣika treatises are concerned with six or seven-category scheme but the present tract holds up the five-category scheme : substance (*dravva*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), faculty (*dharma*) and negation (*abhāva*).

2. The substances are nine as usual, viz., earth, water, fire, air, *ākāśa*, time, direction, soul and mind.

3. But the qualities are only nineteen and not twenty-four and they are : colour, taste, smell, touch, dimension, conjunction, disjunction, weight, liquidity, viscidity, sound, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, fate (*adṛṣṭa*) and tendency.

4. Action is only one, named *gamana* (motion).

5. Faculty (*dharma*) includes number, generality, particularity, *vaiśiṣṭya,* objectability (*viṣayatā*), casuality (*kāraṇatva*), effectivity (*kāryatva*), exclusiveness (*svatva*) and energy (*śakti*). This appears to be a completely new idea in the Vaiśeṣika field.

6. Negation is only two : Negation of relationship (saṃsargābhāva) and mutual negation (*anyonyābhāva*).

7. Raghunātha rejected the separate existence of direction and time and included them under God, since the verbal use of 'east' etc. is due to superficial attribute (*upādhi*) of Him (i.e. God). *Ākāśa* has also been denied separate existence by him since God only can be admitted as an inherent cause of sound.

Veṇidatta does not admit the above views of Raghunātha. According to him, if the above were logical, then the difference between Caitra and Maitra also could be established with the help of the superficial attribute of God. There would be no necessity of admitting innumerable living beings. The use of earth etc. would be possible on admitting smell, taste, etc. as the superficial attribute of God and as a result they would be included under the category of God. But it is absurd. Hence direction and time must be regarded as having separate existences.

Raghunātha's view on *ākāśa* also is beyond logic according to Veṇīdatta. God is always as auxiliary cause and He can never be an inherent one. If even for the sake of argument one is inclined to admit God as an inherent cause of a living being, he cannot show any special reason why only in a single case God is regarded as such. So one must regard the separate existence of *ākāśa*.

8. In this way, to Veṇīdatta, mind has *a* separate existence. The existence of atoms and dyads is proved by inference. It is to be noted that Raghunātha rejected the existence of atoms and dyads.

9. Veṇidatta is sometimes also found to agree with Raghunātha. He like the latter, rejects the existence of four qualities, separateness, priority, posteriority and number. However, the 'numer' is not totally negated by him. It is a separate category under 'Faculty' (*dharma*), a newly innovated larger category, and not a variety of quality. Priority and posteriority are included in 'conjunction'. Though nowhere in the tract have merit and demerit together been mentioned as *adṛṣṭa*, the mention of nineteen qualities helps us to justify a single variety comprising 'merit and demerit' as such. Both Raghunātha and Veṇidatta agrue to admit the non-pervasive nature of colour, taste, smell and touch. But they differ in connection with *citrarūpa*.

Variegated colour is nothing but the combination of different colours subsisting in one substratum and it is the basis of the use "This is *citra* (variegated)". Blue etc. can never create any other colour other than blue etc. So 'variegated colour' is not a separate colour. This is the view of Raghunātha which Veṇidatta cannot support.

10. The actions like throwing upward (*utkṣepaṇa*) etc. are included in one and

exclusive type of action called *gamana*. Both Raghunātha and Veṇidatta admit the non-pervasiveness of action.

11. Agreement of opinion regarding generality is found between them. Existence (*sattā*) and apprehendability (*anubhavatva*) have been rejected by both. Apprehendability, in fact, according to Veṇidatta, is no generality but perception only. Limitedness (*mūrtatva*) and materiality (*bhūtatva*), according to Raghunātha, are not separate from mind and *ākāśa* respectively and hence one, whereas, according to Veṇidatta, those are separate from mind and *ākāśa* and hence differ from each other. But according to both of them they are denied as 'generality' since they simultaneously reside in a substance (e.g. earth) and each of them may reside in the absence of the other, leading to the rejection of the status to be a 'generality' for both of *mūrtatva* and *bhūtatva*.

12. Particularity (*viśeṣa*) is to be admitted not because it brings about the difference between the eternal categories. Veṇidatta opines that there is no harm in arguing for the eternal categories being different from each other by their own capacity. But then *viśeṣa* loses the chance of being a word. It is for this that *viśeṣa* is to be retained. It will help to distinguish between the normal meaningful words and the words like *śaśasṛṅga* (hare's horn) etc.

13. Inherence is numerous. Otherwise smell would be available in water etc. Inherence is not separate from the relation of identity and hence is not a separate category.

14. Prior negation is negated by both Raghunātha and Veṇidatta.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Padārthamaṇḍana* of Śrī Veṇidatta. Ed. With introduction etc. by Pandit Gopala Sastri Nene, Benaras, 1930.
2. *ahicchatradvijacchatra vātsagotrasamudbhavaḥ/*
   āsīd ratnākaro nāma vidvān khyāto dharātale//
   tattanujo rāmabhaktaḥ phaṇubhaṭṭābhidho 'bhavat/
   mahīdharas tadutpannaḥ saṃsārāsāratam vidan//
   nijadeśaṃ parityajya gato vārāṇasīṃ purīm/
   sevamāno naraharim tantragrantham imam vyadhāt//
   Mantramahodadhi. Vide Introduction to *Padārthamaṇḍana*.
3. Commentary on *Śulvasūtra, Caraṇavyūha, Vājasaneyīsaṃhitāmahābhāṣya* etc.
4. *Caraṇavyūha* composed in 1613 V.S. corresponding to 1556 A.D., *Mantramahodadhi* : 1645 V.S. corresponding to 1588 A.D.
5. *Brahmavaivartapurāṇa* : Date of copying : 1751 V.S.
6. *Parāmarśavimarśa* and *Tarkadundhadhvaṃsana* : Date of preparing the ms. By Veṇidatta himself : 1750 V.S.

ŚRĪNIVĀSA AND HIS *NYĀYASIDDHĀNTA-TATTVĀMṚTA*

The Vaiśeṣika school is further enriched with the joining of a very late author named Śrīnivāsa hailing from South India. The *Nyāyasiddhānta-tattvāmṛta*,[1] a small tract from his pen, reviews the seven categories with reference to the views of Dīdhitikāra[2] (i.e. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi), Yajñapati[3], Saundala[4], Śaśadhara[5] as well as other ancient authors like Prabhākara, Līlāvatīkṛt (i.e. Śrīvallabha), Maṇikṛt (Gaṅgeśa the celebrated author of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*) and so on. The date of Śrīnivāsa, though not accurately ascertained, the reference to Raghunātha in the tract makes him a post-Raghunātha logician.

The author Śrīnivāsācārya calls himself the son of Śrīnivāsācārya and grandson of Anantaya deśika or Anantācārya, but nothing is known about his birth-place. Possibly he belongs to Tamilnad since such names are in common usage only in South India. He invokes Śrī Nṛsiṃha in the opening and concluding verses.

The *Nyāyasiddhānta-tattvāmṛta* gives a detailed account of the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika system in a lucid style. The author belongs to the Deccan school of Indian logicians. He is fully conversant with the views of logicians hailing from Karnataka, Gauda, Dravida, Magadha and Mithila whom he frequently quotes and criticises. The present work specially serves as rejoinder to the views of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi who holds many topics in the Vaiśeṣika śāstra as redundant. It is at times interesting as it quotes some Vaiśeṣika views not found in the Vaiśeṣika works. Some of them are :

1. Some accept *guṇas* even in *guṇas* (p. 4) (very strange to the Vaiśeṣika school).
2. Others do not accept *hrasva* and *dīrgha* (long and short) (p. 7).
3. Vaiśeṣika accept a composite conjunction *citrasaṃyoga* like composite colour *citrarūpa*.
4. Some do not accept two kinds of conjunction (*saṃyoga*), (i) *ekatara-karmajanya* (produced by action in either of the things) and (ii) *ubhayakarmaja* (produced by action in both).
5. *Dharma* and *adharma* are *vyāpyavṛtti* (cover the whole substratum).
6. *Samavāya* (inherence) is a category which occupies only a part of the substrate (*avyāpyavṛtti*).

Unlike other modern works like *Tarkasaṃgraha*, *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* and others which have combined both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika views into one Tarkaśāstra, the present work exclusively deals with the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika school alone. Even in matters dealt with in that school the author devotes much space to the ideas developed by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya in their works. Otherwise the author has followed *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* attributed to Viśvanātha. Ideas which are not mentioned in the *Muktāvalī* but only in the commentary of Dinakara and super-commentary of Rāmarudra find prominent place here. For example, *Buddhi* (knowledge) is said to be of three kinds, *Viśiṣṭa*, *Samūhālambana* and *Samuccaya*. *Viśiṣṭa* is said to be of four kinds, viz., (i) *viśeṣya viśeṣaṇam ityādi*, (ii)*viśiṣṭasya vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi*, (iii) *ekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭe aparavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi* and (iv) *ekatra dvayam-ityādi-viṣayatāśāli*. *Viṣayatā* (objectivity) for desire and effort is of three kinds, *upādānatva*, *sādhyatva* and *uddeśyatva*. These and other abstruse ideas, very well-known to the readers of dialectical

works of Navya-nyāya are here dealt with in a simple style understandable to the beginners.

The author rejects the theory of Kāyavūha.

The mnemonic verses on different topics in the *Nyāyasiddhānta-tattvāmṛta* reminds us of the text *Bhāṣāpariccheda*. A few of them may be noted below for example :

The qualities in water (*NST*, 13) :

dravatvaṃ ca nityagataṃ nityam
anityagatam anityaṃ iti/
saṃkhyādayaḥ pūrvavac ca
jale bhānti caturdaśa//
anitya-nitya-bhedena dvedhā rūpādipañcakam//

On fire and its qualities (*NST*, p. 16) :

tejaḥ pañcavidhaṃ proktam
guṇā hyekādaśa smṛtāḥ/
bhāsante tatra nūnaṃ te nityam rūpādayo budhaiḥ//

On the qualities of air (*NST*, p.18) :

sparśādayo nava guṇā bhānti vāyau puraiva hi/
tadanyatve pramāṇaṃ tu tasya vijñāpitaṃ budhaiḥ//

On the qualities of *ākāśa* (*NST*, p. 23) :

śabdādayo guṇāḥ ṣaṭ ca rājante viyati dhruvam/
śrotrendriyaṃ tadaivaivaṃ śabdādhāraṃ tathaiva ca//

It is noteworthy that the author has entirely left out the epistemological section of the school altogether. There is however a reference to a chapter on Pramāṇa (*adhikam pramāṇagranthe vakṣyāmaḥ*, *NST*, p. 37, 39) which is not found in any of the manuscripts. Perhaps the reference is to another work contemplated but not carried out by the author.

The same thing must be said of definitions. The author has not given definition to any category of the Tarka Śāstra. Readers may remember that the Naiyāyikas attach much importance to definitions and many dialectical works are intended to discuss definitions. That Śrīnivāsa wanted to devote a separate chapter on definitions can be inferred from the author's word *Lakṣaṇagranthe vakṣyāmaḥ* (*NST*, p. 2).

Jaiminīya-siddhānta-sāra (*NST*, p. 38) and *Līlāvatī-rahasya* (*NST*, pp. 6, 17, 34, 48, 55) are the author's two other works which he asks the readers to refer to often. But they are not available in any of the Oriental Manuscript Libraries.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Nyāyasiddhānta-tattvāmṛta* of Śrīnivāsa, ed. With introduction by S. Subrahmanya Sastri. University of Madras, 1950. Government Oriental Manuscripts Library Series.
2. *NST*, pp. 2, 3, 7, 23, 29, 32, 39, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56.
3. *NST*, p. 56.
4. *NST*, p. 55.
5. *NST*, p. 17.

SOME OTHER VAIŚEṢIKA TRACTS

A few more Vaiśeṣika tracts have recently come to our notice. We mention their titles only.

1. *Padārtha-nirūpaṇa* by Rāma Tarkavāgīśa. Sanskrit Sahitya Parishat Library ms. No. 337.

2. *Vaiśeṣika-pradīpikā* by Lamṣmaṇācārya. Osmania University ms. No. 296, 65 fols.

3. *Padārtharatnamañjuṣā* by Śrīkṛṣṇabhaṭṭa. Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute ms. No. 2952, 14 fols.

4. *Padārthatattva-viveka-prakaraṇa* by an anonymous author. Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute ms. No. 176, 26 fols.

A Vaiśeṣika tract named *Padārthīyadivyacakṣu* by Umāpati Upādhyāya has been published by the Mithila Research Institute.

CHAPTER IV

Vaiśeṣika Elements In Non-Vaiśeṣika Works And Relation Of The Vaiśeṣika System With Other Systems Of Indian Philosophy

VĀTSYĀYANA AND THE VAIŚEṢIKA SYSTEM

The Nyāya system of Akṣapāda Gautama, it is well-known, is a kindred science to the Vaiśeṣika. Vātsyāyana being the earliest commentator on the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama, quite naturally quoted the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*, give example according to their kindred śāstra, and also explains with the help of the Vaiśeṣika system. But he never mentions the source of the quotations. Sometimes the readings differ slightly from the current text of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*, but that does not stand in the way of recognising the quotations.

Anekadravya-samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ is a Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* (4.1.8) which has been quoted by Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* on *NS* 3.1.37. The *sūtra* means that the apprehension of colour depends on its inherence in a substance constituted by a number of component substances and on particularity of colour (i.e. colourness being generality-particularity). Now the important thing in this context is the following : in many printed texts of the Nyāyasūtras, *anekadravya* ...etc. has been accepted as a Nyāyasūtra. Vācaspati I does not comment on it and Vācaspati II rejects this as a Nyāyasūtra in his *Nyāyatattvāloka*.

Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara, Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana and Rādhāmohana Gosvāmin also do not accept it as a Nyāyasūtra in their *Vṛttis*. Some manuscripts of the Nyāyadarśana also omit it. It is there in the same form in the Vaiśeṣika-darśana (*VS* 4.1.8). It is clear from the *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *NS* 3.1.37 that the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra*, *anekadravya* etc. has been quoted by Vātsyāyana. The sūtra in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* has been put between *yatra* and *tatra* indicating that this sūtra comes from elsewhere. Again both the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārttika* illustrate *dharmabheda*, an expression in *NS* 3.1.37, after quoting the sūtra in question. Had it been a Nyāyasūtra, this illustration should have gone earlier. We may add that the perception of colour alone is the subject-matter of the sūtra in question. It is not sufficient to illustrate the *upalabdhiniyama* of *NS* 3.1.37; it requires other sūtras illustrating the perception of substance, quality, action, generality, etc. But in the Vaiśeṣikadarśana perception of colour is succeeded by the perception of taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, action, qualityness

and existence. Now, if we take *NS* 3.1.38 away from the Nyāyadarśana, there is hardly any harm to the Nyāya-tenets as is evident from the *Vṛttis* mentioned above. But if 4.1.8 is left out from the Vaiśeṣikadarśana there occurs a gap not to be filled up by any other means. The obvious conclusion is that the *sūtra* in question actually belongs to the Vaiśeṣikadarśana and that Vātsyāyana has quoted it from elsewhere in his gloss on 3.1.37. We may add that Uddyotakara has quoted *VS* 4.1.6 also in his exposition of *NS* 3.1.37 itself. Uddyotakara seems to have finally decided the issue in the *Nyāyavārttika* 1.2.2, saying *anekadravyasamavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhir iti. anena-rasa-gandha-sparśeṣu jñānam vyākhyātam* (*VS* 4.1.89) *iti. Na rūpa-viśeṣo 'tidiśyate iti, api tv anekadravya-samavāya-mātram, sāmarthyāt*. No stress or imagination will maintain that the reference (*atideśa*) in *VS* 4.1.9 is to a Nyāyasūtra and not to a Vaiśeṣikasūtra preceding it.

In the *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.3 Vātsyāyana writes *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyoga-viśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣaḥ* i.e. the soul is perceived through a 'specific form of conjunction between the soul and the mind. It corresponds to *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam* (*VS* 9.13). Both Candrānanda and Śaṅkaramiśra add *ātmani* before it. This additional word might have omitted by Vātsyāyana for simplification.

In the *Nyāyabhāṣya* 3.1.67 Vātsyāyana quotes *kāraṇabhāvād dhi kāryabhāvaḥ*. This corresponds to *VS* 4.1.3.

Again, *kāraṇābhābād dhi kāryābhāvaḥ* (in *NBh* 1.2.50) is *VS* 1.2.1.

Tasmin dravyaṃ guṇaḥ karma vti sandehaḥ (in *NBh* 1.1.23) is same with *tasmin dravyaṃ karma guṇa iti saṃśayaḥ* (*VS*. 2.2.25).[1]

Tasya kāryaṃ liṅgam quoted in *NBh* 3.1.67 is the *VS* 4.1.2. *na dravyam ekadravyatvāt* noted in *NBh*1.1.5 corresponds to *VS* 2.2.3 (*ekadravyatvān na dravyam*) with slight change in the order of the words.

mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ (in *NBh* 3.1.35), *mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ* (in *NBh* 3.1.40), and *mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ* (in *NBh* 3.1.67) showing negligible change from one another corresponds to *mahatyanekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ* (*VS* 4.1.6).

yasmād viṣāṇi tasmād aśvaḥ quoted in *NBh* 2.2.35 is *VS* 3.1.16.

rūpasparśavad dhi tejaḥ (in *NBh* 3.1.35) is almost identical with *tejo rūpasparśavat* (*VS* 2.1.3).

virodhyabhūtam bhūtasya (in *NBh* 2.2.1) and *abhūtam bhūtasya* (in *NBh* 3.1.41) come from *virodhyabhūtaṃ bhūtasya* (*VS* 3.1.11).

saṃyogi samavāyi ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ca (in *NBh* 3.2.41) is identical with *VS* 2.1.9.

Besides these, Vātsyāyana partially quotes or refers to some more Vaiśeṣikasūtras.

kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam (*VS* 1.1.4) has been referred to in *kriyāvad dravyam* (in *NBh* 1.1.41) and *dravyāṇāṃ kriyātvād ityevamādir viśeṣaḥ* (in *NBh* 4.1.38).

tadabhāvād aṇu manaḥ (*VS* 7.1.23) seems to have been hinted at in *aṇu manaḥ* (in *NBh* 3.2.59).

tulyajātīyeṣv arthāntarabhūteṣu viśeṣasyobhayathādṛṣṭatvāt (*VS* 2.2.26) has been partly quoted in *viśeṣasyobhayathādṛṣṭatvāt* (in *NBh* 1.1.23).

prayatnāyaugapadyāj jñānāyaugapadyāc caikam (*VS* 3.1.3) may also be connected

with (*aṇu manaḥ*) *ekam ceti* (in *NBh* 3.2.59). However there is a Nyāyasūtra which says the same thing by the same terminology. It is *jñānāyaugapadyād ekaṃ manaḥ* (*NS* 3.2.57).

sad anityaṃ dravyavat kāryam kāraṇam sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṃ aviśeṣaḥ (*VS* 1.1.8) has twice been mentioned in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* : (a) *sadanityam ityevamādinā* (*NBh* 1.1.5) and (b) *dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṃ sadādisāmānyam* (*NBh* 4.1.38).

A few observation in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* agree with the Vaiśeṣikasūtras in their content :

Bhūtasaṃyogo hi mithaḥ pañcānāṃ na niṣiddhaḥ (*NBh* 3.1.27) may be compared with *aṇusaṃyogas tv apratiṣiddhaḥ* (*VS* 4.2.4).

Utpattidharmakasya dravyasya guṇāh kāraṇata utpadyante (*NBh* 3.1.26) is *kāraṇaguṇapūrvakaḥ kāryaguṇo dṛṣṭaḥ* (*VS* 4.1.24) in different phraseology.

sarpatā khalu dravyeṇa yo yas tejobhāga āvṛyate, tasya tasyāsannidhir evāvicchinno gṛhyate (*NBh* 1.2.8) looks like an exposition of *tejaso dravyāntareṇāvaraṇāc ca* (*VS* 5.2.20).

Over and above these, one meets with various passages in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* which have close relation to Vaiśeṣika tenets. Some of the important ones are as follows.

Vātsyāyana refers to some tenets common to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika and attributes them to the 'Yogas'. Thus, 'the entire elemental creation is due to the past deeds of men. Defects and activity are the causes of Karman. Intelligent beings are endowed with their own respective qualities. Things non-existent are produced and only the produced ones are destroyed'.[2] The Yogas mentioned here are Ārambhavādins and as such, cannot be identified with the followers of Patañjali. MM Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa took the word to mean the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, as both accept creation from the conjunction between *paramāṇus* etc.[3] The title of these philosophers may also be due to their association with the Pāśupatas who had their own system of Yoga.[4]

Vidyānandasvāmin[5] and Śālikanātha[6] take the word *yoga* to mean the Vaiśeṣika alone. Vardhamāna however is clear to accept *yoga* as Naiyāyika.[7] The tenets mentioned may thus originally be associated with the Vaiśeṣikas and the acceptance thereof in the Nyāya System might be a later event.

After enumerating and defining the objects of cognition according to the Nyāya system, Vātsyāyana adds that there is another set of objects of cognition, viz., substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence.[8] These Vaiśeṣika categories have again been enumerated in *NBh* 1.1.5, 2.1.34 and 4.1.38.[9] Generality, particularity and inherence find separate mention in *NBh* 4.1.28.[10]

The theory of multiplication of bodies by the yogins in order to enjoy simultaneously the fruits of moral and non-moral actions, technically known as the theory of *kāyavyūha*, can stand only if the all-pervading soul is accepted as the enjoyer. On the other hand, if one takes the mind as the enjoyer, *kāyavyūha* becomes impossible as, because of its minutest dimension, the mind cannot come into contact with more than one body at a time.[11]

That the mind is an organ of knowledge is not mentioned in the Nyāyasūtras. But the logicians accept it as such. Here Vātsyāyana remarks : "The fact that mind is a sense-organ can be learnt from another system."[12] This other system is the system of Kaṇāda.

While explaining the Nyāyasūtra 2.2.67, Vātsyāyana refers to the qualities—colour,

taste, smell, touch, weight, liquidity, tendency, and non-pervasive dimension along with density.[13] Here the first four are common to the *VS* and *NS* while the next five have been dealt with by the Vaiśeṣika alone. The first four have again been mentioned together with their sub-divisions in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* 3.1.58.[14]

In the *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.22 Vātsyāyana raises the question of enjoying eternal pleasure after the final release of the soul. Here he does not subscribe to the Nyāya view as described by Bhāsarvajña, Mādhavācārya and Kumārilasvāmin. According to these masters, Akṣapāda accepts the theory of enjoyment of pleasure by the liberated soul. Vātsyāyana argues against it and his conclusion resembles the Vaiśeṣika theory of final release in which the enjoyment of sorrow or bliss totally vanishes for want of merit and demerit, the cause of the cycle of birth and death.[15] However, according to some authority Gautama's position was just like what Vātsyāyana explained.[16]

The *Nyāyabhāṣya* 2.1.24 shows that an attribute arising out of conjunction cannot inhere in either of its components before the conjunction actually takes place.[17]

The view that sound, an attribute of *ākāśa*, is liable to production and destruction just like knowledge has been alluded to by Vātsyāyana in his introductory remarks on *NS* 2.2.13. It is of Vaiśeṣika origin and Vācaspati I accepts it as such.[18] In his exposition of the same sūtra Vātsyāyana adds that an entity having causes have always been found destructible. A sound arising out of conjunction and disjunction has them for their cause, and as such it is also destructible.[19] The Vaiśeṣika view is given in *saṃyogād vibhāgāt śabdāc ca śabdaniṣpattiḥ* (*VS* 2.2.31). The same has again been echoed in *NBh* 2.2.35 : a sound arising from conjunction or disjunction produces a second. From the second a third is produced. The process goes on till the destruction of the last unit in the series. Vātsyāyana here adds that the succeeding sound which is the product destroys the preceding one.[20] This is also a Vaiśeṣika view. But a Vaiśeṣika will not concur with Vātsyāyana when he says that "What destroys the final sound of the series is the conjunction or impact of an obstructing substance".[21] The Vaiśeṣika accepts the destruction of the last by the immediately preceding sound.[22] Non-eternality of sound, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, has been touched several times in the fifth chapter of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*.

The causes of destruction of qualities according to Vātsyāyana are of two kinds : (a) want of the substratum of the quality and (b) presence of the contradicting qualities.[23] This is also the Vaiśeṣika view.

The existence of the Generality according to Vātsyāyana forming the basis of all comprehensive or inclusive conceptions cannot be denied.[24] He distinguished the highest generality from the lower ones in the following manner : "That which brings about equal or similar cognition in regard to a number of diverse things and which never serves the purpose of differentiating several things from one another and which (thus) forms the basis of comprehensive cognition of several things is the 'generality' pure and simple; while that which includes some and excludes others is a generality partaking of the (mixed) character of both particularity and generality."[25] The above reminds one of *bhāvaḥ sāmānyameva* (*VS* 1.2.4), and *dravyatvaṃ guṇatvaṃ karmatvaṃ ca sāmānyāni viśeṣāś ca* (*VS* 1.2.5). The intermediate generality inhering in touch, smell, colour, taste and sound find mention in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* 3.1.58.

Vātsyāyana raises an objection against the definition of sense-perception in *NS* 1.1.4. In it there is the explicit mention of a contact between the sense-organ and the object thereof (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*) but the contact between the soul and the mind and that between the mind and sense-organ, though essential, have been omitted. The definition is thus inadequate according to Vātsyāyana. Pandit Sukhlalji very rightly points out that Vātsyāyana refers to some ancient text mentioning contacts among the four entities. We find that *ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣād yanniṣpadyate tadanyat* (*VS* 3.1.11) gives the same idea and think that Vātsyāyana had this very Vaiśeṣikasūtra in his mind while making the objection.

Lastly, we come to the problem of the alternative explanation of the three kinds of inference, *pūrvavat, śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.5. Much has been said by scholars on them but we offer here a new suggestion. In the second series, the *pūrvavat* is identical with the *dṛṣṭa* variety of inference in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda.[26] The *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is also common in both the works.[27] As regards the *śeṣavat*, Praśastapāda does not mention it.

It has been included in the *dṛṣṭānumāna*,[28] but Vātsyāyana equates it with the *pariśeṣānumāna*[29] (inference by the method of residues), so well-known to the Vaiśeṣikas. Vātsyāyana's explanation here contains a number of Vaiśeṣikasūtras, themselves forming an instance of *pariśeṣānumāna*. These resemblances are too distinct to be accidental. It may therefore be presumed that Vātsyāyana is here indebted to some ancient Vaiśeṣika master between Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda. We are inclined to accept the first set of explanations as representing the Nyāya work, the Nyāya theory ought to come first as we have seen in the case of the objects of cognition.

Thus Vātsyāyana is found to minimise the gulf between the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems and pave the way for the synthesis visible in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works of the later period.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The *Nyāyakandalī* accepts it as a Vaiśeṣika *sūtra*. Vide *NK* (Viz. Sans. Series), p. 225.
2. *puruṣakarmādinimitto bhūtasargaḥ. karmahetavo doṣāḥ pravṛttiś ca. svaguṇaviśiṣṭāś cetanāḥ. asad utpadyate, utpannaṃ nirudhyate iti yogānām, NBh* 1.1.29.
3. *Nyāyadarśana* (Vangiya Sahitya Parishat ed.) Vol I (2nd ed.), p. 242.
4. cf. *athātaḥ paśupateḥ pāśupataṃ yogavidhaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ. Pāśupatasūtra*, TSS, p. 1.
5. *sadakāraṇavan nityam iti yogavaco yathā. Patraparīkṣā*, p. 4.
6. *Ṛjuvimalā*, p. 209.
7. *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa* (An incomplete manuscript of the 1st chapter in the Asiatic Society of Bengal), fol. 47b.
8. *asty anyad api dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyāḥ prameyam. NBh* 1.1.9.
9. (a) *NBh* 1.1.5 (b) *NBh* 2.1.34 (c) *NBh* 4.1.38
10. *sāmānya-viśeṣa-sāmavāyānām. NBh* 4.1.28.
11. *NBh* 3.2.19.
12. *manasaś cendriyabhāvān na vācyam lakṣaṇāntaram. tantrāntarasamācārāc caitat pratyetavyam. NBh* 1.1.4; cf. *abhāvasya ca samānatantra-siddhasya apratiṣiddhasya nyāyadarśane mānasendriyatā-siddhivad atrāpy avirodhāt. NL*, p. 36.

13. *NBh* 2.2.67.
14. *sparśās tāvat śītoṣṇānuṣṇāśītāḥ. rūpāṇi śuklaharitādīni. gandhā iṣṭāniṣṭopekṣaṇīyāḥ. rasāḥ kaṭukādayaḥ. śabdā varṇātmāno dhvanimātraś ca bhinnāḥ. NBh*, 3.1.58.
15. (a) *anena sukhena viśiṣṭā ātyantikī duḥkhanivṛttiḥ puruṣasya mokṣaḥ. Nyāyasāra*, See *NBhūs.*, p. 598.
(b) *tvadīye caraṇākṣapakṣe sānandasaṃvitsahitā vimuktiḥ. Saṃkṣepaśaṅkaravijaya*, xvi, 69.
(c) *duḥkhātyantavimokṣaḥ syād apavarga iti brūvan/ sūkṣmadhīgamyam ānandam upekṣyam āha gautamaḥ// Saugatasūtrakārikā* of Kumārilasvāmin, 3.13. cf. (a) *nityaṃ sukham ātmano mahattvavan mokṣe 'bhivyajyate. tenābhivyaktenātyantaṃ vimuktaḥ sukhī bhavatīti kecin manyante. teṣāṃ pramāṇābhāvād anupapattiḥ. Na pratyakṣam nānumānaṃ nāgamam vā vidyate nityaṃ sukham ātmano mahattvavan mokṣe 'bhivyajyata iti. NBh* 1.1.22. (b) *tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaś ca mokṣaḥ. VS* 5.2.18.
16. *muktaye yaḥ śilātvāya śāstram uce sacetasām/*
gotamaṃ tam avekṣaiva yathā vittha tathaiva saḥ// Śrīharṣa
17. *na cāsaṃyukte dravye saṃyogasya guṇasyotpattiḥ. NBh* 2.1.24
18. *vaiśeṣikamatam āha—ākāśaguṇa iti. NVTT* (Cal), p. 589.
19. *kāraṇavad anityaṃ dṛṣṭam. saṃyogavibhāgajaś ca śabdaḥ kāraṇavattvād anityaḥ. NBh* 2.2.13.
20. (a) *upapāditaḥ śabdasantānaḥ. saṃyogavibhāgāt śabdāt śabdāntaram. Tato 'pyanyat, tato 'pyanyad iti. Tatra kāryaḥ śabdaḥ kāraṇaṃ śabdaṃ niruṇaddhi. NBh* 2.2.35; (b) *śabdasantāne śabdaḥ śabdāntaravirodhī. NBh* 3.2.24.
21. *pratighāti-dravya-saṃyogas tvantyasya śabdasya nirodhakaḥ. NBh* 2.2.32.
22. *śabdaḥ ... kāryakāraṇobhayavirodhī. PDS* (Viz. Sanskrit Series), p. 287.
23. *NBh* 3.2.23.
24. *NBh* 2.1.36.
25. *NBh* 2.2.69.
26. *pūrvavad iti. yatra yathāpūrvaṃ pratyakṣabhūtayor anyatara-darśanena anyatarasyā-pratyakṣasyānumānam. yathā dhūmena agnir iti. NBh* 1.1.5. *dṛṣṭam prasiddhasādhyayor (atyanta) jātyabhede 'numānam, yathā gavyeva sāsnāmātram upalabhya deśāntare 'pi sāsnāmātradarśanād gavi pratipattiḥ. PDS*, p. 495.
27. (a) *sāmānyatodṛṣṭam nāma yatrāpratyakṣe liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambandhe kenacid arthena liṅgasya samavāyād apratyakṣo liṅgī gamyate, yathā icchādibhir ātmā. icchādayo guṇāḥ, guṇāś ca dravyasaṃsthānāḥ. tad yad eṣāṃ sthānaṃ sa ātmeti. NBh* 1.1.5. (b) *prasiddhasādhyayor atyantajātibhede liṅgānumeyadharma-sāmānyānuvṛttito 'numānaṃ sāmānyatodṛṣṭam. yathā karṣaka-vaṇig-rājapuruṣāṇām ca pravṛtteḥ phalavattvam upalabhya varṇāśramiṇām api dṛṣṭam prayojanam anuddiśya pravartamānānāṃ phalānumānam iti. PDS*, p. 495.
28. *dṛṣṭam api dvividham—pūrvavac cheṣavac ca. Pañcārthabhāṣya* on the *Pāśupatasūtras*, TSS, p. 7.
29. *śeṣavan nāma pariśeṣaḥ. Sa ca prasaktapratiṣedhe 'nyatrāprasaṅgāt śiṣyamāṇe sampratyayaḥ. yathā sad anityam (VS* 1.1.8) *ityevamādinā dravya-guṇa-karmaṇām aviśeṣeṇa sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyebhyo nirbhaktasya śabdasya tasmin dravya-guṇa-karma-saṃśaye* (*VS* 2.2.25), *na dravyam ekadravyatvāt* (*VS* 2.2.27), *na karma śabdāntarahetutvāt*. cf. *acākṣuṣatvān na karma*, (*VS* 2.2.28). *yastu śiṣyate so 'yam iti śabdasya guṇatvapratipattiḥ. NBh* 1.1.5.

UDDYOTAKARA AS A VAIŚEṢIKA

Uddyotakara, the renowned Nyāya commentator, composed the *Nyāyavārttika* on Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* which in its own turn is a commentary on the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama. The treatment of the Vaiśeṣika sūtra and tenets in this *Nyāyavārttika* deserves special attention. Uddyotakara has touched almost all the Vaiśeṣika categories and some sub-divisions thereof, making significant remarks about them. He has quoted some Vaiśeṣika sūtras while some have been partially explained. These explanations though are few in number and fragmentary in character. Nevertheless they are important as they consist of the oldest extant explanations on the sūtras. In some cases Uddyotakara refutes the current explanations and puts forward his own explanations instead. These views of Uddyotakara have been closely followed by Śaṅkaramiśra.

While explaining Gautama's definition of doubt (*saṃśaya*) Uddyotakara quotes by way of comparison the Vaiśeṣika definition *sāmānya-pratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣasmṛteś ca saṃśayaḥ* (*VS* 2.2.19). He remarks here that the expression *sāmānyapratyakṣāt* means 'from the perception of an object possessing resemblances' and not 'from the perception of resemblance' simply. Some held that the expressions *viśeṣāpratyakṣāt* and *viśeṣasmṛteḥ* in the sūtra are redundant and *sāmānyapratyakṣāt saṃśayaḥ* constitutes the definition as nobody remembers particularities which are perceived. Against this Uddyotakara says that the explanation springs from an ignorance of the real import of the *sūtra*. *Viśeṣāpratyakṣatva* does not mean non-perception of particularity, but *avyavasthitaviśeṣatva* which Vācaspatimiśra further explains with the expression *sādhaka-vādhaka-pramāṇābhāva*, a case where means of proof or disproof is wanting.

While explaining the *avayavin* (whole) Uddyotakara remarks that the colour (*rūpa*) and the extension (*mahattva*) are the conditions of perception. Some atoms (*paramāṇus*) have colour but no extension hence they are not perceived. Touch etc. are irregular in character. So they cannot be regarded as conditions of perception while colour and extension are regular and must be regarded as such. In support of the above, he quotes two Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*, (i) *adravyavattvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ* (4.1.7) and (ii) *rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyāv anupalabdhiḥ* (4.1.8), and explains *rūpasaṃskāra* as inherence of colour. Here Śaṅkaramiśra concurs with Uddyotakara while Jayanārāyaṇa, a modern commentator, offers a slightly different interpretation.[1]

In the same context while trying to establish conjunction as a separate entity, Uddyotakara remarks that it is wrong to argue that if a dependent action produces conjunction, then it is in contradiction with the Vaiśeṣika sūtra, *ekadravyam aguṇaṃ saṃyogavibhāgayor anapekṣakāraṇaṃ karma.*[2] The contradiction is apparent only. It arises from a non-comprehension of the import of the sūtra. It means to say that independent action is a condition of conjunction and disjunction. But this independence is not absolute as every action must at least presuppose its substratum. Action does not stand in need of some other extraneous condition (*paścādbhāvi nimittāntaram*) to produce conjunction and disjunction. An effect *qua* substance when produced presupposes, apart from the component parts, a conjunction between them (component parts). When action and

quality are produced, a conjunction presupposes tendency (*saṃskāra*), effort (*prayatna*) and unperceived potentiality (*adṛṣṭa*). Again colour etc. in the cause, in order to produce them in the effect, presuppose the origination of the effect. But action to produce conjunction and disjunction does not depend on any such other condition. In the present context independence of action is to be understood in this sense.

The opponent would contend that an action depends on disjunction when conjunction is to be occasioned, since no action can produce conjunction without engendering a disjunction. To this Uddyotakara's retort is that disjunction when produced counteracts the former conjunction. After the counteractions of conjunction, action produces conjunctions due to the removal of the obstruction (*pratibandhāpagamāt*). The Vaiśeṣika sūtra has laid down that unconditional gravity produces action.[3] And yet the conjunction of the fruit and the stalk is suspended as a result of mutual separation and thereafter gravity being free from impediment, makes the fruit fall to the ground. Similar is the case with action which produces conjunction and the antecedent disjunction is only the resultant of the removal of the deterrent.

Again, a piece of linen is produced by several conjunctions of threads. When it is torn into two pieces, a few conjunctions are destroyed while others remain intact. These remaining conjunctions are the cause of the new pieces and they do not depend on any disjunction. So the opponent's contention must be false and there is no contradiction in the sūtra.

While explaining the definition of *Jalpa* (wrangling), Uddyotakara raises the question of *atideśa*—extension of some expressions of a former sūtra to a latter one. According to him expressions directly connected with the latter sūtra are to be extended and not the unconnected ones. In support to this, he quotes two Vaiśeṣika sūtras : *anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ*, 4.1.9, and *anena rasa-gandha-sparśeṣu jñānam vyākhyātam*, 4.1.10.

Here the expression *rūpaviśeṣa* has nothing to do with the latter sūtra. But *anekadravya-dravyena samavāya* (inherence in object having a number of component parts) is equally connected with the perception of colour, taste, smell and touch. Hence the latter expression is to be understood as referred to by the word *anena*.

Explaining the definition of *tarka*, Uddyotakara says that change of case-ending (*vibhakti-vyatyaya*) in a sūtra can be admitted for the sake of meaning. He cites *iṣāv ayugapat saṃyogaviśeṣāḥ karmānyatve hetuḥ* (*VS* 5.1.16) as an example. Here the seventh case-ending in *iṣau* has been used in the sense of the sixth case-ending. The alteration conveys a new meaning. It shows that not only the arrow but also the parts thereof are also indicated and the sūtra means that special non-simultaneous conjunctions of the parts together with such conjunctions of the arrow itself are the conditions of different actions.

Here Śaṅkaramiśra agrees with Uddyoatkara. But Jayanārāyaṇa has maintained an indifferent attitude towards this construction.[4]

The opponent contends that the notion of commonness (*anuvṛttipratyaya*) which is held as the basis of the generality (*jāti*), exists in all the individual members constituting the class cow, horse and the like for we may point out to them as this is a cow-generality

and that is another, horse-generality. But there is no higher generality in which these lower ones can be included. He further contends that the acceptance of the position that generality inheres in another generality militates against the Vaiśeṣika sūtra (8.5) *sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu sāmānya-viśeṣābhāvāt tata eva jñānam.*

Uddyotakara retorts that the anomaly is due to a wrong idea about the import of the sūtra. It means that just as the idea of a substance, qualified by substanceness , arises with regard to a substance, no such idea of generality qualified by generality arises with regard to a generality. The sūtra does not mean that the notion of commonness is unconditional. The condition is 'inherence in all the members of the group'.[5]

Our author has his own opinion with regard to the question of darkness: 'has it a real content or is it without the same'? He opines that to hold it as without a content is contrary to facts. On the other hand, the opponent argues that to hold it with a real content goes against the Vaiśeṣika sūtra (5.2.21) *dravya-guṇa-karma-niṣpatti-vaidharmyād bhā'bhāvas tamaḥ.*[6]

Uddyotakara argues that this doubt also is due to a non-comprehension of the import of the sūtra. Substance, quality and action which are devoid of all connection with light are called darkness. Darkness has these things for its content. Hence there is no contradiction.[7]

According to Dignāga, a Buddhist logician, proposition like 'Sound is eternal' is fallacious to a Vaiśeṣika. It is *'āgamaviruddha'*—contrary to scriptures. But Uddyotakara in his reply remarks that it is not contrary to scriptures inasmuch as the Vaiśeṣikas do not establish transitoriness of sound from scriptural evidence. An inference, supported by the sūtra *kāraṇataḥ vikārāt* (*VS* 2.2.34), leads to the establishment of the same conclusion. So instead of calling the proposition 'contrary to scripture' one should call it 'contrary to inference'—*anumānaviruddha.*

In addition to these a list of Uddyotakara's reference to and quotations from the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* may be furnished :

adravyavattvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ cf *VS* 4.1.7	*NV*, p. 220
anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa etc. cf *VS* 4.1.9	*NV*, pp. 153, 356
anena rasa-gandha-sparśeṣu etc. cf *VS* 4.1.10	*NV*, p. 153
aśvo 'yam viṣāṇitvāt cf *VS* 3.1.12	*NV*, pp. 113, 119, 290
ātmahastasaṃyogaprayatnābhyām etc. *VS* 5.1.1	*NV*, p. 441
iṣāv ayugapat saṃyoga cf *VS* 5.1.15	*NV*, p. 132
ubhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt cf *VS* 2.2.22	*NV*, p. 344
ekadravyam aguṇam etc. *VS* 1.1.16	*NV*, p. 211
kāraṇato vikārāt VS 2.2.34	*NV*, p. 108
kāraṇatva-mahattva etc. cf *VS* 7.1.16	*NV*, p. 355
kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ VS 1.2.1	*NV*, p. 292
kriyāvadādir viśeṣaḥ cf *VS* 1.1.15	*NV*, p. 452
kāryasya kāraṇavattvāt cf *VS* 1.2.1	*NV*, p. 346
gurutvam nirapekṣam cf *VS* 5.1.7	*NV*, pp. 212, 273
gaur viṣāṇitvāt cf *VS* 3.1.12	*NV*, p. 118
jātiviśeṣāc ca rāgaviśeṣaḥ VS 6.2.16	*NV*, p. 348

tattvam bhāvena VS 2.1.28	*NV*, p. 49
dravya-guṇa-karma-niṣpatti etc. *VS* 5.2.21	*NV*, p. 325
tanmayatvād rāgaḥ cf *VS* 6.2.13	*NV*, p. 348
nodanābhighātāt saṃyukta etc. *VS* 5.2.1	*NV*, p. 225
bhūtasaṃsargo 'vipratiṣiddhaḥ cf *VS* 4.2.3	*NV*, p. 349
mahattvād anekadravyavattvāt etc. cf *VS* 4.1.6	*NV*, p. 205, 356
yannirapekṣaṃ saṃyoga etc. cf *VS* 1.1.19	*NV*, 67
rūpasaṃskārābhāvāt etc. *VS* 4.1.8	*NV*, p. 220
rūpa-sparśa-vaddhi tejaḥ of *VS* 2.1.3	*NV*, p. 355
saṃyogas tvapratiṣiddho cf *VS* 4.2.3	*NV*, p. 372
saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt etc. *VS* 5.1.7	*NV*, p. 273
sāmāyna-pratyakṣāt etc. *VS* 2.2.19	*NV*, p. 94
sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānya etc. *VS* 8.5	*NV*, p. 304
sadādi sāmānyam cf *VS* 1.1.8	*NV*, p. 452

Uddyotakara incidentally refers to many other things which are directly or indirectly connected with the Vaiśeṣika categories. Some of these seem to have been borrowed from him by the later Vaiśeṣika. Some such views of our author are placed in a clear perspective.

A compound object is made from a simultaneous conjunctions of its parts.[8] The cause precedes an effect.[9] An effect must have substratum[10] and there is no instance of an effect without it. Every effect must have some causes[11] which admit of a threefold classification[12]—inherent, non-inherent and auxiliary. No effect arises from a single cause. The auxiliary helps the other two.[13] So long as the destructive force does not present itself, the substance remains intact.[14] Light is not momentary. It exists for five consecutive moments. Nothing is destroyed without a cause of destruction.[15] A substance having a cause is only destroyed.[16] According to Kāśyapa, the same conjunction of fire that destroyed the former colour of a substance does not produce another colour after chemical action. But a different conjunction is required for the purpose.[17]

Earth has smell as its special quality[18]. Embodied ultimate particles of earth etc. can obstruct such particles of light. When this obstruction gains in volume, it is called shade and when the same obstruction comes from all sides it is called darkness.[19] Darkness presupposes substance, quality and action. These on the other hand without any relation with light are called darkness.[20] When the object obstructing light moves on, perceived substance, qualified by the non-conjunction of light, is called shade.[21]

Light (*tejas*) has colour and touch. It is of four kinds : (i) that which has manifested colour and manifested touch, (ii) that which has manifested colour but unmanifested touch, (iii) that which has unmanifested colour but manifested touch, and (iv) that which has colour and touch both unmanifested.[22]

Atoms (*paramāṇu*) of earth etc. are incapable of division into parts. These mark the limit of division and are eternal. A substance is destroyed by the destruction of its cause or from the separation of the component parts. None of these is admissible with regard to the atom since it is no effect.[23] Again, division means dissolution into smaller parts. The question of division ends when atom is reached. If we accept the existence of parts in an atom, they must be smaller than itself. But it has been defined as the ultimate unit and

the smallest part. Hence it admits of no further division.[24] These ultimate particles are invisible.[25] They have no inner or outer parts.[26]

Ākāśa is all-pervasive.[27] The organ of hearing is made of it.[28] It has six qualities.[29]

Time also is all-pervasive.[30] The idea of existence of substance, quality and action proves the existence of the present time.[31] But time is really one.[32] Direction is imperceptible as it has no colour.[33]

Soul acts independently and enjoys the fruits of its action. This independence consists of knowledge, will and effort while enjoyment consists of the knowledge of weal or woe.[34] It is perceived by each individual.

The supreme soul (*īśvara*) has six qualities : number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction and intellect.[35] Further, he has unimpaired desire.[36] He sets the *paramāṇus* in motion according to the merits and demerits of creatures and their enjoyment is fulfilled thereby.[37]

Mind is as small as an *aṇu*.[38] It is neither material nor immaterial.[39]

Quality has no existence independent of substance.[40] It must have a substratum.[41] It is distinct from the object in which it inheres.[42] It is destroyed by the destruction of the substratum or by the appearance of a contradictory quality.[43] Colour, taste, smell, touch and sound are called special qualities as they help us to distinguish objects which possess them from others.[44] Number, quality, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, viscidity and velocity are called dependent qualities.[45] An embodied object has two kinds of qualities, (i) colour etc. which are perceptible to the external sense-organs and (ii) heaviness which is outside their scope.[46] Relation is included in the qualities,[47] so are crookedness and straightness which spring from contraction and expansion respectively.[48] Colour is the cause of perception and not touch.[49]

Relation with fire is not the only cause of colour produced after chemical action. Particularities in the former colour are also conditions thereof.[50] Number is a distinct entity. The ideas of singularity and plurality spring from it.[51]

Dimension is a non-pervasive object which is of six kinds.[52] Largeness in an object arises out of the largeness, plurality and slack union (*pracaya*) in its constituents.[53] An object made of one ultimate unit cannot have largeness.[54] Dimension lasts as long as the object exists.[55] It inheres in one object only.[56]

Conjunction means union of things once separate.[57] It is a distinct entity.[58] Slack union is a special kind of it and forms another distinct entity.[59] There is no conjunction without a prior disjunction.[60] Conjunction of an object (produced by action, *kāryadravya*) with *ākāśa* arises either from (i) another conjunction or from (ii) action while the conjunction of such an object with an ultimate particle arises from action alone.[61] Conjunction does not cover a whole area[62] and it is not an independent cause of substance, quality or action.[63]

Disjunction means the removal of cover.[64] It is the separation of things which were in union.[65]

Heaviness cannot be perceived by means of sense-organs.[66] The cause of the fall of the objects of equal heaviness is sometimes heaviness, effort and throwing. Sometimes the former two, and sometimes the first alone.[67] Heaviness in rain water is obstructed by

conjunction of clouds and air.[68] Heaviness with its auxiliary causes a slow fall. But when the obstacle is removed, the fall becomes rapid.[69]

Any apprehension with regard to any entity is called knowledge.[70] It is a quality of the soul.[71] Inference is of three kinds : (1) positive (*anvayi*), (ii) negative (*vyatiraki*) and (iii) positive-negative (*anvaya-vyatireki*).[72] Contacts between the object and the sense-organ are of six kinds: (i) conjunction (*saṃyoga*), (ii) inherence in that which is in conjunction (*saṃyukta-samavāya*), (iii) inherence in that which inheres in that which is conjoined (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*), (iv) inherence (*samavāya*), (v) inherence in that which is in inherence (*samaveta-samavāya*) and (vi) relation of qualification (*viśeṣaṇatā*).[73]

The existence of pleasure which can be apprehended by everybody cannot be denied.[74]

The faculty (*saṃskāra*) works efficiently due to the efficiency of its auxiliaries. The inefficiency in the auxiliaries leads to an inefficient result though the faculty is the same.[75]

Sound has *ākāśa* for its substratum.[76] It does not cover the whole of *ākāśa*.[77] It is transitory[78] and is produced from conjunction and disjunction.[79] In a series of sounds the latter destroys the former one.[80] The last sound in the series does not produce any other sound as in the former cases.[81] "Sound has a substratum as it is perceived by our eyes" is a fallacious argument according to the Vaiśeṣikas.

Action is of two kinds: (i) upward motion (*utkṣepaṇa*) etc. and (ii) that expressed by conjugated roots.[82] Action in the hand is produced from the contact of the soul and the hand. The active hand then touches the pair of tongs and moves the iron through it.[83]

Generality finds no scope if there is no diversity.[84] One accepting generality must accept particularity also.[85] Generality inheres in all objects included in the class. *Sattā* (being) covers substance, quality and action and it is a generality.[86] The word *sat* (existent) includes all these three.[87] The scope of generality is wide while that of particularity is narrow.[88] *Sattā* is perceived by all sense-organs.[89]

Inherence is the relation between the container and the contained as well as of the part and the whole.[90] Cowness is present in the cow by this relation as there is the idea of 'this is in that'.[91] Inherence is not dependent and has no further inherence.[92] It is eternal and can be perceived by all the organs of sense.[93]

A positive entity with a cause is sure to be destroyed.[94] Prior and posterior negations are absent when the object exists.[95] In prior negation the cause is absent while in posterior negation destruction is wanting.[96] Negation unlike a positive entity is sometimes destroyed if there is no cause and sometimes it is not destroyed when the cause is present.[97] Negation also can be perceived by all the sense-organs.[98]

It is not known if Uddyotakara had any work on Vaiśeṣika philosophy. There was a *Bhāradvāja vṛtti* on the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* and Uddyotakara was a Bhāradvāja. But nothing as yet has been found to prove his identity with the author of the *Vṛtti*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *rūpasaṃskārapadena rūpasamavāyaḥ. Upaskāra. rūpasaṃskāraḥ saṃskṛtam rūpam. Vivṛti.*
2. *ekadravyam aguṇaṃ saṃyogavibhāgeṣu anapekṣam kāraṇam iti karma-lakṣaṇam. VS* 1.1.16.

3. *gurutvaṃ nirapekṣaṃ karmakāraṇam ity uddiṣṭam śāstre. NV*, p. 212. This is not found in the Vaiśeṣika sūtra. But Uddyotakara seems to refer to the Vaiśeṣika philosopher by the word Śāstra. Moreover, the passage in question has a close resemblance to *saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam, VS* 5.1.7.
4. *vibhakti-vyatyaḥ. kasmāt? yadi vyatyayena kaścid artho labhyate yukto vyatyayaḥ. yathā tasmin eva iṣāv ayugapat saṃyogaviśeṣā iti adhikaraṇārthaḥ. iṣor api ye 'vayavās teṣām api ye saṃyogaviśeṣās te 'pi karmānyatve hetur iti. NV* p. 132.
   iṣāv iti ṣaṣṭhyarthe saptamī. Upaskāra.
   iṣau dhanurmuktaśare. Vivṛti.
5. Vide *NV*, p. 304
6. Candrānanda omits *niṣpatti* in the *sūtra.*
7. Vide *NV*, p. 325
8. *NV*, p. 436
9. *NV*, p. 353
10. *NV*, p. 188, 241
11. *NV*, p. 346
12. *NV* (Cal), p. 210
13. *NV*, p. 433
14. *NV*, p. 335
15. *NV*, p. 389
16. *NV*, p. 390
17. *NV*, p. 390
18. *NV*, p. 9
19. *NV*, pp. 485-6
20. *NV*, p. 321
21. *NV*, p. 167
22. *NV*, p. 357
23. *NV*, pp. 481-2
24. *NV*, p. 484
25. *NV*, p. 230
26. *NV*, p. 481
27. *NV*, p
28. *NV*, p. 100
29. *NV*, p. 439
30. *NV*, p. 239
31. *NV*, p. 241
32. *NV*, p. 239
33. *NV*, p. 45
34. *NV*, p. 337
35. *NV*, p. 439
36. *NV*, p. 440
37. *NV*, p. 333
38. *NV*, p. 338
39. *NV*, p. 353
40. *NV*, p. 362
41. *NV*, p. 341
42. *NV*, p. 335
43. *NV*, p. 398
44. *NV*, p. 370
45. *NV*, p. 69
46. *NV*, p. 412

47. *NV*, p. 309
48. *NV*, p. 335
49. *NV*, p. 196
50. *NV*, p. 67
51. *NV*, p. 73
52. *NV*, p. 482
53. *NV*, p. 355
54. *NV*, p. 206
55. *NV*, p. 336
56. *NV*, p. 84
57. *NV*, p. 482
58. *NV*, p. 210
59. *NV*, p. 74
60. *NV*, p. 282
61. *NV*, p.
62. *NV*, p. 281
63. *NV*, p. 81
64. *NV*, p. 460
65. *NV*, p. 461
66. *NV*, p. 412
67. *NV*, p. 392
68. *NV*, p. 262
69. *NV*, p. 392
70. *NV*, p. 378
71. *NV*, p. 196
72. *NV*, p. 43
73. *NV*, p. 28
74. *NV*, pp. 59, 80
75. *NV*, p. 392
76. *NV* (Cal), p. 597
77. *NV*, p. 281
78. *NV*, p. 157
79. *NV*, p. 29
80. *NV*, p. 398
81. *NV*, p. 511
82. *NV*, p. 436
83. *NV*, p. 441
84. *NV*, p. 455
85. *NV*, p. 455
86. *NV*, p. 102
87. *NV*, p. 307
88. *NV*, p. 86
89. *NV*, p. 69
90. *NV* (Cal), p. 100
91. *NV*, p. 305
92. *NV*, p. 69
93. *NV*, p. 69
94. *NV*, p. 389
95. *NV*, p. 128
96. *NV*, p. 279
97. *NV*, p. 389
98. *NV*, p. 69

VAIŚEṢIKA IN THE KASHMIRI NYĀYA WORKS

In the long history of Indian philosophy, it is a remarkable fact that the relation between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas had not been always friendly. In the *Nyāyavārttika*, Uddyotakara is found to have full confidence on the Vaiśeṣika śāstra in many topics of discussion and he at times quoted the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* or put forward Vaiśeṣika concepts in detail in the relevant places. But in the Kashmiri school the two pioneers of the Nyāya śāstra Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Bhāsarvajña did not look upon the Vaiśeṣika śāstra with the same eye as Uddyotakara.

Jayanta the versatile Nyāya author of ninth century A.D. denied the existence of the Vaiśeṣika as an independent system of philosophy. Further he said that the Vaiśeṣikas are the followers of his own system i.e. the Nyāya system.[1] And he interprets that the words *tarka* and *nyāyavistara* in the old *kārikās*[2] are to mean the Nyāyaśāstra only though the Vaiśeṣikas are well-known as the followers of the Nyāya system.

Though Jayanta refers to some Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*,[3] he is not very enthusiastic to discuss the Vaiśeṣika topic in his treatise. In spite of his clear admittance of the Vaiśeṣikas' detailed treatment of direction and time and the Vaiśeṣika system as a *samānatantra* (kindred system), he did not write something on those, because 'the people who talk much are not honoured in the society'.[4] It is extremely important to note that Jayanta criticises the Vaiśeṣika theory of the propagation of sound in the process of *kadamba*-bud or the water-waves.[5]

Another Kashmiri Naiyāyika was Bhāsarvajña. He flourished in the second half of the tenth century. His *Nyāyasāra* and the auto-commentary *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* thereon have attained enormous success. This author also had an antagonistic attitude towards the Vaiśeṣikas, for the sake of promoting Nyāya's supremacy. On one occasion he says that we (the Naiyāyikas) are to explain the Nyāya śāstra and in doing so if there is any conflict with the Vaiśeṣikas we do not consider it harmful.[6] This attitude is also proved true when we seen Bhāsarvajña quoting only a few Vaiśeṣika sūtras in the voluminous treatise.[7] However, he admits the Vaiśeṣika system as the *samānatantra*[8] (kindred system) of the system of Akṣapāda Gautama.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *vaiśeṣikāḥ punar asmadanuyāyinaḥ eva....* *NM* (I), p. 9
2. (a) *purāṇatarka-mīmāṃsā-dharmaśāstrāṅgamiśritaḥ/*
   vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānāṃ dharmasya ca caturdaśa//
   (b) *aṅgāni vedāś catvāro mīmāṃsā nyāyavistaraḥ/*
   purāṇaṃ dharmaśāstraṃ ca vidyā hyetāś caturdaśa// NM (I), p. 9
3. *ātmendriyamano'rtha* ...... (*VS* 3.1.13), *NM* (I), p. 163
   asyedam kāryam ......(*VS* 9.18), *NM* (I) p. 173
   tadvacanād ...... (*VS* 1.1.3), *NM* (I), p. 356
   trayāṇām ...... *PDS*, p. 76
   ṣaṇṇām āśrita .... *PDS*, 321

4. *samānatantre dikkālau vaitatyena vicintitau/*
   tanneha likhyate loke dveṣyā hi bahubhāṣiṇaḥ// *NM* (I), p. 204
   samānatantre kaṇavratamate. *NM*(III), p. 80
5. *NM* (I), p. 299
6. *Nyāyaśāstram ca vyākhyātuṃ vayaṃ pravṛttās tenāsmākaṃ Vaiśeṣika-tantreṇa virodho na doṣāya.* *Nbhuṣ,* p. 163
7. *anekadravyavattvena* ...... (*VS* 1.2.12), *NBhuṣ,* p. 489
   karma Karmasādhyam ...... (*VS* 1.1.10), *NBhuṣ,* p. 162
8. *samānaṃ tantraṃ naiyāyikānāṃ vaiśeṣikaśāstram* ..... *NBhuṣ,* p. 66

JAYANTA BHAṬṬA AND THE VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY

The history of the Nyāya philosophy during the period between Uddyotakara and Vācaspati is not clear. During this period there appeared a separate Nyāya school in Kashmir. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* and *Āgamāḍambara,* a drama, has given a brief introduction about it. There we find that a branch following Bhāṣyakāra Vātsyāyana and another branch following Vārttikakāra Uddyotakara had appeared in Kashmir. The first branch was identified by Jayanta as Vyākhyātṛ school.[1] The chief of this school was Pravara. In the other school the Naiyāyikas who followed the *Vārttika* were called by the name of *ācārya.*[2] The chief among those Naiyāyikas was the commentator of *Ruci* (a commentary on the *Nyāyavārttika*). Jayanta himself was a follower of the *Bhāṣya.* However, he discussed the views of both the schools.

In the drama *Āgamāḍambara,* Dharmaśiva, a teacher of the Pāśupata school, is found to represent the Vaiśeṣika school. Dharmaśiva is described as an expert in the philosophies of Kaṇabhakṣa (Kaṇāda), Akṣapāda (Gautama) and others. He is respected by all. The king Śaṅkaravarman and also the royal servant Saṃkarṣaṇa treat him with great respect. He refers to the *Nyāyabhāṣya* under *NS* 1.1.7, the Nyāyasūtra 2.1.8 as well as the Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.1. No serious differences between the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika have been clearly mentioned in the drama. In the *Nyāyamañjarī* Jayanta discusses various Vaiśeṣika sūtras, Vaiśeṣika views and Vaiśeṣika categories. But there are some differences between the treatment of the Vaiśeṣika in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and the *Nyāyavārttika* on the one hand and that of the Vaiśeṣika in the *Nyāyamañjarī* on the other. Jayanta admits the Vaiśeṣika philosophy as the kindred school (*samānatantra*) of the Nyāya philosophy, yet according to him the Vaiśeṣika philosophy is less respectable than the Nyāya. In the fourteen branches of knowledge[3] the Nyāya has been counted and not the Vaiśeṣika. He says that though the Vaiśeṣikas are the followers of the Nyāyaśāstra and the well-known six logical schools (*Ṣaṭtarkin*) include the Vaiśeṣika, *tarka* and *Nyāya-vistara* which have been mentioned in two verses enumerating the branches of knowledge accept the Nyāyaśāstra only and not the Vaiśeṣika.[4] Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* mentions this *Ṣaṭtarkin* as comprising Jaina, Buddhist and Lokāyata (as the opponents) and Sāṃkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika (as the defendants).[5]

It is important to note that though the Sāṃkhya has been included in the *Ṣaṭtarkin* as accepted by Jayanta, it has been omitted in the *Āgamaḍambara,* also known as *Ṣanmatanāṭaka* (the drama dealing with the six systems).

Jayanta says that the kindred school Vaiśeṣika discusses Direction and Time in great detail.[6] He has the knowledge of one *Vaiśeṣika Kaṭandī* which is a very tough work on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.[7] A very early quotation *jātaḥ sambaddhaś ca ity ekaḥ kālaḥ* has been quoted.[8] The direction is mentioned to be ten-fold.[9] This has the similarity with the direction as has been treated by Praśastapāda.[10]

Jayanta shows his marked difference from Praśastapāda in some respects. (a) He contradicts Praśastapāda's definition of Inherence.[11] (b) In the section of similarities Praśastapāda mentions the similarities of earth, water and fire as being perceptibility, having colour, liquidity etc.[12] Here Jayanta says, the statement of these similar attributes

is not a divine statement which is inviolable. It is not that the perceptibility or imperceptibility is determined by the statement. Perceptibility is meant for being object of sensual knowledge. If that kind of characteristic resides in Time, who is able to negate the perceptibility of Time which is colourless?[13]

A verse composed by Jayanta

dikkālaparamāṇvādi-nityadravyātirekinaḥ/
āśritaḥ sad apekṣyante padārthāḥ kaṇabhojinā//[14]

presupposes the background which comprises a statement of Praśastapāda *āśritatvam cānyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ.*[15]

Jayanta narrates the Vaiśeṣika categories and their sub-divisions : Earth etc. are nine substances. Colour etc. are twenty four qualities. Throwing upward etc. are five actions. Generality is twofold, Supreme and Intermediary. Particularities reside in the ultimate eternal things. Inherence is one. There are subdivisions of the above-mentioned categories and those are innumerable.[16]

Jayanta correlated the Nyāya sūtra defining salvation and the Vaiśeṣika *Vākya* defining the same. The Vaiśeṣika *Vākya* narrates the salvation as being complete destruction of the nine special qualities of the soul.[17] The Nyāya sūtra (1.1.23) asserts that salvation is the absolute negation (of the qualities of the soul). The above-mentioned Vaiśeṣika *Vākya* is again serially related with the Vaiśeṣika sūtra (5.2.20), *tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaś ca mokṣaḥ*. The special qualities like knowledge, etc. cannot be generated in the liberated soul, as that requires connection with body etc. The special qualities are sixteen.[18] Of them seven are of five material substances and the remaining nine are of soul. Nine qualities of the soul as mentioned by Jayanta obviously indicate the nine special qualities of the same, because the general qualities like number, dimension and separateness are not destroyed even when the soul is liberated.

Conjunction and disjunction are produced. Hence they are counterpositive, that which is negated. Disjunction produced by disjunction has been discussed by Jayanta in a detailed manner.[19]

To prove the unity of *ākāśa* Jayanta cites the argument of presence of the mark sound in uniform manner.[20] It completely agrees with the *PDS* sentence *śabda-liṅgāviśeṣād ekatvam siddham.*[21]

After Jayanta, another Kashmiri logician, Bhāsarvajña, did not admit the separate existence of action as different from conjunction and disjunction. But Jayanta admitted action as a separate category. His argument proves that long before Bhāsarvajña there existed the logicians who were reluctant of admitting action as a separate category. The argument forwarded by Jayanta is as follows.

When our knowledge takes up conjunction and disjunction, we feel that 'this is conjoined with that' or 'this is being separated from that', and not 'this is going'. So, as the knowledge appears according to the object the arrangement of the object will be according to the feeling. Otherwise the cloth would be the object in the knowledge of pot. If Conjunction and Disjunction would be the object, the knowledge of moving would appear in the static object because Conjunction and Disjunction are possible in that case. A static

stuff when conjoined with a hawk or disjoined from that would appear to be moving.[22]

Jayanta says that the followers of Kaṇāda have the view, 'Quality does not possess another quality'.[23] This obviously refers to the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 1.1.15 which expresses the above-mentioned characteristic of a quality.

Jayanta refers to a number of Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* in his *Nyāyamañjarī*. Those are the following :

tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam (*VS* 1.1.3) *NM* (I), p. 356

pratyakṣapūrvakaṃ saṃjñākarma (cf. *VS*. 2.1.19 : *pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt saṃjñākarmaṇaḥ*), *NM* (I), p. 206

ātmendriyamano' rathasannikarṣād yad utpadyate jñānam tad anyat (*VS* 3.1.13), *NM* (I), p. 163

(*asyedam*) *kāryam kāraṇaṃ saṃyogi samavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam* (*VS* 9.18), *NM* (I), p. 173

aśvo 'yam viṣāṇitvāt (*VS* 3.1.12), *NM* (I), p. 279

agner ūrdhvajvalanam vāyos tiryaggamanam aṇumanasoś cādyam karmety adṛṣṭakāritāni (*VS* 5.2.14), *NM* (I), p. 319

samavāyinoḥ śvaityāc chvaityabuddheś ca śvete buddhis te kāryakāraṇa-bhūte (*VS* 8.9), *NM* (II), p. 35

bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne prakṛtiḥ (*VS* 4.2.5)), *NM* (II), p. 282

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Vide *NM* (I), p. 106
2. Vide *NM* (I), p
3. Vide *NM* (I), p. 9
4. Vide *NM* (I), p. 9
5. *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, p. 17
6. *NM* (I), p. 204
7. *NM* (II), p, 184
8. *NM* (II), p. 23
9. *NM* (I), p. 204
10. *PDS*, vide *Vyomavatī* (I), p. 130
11. *NM* (II), p. 3
12. *PDS*, Vide *Vyomavatī* (I), p. 52
13. *NM* (I), pp. 199-200
14. *NM* (I), p. 321
15. *PDS*, Vide *Vyomavatī* (I), p. 31
16. *NM* (II), p. 199
17. *navānām ātma* (*viśeṣa*) *guṇānāṃ nirmūlacchedo 'pavargaḥ*. *NM* (III), p. 1
18. Colour, taste, smell, touch, viscidity, natural liquidity, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, impression, and sound are the special qualities. *PDS*, vide *Vyomvatī* (II), p. 4
19. *NM* (III), p. 71-75
20. *NM* (I), p. 202
21. *PDS*, Vide *Vyomavatī* (I), p. 108
22. *NM* (I), pp. 195-96
23. *NM* (I), p. 323

BHĀSARVAJÑA AND THE VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY

We have already seen that the Kashmiri logician Jayanta Bhaṭṭa accepted only the philosophy of Gautama as Nyāya, though he admitted the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika philosophies as kindred sciences. He does not include the Vaiśeṣika in the Ṣaṭṭarkī, six groups of logicians. Moreover, according to him the Vaiśeṣika śāstra is only a follower of the Nyāya śāstra.

The works of other Kashmiri logicians, contemporary to Jayanta, have been lost. Though the *Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga* of Cakradhara and other Nyāya and Jaina logical works of a later period record the contribution of the Kashmiri teachers in logic, the specific evidences of the nature of their inclination towards the Vaiśeṣika śāstra are not extant in a considerable amount. Bhāsarvajña, the Naiyāyika of a later period is the founder of a new school of the Nyāya philosophy. He composed a work named *Nyāyasāra*. It deals with the definitions of the means of knowledge, different means of knowledge as well as many other related categories. Though it is a compiled treatise, due to its novelty of outlook and speciality of analysis the *Nyāyasāra* was honoured everywhere. Guṇaratna Sūri and Rājaśekhara Sūri knew eighteen commentaries on it. Among those the main is the auto-commentary named (1) *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*. Two subcommentaries are also heard of. One named *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa-bhūṣaṇa* by Vāsudeva Sūri is mentioned in the *Nyāyasāra-pada-pañjikā*, of the same author. Mention of the other is found in the *Nyāyaratnadyūtimālikā*. Some other commentaries on the *Nyāyasāra* are (2) *Nyāyasārapadapañjikā* by Vāsudeva, (3) *Nyāyatātparya-dīpikā* by Jayasiṃha Sūri, (4) *Nyāya-Muktāvalī* by Aparārkadeva, (5) *Nyāyakalānidhi* by Ānandānubhava, (6) *Nyāyasāravicāra* by Bhaṭṭa Rāghava, (7) *Nyāyasāraṭīkā* by Jayatīrtha, (8) *Nyāyasāraṭikā* by Vijayasiṃhagaṇi, (9) *Vyākhyāratna* by Vidyāsāgara, (10) *Śiśuhitaiṣiṇī* by Ratnapuribhaṭṭāraka and (11) the *Nyāya-nayāmbudhisopānopadhāna* by Rāmabhaṭṭa. The manuscripts of these works are preserved in different manuscript libraries. The first six have already been published.

The author Bhāsarvajña called his *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* as *Sadartha-saṃgraha* and *Saṃgrahavārttika*. With the main work and its commentary Bhāsarvajña started the medieval school of orthodox logic. He was more bitter than Jayanta on not giving any recognition to the Vaiśeṣikas. His pronounced view on the relation between the two systems (Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika) is that we want to explain the Nyāya position and we take the Nyāya as independent of the Vaiśeṣika; therefore there is no harm if our explanation, consistent with the Nyāya, goes against the Vaiśeṣika views. Bhāsarvajña was called sectarian (*ekadeśin*) by the orthodox Naiyāyikas. There was long-standing controversy between the orthodox Naiyāyikas and the followers of Bhāsarvajña. It is because of this that the school of Bhāsarvajña has been given an independent position between the classical and the neo schools of Indian logic, though it arose after Uddyotakara and subsided along with the orthodox one due to the disappearance of the Buddhist opponents.

References to the Vaiśeṣika sūtras in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* are not many in number. The sūtras referred to in the work are the following :

Anekadravyavattvena dravyatvam uktam (*VS* 1.2.12), quoted in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (p. 489).

Karma karmasādhyaṃ na vidyate (*VS* 1.1.11) quoted in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (p. 162).

To note the six marks *icchā* (desire) etc. to infer *jīvātman* Bhāsarvajña refers to the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10. In support of this sūtra he quotes a part of the Vaiśeṣika sūtra (1.1.6) enumerating the qualities—*buddhayaḥ sukha-duḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnāś ca guṇāḥ*.[1]

Many a time, the views of *Bhūṣaṇa*-writer do not follow the Vaiśeṣika tenets. According to him action is not a separate category, but is only the twenty-fifth variety of quality. To establish his view he formulates a different definition of the quality : a quality is something which has no touch but has generality and which is subsistent in substance.[2] He says that this definition is consistently applicable to the twenty-four qualities as well as action. In this case the mention of twenty-four qualities in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* is nothing but insinuation towards Praśastapāda.

Number according to Bhāsarvajña is the form of difference and non-difference. Oneness (*ekatva*) means non-difference and duality (*dvitva*) difference. The steps of origination and destruction of duality etc. which have been imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas, have been declared unjustified by Bhāsarvajña. It is clear that this objection is against Praśastapāda. The later Vaiśeṣika teacher Śrīvallabha, in his *Nyāyalīlāvatī* declares the position of Bhāsarvajña as shameful. He says that by ignoring the argument of the ancient teacher Uddyotakara, Bhāsarvajña exposes nothing but his own ignorance. Śrīvallabha cites a statement of Vācaspati, *saṃvid eva bhagavatī vastūpagme naḥ śaraṇam*[3], i.e. our consciousness is the supreme which is to be followed to know the proper nature of the categories. So according to Vācaspati and Śrīvallabha duality is perceived by all.

Separateness (*pṛthaktva*), according to *Bhūṣaṇa* is not a separate quality. Difference (*bhinnatva*) is the cause of our use 'this is separate'. So Praśastapāda's display of complex steps of origination and destruction of separateness should not be followed.[4]

Disjunction is not a separate quality but it is only the negation of conjunction. So to establish the separate existence of Disjunction, the arguments are illogical.[5]

Priority (*paratva*) and posteriority (*aparatva*) are not separate qualities.[6]

Velocity is not a separate quality. He says that the quick generation of the action is velocity.[7]

The Vaiśeṣikas admit viscidity (*sneha*) as the quality of water only. But Bhāsarvajña has an objection. He shows the example of Āyurveda and also follows the common behaviour in determining that clarified butter etc. also have viscidity.[8]

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, direction as well as time is the auxiliary cause of every type of effects. Bhāsarvajña is reluctant to admit it. According to him admittance of God as the auxiliary cause of all types of effects being knowledge or not-knowledge will be sufficient in this matter.[9]

The Vaiśeṣikas admit 'salvation without pleasure'. Bhāsarvajña, to the contrary, admits the permanent joy in salvation. According to him if anybody admits 'salvation without pleasure', the fainted state and salvation would be identical. Man hankers after

salvation but never after fainting. It is important to mention in this connection that the view of Bhāsarvajña regarding salvation also goes against the traditional Nyāya view. According to Praśastapāda, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, merit, demerit and impression (*bhāvanā*), are auxiliary causes.[10] But it is not logical according to Bhāsarvajña.[11]

The conjunction of two ubiquitous categories is not admissible because their separate existence cannot be accepted. It is the view of Praśastapāda.[12] But this is not acceptable to Bhāsarvajña.[13]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *vaiśeṣikapāṭhaprasiddhyā tu buddhiḥ ādir yeṣām iti draṣṭavyam. NBhuṣ*, p. 187
2. *asparśatve sāmānyavattve ca sati dravyāśritatvam.* Ibid, p. 158
3. *NVTT* (Cal), p. 506
4. Vide *NBhuṣ*, p. 160
5. Ibid., p. 161
6. Ibid., p. 162
7. Ibid., p. 162
8. Ibid., p. 164
9. Ibid., pp. 590-91
10. *PDS*, p. 216
11. *NBhuṣ*, p. 492
12. *vibhūnāṃ tu parasparataḥ saṃyogo nāsti, yutasiddhyabhāvāt. PDS*, vide *NK* (BORI), p. 366
13. *NBhuṣ*, p. 170

VĀCASPATIMIŚRA'S *TĀTPARYAṬĪKĀ* AND THE VAIŚEṢIKA SYSTEM

The *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyaṭīkā* or briefly *Tātparyatīkā* is the commentary on the *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara and the latter is the commentary on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin. All these commentaries are of the Nyāya system of philosophy. Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* has discussed the Vaiśeṣika tenets and referred to the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*, in as many places as he could. Vācaspati, being a commentator of that *Nyāyavārttika*, naturally had the scope of explaining those, and he explained in an illuminous way.

It is well-known that Vācaspati was an independent writer on all the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy[1] and his commentaries and independent treatises on all these systems are available, but the significant exception is the Vaiśeṣika. No commentary, nor any tract, on this system is known to have been written by him. But this does not show any apathy of this author to the Vaiśeṣika system as he is found to quote Vaiśeṣika sūtras and Vaiśeṣika tenets apart from those quoted by Uddyotakara to support his views in his works specially in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*.

Generally Vācaspati refers to the views of Kaṇāda or his followers with the epithet Vaiśeṣika.[2] The word Aulukya has twice been used.[3] The Vaiśeṣika has again been called Pailukaṇṭha,[4] which is an alternative form of Pailuka. Dharmottra uses the term Pailuka, for the disciple of Kaṇāda.[5] Vācaspati refers to the views of Vaiśeṣika and the śāstra, as Āulukyamatam and the Vaiśeṣikatantra.[6]

On one occasion[7] Vāsaspati is found to remark that the study of the Vaiśeṣika tantra alone does not make one a Vaiśeṣika. If one adept in this system is found to accept any tenet that goes against the Vaiśeṣika view, he is not to be called a Vaiśeṣika because he does not take this śāstra as authoritative.

Like the ancient Vaiśeṣikas Vācaspati also counts the six categories, but primarily being a Naiyāyika he cannot ignore *abhāva* (negation) which received distinct treatment in the hand of his predecessors, Vātsyāyna and Uddyotakara.

Vācaspati seems to accept the division of entities into *dṛṣṭa*, philosophically explained and *adṛṣṭa*, not so explained. He was very naturally not fond of referring to the latter when the former could serve the purpose.

He explains origin of an entity as inherence in its cause (*svakāraṇa-samavāya*) or the inherence of generality in itself.[8]

While explaining the expression *anekadharmopapatteḥ* in the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.23 defining doubt, Uddyotakara quotes some sectarian scholars who expounded *anekadharma* in a twofold way *anekasya anekaś ca dharmaḥ*.[9] By way of illustration this scholar is said to cite the instance of *saṃyogajatva*, being produced from contact, as a common attribute to substance, quality and action. Again as an instance of many attributes inhering in one entity he cites the case of sound in which being produced from contact, having no quality nor action and being momentary in character—all inhere. Vācaspati explains this portion

in detail.[10] This illustrations come from the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* (1.1.8) *sad antiyam dravyavat kāryam kāraṇam sāmānya-viśeṣavat iti dravya-guṇa-karmaṇām aviśeṣaḥ*, in this connection. The Vaiśeṣika does not accept conjunction between limitless substances, and the theory is known as *ajasaṃyogābhāva-vāda*. This says Vācaspati, in the Vaiśeṣika views *ākāśa*, time, direction and the soul co-exist, but have no mutual conjunction.[11] Conjunction is possible when either or both of the components have limits. In this connection Vācaspati further refers to the peculiar character of generality which co-exists with everything but inheres only in a limited number of entities. Thus in a substratum where an individual is born, both generality and inherence do exist though they have neither conjunction nor inherence with the substratum. Birth is here defined as limitation by generality and inherence.

Earlier Vācaspati is found to give the view of the opponent the Buddhist) who does not accept generality as a category. The opponent enquires—where does generality exist? Is it in the individuals alone or everywhere? If everywhere, every individual should be called a cow for cowness is present in cows as well as non-cows. If again cowness is present only in a few individuals, the Vaiśeṣika will have to explain how and from where does cowness come to it. It was not there before the birth of the individual cow. Nor does it come from another cow. In the latter case action should inhere in generality also which the Vaiśeṣika cannot accept. Again if the calf inherits cowness from its mother, the mother ceases to be a cow. This would be an absurd position. As generality is held to be eternal it cannot be born at the birth of the calf. It will be an uncommon situation indeed if the cowness in the calf is born and still it is held as eternal as the Vaiśeṣika does.[12] The objection is clearly from Dharmakīrti.[13]

The destruction of an effect according to the Vaiśeṣika is due to the destruction of the material cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). Thus the destruction of one or more limbs in a body means the destruction of the body. What remains is the partial body (*khaṇḍa-deha*) which is different from the original. Again the destruction of the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*) also brings about the destruction of the effect. When the mutual conjunctions of the different limbs in the body give way, the effect i.e. the body cannot remain intact. But Vācaspati has cited a case of the destruction of an effect from that of the auxiliary cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*). In the destruction of numbers like duality (*dvitva*) etc. the destruction of *apekṣābuddhi* is the cause.[14] This has been reproduced in the *Nyāyakaṇikā* also.[15] Śrīdhara cites a separate instance. It is the destruction of the final true knowledge at salvation by the destruction of the body.[16]

As regards the destruction of the qualities Vācaspati has to add that the advent of an opposite quality in the substratum, the destruction of the substratum itself or of the non-inherent cause also destroy qualities. In some cases this destruction is effected by that of the auxiliary cause.

Vācaspati is found to oppose the non-acceptance of qualities like priority and posteriority arising out of the notion of addition (*apekṣā-buddhi*) on the ground that they are of immense importance in our mundane affairs.[17]

Besides the Vaiśeṣika sūtras to which we shall refer hereafter, Vācaspati has quoted the aphoristic sentence *jātaḥ sambandhaś ca ityekaḥ kālaḥ*[18] presumably from some ancient Vaiśeṣika work. This looks like *niṣṭhāsambandhayor ekakālatvāt* which has been attributed to the lost Vaiśeṣika work *Vākya*, by Siṃhasūri.[19] The view here is that the origination of

an effect and the conjunction of the generality with that effect at one time, not that at the first moment the effect originates and at the next moment the generality connects.

Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* has been quoted as an authority in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*.[20] Here Praśastapāda has been designated as Padārthavit i.e. one conversant with the Vaiśeṣika categories. The quotation gives the definition of pleasure as is found in the *Padarthadharmasaṃgraha*.[21] Again, Vācaspati quotes the definition of time (*kāla*) from the same work.[22] Uddyotakara refers to *parāparādipratyaya* in connection with his explanation of the Nyāyasūtra 2.1.39. This refers to the Vaiśeṣika sūtra 2.2.6 Vācaspati does not touch this sūtra but prefers to explain the corresponding proposition in Praśastapāda's work. It runs as *Kālaḥ parāpara-vyatikara-yaugapadya-cirakṣipra-pratyayaliṅgam*. Without quoting it Vācaspati first explains *parāparāpratyaya* referred to by Uddyotakara. He then refers to the other items mentioned by Praśastapāda—*evam yaugapadyāyaugapadya-cirakṣipra-pratyayā api kālaliṅgam*.

In connection with the explanation of aversion (*dveṣa*), Vācaspati seems to have referred to the same work. His *dveṣah krodho manyur ity anarthāntaram, prajvalanātmako hi sa bhavati*[23] can be compared with *prajvalanātmako dveṣaḥ, krodho droho manyur akṣamā 'marṣa iti dveṣabhedaḥ* of *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.[24]

Uddyotakara refers to the Vaiśeṣika view in *nirapekṣaṃ gurutvaṃ karma-kāraṇam iti hi śāstram*.[25] He explains that *nirapekṣa* never means 'independent of everything' because in the case of weight it does not suit. It should be that weight does not depend on any final cause.[26] Vācaspati brings out the significance of the expression *nirapekṣa*. He says, in order to produce a fall, weight no doubt depends upon its material cause—the substance. But it requires no further help from any additional and positive auxiliary cause.

The Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* (1.1.7) *sad anityam dravyavat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti dravya-guṇa-karmanām aviśeṣaḥ* has first been hinted at in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*.[27] The *Nyāyavārttika* refers to it in 1.1.23. Vācaspati quotes it in full.

In the Vaiśeṣika sūtra (1.1.12) *ubhayathā guṇāḥ*, Kaṇāda seeks to show that a quality destroys its cause as well as its effect. His commentaries present sound as an instance. They say one sound produced at a substratum produces similar sounds around it and each new sound in its turn will produce others around itself. The process will go on till the last sound in each series is destroyed. The Vaiśeṣika holds that the succeeding sound destroys the preceding one in the same series. Here Vācaspati adds that the last sound in each series produces no further sound. It destroys its predecessor and is itself destroyed by it. Thus the last and last but one sound destroy each other. About the rest there is no fixed rule.[28] Udayana in his *Tātparyapariśuddhi* adds in this connection that the last sound has neither the capacity to produce another sound nor does it receive any external aid. Hence it is impotent.[29]

The Vaiśeṣika definitions of *karma* and *guṇa* as given in the sūtras 1.1.15 and 16 maintain that both are devoid of qualities. This has been referred to in *nirguṇatvam guṇakarmaṇoḥ*.[30] It may also refer to *guṇādīnām pañcānām api nirguṇatvaniṣkriyatve* of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.[31] Here Vācaspati in the Vaiśeṣika fashion adds that momentariness is found in common in substance, quality and action.[32]

The *Tātparyaṭīkā* on 1.1.23 refers to the expression *viśeṣāpratyakṣāt* in some Vaiśeṣika

definition. This evidently refers to the definition of doubt in the Vaiśeṣikadarśana—*sāmānyapratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣasmṛteś ca saṃśayaḥ* (2.2.19)

While explaining the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5, Vācaspati incidentally remarks *dvividham eva hi dravyam—adravyam anekadravyaṃ ca. Adravyam paramāṇvādi anekadravyaṃ ca ghaṭādi.* This seems to be a quotation from some earlier Vaiśeṣika work. Vyomaśiva quotes a *vacana* presumably of an earlier authority to the same effect.[33] The *Nyāyamañjarī* also refers to *adravya* and *anekadravya* substances.[34] Similarly Vādirāja in his *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* refers to the same : *adravyam dravyam anekadravyaṃ ca dravyam.*[35] However, the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* refer to *adravya* (2.1.11, 13 & 4.1.7) and *anekadravya* (4.1.6 & 4.1.9). Candrānanda in his *Vṛtti* on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 2.1.11 quotes *dravyam hy adravyam anekadravyam ca* and illustrates the same in *dravyaṃ hi adravyaṃ paramāṇvādi, anekadravyaṃ ca ghaṭādi.*

Vācaspati follows Uddyotakara when he reads the Vaiśeṣikasūtra (2.2.34) *kāraṇato vikārāt.* Abhayatilaka and Candrānanda follow this reading whereas Śaṅkaramiśra is found to have divided it into two *sūtras*.[36]

In the above connection Uddyotakara writes *kāraṇato vikārāt ity evam ādeḥ*. Here Vācaspati discloses the significance of the expression *ādi* in *ādiśabdena ca sataḥ śabdasya abhivyaktau doṣāt ity evam ādayo grāhyaḥ.* Here *abhivyaktau doṣāt* is the Vaiśeṣika sūtra (2.2.35). Vādīndra omits *abhivyaktau*. The edited text of Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* also shows the sūtra being *doṣāt* only and *abhivyaktau tu* as part of the *Vṛtti*. But Śaṅkaramiśra[37] here preserves the reading of Vācaspati.

Vācaspati[38] refers to a very wide-spread philosophical tenet accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas and some non-Vaiśeṣikas alike when he says that sound is the specific attribute to *ākāśa*. The same view is there in the *Niruktapariśiṣṭa*[39] as well as in the *Raghuvaṃśa*[40] of Kālidāsa. Vācaspati adds that the ear is actually a portion of *ākāśa* inside the ear cavity. Here he gives the current Vaiśeṣika view.[41]

The Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* (2.2.36) *saṃyogād vighāgāc chabdāc ca śabdaniṣpatteḥ* counts the three sources of sound, viz. conjunction, disjunction and sound. Here Vācaspati adds that the first sound in the series alone can be produced by conjunction and disjunction.[42] He implies thereby that the subsequent sounds in the series are all produced from sound. Again he adds that sound spreads in all the directions and some sound in the series is produced in the ear cavity which is nothing but *ākāśa*.[43] It is transient and during its short existence it inheres in that *ākāśa*.

Śaṅkaramiśra enumerates three kinds of contradictory (*virodhi*) signs which had to include inference in (i) *virodhy abhūtaṃ bhūtasya* (3.1.11), (ii) *bhūtam abhūtasya* (3.1.12) and (iii) *bhūto bhūtasya* (3.1.13). Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra is found to have added a fourth—*abhūtam abhūtasya* and this addition is justified by Candrānanda by counting all the four and incidentally preserves brief comments on each from some earlier commentary. The *Tātparyaṭīkā* also mentions all the four with some elucidation.[44]

In the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 4.1.1, the readings vary in the different recensions. Śaṅkaramiśra and Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra read *sad akāraṇavan nityam.* It is supported by the *Hetubinduṭīkā, Śāṅkarabhāṣya, Āptaparīkṣā, Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa, Sanmatiṭīkā, Patraparīkṣā, Dharmottarapradīpa, Tarkarahasyadīpikā* and *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī.*[45] One

manuscript of Candrānanada's *Vṛtti* accepts this reading while the other gives *sad akāraṇavat tan nityam.*[46] Vācaspati refers to this *sūtra* in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* (Cal ed., p. 915) and reads *sad akāraṇam nityam*. He again refers to it in 4.1.21 (*sad akāraṇatayā*). But he does not seem to give the exact reading in either case.

The Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4 mentions contact between the sense-organ and its object as a condition of perception (*indriyārtha-sannikaraṣotpannam*). Vātsyāyana finds the definition inadequate though it gives the most significant condition of sense-perception.[47] Uddyotakara here counts the remaining conditions. They are soul-mind contact, mind-sense-object contact, object-light contact, colour in the object, colour in the eye as well as in the light itself, big size in the object (*mahattva*), its being composed of many components (*anekadravyavattva*) and having manifestness in its colour.[48] Here the last three conditions come from the Vaiśeṣikasūtra 4.1.6. Vācaspati adds that either of the expressions *mahattva* or *anekadravyavattva* will suffice and both are not required. For having parts composed of many units is possible in the case of a big object. No dyad (*dvaṇuka*) nor atom (*aṇu*) has parts each of which is composed of many units. Hence one expression is required and the other necessarily follows. The eye-ball of the cogniser made of *tejas*-particles have all the conditions except manifest colour. Still it is not visible to him. Hence having manifest colour and touch is an indispensable condition in occular perception.[49] Vācaspati refers to this Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* (4.1.6) in *Tātparyaṭīkā* 4.1.11 : *nanu bhavatu śarīram pṛthivyādi vyaktam mahattvāneka-dravyavattva-rūpa-viśeṣebhyaḥ*. We find him quoting the *sūtra* in full in *Tātparyaṭīkā* 1.1.5. Perception of action also has been described there. Here Vācaspati must had in his mind the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 4.1.12 *saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpidravya-samavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi*.

A reference to *pratyakṣāpratyakṣāṇām apratyakṣatvāt saṃyogasya pañcātmakatvaṃ na vidyate* (*VS* 4.2.1) is made when Vācaspati says *pratyakṣāpratyakṣavṛtter vāyuvanaspatisaṃyogavad apratyakṣatva-prasaṅgād dehasya* in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* 1.1.11. The same Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* is again hinted at in *na ca pratyakṣāpratyakṣavṛttiḥ sambandhaḥ pratyakṣaḥ*.[50]

Uddyotakara refers to the Vaiśeṣika sūtra 5.2.3, *apāṃ saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam,* in *vidhārake vāyvabhrasaṃyoge sati gurutva-pratibandha apāṃ pātaḥ pratiṣiddhaḥ* in *Nyāyavārttika* 2.2.1. Vācaspati explains this in *apāṃ pātapratyanīkasya apātasya grahaṇāt tadvirodhinaḥ pātavirodhino vāyvabhrasaṃyogasya grahaṇaṃ tadidaṃ kilābhāvākhyam pramāṇam pramīyate hi meghodaye'pi toyapātābhāvena vāyvabhrasaṃyoga iti*.

The Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 7.2.31 in Candrānanda's text stands as *tattvaṃ ceti*. Śaṅkaramiśra reads it as *tattvam bhāvena vyākhyātam*.[51] Vācaspati explains it in *tattvam ekatvaṃ samavāyasya bhāvena sattayā*.[52]

As regards the reading of the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 9.18 authorities differ. Śaṅkaramiśra along with Śrīdhara reads (a) *asyedam* (b) *kāryam kāraṇam* (c) *saṃyogi* (d) *virodhi* (e) *samavāyi ceti laiṅgikam*. Here (a) *asyedam* is omitted by Jayantabhaṭṭa.[53] Pārthasārathimiśra changes the order and reads *kāraṇam kāryam*. *Saṃyogi* is changed into *sambandhi* by Candrānanda, Pārthasārathi and Vācaspati. *Virodhi* is replaced by *ekārtha-samavāyi* in Candrānanda, Pārthasārathi and Vācaspati's readings and by *samavāyi*

in the *Nyāyakumudacandra, Nyāyakusumāñjalibodhanī, Vyomavatī, Tarkarahasyadīpikā, Prakaraṇapañjikā, Nyāyamañjarī,* and *Nyāyāvatāraṭīkās* of Siddharṣi and Devabhadra *Samavāyi* is changed into *virodhi* in the *Nyāyakumudacandra, Nyāyakusumāñjalibodhanī, Vyomavatī, Śāstradīpikā, Prakaraṇapañjikā, Tātparyaṭīkā, Nyāyamañjarī, and the Nyāyāvatāraṭīkās* of Siddharṣi and Devabhadra.

This shows that Udayana's readings support Śaṅkaramiśra, while Vācaspati supports Candrānanda's reading. Pārthasārathi slightly differs from Vācaspati in changing the order in *kāryaṃ kāraṇam*. Śālikanātha also is in agreement with Vācaspati except in the change of *saṃyogi* for *sambandhi*. Most of the changes are due to an admixture of two *sūtras* viz, *saṃyogi samavāyi ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ca* (*VS* 3.1.9) and *asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sambandhi virodhi ekārthasamavāyi ceti laiṅgikam* (9.18). Candrānanda explains *sambandhi* as *saṃyogi* and thus seems to have shown that Śaṅkaramiśra preserves the correct sūtra tradition here.

Vācaspati adds an interesting discussion on the sūtra in question. According to him the Vaiśeṣika definition of invariable concomitance as given here is open to objection. The Vaiśeṣikas of his time accepted four marks only whereas the *sūtra* counts five, viz. (i) *kārya*, (ii) *kāraṇa*, (iii) *sambandhi*, (iv) *ekārthasamavāyi*, (v) *virodhi*. Of these the third one viz., *sambandhi* alone counts as they are covered by it. It cannot be said, adds Vācaspati, that the mention of the additional marks is justified in as much as they restrict the unwarranted stretch (*atiprasakti*) of the term *sambandhi*. In that case the form additional marks should constitute the definition and the mark *sambandhi* with a wider connotation could be spared. It is not clear how and when the theory of fourfold mark was accepted in the Vaiśeṣika school. The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda took *asyedam* alone as the definition and all the other marks mentioned in the sūtra were taken as illustrative.

We have seen before that Vācaspati knew Praśastapāda and quotes him. It is again difficult to say why this difference and why Vācaspati kept silent on Praśastapāda's contention.

In *aśvo 'yam viṣāṇitvāt* Vācaspati seems to refer to the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* (3.1.12) *viṣāṇī tasmād aśvaḥ*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Nyāyakaṇikā*—a Mīmāṃsā work, *Tattvasamāsa*—a Vedanta work; *Tattvabindu*—a Mīmāṃsā work; *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*—a critical edition of the Nyāya sūtras; *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyaṭīkā*—a Nyāya work; *Tattvakaumudī*—a Sāṃkhya work; *Tattvavaiśāradī*—a Yoga work; *Bhāmatī*—a Vedānta work.
2. Vide *NVTT*, pp. 134, 159, 217, 283, 417, 526, 675
3. Vide *NVTT*, pp. 287, 520
4. Vide *NVTT*, p. 462
5. *pailukena kaṇādaśiṣyeṇa. NB-Ṭīkā*, p. 332
6. Vide *NVTT*, pp. 520, 232
7. Vide *NVTT*, p. 232
8. Vide *NVTT*, p. 398
9. Vide *NV*, p. 87
10. Vide *NVTT*, p. 208

11. Vide *NVTT*, p. 353
12. *NVTT*, p. 353
13. cf. *PV*, Svārthānumāna 152-155.
14. *NVTT*, p. 416
15. Vide *Nyāyakaṇikā*, p. 334
16. *dṛṣṭo guṇānāṃ nimittakāraṇavināśād api vināśo yathā mokṣaprāptyavasthāyām antyatattvajñānasya śarīravināśāt. NK*, p. 118
17. *NVTT*, pp. 356-9
18. *NVTT*, p. 339
19. *DANC*, p. 508
20. Vide *NVTT*, p. 100
21. *PDS*, p. 603
22. *NVTT*, p. 357, cf. PDS, p. 164
23. *NVTT*, p. 202
24. *PDS*, p. 606
25. *NV*, p. 273
26. *NV*, p. 273
27. *NBh*, p. 237
28. *NVTT*, p. 399
29. *ārambham prati svarūpaśaktisahakāriśakti-vaidhūryam antaḥ tadbhavo 'ntyaḥ svarūpaśakti-sahakāriśakti-virahavān ity arthaḥ. NVTP*, p. 397
30. *NVTT*, p. 208
31. *PDS*, p. 56
32. *NVTT*, p. 208
33. *tathā adravyaṃ dravyam anekadravyaṃ ca dravyam iti vacanavyāghātaḥ. tathā hi na vidyate janyaṃ janakaṃ ca dravyam ity adravyam paramāṇūnāṃ janakaṃ nāsti, ākāśādīnāṃ janyaṃ nāpi janakam ity adravyam nitya-dravyam iti yāvat. anekadravyaṃ tu anekadravyam janakam asya ityanena svarūpeṇa. dvividham eve dravyam adravyaṃ nityam, anekadravyajanyam kāryam iti. Vyomavatī* (I) p. 74
34. *adravyam vā bhavati dravyam. ākāśa-paramāṇvādi. Anekadravyaṃ vā dvyaṇukādi kāryadravyam. NM* (I), p. 321
35. *NVV*, p. 367.
36. *anityaś cā 'yam kāraṇataḥ, na cā 'siddham vikārāt* (2.2.28-9). It may be added here that *anityaś cā 'yam* and *na cā 'siddham* have come down from some earlier *Vṛtti* in Śaṅkara's version.
37. *Upaskāra* : *VS* 2.2.30
38. Vide *NVTT*, pp. 208, 213, 237, 495, passim
39. *Nirukta* (Ed. Mansukhraya More, Cal, 1953), 4th vol., p. 1177
40. *Raghuvaṃśa* XIII. 1
41. Vide *NVTT*, p. 186
42. *ādyasyaiva śabdasya saṃyoga-vibhāgayonityam. NVTT*, p.
43. *santānena śrotre samutpādaḥ sambhavaḥ. NVTT*, p.
44. Vide *NVTT*, pp. 134-5
45. *Hetubinduṭīkā* (GOS), p. 77, 144; *Āptaparīkṣā*, p. 4; *NVV* (I), p. 413; *Sanmatiṭīkā*, pp. 647, 656, 731; *Patraparīkṣā*, p. 4; *Dharmottarapradīpa*, p. 269; *NAA*, p. 523.
46. *Vaiśeṣikasūtram* (GOS), p. 32
47. cf. *nedaṃ kāraṇāvadhāraṇam etāvat pratykṣe kāraṇam iti. NBh* 1.1.4
48. *NV* p. 29
49. *NVTT*, p. 90
50. *NVTT* (Cal), p. 41
51. *NV*, p. 49
52. *NVTT*, p. 153
53. *NM* (I), p. 173

VAIŚEṢIKA ELEMENTS IN UDAYANA'S *NYĀYA-VĀRTTIKA-TĀTPARYA-PARIŚUDDHI*

The versatile Naiyāyika ācārya of Mithila, Udayana commented upon the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* and this Vaiśeṣika commentary entitled *Kiraṇāvalī* became the fulcrum of the Vaiśeṣika study in Mithila after his time. However, a little later, the significant joining of Śrīvallabha's *Nyāyalīlāvatī* created a high tide in the same. Anyway, the Vaiśeṣika discussion in a Nyāya work like Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* draws our special attention because of the author's attaching special importance to the Vaiśeṣikas to explain the Nyāya position. He tried to strengthen his own with the help of the Vaiśeṣika metaphysical doctrines and arguments for them. But quite surprisingly Vaiśeṣika discussion is remarkably less in Udayana's *Pariśudhi*, an indirect commentary on the very *Nyāyavārttika*. Only a few Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* are found to have been quoted in the work and they are :

athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ (*VS* 1.1.1)[1]

bhā'bhāvas tamaḥ (*VS* 5.2.19)[2]

sāmānyavān aguṇaḥ etc. (*VS* 1.1.16)[3]

asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇam.[4] (Fragment of the full *VS* 9.18.)

The case of 'disjunction produced by disjunction' has been explained according to the Vaiśeṣikas. It is the excellence of Udayana that the meaning as had appeared from that was not acceptable to him and that is why he suggested a justifiable meaning.[5] The portion regarding disjunction discussed in pages 272-4 is notably similar to the corresponding portion of the *Kiraṇāvalī* (BI, pp. 493-96).

In the *Pariśuddhi* under *NS* 2.1.39 dealing with the examination of the present time, Udayana just refers to the Vaiśeṣika śāstra for one who wants to establish the priority (*paratva*) and posteriority (*aparatva*) relating to time.[6] The topic has further been brought into consideration in the *Pariśuddhi* under *NS* 4.1.40.

Udayana exposes the implication of a Vācaspati passage by asserting that Vācaspati was quite intelligent to understand that though there appears a conflict between a *Bhāṣya* statement regarding the cessation of the ultimate sound and the corresponding Vaiśeṣika doctrine, by this the Nyāya position is not hampered.[7] The *Bhāṣya* asserts : *pratighāti-dravya-saṃyogas tvantyasya śabdasya nirodhakaḥ.*[8] It would apparently mean that the final sound would cease after coming into contact with a solid obstructive substance. But this would contradict the Vaiśeṣika theory because the cessation of the sound, according to it, can be nothing but the penultimate sound only. That is why Vācaspati explained the *Bhāṣya* statement in a rather innovative way : *Pratighāti-dravya* means wall etc. and its connection (*saṃyoga*) means the *ākāśa*. Then it means that the *ākāśa* in connection with a solid obstructive substance cannot be the inherent cause of sound. If, for the sake of argument it is even admitted non-inherent cause sound (i.e. pen-ultimate sound) cannot create another sound, so the final sound ceases due to its own cause. Thus the Vaiśeṣika theory is not contradicted by the *Bhāṣya* statement. Udayana refers to the Vaiśeṣikas who hold that the emergence of a posterior conjunction occurs due to the destruction of the prior one.

Udayana's view of salvation as the absolute negation of sorrows is clearly revealed.[9] And we know this type of salvation was primarily admitted by Kaṇāda. And that Gautama did not accept it is clear from a verse cited by Udayana :

varaṃ vṛndāvane 'raṇye kroṣṭṛtvam abhivāñchitum/
na tu vaiseṣikīm muktiṃ gautamo gantum icchati//

I shall rather wish to be a jackal in the forest of Vṛndāvana, but Gautama can never wish the salvation propounded by the Vaiśeṣikas.

Under *NS* 3.1.30, the *Pariśuddhi* discusses in detail the atoms, dyads and triads and their role to create gross elements. Some among them are : the substance with smell can be created by atoms with smell only. Similarly, the substance with taste by the atoms with taste only, and so on. The substance without smell by smell-less atoms only. And so on.

If many dyads create a gross element, the dimension of the cause and effect would be similar. That is, the effect would also be atomic. The fibres (of the thread) cannot produce a cloth. Those can produce only a thread. Hence a cause of a cause cannot be admitted as a cause at all to an effect of an effect. So the dyads produce a triad and each of the former is produced by two atoms.

Udayana shows a number of syllogistic arguments to prove the origin of the gross elements with smell from the atoms with smell only, and similar others, e.g.

1. *vivādādhyāsitaṃ dvyaṇukaṃ gandhavadbhyāmeva paramāṇubhyām ārabhyate gandhavattvāt, ubhayavādisiddha-parthivadvyaṇukavat.*

2. *vivādādhyāsitāḥ paramāṇavo gandhavanty eva dravyāṇi ārabhante gandhavattvāt pārthivadvyaṇukārambhaka-paramāṇuvat*, etc.

This form of syllogistic argument is also found in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* (p. 223) of Vācaspati: *vivādādhyāsitam upalabdhimat-kāraṇam utpattimattvād vastrādivat*. It is interesting to note that Vādivāgīśvara followed exactly the same technique to establish different categories throughout his *Mānamanohara*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Pariśuddhi*, p. 18
2. Ibid., pp. 68, 429
3. Ibid., p. 322
4. Ibid., p. 187
5. Ibid., p. 273 under *NS* 1.1.23
6. Ibid., p. 371

7, 8. Ibid., p. 408, cf. *NVTT*, p. 414

9. Ibid., p. 28

VAIŚEṢIKA ELEMENTS IN VARDHAMĀNA'S WORKS

Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, the worthy son of the celebrated Maithila Naiyāyika Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya has excelled in writing commentaries on different Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika works. The name of his commentaries is *Prakāśa* or *Upāya*. For certain, he did not comment upon his father's *magnum opus Tattvacintāmaṇi*. But in his different works, he quoted numerous passages from that. And in this way he established his father's views on different topics of Indian philosophy.

Anyway, Vardhamāna wrote nine commentaries on Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta works. They are as follows :

1. *Anvīkṣānaya-tattvabodha*, a commentary on Chapter V of the *sūtras* of Gautama.

2. *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, a detailed commentary on the *Tātparya-pariśuddhi* of Udayanācārya. The latter, in its own turn is a commentary on the *Tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati I which is further a commentary on the celebrated *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara. The *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa* is available only in manuscript which we luckily could consult.

3. *Nyāyapariśiṣṭaprakāśa*, a commentary on the *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa* of Udayana which is its own turn is a commentary on Chapter V of the *sūtras* of Gautama.

4. *Kusumāñjaliprakāśa*, a commentary on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana.

5. *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*, a commentary on the *Kiraṇāvalī* of the same author.

6. *Līlāvatīprakāśa*, a commentary on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Śrīvallabhācārya.

7. *Khaṇḍanaprakāśa*, a commentary on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* of the *Vedānta* scholar Śrīharṣa. Only a portion of this commentary is available in manuscript.

8. *Bauddhādhikāraprakāśa*, which has not yet been discovered in manuscript. Padmanābha refers to the sub-commentary on the *Bauddhādhikāraprakāśa* of Vardhamāna by Balabhadra in his *Setu.*[1]

9. *Tarkaprakāśa* on Keśavamiśra's *Tarkabhāṣā*. It is said to have been preserved along with a sub-commentary at Ulwar.[2]

Vardhamāna was a follower of Udayana. Apart from *Lakṣaṇamālā* and *Lakṣaṇāvalī* all other works of Udayana have been commented upon by him. As we are concerned here with the Vaiśeṣika works we see that he wrote two full-fledged commentaries, (i) the *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* and (ii) *Līlāvatīprakāśa*. In these commentaries Vardhamāna has provided much help to us to unveil some mysteries of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika history.

1. In *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* he mentions the name of *Kandalīkāra* i.e. Śrīdhara, the great Vaiśeṣika scholar from Bengal who has been refuted by Udayana.[3]

2. Udayana in the *Kiraṇāvalī*[4] while explaining the argument establishing 'Time' as a separate entity quotes the following passage—*na cātmākāśau tathā bhavitum arhato viśeṣaguṇavattvāt pṛthivyādivad ityācāryaḥ*. Here *ācāryaḥ* may well be taken for Vācaspati who writes *api cākāśātmānau na parāparavyatikarakāraṇam asādhāraṇa-guṇa-yogitvāt pṛthivyādivat.*[5] But curiously enough Vardhamāna in his gloss here definitely identified this Ācārya with Vyomaśivācārya and not Vācaspati.

3. Vardhamāna has come out to declare a passage of the *Kiraṇāvalī* to have been the

refutation of Śālikanātha.[6] The passage is *kecit tu saṃsargidravyatayā niḥsarad eva nāyanaṃ tejo bāhyālokena ekatāṃ gatam yugapad eva tāvad arthena saṃsṛṣṭam indriyam utpāditavad iti śākhā-candramasos tulyakālagrahaṇam upapadyata iti samādhānam āhuḥ.* The passage is very important as it points to the interesting fact hitherto unknown, that Śālikanātha commented upon the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. This is clearly stated by Cinnambhaṭṭa in the *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā*[7] where another passage is cited :

mṛtpiṇḍa-pāṣāṇādi-lakṣaṇaḥ śarīrendriya-vyatirikto viṣaya iti śālikanāthaḥ praśastapādabhāṣyavyākhyāne nyarūpayat.

The *Rasasāra*[8] (actual title of the work is *Haraprasāda-kiraṇāvalīdarpaṇaka*) also quotes Śālikanātha in connection with the explanation of error. Anyway, the name of Śālika's commentary on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* appears to be *Vallabhā* which has been mentioned by Aparārkadeva in his commentary on the *Nyāyasāra*.[9]

4. Vardhamāna's quotation from Śivāditya in the *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha* under *NS* 5.1.37 seems to be an implication of the latter's writing of a separate commentary on the fifth chapter of Gautama.[10]

5. An useful indication on the Vaiśeṣika history, as supposed by Prof. Bhattacharya,[11] has been made by Vardhamāna in his *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*.[12] The scholars mentioned as *eke* and *anye* in the work have been identified by Pragalbhācārya as Prabhākara and Divākara respectively. Divākara, therefore commented on the *Kiraṇāvalī* before Vardhamāna as did another rival scholar of Mithila named Prabhākara. But unfortunately their works have not come down to us. That Divākara wrote a commentary on the *Kiraṇāvalī* is known to us from his own statement in the manuscript of the only extant work of his named *Nyāyanibandhoddyota* also. The *Nyāyanibandha*, as we already know is the name of the *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyapariśuddhi* of Udayana. Apart from the above works, *Vilāsa* or Vilāsakāra have been mentioned in a few other works also.[13]

6. Prabhākaropādhyāya, as supposed by Prof. Bhattacharya[14], commented upon the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Śrīvallabha, also. A number of passages cited by Vardhamāna in his *Līlāvatīprakāśa* are, according to Pakṣadhara, from Prabhākaropādhyāya. Unfortunately enough, none of the works of Prabhākara has come down to us in manuscripts.

The above is the valuable discovery regarding the Vaiśeṣika history from Vardhamāna's works. His knowledge of the Vaiśeṣika theories also is elaborate. We are noting some of them below.

Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa : Though sometimes we come across some lengthy passages in the commentary, in most cases it is written in word-note style. There is an expression 'asyārtha' in Pariśuddhi of Udayana. This expression which has been used by Vācaspati literally means 'its meaning'. Vardhamāna explains that it means the view of the Vaiśeṣika[15] In the same context he makes another point clear that action does not depend on disjunction to produce the later conjunction, but it depends on the destruction of the prior conjunction which is an obstruction. And to produce the later conjunction, the disjunction is a superfluity (*anyathā-siddha*).[16] Some notable points are : There are some disjunctions, that are contradictory to the productive conjunction and also there are some which are not so.[17] In the same place discussion of disjunction and 'disjunctions produced by disjunction' has been done at a considerable length. All the above have been discussed under the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.23.

It has been a matter of contention whether the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* of Praśastapāda is a *Bhāṣya*. We, however, see it to have been called *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. Vardhamāna is here found to have justified the *Bhāṣya*-characteristic of the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha*.[18] He says : keeping the sūtras in mind and then without maintaining the serial order of the words in the sūtras their explanation may also be called a *Bhāṣya*. Hence, following the above view, the Vaiśeṣika work of Praśastapāda is entitled to gain the title—*Bhāṣya*. Vardhamāna gives an alternative explanation also. If an explanation of the sūtras is prepared without taking help from any other explanation, it may be called a *Bhāṣya*. But if the same is made with the help of another explanation, it is called a *Vṛtti*.

The Vaiśeṣika view that sound in conjunction with a dense solid obstructive substance dies away has been referred by Vardhamāna.[19]

In the view of Kaṇāda also, the knowledge of a generality is guided by the individual factors.[20]

Kaṇāda enumerates seventeen qualities and the rest seven have to be collected by the implication of the particle *ca* in the sūtra.[21]

Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa[22] :

This is solely a Vaiśeṣika work. We may note here some of the excellent explanations of Vardhamāna therein.

1. Udayana described reality (*tattva*) as a form which is not superimposed. Vardhamāna explains that this meaning of the word *tattva* is conventional, the etymological sense being ignored. The negative particle in *anāropita* (not superimposed) conveys the sense that superimposition which is the basis of error is ruled out here. Hence correct knowledge has no room for superimposition. There cannot be reality of a general kind. The classification is merely that in general a thing is either *tattva* (real) or *atattva* (unreal). The latter has the form of something else superimposed on it. Or, in the technical language of the neo-logic, X's reality is to be taken as X's having a feature which exists in the same substratum as a mutual negation whose counter-positive is different feature.

2. Udayana explains that negation is not mentioned as a separate category, as it is to be proved through its counterpositive which must belong to a positive categories. On this, Vardhamāna remarks, in the context of treating the categories which are useful for obtaining salvation, that negation also becomes a category (*tattva*). Categories are in general of two kinds, positive and negative. Classification of the categories through verbal expression is confined to the positive categories.

A different interpretation is also offered by Vardhamāna. The Nyāya system adopts a particular mode of treatment according to which an object is studied in relation to another with which it is related. The soul is not primarily dealt with here as its study is to be undertaken on the basis of its difference from other objects. This is done through inference. Verbal treatment does not help at all in providing the opportunity for this inferential process. The system therefore shows the instrumentality of knowledge for the proper understanding of the nature of the soul. In parallel fashion this suggests that

negation is to be understood as inferred from the treatment given to the positive categories. Vardhamāna adds further that the Nyāya system depends on the Vaiśeṣika system, with which it is related, for treatment of certain topics, e.g. the internal organ is said to be a sense-organ in Vaiśeṣika, and though that is not mentioned in Nyāya, it holds good here. On similar grounds it should be admitted that negation, which is treated in Nyāya-sūtras 2.2.7-12 and in Vaiśeṣika sūtra 9.1, is a category. Vardhamāna adds that this matter is treated by him in his commentary on the (*Nyāyapariśuddhi*) in the first chapter of the *Nyāyadarśana*.

3. Udayana defines generality as a property present in many things. It is a natural feature shared by things of the same kind, not imposed from without. Vardhamāna notes that this should be taken to include imposed properties (*upādhi*). Udayana also says that a generality is eternal and single. Vardhamāna notes that the word "single" conveys here, according to some commentators, the nature of the generality and does not form part of the definition. Others say that the word "single" means that this is *one* definition. Another definition of a generality is that it is inherent in more than one thing and does not itself have an inherent cause.

4. Time does not have any specific feature to mark it as having divisions. Yet origination, activity, fruition and destruction become the factors which mark it as varied. Udayana notes that origination refers to prior negation which is adjacent to the beginning of activity. Vardhamāna justifies the use of "proximity" (*sannikṛṣṭa*) as a property of prior negation. Prior negation as such gives rise to linguistic references to the future. But it cannot be taken note of without apprehending the object which is its counterpositive. Hence, origination means the prior negation which is proximate to the effect which is to come into being.

5. On the classification of the spatial direction, Vardhamāna says that left is not a direction. It is, along with right (*dakṣiṇa*), a particular species present in (particular) parts of the body. Down (*adhaḥ*) is the direction which depends on contact produced by a motion having weight as the non-inherent cause. Above (*ūrdhva*) is the direction depending on contact produced through the motion in fire, which motion is generated by contact with a soul having *adṛṣṭa*.

6. Quality is subordinate to a substance. But it is contested that qualityness is not a proper generality, because it is not perceived to belong to several things like cowness. Vardhamāna answers : just as a particular kind of gem is identified by reference to its specific colour so the presence of qualityness is identified perceptually by reference to its being an instance of a generality and which is not a substratum of motion and is not a motion.

7. In connection with Udayana's rejection of Bhāsarvajña's attempt to make motion a kind of quality, Vardhamāna explains the general notions underlying Udayana's reasons. That both are caused by substances cannot be a sufficient reason for saying they have the same universal property for qualities are neither the inherent nor the non-inherent cause of conjunction and disjunction, while motions are.

8. Udayana says that the qualities listed in the text (i.e. *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*) are destroyed upon the destruction of their substrata. Vardhamāna explains the above

statement : To avoid over-extension to the disintegrating conjunction and under-extension from colour etc. of eternal things, this class of qualities should be understood as demarcated by possession of a generality pervaded by qualityness that occurs only in what is not the counterpositive of posterior negation occurring at the same time at its substratum.

Līlāvatīprakāśa : 1. The difference between mutual negation (*anyonyābhāva*) and absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) is this : when a negative judgement is produced through superimposing the counterpositive of a negation, that negation is an absolute negation. But when the negative judgement is produced through superimposing the limitor of the counter-positive, then the negation is a mutual negation. Vardhamāna says he has explained this in the second chapter of his *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*.

2. According to some, one need not suppose the property absentness (*abhāvatva*) present in all negations. Generic absence can be explained with reference to specific negation; e.g., one can define negation as that which has mutual negation with (i.e. difference from) the six positive categories (*bhāva*), or as that which is absolutely absent in the six positive categories. We may be supposed to know the six positive categories on the basis of direct awareness (*anubhavatva*). Then the four "kinds" of generic negation should be understood as four distinct classes deriving from their distinct illustrations. However, the Nyāya tradition is different from this. According to it, absentness possesses a feature which is (generically) opposed to the presentation of existence (*sattā*).

3. Weight (*gurutva*) is inferred, but it is sometimes perceptible by the sense with assistance of *adṛṣṭa*. Does that mean that imperceptible (*atīndriya*) things—such as atoms—must lack weight? No, atoms are perceptible through extraordinary perception (*yogaja pratyakṣa*), and like-wise the tactile sense may be assisted by *adṛṣṭa* to grasp their weight. Some things, e.g. grass, have unmanifest weight.

4. The Prābhākaras say that when an unbaked pot gets baked both the black and red colours (of its constituents) are cognized. Now since one of these colours is eternal, what is produced by baking and destroyed (when the pot is broken up into bits) is a relation between the colours, and it is this relation which is inherence.

The view of the Prābhākaras is wrong. What we experience is that the black colour is destroyed and the red colour arises and we infer that the inherence (of black colour in the pot) is destroyed and that the inherence (of red colour in the pot) arises, even though the constituents of the pot are beyond the senses (viz. atoms). Otherwise smells, etc., cognized in a whole will be eternal despite the production or destruction of their inherence there.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Setu*, p. 378 (Vide *HNNM*, p. 111)
2. Ulwar Cat, p. 28, No. 653, 654
3. *HNNM*, p. 9; *Kiraṇāvalī* (BI), pp. 111-2
4. *Kiraṇāvalī* (BI), p. 350
5. *NVTT*, p.

6. *Śālikamatam̥ darśayitum upanyasyati kecit tviti, Kiraṇāvalī (BI)*, p. 288
7. *Tarkabhāṣā* (Bombay), p. 211
8. *Rasasāra*, pp. 100-1
9. *Nyāyasāra* (Madras), p. 160
10. *HNNM*, p. 63
11. *HNNM*, p. 69
12. *Kiraṇāvalī* (BI), pp. 217-8
13. *HNNM*, p. 71
14. Ibid., p. 75
15. *NNP*, fol 41a
16. Ibid., fol. 40b
17. Ibid., fol.,40b
18. *NNP*, fol. Nos. 46b-47a, under *NS* 1.1.26
19. *ghanatara-dravya-saṃyogaḥ śabdanāśaka iti vaiśeṣikābhyupagamād* etc. (*NNP* under 2.2.35, Mysore ms. 2nd chapter, fol no. 64b)
20. *NNP* ms. 4th chapter, fol no. 47a
21. *NNP* ms. 5th chapter, fol. No. 17a
22. Excerpts are from *EIP* (VI), pp. 314-332

VAIŚEṢIKA ELEMENTS IN THE *TARKABHĀṢĀ* OF KEŚAVAMIŚRA

Tarkabhāṣā of Keśavamiśra is an elementary treatise of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines and is more or less popular throughout India. It is divided into two broad sections : *Pramāṇa* and *Prameya*. "In the most flourishing period of advanced studies on Navyanyāya in Mithila and Bengal the smaller and elementary works never attracted scholars and they became extinct or what is more surprising, some of them created excellent fields elsewhere. There is a notable instance in the *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī* of Jānakīnātha, which was composed at Navadvipa and completely forgotten there, though it was studied at Varanasi and elsewhere for a long time. We believe that the *Tarkabhāṣā* similarly was driven out of Mithila and became popular in Varanasi, from where it circulated in other parts of India."[1]—This is the observation of Prof. Bhattacharya about the transition of the text. The date of Keśavamiśra, though it involves some controversy, "the best guess would seem to be mid-thirteenth century".[2]

Prof. Bhattacharya,[3] however, is in favour of middle of the twelfth century A.D. Anyway, that the commentator of the *Tarkabhāṣā* Cinnam Bhaṭṭa flourished in the second half of the fourteenth century is almost certain.

In the Prameya section of the *Tarkabhāṣā*, Keśava is set to explain the Nyāya-sūtra (1.1.9) enumerating the *prameyas* (the objects to be proved) : *ātma-śarīrendriyārtha-buddhi-manaḥ-pravṛtti-doṣa-pretyabhāva-phala-duḥkhāpavargās tu prameyam*. The *sūtra* simply means that *ātmā, śarīra* etc. are the *prameyas*. Vātsyāyana, the ancient Nyāya commentator, is found to note an interesting thing here that there is another set of *prameyas* also and they are *dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *samavāya*.[4] There is little doubt that these are the Vaiśeṣika *padārthas* and nothing else. And consequently they got some kind of recognition in the Nyāya śāstra through a pioneer Nyāya commentator like him.

The Vaiśeṣika *prameyas* thus have already been introduced in the Nyāyaśāstra. But what is peculiar in the *Tarkabhāṣā* is that Keśava accepted the Vaiśeṣika categories only for *artha*[5] and not for *prameya* in the *NS* 1.1.9. And as a result, some categories come twice. For example, to define mind (in the *NS* 1.1.9) Keśava writes *sukhādyupalabdhi-sādhanam indriyaṃ manaḥ*.[6] Further, to define the same (as the ninth substance) he writes : *manastvābhisambandhavān manaḥ*.[7] Anyway, the overall characteristic of the portion describing *artha* is the bare scheme of the Vaiśeṣika śāstra with some occasional arguments. A brief description of the portion may be prepared in the following way :

1. Substance is 'the inherent cause' or 'the substratum of quality'. Nine substances are enumerated. Earth is that which is endowed with the generality earthness. Its qualities are smell, colour, taste, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, weight, liquidity, and tendency. The earth is twofold, eternal and non-eternal. Eternal earth is atomic and non-eternal is produced one.

2. In the same manner, water, fire and air have been explained. The order of

production and destruction of the four categories, earth etc. have been narrated. Two atoms constitute a dyad. Three dyads constitute a triad. Four triads constitute a *caturaṇuka*.[8] In this way the wide earth is produced. The notable point is it that Mādhava Sarasvatī also mentioned this very order. The *Tarkabhāṣā* argues for the existence of the atoms in a precise way.

3. The other substances are defined and explained in a simple and traditional manner.

4. The qualities have also been defined and treated by simply following the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. In the context of weight one Vaiśeṣika sūtra appears to have been cited and that is *saṃyoga-vega-prayatnā-bhāve gurutvāt patanam*.[9] We see the *Bhāṣya* line running thus : ... *saṃyoga-prayatna-vegābhāve sati gurutvād yad adhogamanam tat patanam*.[10] But the *VS* (5.1.7) is *saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam*. Though both Candrānanda and Śaṅkaramiśra read the *sūtra* exactly like the one just mentioned, Cinnambhaṭṭa's quotation[11] supports the *sūtra* reading like that of Keśava.

5. The seventh category is negation (*abhāva*). It is fourfold.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *HNNM*, p. 64
2. *EIP* (I), p. 663
3. We are of the opinion that Keśava belonged to the middle of the twelfth century A.D. His direct mention of Udayana and the marked predilection for his views point to the same conclusion. He must have preceded Gaṅgeśa by a length of time. For, Cinnambhaṭṭa (late in the fourteenth century) commented on it at Vijayanagari, the great cultural centre of South India, where Keśava's work must have circulated long ago. Cinnambhaṭṭa, it should be noted, himself belonged to a very distinguished family and was quite unaware of Gaṅgeśa. Vardhamāna again regarded the *Līlāvatī* and the *Khaṇḍana*, both written in the middle of the twelfth century A.D. as the latest classics for him to adorn with masterly commentaries. As Keśava also seems to have attracted his pen, he cannot be later in date. Keśava is unaware of the great Khaṇḍanakāra, who was probably his contemporary. His early date is corroborated by the fact that his work bristles with a large number of various readings. According to Cinnambhaṭṭa (p. 137) and following him Viśvakarma (p. 42), Keśava has controverted the views of the Kandalīkāra (vide *Kandalī* p. 206) in his treatment of Anumāna. He has similarly rejected the *Kandalī's* views on the nature of gold (which in Nyāya falls under the substance 'light') preferring Udayana's opinion on the point (vide Cinnambhaṭṭa, p. 214). Keśava, therefore, belongs to an early period, when Udayana's controversy with Śrīdhara was still a current topic." *HNNM*, pp. 65-6
4. *NBh*, p. 15
5. *arthāḥ ṣaṭ padārthāḥ. Tarkbhāṣā*, p. 60
6. Ibid., p. 60
7. Ibid., p. 66
8. Ibid., pp. 62-3
9. Ibid., p. 71
10. *PPB* (BORI), p. 659
11. *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā*, vide *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 211

VAIŚEṢIKA ELEMENTS IN THE *TARKABHĀṢĀPRAKĀŚIKĀ* OF CINNAMBHAṬṬA

Cinnambhaṭṭa is one of the brightest figures among the Indian commentators. A native of the Andhra country, he appears to have been patronized by the Vijayanagara king Harihara II, who ruled around A.D. 1400.[1] He was the son of Sahajasarvajña Viṣṇudeva.[2] We find in the introductory verses of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* that Mādhavācārya was the pupil of Sarvajñaviṣṇu. The latter is none but the father of Cinnambhaṭṭa. Cinnam's elder brother is Sarvajña.[3] Apart from this scanty information about the author nothing more is available. His *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā* is a worthy and important commentary on Keśavamiśra's *Tarkabhāṣā*.

We have seen earlier that Keśavamiśra in his *Tarkabhāṣā* accepts six positive categories of the Vaiśeṣikas as to denote *artha* and added the seventh one "Negation" therewith. Now, if we compare Cinnambhaṭṭa's commentary thereon we find that Cinnam had some valuable material and definite information about the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika history in his hand which we must say have increased the value of his commentary.

From a statement of Cinnambhaṭṭa we are informed that Śālikanātha composed a commentary on *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.[4] And he is said to have distinguished the object from the body and the sense-organs. We elsewhere have discussed that this Śālika was a Bengalee commentator prior to Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara. So, that at least one ancient commentary was composed on the *Bhāṣya* must be important in the history of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. From the commentary *Nyāyamuktāvalī* of Aparārkadeva on Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyasāra we find the name of Śālika's commentary on the *Bhāṣya* was *Vallabhā*.[5] Apart from the above, Cinnam knows other important commentaries on the *Bhāṣya* like the *Nyāyakandalī*, *Kiraṇāvalī* and also the sub-commentary of Vādīndra on the *Kiraṇāvalī*[6] and utilises them. He, however, in his commentary makes no such mention of the *Vyomavatī*.

Analysis takes much place in the commentary. The topics like substance, fire, air, atomic substance, sound, number, dimension etc. may be cited for example, as follows.

"On gold, Cinnambhaṭṭa writes that gold's colour and touch are manifest (*udbhūta*). Its touch, however, is subdued (*abhibhūta*) because it is not then apprehended as belonging to that which belongs to the same kind and is also powerful. Since the earth portion, which supports it, subdues the colour of gold which belongs to the element fire, the brilliant white colour of fire is not apprehended. This does not mean that the colour of gold is not manifest. Its colour is said to be subdued because its brilliant colour is not clearly apprehended like the glow of a lamp. Similarly a lamp which is lustrous does not cease being so because it is cognized in daylight. The author cites a passage from the *Kiraṇāvalī* to illustrate this. When some kind of substance is sublimated it appears as red, and that is because the things mixed in subdue the substance. Vādīndra, who commented on this, writes that the colour of gold is said to be subdued because it gets mixed up with some other objects, i.e. some unmanifest object. Śrīdhara held that the colour and touch

of gold are unmanifest. Cinnambhaṭṭa remarks that when colour and touch are said to be unmanifest what is really meant is that they are subdued.

"Keśava denies number as the special cause for the use of expressions such as "one", "two" etc. Ciṅnambhaṭṭa notes that the author of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* did not admit number as a quality, though it is inherent in perceptible substance. Keśava is therefore offering an inference as a proof for the establishment of number. Cinnambhaṭṭa remarks that the words "one", "two" up to "ten" denote the objects that are numbered, whereas numerals beyond ten denote both the number and the numbered objects. The numerals are used while recollecting something or some persons addressed. In such cases the usage presupposes the knowledge of the object denoted by the words used, and hence the numerals must denote the number which becomes the relevant qualifier in such usages.

"Praśastapāda states that sound is opposed to both cause and effect. This is interpreted by some scholars as explaining how a particular sound that is produced gets destroyed. All sounds are destroyed by sounds produced subsequently. The penultimate one is destroyed by the last one and the last one by the penultimate one. This position is not admitted by Cinnambhaṭṭa. At the moment when the penultimate one is produced the final sound is being produced. The final sound remains when the penultimate one also remains. When the penultimate one is being destroyed, the final sound still remains. Therefore the final sound cannot be destroyed by the penultimate one which does not exist in the third moment since the final one is produced. Hence it must be admitted that the final sound is destroyed by the destruction of the penultimate one."[7]

Cinnam's explanation to justify the sequence of the twenty-four qualities[8] in the Vaiśeṣika śāstra demand much praise of the scholars.

The definitions of the main categories and their sub-varieties are simple in the *Tarkabhāṣā*. Cinnam explains those in a sentence or two. At the same time, the complex and verbose definitions involving generality has also been supplied in each case. Below are the examples of some of them :

(i) *dravyatvaṃ nāma gaganāravinda-samavetatve sati nitya-gandha-samavetatvaṃ sāmānya-viśeṣaḥ* (p. 210).

(ii) *pṛithivītvaṃ dravyatva-sākṣād-vyāpyatvaṃ nāma dravyatva-vyāpyāvyapyatve sati dravyatva-vyāpyatvam* (p. 210).

(iii) *vāyutvaṃ nāma rūpa-sāmānādhikaraṇatva-rahita-sparśavad asamavetatva-rahita-sparśa-rahita-samavetatva-rahitam* (p. 215).

(iv) *vibhutve sati digasanaveta-paratvā-paratva-samavāyi-kāraṇādhikaraṇam kālaḥ* (p. 225).

(v) *saṃkhyātvaṃ nāma prāgabhava-pratiyogitva-rahita-samaveta-sāmānyānyonyā-bhāva-samānādhikaraṇa-saṃaveta-parimāṇa-samavāyikāraṇa-samaveta-guṇatvā-vāntarajātiḥ* (p. 235).

A few Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* are found to have been utilised by Cinnam in this commentary. They are the following :

tadvacanād āmnāya-prāmāṇyam (1.1.3) (p. 175).

rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśavatī pṛthivī (2.1.1) (p. 211).

rūpa-rasa-sparaśavatyaḥ āpo dravāḥ snigdāś ca (2.1.2) (p. 213).

tejo rūpa-sparśavat (2.1.3) (213).

vāyuḥ sparśavān (2.1.4) (p. 215).

sarpi-jatu-madhūcchiṣṭānāṃ pārthivānām agni-saṃyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ samānam (2.1.6) (p. 211).

trapu-sīsa-loha-rajata-suvarṇānāṃ taijasānām agni-saṃyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ samānam (2.1.7) (p. 213).

buddhi-sukha-duḥkhecchā-dveṣa-prayatnāś cātmano liṅgāni (3.2.4) (p. 201).

anekadravyena samavāyād rūpaviśeṣācca rūpopalabdhiḥ (4.1.9) (p. 213).

samkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvam saṃyoga-vibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpi-dravya-samavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi (4.1.12) (p. 211).

saṃyoga-vega-prayatnābhāve gurutvāt patanam (5.1.7) (p. 211)

nodanādādyam iṣoḥ karma tatkarmakāritācca (5.1.17) (p. 211).

saṃskārāt tathottaram uttram ca [fn. *tathottaram uttaram uttaraṃ ca*] (5.1.17) (p. 211). And

agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyostiryakpavanam aṇumanasoś cādyam karmetya-dṛṣṭakāritāni (5.2.4) (p. 203).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1, 2, 3. *EIP* (VI), p. 368
śrīharihara-mahārāja-paripālitena sahaja-sarvajña-viṣṇudevārādhya-tanujena sarvajñānujena cinnambhaṭṭena viracitāyāṃ tarkabhāṣā-prakāśikāyām .... *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā*, p. 196
"Vijayanagari" mentioned in the commentary (p. 229)

4. Vide *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 211
5. *Nyāyamuktāvalī*, Vide *Nyāyasāra*, p. 160
6. Vide *Tarkabhāṣā*, pp. 211, 213, 214
7. *EIP* (VI), pp. 372-3
8. Vide *Tarkabhāṣā*, pp. 231-2

VAIŚEṢIKA ELEMENTS IN THE *PRAMĀṆASAMUCCAYA, VṚTTI* AND THE *VIŚĀLĀMALAVATĪ*

Like the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* of Siṃhasūri which has given us highly valuable information regarding the Vaiśeṣika system, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, its *Vṛtti* and the *Viśālāmalavatī* of Jinendrabuddhi are also equally rich in the same field. It is a pity that the original texts are lost but we have the Tibetan versions of each of them, portions of which are now available in Sanskrit through the reconstruction of Iyengar, Hattori, Muni Jambuvijaya[1] and others.

In the first four chapters of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga discusses the Vaiśeṣika views on perception, inference, pseudo-probans and example (*dṛṣṭānta*) respectively. In the first chapter of his *Vṛtti* Dignāga refers to the definition of the perception as given by Kaṇāda : *ātmendriya-mano'rtha-sannikarṣād yanniṣpadyate tadanyat* (*VS* 3.1.13).

Here the views of the two groups of ancient commentators have been noted. The first group differentiating a *pramāṇa* from an effect puts forward *sense-object contact* as an evidence of its (contact) being the extraordinary cause. But the other intends to emphasise the *soul-mind contact* as the chief cause. Now the *Viśālāmalavatī* identifies the first group with Śrāyaska and his followers and the other group—Rāvaṇa and his followers. The information regarding Rāvaṇa is found from other sources also but Śrāyaska is mentioned exclusively in this commentary in the whole Sanskrit literature. One Bhāṣyakṛt (p. 174) has been separately mentioned. One sentence is cited from one *Bhāṣya* also (p. 195)..

The whole discussion on the Vaiśeṣika views in the *Vṛtti* and *Viśālāmalavatī* appears to be mainly on Kaṇādasūtras[2] though some passages of unknown philosophers or commentators have been contextually added. The Vaiśeṣika definition of a probans as *tadvaddharmasya hetuḥ* or definition of an example *"udbhayaprasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ"* is a remarkably simple definition from some unknown sources. Anyway, with the comment we would like to conclude now that as the texts of the three Buddhist works are a retranslation, and so the exact form of the Vaiśeṣika sūtras or the unknown passages quoted therein may be different from the original texts if ever discovered.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Vaiśeṣikasūtram* (BORI), pp. 153-208
2. *VS* (BORI), pp. 173-76, 191, 195, 196, 203, 207, 208

VAIŚEṢIKA ELEMENTS IN THE *TATTVASAṂGRAHA* OF ŚĀNTARAKṢITA AND THE *PAÑJIKĀ* OF KAMALAŚĪLA

The *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita and the *Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla thereon became a storehouse dealing with the philosophical activities and speculations of nearly three centuries from the time of Dharmakīrti down to that of Uddyotakara. It is therefore natural that the Vaiśeṣika activities with their Buddhist repercussions were not left unnoticed. The refutation of traditional Vaiśeṣika doctrines were felt necessary to the Buddhists and for that, six separate sections (10-15) were devoted to the six Vaiśeṣika, categories, Substance, etc. The *Tattvasaṃgraha* being a versical composition had little scope to quote the actual Vaiśeṣika texts but the *Pañjikā* sufficiently explains the actual positions of the Vaiśeṣikas quoting the Sūtra text and commentary thereon. The *Pañjikā* quotes a number of Vaiśeṣika sūtras like the following :

sadakāraṇavan nityam (*VS* 4.1.1)

mahatyanekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (*VS* 4.1.6)

aparasmin aparam yugapad ayugapac ciram kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni (*VS* 2.2.6)

ita idam iti yatas taddiśo liṅgam (*VS* 2.2.12)

dravyāsrayy aguṇavān saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣam iti guṇalakṣaṇam (*VS* 1.1.15)

ekadravyam aguṇam saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣv anapekṣam kāraṇam iti karma-lakṣaṇam (*VS* 1.1.16)

rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ ...... (*VS* 1.1.5) etc.

Kamalaśīka knows the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda as he refers to the text by the title *Padārthapraveśaka*[1] an alternative title of the above. A few quotations[2] from the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* are also found in the *Pañjikā*. But a few more,[3] declared by Kamalaśīla to be of Praśastamati (i.e. Praśastapāda) are not literally the same as we find in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. We know from the other source like *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* that Praśastapāda composed another work named *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* and most probably those might have been from that commentary. The *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* as its name reveals is a commentary on a certain *Bhāṣya* but it is still unsettled as on which *Bhāṣya* the commentary by Praśastapāda is. We have discussed about this *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* in an earlier section named "The problem of successors of Kaṇāda upto Praśastapāda."

Now, we would like to draw attention of the scholars towards a passage quoted in the *Pañjikā* which most probably points to the existence of an unknown commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* which has not come down to us. The passage is :

Ṣaṇṇām astitvaṃ hi saduplambhaka-pramāṇa-gamyatvam, gamyatvam ca ṣaṭpadārthaviṣayam vijñānam; tasmin sati sad-vyavahāra-pravartanāt. tathā jñāna-janitam jñeyatvam, abhidhāna-janitam abhidheyatvam iti. ato vyatireka-nibandhanā ṣaṣṭhī bhavatyeva. na cāpy anavasthā, nāpi ṣaṭ-padārthāntara-prasaṅgaḥ iti.

It is clear from the above passage that it is an exposition of the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha*-line *ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatva-jñeyatvāni.* Śālikanātha's

commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is known to us by name only but there has been no chance of verification due to loss of the above commentary.

Lastly we would like to mention that Kamalaśīla exposes in his *Pañjikā* some of the Vaiśeṣika qualities in his own language. They are, for example, dimension,[4] priority and posteriority,[5] tendency,[6] etc.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *TSP*, p.
2. *TSP*, p. 325, cf. *PDS*, pp. 692-94
3. *TSP*, pp. 54-5, 72-3, 99.
4. *TSP*, pp. 266-7
5. *TS*, pp. 277-8
6. *TSP*, p. 282

VAIŚEṢIKA ELEMENTS IN *NYĀYAVINIŚCAYAVIVARAṆA* OF VĀDIRĀJA

The *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* is a brilliant commentary by Vādirāja (1025) of the *Nyāyaviniścaya* of Akalaṃka. It has three chapters, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Pravacana. Quotations and references from different treatises have highly enriched the commentary. In this commentary, we find profuse Vaiśeṣika quotations. They are from Sūtrakāra Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda and Vyomaśiva.[1] Vādirāja appears not to show any instance of quoting from Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī* most probably because of non-receipt of manuscript at the time of composition of his *Vivaraṇa*. The passages in connection with Vyomaśiva are not the exact quotations from the *Vyomavatī* but paraphrasing of Vyomaśiva's expressions. The number of the Vaiśeṣika sūtras quoted by Vādirāja in his *Vivaraṇa* is about fifteen and their readings therein stand with minor differences from Candrānanda's in a few cases.[2] The name *Padārthapraveśa*[3] mentioned in the commentary is invariably *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda. From it a sentence is quoted *"iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ iha vīraṇeṣu kaṭaḥ"*[4]. There are nine quotations[5] from one *Bhāṣya* in the commentary but they are not traced in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, and therefore remain unidentified. Vādirāja mentions Ātreya who is known to have written one *Bhāṣya* on the Kaṇādasūtras and two passages are attributed to him. It is a strong presumption that at least three unidentified passages are from this *Ātreyabhāṣya* as they are proximate to the abovementioned identified passages. It is Vādirāja who first mentions Ātreya.[6] Subsequently we find references to him from Vādīndra, Rājaśekhara and Guṇaratna. It is strange we find no mention of Ātreya in the *Nyāyakandalī*. Anyway, we have discussed on the Ātreya passages in the section "Ātreya, the Vaiśeṣika".

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *NVV*, pp. 181-4, 212-4, 374, 419, 421 (17 passages in total).
2. *Sūtras* : 1.1.9; 1.2.3 , 5, 7; 2.1.1, 25, 26, 27, 28; 4.1.5,6,9,10; 8.14; 9.20.
3. *NVV*, p. 426
4. *NK* (BORI), p. 689
5. *NVV*, pp. 121 (2 passages), 122, 123, 124 (2 passages) 508 (3 passages), 510
6. *NVV*, pp 506, 507

VAIŚEṢIKA ELEMENTS IN PRABHĀCANDRA'S WORKS

Prabhācandra (980-1065) is a talented Jaina logician whose two major works, the *Prameyakamala-mārtaṇḍa* and the *Nyāyakumuda-candra* are in true sense a store-house of Indian philosophy. But the works are commentaries, first on Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra* and the next on Akalaṃka's *Laghīstraya*. Pt. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, in his Introduction to *Prameyakamala-mārtaṇḍa*, has discussed the relation of Prabhācandra with different authors of Indian philosophy. Therein we find that Prabhācandra was acquainted with a number of Vaiśeṣika authors like Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda and commentators like Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara. Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda and Vyomaśiva are thus anterior to Prabhācandra. And as Śrīdhara also finished his work *Nyāya-kandalī* in 913 śaka corresponding to 991 A.D. so the *Kandalī* also was available to Prabhācandra. Prabhācandra mentions *Padārthapraveśaka-grantha*. (*PKM*, p. 131) and Praśastamati (*PKM*, p. 270) and many other long passages from *Padārthapraveśaka* which can be easily identified but he mentions neither Vyomaśiva nor Śrīdhara. Pt. Mahendra Kumar asserts that in the determination of salvation (*PKM*, p. 307), of the nature of soul (*NKC*, p. 349, *PKM*, p. 110), of the definition of inference (*NKC*, p. 295, *PKM*, p. 604) and at some other places, Prabhācandra takes much help from the *Vyomavatī* (pp. 20, 393, 107).

A passage quoted in the *Prameyakamala-mārtaṇḍa* is by Praśastamati but most probably it is from his lost work *Vaiśeṣika-bhāṣya-ṭīkā*. It is *sargādau puruśāṇām vyavahāro anyopadeśapūrvakaḥ* etc. (*PKM*, p. 270). It is found that the same passage is also quoted in the *Pañjikā* by Kamalaśīla. So it is not altogether impossible that Prabhācandra has taken it from Kamalaśīla's work.

It is to be noted that the learned editor of *Prameyakamala-mārtaṇḍa* supposes Vyomaśiva to be an author of the seventh century and mentions of a Praśasti in support of his supposition. But Prof. Bhattacharya is in favour of tenth century A.D. as the date of Vyomaśiva, after a critical argument on the available material.

Lastly, we should note that the *Nyāyakumuda-candra* quotes from and refers profusely to Vaiśeṣikas for which the pūrvapakśin arguments can constitute a full resume of Vaiśeṣika philosophy with suitable references to the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*.

VIŚEṢA IN VYĀSATĪRTHA'S *NYĀYĀMṚTA*

The appearance of Vyāsatīrtha (1460-1539), the strongest exponent of the Dvaita Vedānta is a remarkable event in the history of Indian philosophy. His *Nyāyāmṛta* and *Tarkatāṇḍava* are like two gems in Indian philosophical literature. "Tradition has it that contemporary scholars of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were first loudest in their laudation of Vyāsatīrtha for his famous attack on the Advaita in his *Nyāyāmṛta*; but that they grew restive and silent when he published his *Tarkatāṇḍva*, which was directed against them. They are said to have voiced their indignation and disapprobation, later, through the oft-quoted line :

Nyāyāmṛtārjitā kīrtis tāṇḍavena vināśitā.

What now we want to note here is that the *Tarkāmṛta* shows its unique characteristic of admitting a Vaiśeṣika category *Viśeṣa* (particularity) with its all-powerful role in the categories.

Those interested in details may please refer to "History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and its literature" (pp. 353-56).

VAIŚEṢIKA IN THE *CITSUKHĪ* AND THE *NAYANAPRASĀDINĪ*

The *Tattvapradīpikā* alias *Citsukhī* of Citsukhācārya and its commentary *Nayanaprasādinī* of Pratyaksvarūpabhagavān are highly respectable texts of the Vedānta philosophy. In these texts one of the remarkable features is the vehement refutation of the Vaiśeṣikas, specially Vādivāgīśvara, Udayana and Śrīvallabha to the extreme. The other Vaiśeṣikas refuted are Śrīdhara and Śivādityamiśra.[1] The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*[2] of Praśastapāda is also cited and sometimes there are long and short passages simply attributed to the Vaiśeṣikas.[3]

Though from the Vedāntic outlook the realistic philosophy like the Vaiśeṣikas can be suitably refuted, that Citsukha and Pratyaksvarūpabhagavān discovered some very general lacunae in the definitions of the Vaiśeṣika categories is not less important in the history of Indian philosophy.

In the second chapter of the *Tattvapradīpikā* we find merciless refutation of the seven Vaiśeṣika categories, e.g. substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence and negation. With these in general manner, the atoms, composite whole, conjunction, disjunction, duality, process of production of dyads, process of chemical change, time, direction and some other minor points, have also come under attack by Citsukha and his commentator Pratyaksvarūpabhagavān. During the refutation, Citsukha rarely quotes the exact lines from the Vaiśeṣika texts, but the commentator identifies them with full textual quotations and presents the full purvapakṣa and uttarapakṣa scenario.

Some of the Vaiśeṣika views of Udayana that were contradicted by the author and his commentator are the following :

1. The 'Superfluity of cause' (*upādhi*) can be considered in the cases, (i) where there is unity of the substratum, (ii) equality of extension, (iii) cross-division (*saṅkara*), (iv) *regressus ad infinitum*, (v) abandonment of nature and (vi) non-inherence.[4]

2. That which possesses generality, does not have touch, abides in a substance and which is different from action is defined to be a quality.[5]

3. Quality does not further possess another quality. Otherwise there would be the *regressus ad infinitum*. If taste etc. would occur in colour etc. the former i.e. taste etc. would be limited (*mūrta*). And the knowledge etc. would not be justified to fix up as the qualities of the rememberer. As because the sound resides in *ākāśa* (a substance, so it is a rule that a quality cannot reside in other than substance). Moreover, if a quality is admitted to reside in another quality, the latter quality would become an inherent cause and hence that cause (quality as a substratum) would be a substance (because only a substance can be as a rule an inherent cause). Further, had the composite colour been in the colour (parts), the pot etc. would have no colour etc., (because the colour then is not of a substance). Therefore, "the colour etc. are moving" or "the qualities are twenty-four, "strong sound" etc. are the secondary usages.[6]

4. An action, which creates a disjunction, contradictory to the non-productive conjunction, cannot create a disjunction contradictory to the productive conjunction. And as that action has that type of nature, that cannot be contradictory to the substance in which it effects. This rule is to be established with the observation in blooming lotuses, etc. The difference in effect presupposes the difference in cause. It can never be a matter of justification that the effect is contradictory but the cause is un-contradictory.[7]

5. If there are two categories separately produced and not related to each other—in that case there is no inherence. But the very moment they are produced the relation occurs between them, and is called inherence.

Conjunction on the other hand is not of that nature. Two produced substances separately exist and the relation between them is called conjunction.[8]

6. Not coming together means the contradictory quality. If coming together means Conjunction, then against it (i.e. coming together) what type of contradiction is there? Is it regarding place, or time, or identity? All of them are unjustified. That is why [Praśastapāda] speaks of this contradiction as non-existing-together. That is 'coming together' is to be killed and the disjunction is the killer. Thus disjunction is the destroyer quality of conjunction.[9]

Some of the Vaiśeṣika views of Śrīvallabha that were contradicted by them i.e. Citsukha and his commentator are the following :

1. Substance is the substratum of quality.[10]

2. A category which is endowed with generality and is not action and cannot be an inherent cause is called quality.[11]

3. The superfluity of cause (*upādhi*) is the state of one's occurence in a part of the probans but in the whole of the probandum.[12]

4. Colour etc. is also endowed with other generalities apart from colourness, as they are endowed with generalities, like action (i.e. as in the case of action).[13]

5. The prior negation may reappear through the negation of the negation of the prior negation. That is—the negation of the prior negation of a pot means the appearance of the pot. Further its negation may lead to the same previous negation of the pot (when the pot in destroyed) to reappear. According to Śrīvallabha it is illogical, because the last negation i.e. the posterior negation of the pot is contradictory to the prior negation.

So there is no scope of 'prior negation' to rise again by the negation of its negation.[14]

Some of the Vaiśeṣika views of Vādivāgīśvara that were contradicted by Citsukha and his commentator are noted below :

1. Knowledge is perceptible, as it is a thing, like a pot.[15]

2. (The effects like pot etc.) which are the matter of contention are produced by the 'Substratum of knowledge' (i.e. soul), as those are effects, like effort etc.[16]

3. The word *jñāna* stands for substratum, following the derivation "*jñāyate asmin*" i.e. in it, it is known.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Kandalīkāra Śrīdhara : *Tpradīpikā*, pp. 52, 306, 332, 564 Śivādityamiśra : ibid, pp. 305, 308, 318, 321, 326, 334, 387, 472, 520.

2. *Tpradīpikā*, pp. 247, 300, 311, 321, 325, 396, 474, 514.
3. *Tpradīpikā*, pp. 310, 359, 489, 496, etc.
4. *Tattvapradīpikā*, pp. 25, 223, cf. *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 161
   (i) *e.g. ākāśa-ness* is no generic attributed, because its substratum, *ākāśa*, is a single individual.
   (ii) e.g. *ghaṭatva* and *kalaśatva* cannot be separate generic attributes, as both connote the same thing, the essence of a jar.
   (iii) Being partly exclusive of each other and partly co-existent. For example, materiality (*bhūtatva*) and limitedness (*mūrtatva*) through each other's being a generic attribute, because materiality is in earth, water, fire, air and *ākāśa*, while limitedness is in the first four and mind. The new school of logicians does not consider this a bar against a generic attribute.
   (iv) If it is held that a generic attribute, e.g. *ghaṭatva*, has another generic attribute, *ghaṭatvatva*, abiding in it, then there will be no end to such assumptions.
   (v) Particularity (*viśeṣa*, ultimate difference) cannot have a generic attribute *viséṣatva*, since by itself if differentiates one atom from another. If it has, it will cease to be a particularity. It is things possessing a particularity that are differentiated by it from one another.
   (vi) Inherence (*samavāya*) and negation (*abhāva*) cannot be generic attributes, because they are never related to another through inherence.
5. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 306. cf. *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 400
6. *Nayanaprasādinī*, vide *Tpradīpikā*, p. 300. cf. *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 405-6
7. *Nayanaprasādinī*, vide *Tpradīpikā*, pp. 314-5, cf. *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 493
8. *Nyanaprasādinī*, vide *Tpradīpikā*, pp. 471 cf. *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 478.
9. Ibid., p. 475, cf. *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 491-2
10. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 298, *Nayanaprasādinī*, p. 299, cf. *NL*, p. 752
11. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 306, cf. *NL*, p. 753
12. Ibid., p. 387, cf. *NL*, p. 502
    Nayanaprasādinī, vide *Tpradīpikā*, p. 308. cf. *NL*, p. 100
13. *Nayanaprasādinī*, vide *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 443. *NL*, pp. 567-8
14. Ibid., vide *Tpradīpikā*, p. 34. cf. *MM*, p. 74
15. Ibid., vide *Tpradīpikā*, p. 37. cf. *MM*, p. 29
16. Ibid., vide *Tpradīpikā*, p. 43. cf. *MM*, p. 41

VAIŚEṢIKA CATEGORIES IN THE ĀYURVEDA

It would be quite an interesting exercise to discuss the nature and treatment of the Vaiśeṣika categories in the Āyurvedic texts like *Caraka* and *Suśruta Saṃhitās* in comparison with the traditional Vaiśeṣika texts. The Vaiśeṣika system of Kaṇāda is well-known to schematically admit six categories, Substances, Quality, Action, Generality, Particularity and Inherence.[1] If we go through the preliminary portions of the Sūtrasthāna of *Carakasaṃhitā* we find the same categories enumerated in a different order only. There the categories are : Generality, Particularity, Quality, Substance, Action and Inherence.[2] Cakrapāṇi in his commentary on the *Carakasaṃhitā* clearly admits these as belonging to the Vaiśeṣika śāstra and says that the specific necessity of Āyurveda lies behind this change of order.

The relation and similarity between the two śāstras in this regard led Dr. S.N. Dasgupta, the doyen of Indian philosophers, to put forward his opinion that Caraka draws from Kaṇāda in this regard. He writes, "It seems to me perfectly certain that the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* were written before Caraka (A.D. 80); for he not only quotes one of the Vaiśeṣika sūtras, but the whole foundation of his medical physics is based on the Vaiśeṣika physics".[3] The particular Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* indicated is obviously *pṛthivyāpastejo vāyur* etc. (*VS* 1.1.4).

Caraka in one (1.49) of the verses of Sūtrasthāna refers to the qualities *parādayaḥ prayatnāntāḥ* i.e. beginning with *para* and ending with *prayatna*, together with the sense-qualities (*sārtha*), *guru* (weight) etc. and *buddhi* (knowledge). According to Dr. Dasgupta the above enumeration in *Caraka* leaves us convinced that Caraka had some compendium of Vaiśeṣika such as that of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* before him. And he further says, "It seems that this [*parādayaḥ prayatnāntāḥ*] is a reference to some well-known enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found in the Vaiśeṣika sūtra [1.1.5, Candrānanda] which leaves out the six *guṇas*, heaviness (*gurutva*), liquidity (*dravatva*), oiliness (*sneha*), elasticity (*saṃskāra*), merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*); in one part of the sūtra the enumeration begins with *'para'* and ends in *'prayatna'*, but *buddhi* (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from *para* and ending in *prayatna*, whereas in *Caraka buddhi* does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka's sūtra was written at a time when the six *guṇas* left out in the Vaiśeṣika enumeration had come to be counted as guṇas, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated."[4]

Now we will discuss a little on the above observation of Dr. Dasgupta. It is quite correct that the Vaiśeṣika compendiums had already begun to have been written by Caraka's time, as we know from other sources that the great and voluminous *Bhāṣya* of Rāvaṇa, and the like were written obviously on rich cultured background of the Vaiśeṣika. But the mention of the *guṇas* in Caraka appears to be not directly from any Vaiśeṣika work. We find *parādi* in *Caraka* includes qualities like *yukti* and *abhyāsa*. The list *guru* etc. in the same includes qualities like *laghu, śīta, uṣṇa, rukṣa, śara, viśada* etc. Those are never heard of in extant Vaiśeṣika literature, so they may be insertions by the āyurveda ācāryas in the Vaiśeṣika manuals prepared by them or there might have been Vaiśeṣika

manuals themselves which the āyurveda ācāryas used.

Now coming to the Vaiśeṣika categories, Caraka first mentions Generality.[5] Cakrapāṇi says in this connection that Āyurveda is a śāstra which abounds in specific details and as all of those details first rest on the knowledge of general matters, so generality (*sāmānya*) tops the list.[6]

Caraka defines generality : *Sāmānyam ekatvakaram* (*Sūtra* 1.45) i.e. Generality is the knowledge which nurtures the sense of oneness. Cakrapāṇi explains this in the following way : in different times and places there exist innumerable individual cows. Yet we know each and every cow as 'It is a cow', 'It is a cow', etc. This knowledge of non-difference in different individual cows can never appear if there is no such category like generality. Similarly, knowledge like 'This person is cooking', 'This person is cooking' etc. in different individual actions of cooking could appear due to generality only. Moreover, knowledge like 'This is white', 'This is white' and so on appear due to same generality.

Not that the action of one cook is the same as that of another cook. In spite of their individual differences we say there is the same cooking. The same applies to cases of substances and qualities also.[7]

It is needless to say that the above idea of Caraka on generality and the corresponding explanation of Cakrapāṇi is essentially the Vaiśeṣika one in character but in treatment there is difference between the two. However, there are some technicalities in the Vaiśeṣika definition such as 'one' (*eka*) and 'inhering in many' (*anekasamaveta*) etc.[8]

In course of explaining the generality, Cakrapāṇi refers to different ācāryas some among whom divided generality into three types, some showed the different other three divisions and some advocated its two divisions. But it is clear that those explanations are in relation with āyurvedic purpose. However, Cakrapāṇi rejects those views.

Anyway, though generality has been explained by Cakrapāṇi in the Vaiśeṣika way, the āyurveda application of this category is to be noted very carefully. According to Caraka, generality is the cause of physical development.[9] So the substance meat etc. having the capacity of being causes of physical development are treated to be common and the essential attributed there is *sāmānya* (generality). As the generality in the form of the common characteristic like meatness and the like cannot be the cause of physical development, so generality is to be admitted in a special way : meatness as exists in the consumable meat contributing to the development of the body, likewise exists in *śarīradhātus* also which are to be developed. That is why meatness etc. are to be marked as generality.[10] The ingredients also lead to the same effect. Hence according to the āyurveda there is something common between meat—anything developer and developed—between these there is *sāmānya*. It is the specific sense of the Vaiśeṣika term when used by the āyurveda ācāryas. While the generality (common characteristic) cannot be the *cause* of physical development, how can Caraka cite generality to be so? Cakrapāṇi in defence of the Vaiśeṣika use of the term *sāmānya* in a special sense puts forward the Vaiśeṣika view regarding generality, particularity and inherence that these three cannot be the cause and the effect.[11] The *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* is found to note the same effect of the three also with some other similarities between them.[12]

Āyurveda ācāryas admit the causality (*kāraṇatva*) of generality to explain their philosophy but the Vaiśeṣikas do not.

Particularity in āyurveda is totally different from Vaiśeṣika particularity. In Vaiśeṣika it is *antyaviśeṣa* i.e. particularity at the lowest extremity of a substance.[13] Though Caraka defines it as *pṛthakkṛt* i.e. which differentiates, the āyurvedic conception of it is not the same as the Vaiśeṣika one. No doubt, it is just the opposite of generality but is the cause of decrease in the physical structure.[14]

According to the order of the categories in enumeration in the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, quality comes next after generality and particularity. But Caraka, violating the order discusses substance which is enumerated next after quality. Cakrapāṇi justifies this violation of sequence by saying that here Caraka indicates the general tendency of the āyurveda śāstra in favour of mentioning quality after generality and particularity. Moreover, in the Ātreya-Bhadrakāpyīya chapter of the *Caraka Saṃhitā* the qualities like sweet taste etc. and actions of the substances are emphatically explained. The life (*āyuḥ*) which is the main thing is the quality being conjunction. So according to this nature of the thing, quality has been mentioned first. But in the case of particular qualities, substance holds the main position. So is the violation of order.

Caraka defines substance : that where action and quality exist and which becomes an inherent cause of them, is a substance.[15] Here Cakrapāṇi's explanation is the following : existence means existence in relation of inherence. By this, only a substance can become the inherent cause of substance, quality and action. As quality and action cannot produce an effect in relation of inherence in their own, they are not inherent causes. 'Having action' in the definition of substance is only to exclude the other five categories, quality etc. and not 'simultaneously to exclude the dissimilar categories (quality etc.) and to pervade the similar ones (substances)', because the inherence of action does not exist in *ākāśa* etc. Therefore the definition of substance after excluding the dissimilar categories stands as : 'that which has quality and is an inherent cause' (is a substance). A further question may arise that when a pot at the first moment of its origination exists without any quality, then the definition of substance 'having quality' is non-pervasive. Here the solution suggested by Cakrapāṇi is that, as at the second moment quality must come therein, so the capacity of having quality is there in the pot. And in this capacity the expression 'Having quality' must be explained. Cakrapāṇi now refers to the Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* as to show that Kaṇāda also used the same expressions to define substance : *kriyāvad guṇavat sama-vāyikāraṇam dravyam*[16] (*VS* 1.1.14, Candrānanda). It is to be noted that the above explanation of Caraka's definition of substance totally corresponds with the Vaiśeṣika explanation.

The number of substances mentioned in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* is nine and it corresponds with the same number of substances mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika śāstra. The only exception between the two śāstras is the change in order of the enumeration of the substances. In *Caraka* they are *kha* (*ākāśa*), air, fire, water and earth, soul, mind, time and direction.[17] In Vaiśeṣika the sequence of the categories are earth, water, fire, air and *ākāśa*, time, direction, soul and mind.[18]

It is to be noted that in *Caraka* the enumeration of the first five substances (*mahābhūtas*) follows the sequence of evolution.[19] The *Mahābhārata* follows the Vaiśeṣika sequence of the five *mahābhūtas*.[20] However, one thing is important in this connection

that though there are in the *Mahābhārata*—the five *mahābhūtas*, mind, soul, time and general reference to direction, the grouping of nine substances is absent therein. And the reference to five *mahābhūtas* and their qualities in the *Mahābhārata* are obviously according to the Sāṃkhya philosophy and not any other one—that which is easily apprehended by contextual evidences.[21] The *Mahābhārata* narrates time from the objective point of view when it divides it into *kṣaṇa, lava, ahorātra* (a day and a night together), *pakṣa* (half-month), etc.[22] It is found that Praśastapāda also gives place to this type of information in his *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.[23]

The *Caraka* verse enumerating nine substances starts with *kha* but on common expectation it should start with soul as the soul is the main substance so far as the āyurveda (science of life) is concerned. Cakrapāṇi answers : diseases and ailments are concerned with the body. Therefore its constituents *kha* etc. are mentioned first. The soul being changeless cannot be the prime concern in āyurveda.

Now we come to the treatment of quality by Caraka. It is defined that which exists in relation to inherence, which is *niśceṣṭa* and which becomes a cause is quality.[24] On this the explanation by Cakrapāṇi is the following : by saying existence in relation of inherence, *ākāśa* etc. which are pervasive substances and are motionless are being excluded, since *ākāśa* etc. never exist anywhere in relation of inherence. By the term *niśceṣṭa* action as well as one with activity is being excluded. One with activity indicates the finite substance which becomes the substratum of the action. So they cannot be the quality. By 'being a cause', generality, particularity and inherence which cannot be the causes, are excluded.

Now it may be argued that definition of the quality is inconclusive, as it does not pervade all qualities, e.g., the dimension of the ubiquitous substances, colour of the substances in the final aggregate (*antyāvayavin*), and the like. They cannot be the causes and hence 'being a cause' is partly unproved. Therefore, its meaning should be 'having generality' which is invariable in the causes being positive entity. This type of causality excludes generality etc. as generality cannot have any further generality.

Cakrapāṇi now gives another explanation of 'being a cause' for a quality. As the efficiency of 'being a cause' in qualities other than dimension of a ubiquitous substance, the colour of a substance in the final aggregate and the like are seen, so the capacity of being the causes in the unseen cases are also to be admitted. Hence there is no question of being partly unproved for causality of quality. The dimension of a ubiquitous substance can be a cause of the yogic perception, so its causality cannot be negated. Though this kind of causality (*kāraṇatva*, a generality) may exist also in generality etc., but by the expression 'existence in relation of inherence' (*samavāyin*) generality etc. are excluded. Because the expression *samavāyin* means 'to be a substratum (*ādhāra*) where something exists in relation of inherence as well as 'to be contained (*ādheya*) somewhere in the same relation'. So the ubiquitous substances that can only be the substrate in relation of inherence and the generality etc. that can only be 'contained' in the same relation are excluded as qualities.[25]

We see Caraka to have mentioned forty-one qualities in his list. It is to be remembered that āyurveda has a vast utility with them. So the twenty-four qualities which have been mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika śāstra appear in many respects inadequate in the perspective

of āyurveda. Anyway, the comparative study between the two śāstras in this regard may be of some interest.

The qualities in *Caraka*[26] are :

(i)	sound (*Śabda*),		touch (*sparśa*),	
	colour (*rūpa*),		taste (*rasa*), and	
	smell (*gandha*).			

These are mentioned as *artha* in *Caraka* whereas in the Vaiśeṣika *artha* denotes substance, quality and action.

(ii)	heavy	(*guru*),	light	(*laghu*),
	cold	(*śīta*),	hot	(*uṣṇa*),
	viscous	(*snigdha*),	rough	(*rukṣa*),
	slow	(*manda*),	speedy	(*tīkṣṇa*),
	steady	(*sthira*),	fickle	(*sara*),
	soft	(*mṛdu*),	hard	(*kaṭhina*),
	bright	(*viśada*),	slippery	(*picchila*),
	smooth	(*slakṣṇa*),	pungent	(*khara*),
	coarse	(*sthūla*),	minute	(*sūkṣma*),
	thick	(*sāndra*), and	liquid	(*drava*)[27].
(iii)	knowledge	(*buddhi*),		
(iv)	desire	(*icchā*),	aversion	(*dveṣa*),
	pleasure	(*sukha*),	pain	(*duḥkha*), and
	effort	(*prayatna*).		
(v)	posterior	(*para*),	prior	(*apara*),
	argument	(*yukti*),	number	(*saṃkhyā*),
	conjunction	(*saṃyoga*),	disjunction	(*vibhāga*),
	separation	(*pṛthaktva*),	dimension	(*parimāṇa*),
	tendency	(*saṃskāra*), and	practice	(*abhyāsa*).

The Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* (1.1.5 Candrānanda) enumerates seventeen qualities and seven others are circumstantially admitted. Those twenty-four qualities are :

colour	(*rūpa*),	taste	(*rasa*),
smell	(*gandha*),	touch	(*sparśa*),
number	(*saṃkhyā*),	dimension	(*parimāṇa*),
separateness	(*pṛthaktva*)	conjunction	(*saṃyoga*),
disjunction	(*vibhāga*),	posteriority	(*paratva*),
priority	(*aparatva*),	knowledge	(*buddhi*),
pleasure	(*sukha*),	pain	(*duḥkha*),
desire	(*icchā*),	aversion	(*dveṣa*),
effort	(*prayatna*),	viscidity	(*sneha*),
tendency	(*saṃskāra*),	merit	(*dharma*),
demerit	(*adharma*), and	sound	(*śabda*),

If we see the *Mahābhārata* verses in this regard we find that the qualities mentioned of five *mahābhūtas* here are very similar with those mentioned in Caraka, though there are some additional ones in *Caraka* which are absent in the *Mahābhārata* and also *vice*

versa. Run on the *Mahābhārata* enumerates nine types of smell in the earth : *iṣṭs, aniṣṭa, madhura, kaṭu, nirhārin, saṃhata, snigdha, rukṣa* and *viśada*. Six tastes in water are *madhura, lavaṇa, tikta, kaṣāya, amla* and *kaṭu*. Sixteen colours in fire are *hrasva, dīrgha, sthūla, caturasra* and *anuvṛttavat, śukla, kṛṣṇa, rakta, pīta, nīla, aruṇa, kaṭhina, cikkaṇa, ślakṣṇa, picchila, mṛdu* and *dāruṇa*. Twelve types of touch in air are *uṣṇa, śīta, sukha, duḥkha, snigdha, viśada, khara, mṛdu, rukṣa, laghu, guru* and *gurutara*.[28]

Cakrapāṇi points out the three types of qualities in the enumeration of Caraka : special qualities, general qualities and the qualities of the soul.

Sound etc. are special qualities, as they predominantly exist in some specific substances. Sound is the predominant quality of *ākāśa*, touch—of air, colour—of fire, taste—of water and smell—of earth. Among these five qualities some are also seen to be present in a substance which is not their main sunstrata. Such as earth has sound, touch, colour, taste and smell, water has sound, touch, colour and taste; and so on. It is only because of the entry of the other *bhutas* into another. Cakrapāṇi refers here to the Nyāya sūtra (3.1.65) *viṣṭam hyaparaṃ pareṇa* which state the exact above phenomenon. The qualities like *guru, laghu* etc. are general qualities because they are common in earth etc. These have special utility in āyurveda as for which a separate list of them has been made starting with *para* etc. Now, coming to the qualities of the soul, it is found that by the enumeration of *buddhi* (knowledge), its varieties like remembrance (*smṛti*), consciousness (*cetanā*), steadiness (*dhṛti*), egoism (*ahaṃkāra*) etc. are collected. A special group in this regard is formed by *prayatnānta* i.e. those ending with *prayatna* (effort). It includes desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) and effort (*prayatna*). However, these five also along with conciousness (*cetanā*), steadiness (*dhṛti*), knowledge (*buddhi*), remembrance (*smṛti*), egoism (*ahaṃkāra*) have been said to be the marks of the absolute soul.[29] Here it is to be noted that according to Cakrapāṇi *smṛti, cetanā* etc. are only different varieties of *buddhi* but Caraka in Śārīrasthāna 1.72 mentions *buddhi* simultaneously in the same rank of *smṛti, cetanā* etc.

The qualities, particularly taste, acquire a major position in *Caraka Saṃhitā*. The *Mahābhārata*, the Vaiśeṣika, the *Caraka Saṃhitā*[30]—all advocated for the six types of taste though different views of the other ācāryas have also been quoted in *Caraka*.[31]

Action in *Caraka* is *ceṣṭita* (i.e. activities of living beings) where effort (*prayatna*) stands as its very cause.[32] Cakrapāṇi mentions of some who explain action to be the cause of effort. He also notes that though effort is narrated to be the cause of action, the term *prayatna* is used in āyurveda as a synonym of *karma*.[34]

On another occasion i.e. to explain the *Caraka* verse (Sūtrasthāna 1.52)

saṃyoge ca vibhāge ca kāraṇam dravyān āśritam/
kartavyasya kriyā karma karma nānyad apekṣate//

Cakrapāṇi notes in this connection some other characteristic of action also.

An action is simultaneously a cause of conjunction and disjunction. A conjunction is not an action because the former produces only the connection of a thing with the latter place but does not produce the disjunction from the former one. Similar, a disjunction also is not an action because the former produces only the disjunction from the former place but does not produce the conjunction with the latter one. To the contrary, an action produces conjunction and disjunction simultaneously. Next, action being produced does

not depend on any other subsequent cause to the former place and conjunction with the latter one.

The above contention of Cakrapāṇi regarding action totally corresponds with the Vaiśeṣika view. The *sūtras* are :

ekadravyam aguṇam saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣu anapekṣaṃ kāraṇam iti karmalakṣaṇam (VS 1.1.16)

dravyāśryy aguṇavān saṃyoga-vibhāgeṣu akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam (VS 1.1.15)

Now, it may be argued that the definition of action is too wide as it applied to a substance also, since substance simultaneously becomes the cause of conjunction and disjunction. But it is not correct, for a substance after being produced, becomes a cause of conjunction and disjunction only when it is connected with action, whereas an action whenever appears, produces conjunction and disjunction and does not depend on any other subsequent cause. Again, doubt arises whether an action depends on the connection with the substrate of conjunction and disjunction. But this type of connection is already present whenever action appears. So the question of the dependence of action on the final cause cannot arise.[34]

Inherence, according to Caraka, is an inseparable existence (relation) of the earth etc. with the qualities. It is everpresent as long as a substance exists and it is absurd that a substance being existence is devoid of quality.[35]

To explain Caraka's contention here Cakrapāṇi totally goes the Vaiśeṣika way. He extends the relation between 'earth etc. and the qualities' to the relations between parts and the whole, qualities and qualified, action and one having action, and generality and one having generality.[36] Here no mention has been made by Cakrapāṇi—of 'the relation between eternal substances and particularities', because the idea of particularities according to āyurveda is totally different from that of Vaiśeṣika śāstra. Anyway, earth etc. is the substrate of the substrates like qualities, *guru* (heavy) etc. Thus the inseparable existence is inherence.[37] Substratum is the main and the substrate is the secondary. Anyway, Cakrapāṇi now quotes the definition of inherence from the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* of Praśastapāda to establish the above idea on inherence: *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānāṃ yaḥ sambandha iheti-pratyaya-hetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ*.

Now, Cakrapāṇi goes to discuss on the eternity of inherence. When a substance is eternal no non-eternal qualities can exist in it e.g. dimension in the eternal *ākāśa* is eternal. Similarly substanceness therein is also eternal. So between the eternal *ākāśa* and the eternal qualities therein the relation inherence also is eternal. Now as inherence is one so it is to be admitted as eternal also elsewhere. Inherence cannot be destroyed due to destruction of the substrata—substances etc., as cowness is not destroyed after destruction of the individual cows. The earthly substances etc. indicate the eternal inherence in their own cause, as the individuals are the indicators of generality. Here it is to be noted that Cakrapāṇi refers to inherence as of the Vaiśeṣika śāstra when he admits only indication of inherence and not its perceptibility according to the Nyāya śāstra.

Now to prove the eternity in inherence Cakrapāṇi accepted the relation of qualities with the eternal substances and not the relation of qualities with the non-eternal ones. Had the last one been first taken up into consideration then the inherence would have

been non-eternal. But no answer to this has been given by him. However, he refers of some ācāryas who advocated two types of inherence—eternal and non-eternal. He says that their opinion simply corresponds the verbal explanation of Caraka's statement *bhūmyādīnāṃ guṇaiḥ*. It means : when the substances are eternal, inherence is eternal and when they are non-eternal, inherence is non-eternal. But Cakrapāṇi does not accept and explain the ācārya's views as he says that the above explanation is neither pervasive nor according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.[38]

The *Suśruta Saṃhitā* like each and every other system of Indian knowledge is no exception to the acceptance of five *bhūta dravyas*[39] to obtain substances, obviously things here for preparation of medicine or body to which it is applied. Already in the fortieth chapter of the Sūtrasthāna, while going to define *dravya* (substance)., *rasa* etc., Suśruta says that a substance is to be "endowed with action and qualities and to be an inherent cause."[40] This is the same with the idea the Vaiśeṣikas hold to define a substance. Dalhanācārya, the celebrated commentator on the *Saṃhitā*, makes it clear with a note that an inherent cause must be a substance, etc. the yarns to a cloth, the lump of earth to a pot; and the like. The action cannot be inherent in another action or the quality in another quality.[41] Though the idea of a substance is almost alike the Vaiśeṣika's, the qualities, however, have a varied and different scope in the āyurvedic perspective. And those qualities are twenty.[42]

All the substances are eternal.[43] Here the meaning of eternity is not without destruction but "staying for some time only".[44] Obviously it has āyurvedic justification, but the idea is not akin to the Vaiśeṣika one. Dalhana in the same context states that a substance having predominantly of the air and a substance having the qualities predominantly of *ākāśa* is grasped through inference because they are without limitation (*amūrta*).[45] It is to be remembered that the Vaiśeṣikas admit only the inferability and not perceptibility of air.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. There is no Vaiśeṣika sūtra to enumerate the six categories, but regarding Kaṇāda's scheme of six categories there is no controversy. The *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha* clearly enumerates those six. : *dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānām ṣaṇṇām padārthānām sādharmya-vaidharmya-tattvajñānaṃ niḥśreyasahetuḥ*. *PDS*, p. 15
2. *CS*, Sūtrasthāna 1.28-9
3. *HIP* (I), p. 280
4. *HIP* (I), pp. 280-1
5. *sāmānyam ca viśeṣam ca guṇāḥ dravyāni karma ca/*
   samvāyam ca tajjñātvā tantroktaṃ vidhim āsthitaḥ// Sūtrasthāna, 1.29
6. *Āyurvedadīpikā*, (*CS*, p.15)
7. *AD* vide *CS*, p. 16
8. *PDS*, p. 741
9. *sāmānyaṃ vṛddhikāraṇam*. *CS*, Sūtra 1.44
10. *AD* (*CS*, p. 15)
11. *trayāṇām akāryatvam akāraṇatvaṃ ca. atra trayāṇām iti sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānām*. *AD* (*CS*, p. 15).
12. *sāmānyādīnām trayāṇām api svātma-sattvam buddhilakṣaṇatvam akāryatvam akāraṇatvam asāmānya-viśeṣavattvaṃ nityatvam artha-śabdānābhidheyatvaṃ ceti*. *PDS* (GOS), p. 63

13. *vaiśeṣikoktānām antyaviśeṣāṇām iha śāstre cikitsāyām anupayuktatvāt tadviśeṣadharma-vyāvarttakatva-yogāt sāmānya-viśeṣān eva hrasakāraṇatvenāha—hrasahetur ityādi. AD* (*CS*, p.15)
14. *viśeṣas tu pṛthakkṛt/ .... viśeṣas tu viparyayaḥ// CS,* Sūtra 1.45
15. *yatrāśritaḥ karmaguṇaḥ kāraṇam samavāyi yat/taddravyam...// CS,* Sūtra 1.51
16. *Āyurvedadīpikā,* (*CS*, p. 21)
17. *khādiny ātmā manaḥ kālo diśaś ca dravyasaṃgrahaḥ. CS* Sūtra 1.48 *mahābhūtāni khaṃ vāyur agnir āpaḥ khitis tathā. CS,* Śārīra 1.27
18. *pṛthivyāpas tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāni* (*VS* 1.1.4 Candrānanda)
19. In the section of Sṛṣṭi-saṃhāra of the *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha,* Praśastapāda shows a slightly different sequence of origination of the four *mahābhūtas.* It is air, water, earth and fire. *Ākāśa* is already present before air.
20. *bhūmirāpas tathā vāyur agnir ākāśam eva ca/MBh,* Bhīṣma 5.4
21. The five *mahābhūtas* and its qualities are described in the discussion of 25 *tattvas,* 10 qualities of *ākāśa,* Śānti, Mokṣa 247.7-8
22. *MBH* (Gita Press), p. 5035. Cf. *Manusaṃhitā* 1.64.
23. *kṣaṇa-lava-nimeṣa-kāṣṭhā-kalā ..... PDS* (GOS), p. 165
24. *samavāyi tu niśceṣṭaḥ kāraṇam guṇaḥ// CS,* Sūtra 1.51
25. *AD* (*CS*, p. 22)
26. *sārthā gurvādayo buddiḥ prayatnataḥ parādayaḥ/guṇāḥ proktāḥ......// CS,* Sūtra 1.49
arthāḥ śabdādayo jñeyā gocarā viṣayā guṇāḥ/CS, Śārīra 1.31
27. *AD* (*CS*, p. 20). Though the source is not mentioned by Cakrapāṇi it is clear that he has collected those from the very Caraka verses, like Sūtrasthāna 1.59-61.
icchādveṣaḥ prayatnas ... CS, Śarīra 1.72
parāparatve yuktiś ca saṃkhyā saṃyoga eva ca/
vibhāgas ca pṛthaktvaṃ ca parimāṇam athāpi ca//
saṃskāro 'bhyāsa ityete guṇāḥ proktāḥ parādayaḥ// CS, Sūtra 26.29
28. *MBH* (Gita Press), Śānti, Mokṣa 184.28, 33-4, 36-7.
29. *AD* (*CS*, p. 20); *CS,* Śārīra 1.72
30. *madhuro lavaṇas tiktaḥ kaṣāyo 'mlaḥ kaṭus tathā// eṣa saḍvidhavistāro raso vārimayaḥ smṛtaḥ/ MBh,* Śānti, Mokṣa 184.31-2
svādur amlo 'tha lavaṇaḥ kaṭukas tikta eva ca/
kaṣāyaś ceti ṣaṭko 'yam rasāṇāṃ saṃgrahaḥ smṛtaḥ//CS, Sūtra 1.65
31. Vide 26th chapter of Sūtrasthāna of *CS.*
32. *prayatnādi karma ceṣṭitam ucyate/ CS,* Sūtra 1.49
"prayatno nāma guṇaviśeṣaḥ prakṛtiguṇamadhye paṭhitaḥ, sa cātmanā icchājanya pravṛttir dveṣajanya nivṛttiḥ, sa ādiḥ kāraṇam yasya tat karma". Gaṅgādhara.
33. *AD* (*CS*, p. 20)
34. *AD* (*CS*, p. 22)
35. *samavāyo 'pṛthagbhāvo bhūmyādīnāṃ guṇair mataḥ/*
sa nityo yatra hi dravyaṃ na tatrāniyato guṇaḥ// CS, Sūtra 1.50
36. *AD* (*CS*, p. 21)
37. *tena ādhārāṇām ādheyair yo 'pṛthagbhāvaḥ sa samavāya iti. AD* (*CS*, p. 21)
38. *AD* (*CS*, p. 21)
39. *tatra pṛthivyaptejovāyvākāśānāṃ samudāyād dravyābhinirvṛttiḥ. SS,* Sūtra 41.3
40. *kriyā-guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti. SS,* Sūtra 40.3
41. *Nibandhasaṃgraha, SS,* p. 159
42. *Guṇaḥ śītoṣṇa-snigdha-rukṣa-manda-tīkṣṇa-guru-laghu-picchila-viśada-ślakṣṇa-paruṣa-kaṭhina-mṛdu-drava-sāndra-sthira-sara-sthūla-sūkṣmā viṃśatiḥ. Nibandhasaṃgraha, SS,* p. 158
43. *SS,* Sūtra 40.3
44. *Nibandhasaṃgraha, SS,* p. 159
45. *Nibandhasaṃgraha, SS,* p. 159

VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY IN THE DARŚANASAṂGRAHAS

Simultaneously with the development of literature in the individual philosophical systems in India there developed another type of philosophical literature which may well be called darśanasaṃgraha, from about the A.D. sixth century. These darśanasaṃgrahas (collection of philosophies) have their special characteristics in dealing with the philosophies according to the peculiar choice of their authors. Some deal with six systems of philosophy whereas some with twelve, or some with even more[1]. Among the six systems again orthodox and heterodox systems are mixedly dealt with. Among the twelve systems, six well-known orthodox (Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mimāṃsā and Vedānta) and six well-known heterodox (Cārvāka, Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika and Jaina) systems of philosophy are discussed. The treatises dealing with more than twelve philosophies accept Vedic philosophy, Purāṇic philosophy, Pañcatantra philosophy, Raseśvara philosophy, philosophies of some sections of the Vedānta, etc. The darśanasaṃgrahas are written in prose or verse or in mixed form.

Dvātriṃśikā of Siddhasena Divākara

The *Dvātriṃśikā* of Siddhasena Divākara (700 A.D., according to Nakamura, but fifth century, according to Sukhlal Sanghvi) is most probably the first attempt to collect different Indian philosophies. This *Saṃgraha* is a versical composition. Main tenets of each of the different philosophies have been narrated in thirty-two verses. The fourteenth section of the *Dvātriṃśikā* comprises the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. We see here that the section exactly narrates the philosophy of the Kaṇādasūtras. We can easily identify the indications therein. For example, the first-half (3) *karma kāryavirodhi syād ubhayobhayathā guṇāḥ* clearly indicates the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras, kāryavirodhi karma* (1.1.3) and *ubhayathā guṇāḥ* (1.1.12). The verse (6) *saṃyogajatvāt kāryasya kāraṇan paramāṇavaḥ/dṛṣṭavān naikajātiyas teṣāṃ santyeva pākajāḥ//*must have indicated the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras, saṃyogānāṃ dravyam* (1.1.25), *kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ pṛthivyāṃ pākajāś ca* (7.1.10) and *apsu tejasi vāyau ca kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ pākajā na vidyante* (7.1.11). The verse (11) *setarair yugapat-kṣipraṃ paratvaiḥ kālasambhavam/idam asmad iti diśo nānā kāryaviśeṣataḥ//* indicates the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* : *aparasmin paraṃ yugapad ayugapad ciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni* (2.2.6), *iti idam iti yatas taddiśo liṅgam* (2.2.12) and *kārya-viśeṣeṇa nānātvam* (2.2.15). The verse (30) *ihedam iti sambandhaḥ samavāyo 'ti bhāvavat/ saṃjñālakṣaṇa-tattvārtho nānaiva tu jagadvidheḥ//* indicates the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras, iheti yataḥ kārya-kāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ* (7.2.29), *dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatva-pratiṣedho bhāvena vyākhyātaḥ* (7.2.30) and *tattvaṃ ca* (7.2.31). In this way the whole work is a clear narration of the philosophy propounded by Kaṇāda in his Vaiśeṣikasūtras. The verse (5) may draw a special attention here. It is *pratyak-viṣaya khatis tatsambandha asyedam iti tulyatve 'tyanumānaṃ tridhā [vīdhā?] tridhā//*. It indicates the Vaiśeṣika sūtra *asyedam kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sambandhyekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam* (9.18). But the element *tridhā tridhā* is not from Kaṇādasūtra, but probably from the Praśastapāda's verse *yad*

anumeyena sambandhaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite/tadabhāve ca nāstyeva talliṅgam anumāpakam (*NK*, BORI, p. 466) where three characteristics of a *liṅga* (inferential mark) is spoken of. However, obviously available were the other commentaries of the Kaṇādasūtras to draw such an element from which is not impossible.

Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya of Haribhadra Sūri

Among the darśanasaṃgrahas, the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Hribhadra Sūri, a Jaina author (d. 585) of the sixth century is probably the second of this kind. It has 87 verses in all of which only 9 verses (No. 59-67) deal with the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

The Vaiśeṣika views as recorded in the text are as follows.

The Vaiśeṣikas do not differ from the Naiyāyikas in accepting the worshipping god. According to the commentators both of them are the worshippers of the lord Śiva or Paśupati. We see that Uddyotakara, the celebrated Nyāya commentator was the pāśupata ācārya. Again, from the Vaiśeṣika commentator we come to know that Kaṇāda the Vaiśeṣika sūtrakāra got the śāstra from the lord Śiva who appeared before him in the form of an owl (*ulūka*).

There are six categories, substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence.

The substances are nine : earth, water, fire, air, *ākāśa*, time, direction, soul and mind.

In the enumeration of the qualities, curious enough is the matter that there are twenty-five qualities while according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy the qualities are twenty-four and not 25. This happened due to separate mention of *vega* (velocity) though it is included in *saṃskāra* (tendency) according to Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, the basic text recognised by all the scholars. The categorical enumeration of the twenty-five qualities (*guṇāḥ punaḥ pañcaviṃśatidhā*) leads us to think of something new. Moreover, Rājaśekhara quotes these verses in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*[2] (the same name with Haribhadra's) without raising any quotation on it. Guṇaratna who followed Rājaśekhara in the exposition of philosophical doctrines writes in his *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, the commentary of Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* : "*Saṃskāra* is of two types : *bhāvanā* (impression) and *sthitisthāpaka* (elasticity) and *vega* is a separate quality. Some accept *vega* as a third kind of *saṃskāra* and naturally the number of *guṇas* comes to be reduced to twenty-four.

Anyway, leaving out any discussion on Guṇaratna's (14-15th cen.) comments what simply comes from Haribhadra's verses is that there were some Vaiśeṣikas who thought *vega* a separate *guṇa* from *saṃskāra*. Though Kaṇāda himself did not say anything how many types are there of *saṃskāra*, but the sūtra *saṃskārābhāve gurutvāt patanam* (5.1.18) certainly indicates that *vega* is included in *saṃskāra*, as arrows fall down in the absence of *vega* (a type of *saṃskāra*) and not of others, *bhāvanā* and *sthitisthāpaka* which are absurd in this case. Praśastapāda followed the twenty-four *guṇa* scheme. So most probably twenty-five *guṇa* scheme was of some other school of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. *Caraka-saṃhitā* though mentions a series of *guṇas* for their specific medical purpose and

enumerates *saṃskāra* but it is of no help. This *saṃskāra* is no doubt *guṇāntarādhāna* i.e. imposition of another quality but they explain it in foodstuff only and keep no connection with Vaiśeṣika matter. One thing is notable here that *vega, bhāvanā* and *sthitisthāpaka* have not been separately mentioned in the long list of forty-one qualities in the *Caraka Saṃhitā*.

The actions are five. Generalities are two. Particularities subsist in the eternal substance. Inherence is the relationship between things that are inseparably connected, and which stand for each other in the relation of the container and the contained—the relationship, namely, that serves as the ground of the notion that 'such and such a thing subsists in this'.

The *pramāṇas* are two according to the Vaiśeṣika : perception and the knowledge produced by the mark (*laiṅgika*). Twofold is perception : Determinate (*savikalpaka*) and Indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*).

The commentator Guṇaratna Sūri (A.D. fourteenth-fifteenth century) got the full-fledged Vaiśeṣika literature like *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* and its two commentaries *Vyomavatī* and *Nyāyakandalī* and very naturally some more. So in the commentary *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* we find the Vaiśeṣika views, more or less as we witness in Vaiśeṣika primer like *Saptapadārthī* or *Tarkāmṛta* or *Tarkasaṃgraha*. Anyway, some notable points regarding the commentary are :

1. It refers to some Vaiśeṣikas who admit *abhāva* (negation) as the seventh category.

2. Shadow and darkness are the absence of light, hence they are not substances.

3. The definition of time has exactly been quoted from the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda.

4. Mind has been defined by quoting the Nyāyasūtra *yugapajjñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam* (*NS* 1.1.16).

5. Qualities have been summarised from the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* according to the enumeration in the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*.

6. The well-known *kārikā* of Udayana stating the *jātibādhakas* has been quoted. The *kārikā* is

vyakter abhedas tulyatvam saṃkaro 'thānavasthitiḥ/
rūpahānir asambandho jātibādhakasaṃgrahaḥ//

7. Three types of a generalities are mentioned to the view of a section of the Vaiśeṣikas. According to them, those three are the Highest generality, existence (*sattā*) and generality-particularity. The first is the generality which leads to produce the knowledge of categoryness in the six categories. The second one is the generality which leads to produce a common knowledge in three categories, substance, quality and action. The last one is the generality which leads to produce the knowledge of grouping and at the same time the knowledge of distinguishing from others. e.g. substanceness, qualityness etc. Each of these groups the similar entities and at the same time distinguishes the dissimilar entities.

Others explain the three types in a different way : According to them, existence (*sattā*) groups three categories, generality (*sāmānya*) is substanceness, etc. and generality-particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) is earthness etc.

8. The general definition of *pramāṇa* according to the Vaiśeṣikas is given in the

commentary. It is *arthopalabdhihetuḥ pramāṇam* i.e. the (valid) cause of cognising an *artha* is *pramāṇa*.

9. In the context of *laiṅgika* knowledge the Vaiśeṣika sūtra (9.18) *asyedam kāryam kāraṇam saṃyogi* etc. is explained.

10. One wishing to know the matter of perception and inference in detail is advised to see the *Nyāyakandalī*.

11. Praśastakara (alias Praśastapāda) is mentioned twice.

12. Two *pramāṇas*, perception and inference, are admitted by Nyāyakandalī-kāra, whereas according to Vyomaśiva the *pramāṇas* are three, perception, inference and verbal testimony.

13. Following the style of Rājaśekhara, Guṇaratna also give a list of the Vaiśeṣika literature.

(a) *Ṣaṭpadārthī*—of Kaṇāda.

(b) *Bhāṣya* on it—of Praśastakara.

(c) *Kandalī*, a commentary on the *Bhāṣya*—of Śrīdhara.

(d) *Kiraṇāvalī*, another commentary on the Bhāṣya—of Udayana.

(e) *Vyomavatī* (printed—*Vyomamatī*), another commentary on the same *Bhāṣya*—of Vyomaśiva.

(f) *Līlāvatītarka of Śrīvatsa*. Most probably it is *Nyāya-līlāvatī* of Śrīvallabha.

(g) *Ātreyatantra*. It has not come down to us.

Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha of Śaṅkarācārya

The *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha*, a notable darśanasaṃgraha work of Śaṅkarācārya, tries to narrate the bare outline of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in thirty-seven and a half *kārikās* in the fifth chapter of the work. The chapter starts with the Vaiśeṣika characteristics of upholding the Vedic teachings and of refuting the Buddhists, the Lokāyatas and the Ārhatas (i.e. the Jainas). The Supreme Lord only and not the 'ultimate atoms' or 'Time' is the bestower of the fruits of actions to the individual souls. And these individual souls can prevent by means of their own efforts the undesirable miseries. Liberation which is the final goal of the mankind can be attained by the knowledge of some categories the number of which is said to be six. The Supreme Lord, the individual souls and the whole of this world are all comprised within these categories. Six categories comprise nine substances, twenty-four qualities, five actions, generality, particularity and inherence. The names of the substances, etc. have been enumerated. The matter of similarities and dissimilarities between the categories is mentioned but no instance of such similarity and dissimilarity has been given. A bit notable is the fact that the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* mentions three *pramāṇas* (instruments of valid knowledge), perception, inference and scriptural authority[3]—as recommended by the Vaiśeṣikas. We know the Vaiśeṣika admit only two *pramāṇas*, perception and inference. However, the exception with the Vaiśeṣika ācārya Vyomaśiva who admitted three *pramāṇas* exactly as noted in the *Saṃgraha*, is important to be pointed out. So, it is in one way clear that the author of the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* has recorded the Vaiśeṣika philosophical system of the three-

pramāṇa tradition. Moreover, the question and presence of the Supreme Lord and the Veda is so much vividly dealt with in the work[4] that we may clearly observe in the work the tradition of later Vaiśeṣika where god has been a major topic. We may not be wrong to assert that the Kaṇāda *sūtras* and its earlier commentaries hardly involved God in such a manner or did not involve the same at all.

The author may not be the famous Śaṅkarācārya, the commentator on the Brahmasūtra.

Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha ascribed to Mādhavācārya

The *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* ascribed to Mādhavācārya has attained the overwhelming popularity as a darśanasaṃgraha work due to its excellent quality of presentation and precision of sixteen systems of Indian philosophy with the appropriate quotations and sources thereof. But regarding the authorship of this work there is a controversy. In the commentary of *Tārkikarakṣā,* Cinnambhaṭṭa claims the authorship of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* referring to some of his own statements as to be enquired in the *Saṃgraha*. Much to the astonishment the quotations are found verbatim in the *Saṃgraha*. This Cinnambhaṭṭa was the son of Sarvajñaviṣṇu, and Mādhavācārya his disciple.[5] Mādhava served as the minister of Bukka (accession, A.D. 1354), the second king of Vijayanagara. Cinnambhaṭṭa was a protégé of king Harihara of the Vijayanagara dynasty. Two Hariharas of this royal family are known. The second of these was, like his father Bukka, a patron of literature and flourished from A.D. 1377 to 1404. It was of this Harihara that Cinnambhaṭṭa was most probably a protégé.

The Vaiśeṣika philosophy comprise the 10th section of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. The salient features of this account may be noted in the following way.

1. Kaṇāda's sūtra work is noted as *Daśalakṣaṇī*.

2. The contents of the 10 chapters are noted in a nice and effective way. We come to know from the Saṃgraha that the last three chapters of Kaṇāda's sūtra work comprise one *āhnika* each. Two *āhnikas* in each chapter of the sūtra work have perhaps been according to a different tradition carried by Śaṅkaramiśra.

3. The mention of substance is done first due to its being substratum of all the categories. Next is quality due to its character of containedness in all the substances. Action is enumerated next because it has the common nature of containing generality. Generality which resides in all the above three is noted after it. Particularity as being the substratum of inherence is thereafter put in the list. Last of all, Inherence, the left one got its place.

4. The justification of non-mention of the seventh category 'Negation' is provided.

5. The definitions of six categories are given. It is important to note that the definitions of the categories except inherence in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* are more or less same as those in the *Tarkabhāṣaprakāśikā* of Cinnambhaṭṭa.[6]

6. The definition of substances as well as quality and action are given with the help of their characteristics endowed with generality. Quite surprisingly the definitions of

substances except Time in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* differ much in terminology from those in *Tarkabhāṣaprakāśikā*.

7. Of the qualities only colour has been defined.

8. The Vaiśeṣikas have their unfailing intellect in Duality, Process of production of the qualities through chemical action and the Disjunction produced by disjunction.

9. The seven-moment process of production of knowledge as 'these are two objects' is noted. Destruction of this knowledge is also taken into account. Five pnemonic verses in this regard are quoted.

10. The process of production of qualities through chemical action pertaining to nine moments, is described. The theories involving ten moments, etc. are only mentioned.

11. Two are the 'Disjunction produced by disjunction'. They are explained with calculation of moments.

12. Darkness is substance according to the Bhaṭṭas and the Vedāntins. It is colour according to Śrīdharācārya. While a section of the Prabhākara's followers considers it to be the negation of the knowledge of light, the Naiyāyikas state that darkness is the negation of light. All the views have been rejected one by one. Kaṇāda sūtra divulging the nature of darkness runs thus: *dravya-guṇa-karma-niṣpatti-vaidharmyād abhāvas tamaḥ* (sic., *VS* 5.2.21).

13. The seventh category "Negation" has been explained in brief with its four varieties.

Sarvadarśanakaumudī of Mādhava Saravatī

We are not hesitant to admit that of the darśanasaṃgrahas, Mādhava Sarasvatī's *Sarvadarśanakaumudī* records the Vaiśeṣika system in such a detailed manner and contains such a critical argument that only this position may be considered as a full-fledged Vaiśeṣika treatise. K. Sambasiva Sastṛi, editor of the *Sarvadarśanakaumudī*, mentions that MM. Abhyankar Vasudeva Sastrin fixed the date of Mādhava Sarasvatī to whom the commentary *Saptapadārthī-ṭīkā* (*Mitabhāṣiṇī*) is ascribed, to 1350 A.D. in the introduction to his edition of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (p. 575). He however, was inclined to further research on Mādhava Sarasvatī's date.[7] In Potter's *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies* (Vol. I) the date of this Mādhava is fixed as the beginning of the fifteenth century.

Mādhava was a native of Sodasi, in the valley of the Sahya mountains wherein is situated the temple of Gokarnamahavali. This is the only glimpse into his personal history. Anyway, he was more a Vaiśeṣika writer than a writer on any other system. He wrote a commentary on Śivādityamiśra's *Saptapadārthī-Mitabhāṣiṇī*, and composed a separate treatise named *Abhinava-saptapadārthī*. That he gives a detailed account of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in the *Sarvadarśanakaumudī* and also that in the very beginning of the work strengthens Mādhava's inclination towards the Vaiśeṣika. His works on other system of philosophy are Mayūkhamālā on *Tattvacintāmaṇi, Mandānukampinī* on *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and *Vāśiṣṭha-pañcikā*[8]. *Vedāntasarvasya*[9] is his other work also to be mentioned here.

The *Kaumudī* starts with maṅgalavāda. Then a total of eight different systems of Indian philosophy have been discussed. They are the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā,

Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Cārvāka, Vedānta and Jaina. However, the Jaina philosophy is not treated separately but is found to have been dealt with in the Vaiśeṣika section.

Different topics of the Vaiśeṣika system in the work are as follows :

1. The division of categories into seven. *Abhāva* (negation) is admitted as the seventh category. Four types of negation.

2. The definition of substance.

3. *Śakti* (potency), *saṃkhyā* (number) and *sādṛśya* (similarity) are not separate categories.

4. Nine substances.

5. Doubt about air to be nothing but earth. Refutation.

6. Gold, included in the substance fire.

7. Darkness to be the tenth substance is rejected.

8. Similarities and dissimilarities between the seven categories are described.

9. Nine substances have been explained. The work puts forward the constitution of *dvyaṇuka* (dyad), *tryaṇuka, caturaṇuka, pañcāṇuka* and so on. Two atoms constitute a *dvyaṇuka*, three *dvyaṇukas* constitute a *tryaṇuka*, four *tryaṇukas* constitute a *caturaṇuka* and five *caturaṇukas* constitute a *pañcāṇuka*.

10. Twenty-four qualities have been enumerated and each of them defined.

The feeling of joy is eternally existing in liberation—this is the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas (Prabhākara), the Bhāṭṭas and Bhūṣaṇakāra (i.e. Bhāsarvajña). This theory along with the liberation according to the Idealist Buddhist, Cārvākas and the Jainas has been rejected.

11. The knowledge is divided into two broad sections : right knowledge (*vidyā*) and false knowledge (*avidyā*). Right knowledge is further divided into four types : *Pratyakṣa, Laiṅgika, Smṛti* and *Ārṣa*. False knowledge also is of four types : *Saṃśaya, Viparyaya, Svapna* and *Anadhyavasāya*. All divisions are just like in *Prasastapādabhāṣya* but their definitions in *Kaumudī* are different from those in the *Bhāṣya*. Now about pseudo-probans.

We find in the statement of Praśastapāda that Kaṇāda admitted three types of pseudo-probantia e.g. *Viruddha, Asiddha* and *Sandigdha*. Praśastapāda admits four types of the same by adding one *Anadhyavasita*. But *Kaumudī* is found to have been recorded the Vaiśeṣikas who unlike the traditionals in this regard, adopted the Nyāya scheme of the pseudo-probans, as *Asiddha, Viruddha, Anaikāntika, Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* and *Prakaraṇasama*. In the Nyāyadarśana of Gautama, the five pseudo-probantia are *Viruddha, Anaikāntika, Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa, Prakaraṇasama* and *Sādhyasama*. In course of discussing *Viparyaya* knowledge *Kaumudī* records and refutes the theories of *viparyaya* according to the Prābhakaras, Sāṃkhyas, Mādhyamikas, Yogācāras and the Jainas. *Anyathākhyāti* has been accepted.

12. A detailed treatment on similarities and dissimilarities of the qualities is found in the work.

13. The other categories like action, generality etc. have been treated at length.

14. The work hardly quotes any Vaiśeṣika authority except in two cases of Kaṇāda, one, the Vaiśeṣika sūtra enumerating nine substances and the other a part of the Vaiśeṣika sūtra enumerating qualities.

Prasthānabheda of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (1540-1647)

One of the important darśanasaṃgrahas is Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Prasthānabheda*. In it, though all the important philosophical systems, orthodox and three heterodox, have been mentioned but discussed in a very short manner. Four *upāṅgas* are known to be Purāṇa, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra. Nyāya, as Madhusūdana observes includes Vaiśeṣika śāstra, like Mīmāṃsā includes Vedānta śāstra and Dharmaśāstra includes the *Mahābhārata*, the *Rāmāyaṇa* as well as Sāṃkhya, Pātañjala, Pāśupata and Vaiṣṇava śāstras.[10] It may in this connection be observed that it is an attempt to include the different śāstras by expanding the denotation and connotation of the terms. Anyway, Vaiśeṣika śāstra, according to *Prasthānabheda* is propounded by Kaṇāda and is divided into ten chapters. The necessity of this śāstra is to teach the similarities and dissimilarities of the six categories—substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence as well as a seventh category, negation.[11]

Sarvamatasaṃgraha[12] of an anonymous author

In 1918 T. Ganapati Shastri had edited a *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*-type of work named *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* of an anonymous author. The work deals with eight *pramāṇas* at the very beginning and then ten systems of Indian philosophy, e.g. Cārvāka, Jaina, Bauddha, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsaka, Vedānta which admits Brahman with attribute, Vedānta which admits Brahman devoid of any attribute, and Paurāṇika.

According to the text the Vaiśeṣika maintain the two *pramāṇas*, six categories, nine substances, twenty-four qualities, five actions, two generalities, particularity and inherence. The text records their bare details. The qualities in each of the substances have been enumerated. Liberation has been narrated to be the complete destruction of the nine special qualities of a person having the knowledge of the six Vaiśeṣika categories. Ātman has fourteen qualities, namely number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit and impression. Out of these, qualities beginning with knowledge are the special qualities of the soul.

The Vedas are faultless because they are told by the Supreme trustworthy person, God. His existence is proved by inference.

There are three types of causes, inherent, non-inherent and auxiliary. Their definitions and examples have been given. A few Vedic lines have been explained in support of God, heaven, fruition of the Vedic rite, means to attain liberation, etc.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. (a) *Dvātriṃśikā* of Siddhasena Divākara.
   (b) *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra Sūri.
   (c) *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* attributed to Śaṅkarācārya.
   (d) *Sarvadarśanakaumudī* of Mādhava Sarasvatī.
   (e) *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Rājaśekhara Sūri.

(f) *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* ascribed to Mādhavācārya.
(g) *Prasthānabheda* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.
(h) *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* (anonymous), Ed. T. Ganapati Sastri.
(i) *Āryavidyāsudhākara* of Śrī Yajñeśvara Cimanabhaṭṭa.
(j) *Dvādaśa-darśana-sopānāvalī* of Śrīpādaśāstri Hāsurkar.

2. *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, pp. 273-4
3. *tridhā pramāṇaṃ pratyakaṣam anumānāgamāv iti. Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha.* (*kārikā 33*).
4. Verse Nos. 4-5, 10-19, 32-35.
5. *iti śrīharihara-mahārāja-paripālitena sahaja-sarvajñaviṣṇudevārādhya-tanujena ... Cinnambhaṭṭena. Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā*, p. 262
sarvajñaviṣṇugurum anvāham āśraye 'ham. SDS (BORI), p. 1
6. (a) *dravyaṃ nāma gaganāravinda-samavetatve sati nityatve sati gandha-samavetatvam. SDS*, p 215
dravyatvaṃ nāma gaganāravinda-samavetatve sati nityagandha-samavetatvam. Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā, p. 210
(b) *guṇatvam nāma samavāyi-kāraṇa-samaveta-samavāyi-kāraṇa-bhinna-samaveta-sattā-sākṣād-vyāpya-jātiḥ. SDS*, pp. 215-6
guṇatvaṃ nāma samavāyi-kāraṇā-samavāyi-kāraṇa-samaveta-sattā-vyāpya-vyāpakatva-rahita-vyāpyajātiḥ samaveta-samaveta-dvi-samaveta-sameveta-sattā-sākṣād-vyāpyajātir vā. Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā, p. 231.
(c) *karmatvaṃ nāma nitya-samavetatva-rahita-sattā-sākṣād-vyāpyajātiḥ. SDS* p. 216
karmatvaṃ nāma gagana-samavetatva-rahita-sattā-sākṣād-vyāpyajātiḥ. Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā, p. 245
(d) *sāmānyaṃ tu pradhvamsa-pratiyogitva-rahitam anekasamavetam. SDS*, p. 216
nityam ekam anekasamavetam sāmānyam. Tarkabhāṣaprakāśikā, p. 246
(e) *Viśeṣo nāma anyonyābhāva-virodhi-sāmānya-rahitaḥ samavetaḥ. SDS*, p. 217
anyonyābhāva-virodhitve sati samvetānādhikaraṇaṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ viśeṣaḥ. Tarkabhāṣaprakāśikā, p. 247
(f) *samavāyas tu samavāyarahitaḥ samabandhaḥ. SDS*, p. 217
dravyatva-samānādhikaraṇatve sati dravyatvātyantābhāva-samānādhikaraṇaḥ sattetaro bhāvaḥ samvāyaḥ. Tarkabhāṣaprakāśikā, p. 247
7. *Sarvadarśanakaumudī* (ed. K.S. Sastri, Trivandrum, 1938). Preface, p. iv
8. *Sarvadarśanakaumudī*, Preface.
9. Vide *EIP* (I).
10. *Prasthānabheda* (Vani Vilas), 1912, p. 1 ibid, p. 11
11. Ibid., p. 11
12. *Sarvamatasaṃgraha*, (Trivandrum Govt. Press), 1918

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VAIŚEṢIKA AND THE NYĀYA

Vaiśeṣika philosophy is designated as a *samānatantra* with Nyāya philosophy. The meaning of *samānatantra* is: it is a system of philosophy, which does not totally agree with the doctrines of another particular system of philosophy, yet very much resembles that. And in this principle, the Sāṃkhya system is a *samānatantra* with Yoga, and the Mīmāṃsā with Vedānta. Anyway, looking at the characteristics of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya systems of philosophy, Dr. Umesh Misra points out that "There appears to be no doubt that even in the earliest literature of the schools known to us we recognise distinct and unmistakeable points of affinity between them, not only in the general metaphysical position but even in several minor details. The differences too are "equally marked".[1]

Dr. Misra[2] tried to sum up those differences for facility of a proper appreciation of the distinct nature of each. Those are the following.

1. Standpoint : Like almost all other schools of Indian thought, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika aim at the realisation of *mokṣa* (salvation) as their *summum bonum*. But they differ in their method of treatment. Nyāya, as represented by Gautama, begins mainly as a logical system emphasizing the means of right knowledge. According to this system true knowledge depends upon the critical examination of objects by means of right knowledge. Hence, the entire importance is laid on the various means of right knowledge themselves. We can see Vātsyāyana's statements which contain the views : "The true knowledge of the objects is not possible without the means of right knowledge".[3] Or "The very science of reasoning (*nyāya*) consists in the true knowledge of the *artha* by means of right knowledge".[4] Quite consistent is Gautama's first *sūtra* starting with the very *pramāṇa,* the instrument of right knowledge, as the most important category. The object of knowledge (*prameya*) according to him occupies the secondary place. The other fourteen categories of his are the auxiliaries to help the science of reasoning. This fact has been very well illustrated by the foundation of the neological school which has led to the development of the entire later Nyāya literature on the basis of the means of right cognition alone. This justifies the name given to this school of thought as *Pramāṇaśāstra*.

The standpoint of Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, is entirely different. It lays stress on the ontological aspect of the cosmic order. According to it the critical examination of the six categories into which the entire field of existence is divided leads to the realisation of the *summum bonum*. The treatment of the means of right.knowledge is only subsidiary. Here a small note may be added that the Vaiśeṣika writers, though are in favour of Kaṇāda's consent to a seventh category called *abhāva* (negation), yet they undoubtedly introduced the six-category scheme. The explicit recognition of the seventh category is found for the first time in the work of Śivādityamiśra which is named as *Saptapadārthī*.

2. *Pramāṇa* (means of right knowledge) : Nyāya believes in four *pramāṇas* while Vaiśeṣika recognises only two. This is a general view and there are exceptions. Bhāsarvajña, a strong exponent of the Nyāya school denied the independent character of *upamāna* as a valid source of knowledge. So his nyāya system recognises three *pramāṇas*.

On the other hand Vyomaśivācārya, an able exponent of the Vaiśeṣika is in favour of admitting a third *pramāṇa—śabda* (verbal testimony), which was well discarded by Praśastapāda. However, Bhāsarvajña was designated by other Nyāya exponents as *ekadeśin* i.e. sectarian and Vyomaśivācārya as described by Śrīdhara as unschooled (*aśrutavyākhyātṛ*).

3. *Pratyakśa* (Perception) : It appears that according to Naiyāyikas there are as many kinds of direct perception (*Pratyakaṣa*) as there are sense organs; so that, by direct perception we should understand the visual (*cākṣuṣa*), gustatory (*rāsana*), olfactory (*ghrāṇa*), tactual (*spārśana*) and auditory (*śrāvaṇa*). Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, seem to consider that there is only one kind of direct perception, namely, visual. That is, the use of the term *pratyakṣa* should be restricted to that of the eyes alone. This is understood from the Vaiśeṣika view on the inferential apprehension of the air. Though air is apprehended by touch, according to Vaiśeṣikas, it is not tactual perception.

4. *Samavāya* (Inherence) : According to Nyāya *samavāya* is cognised through perception, while according to Vaiśeṣika it is inferential. Now, the arguments on behalf of both the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas are being noted below.

The early Vaiśeṣikas[5] argue that as *samavāya* cannot be held as related to an object through an independent relation being *saṃyoga* or another *samvāya*, it must be accepted as constituting its own relation and consequently, super-sensuous in character. The senses are capable of cognising positive categories only through one of the relations recognised in the system. They add further that unlike *saṃyoga, samavāya* never appears in our perceptual knowledge, inasmuch as its two terms are always perceived as inseparably asociated *en masse*, which would not have been the case if it were immediately perceived. The later Vaiśeṣikas[6] further point out that the supersensuous nature of *samavāya* is deduced from the fact that like *manas*, *kāla* etc. it is a positive category distinct from the ātman and does not inhere in anything else.

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, criticise the above inference as intrinsically defective and incapable of leading to a conclusion. They adduce a counter-argument in support of their own doctrine. The more important point bearing on the question, from their angle of vision, relates to the recognition and function of what is technically known as a *svarūpa-sambandha* in neo-logical literature. About the *svarūpa-sambandha* something will be said in a nutshell at the end of this *samavāya* topic. Anyway, the Naiyāyikas hold that a relation or negation (*abhāva*), of which the predicate (*pratiyogin*) and the subject (*anuyogin*) are capable of direct perception, is itself capable of such perception. For example, when we say there is no jar on a particular spot (signifying the case of an absolute negation) both the subject (spot) predicate (jar) are perceptible. In the case of cognition of the negation what will be the relation? Again without relation nothing can be cognised. Here the relation is *viśeṣaṇatā* (a type of *svarūpa-sambandha*) or *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*. So by the relation of this *svarūpa-sambandha* the *samavāya* can be perceived. The *svarūpa-sambandha* is defined as : *sambandhāntareṇa viśiṣṭapratīti-jñanāyogyatvam*. It means that it is a relation which must be held to exist in a case where a determinate knowledge (*viśiṣṭa-pratīti*) could not have been affected by any other relation, namely, *samavāya* or *saṃyoga*. In other words, this relation must be either the subject itself (*anuyogin*) or predicate (*pratiyogin*) of the said judgement. For example, in

the judgement *ghaṭaṃ jānāmi*, there are three factors : (a) *ghaṭa* (the object of knowledge), (b) the knowledge which has *ghaṭa* as its object, and (c) knower, the substratum of the knowledge, represented by the verbal termination *mip*. Between (b) and (c) there is *samavāya* relation, for knowledge is the attribute of the individual soul. But there must be some sort of relation between (a) and (b) also, in order that this very judgement rather than any other, e.g. *paṭaṃ jānāmi*, might arise. But the relation cannot be *samavāya*, because the attribute 'knowledge' belongs to the soul and not to the *ghaṭa*. Nor can it be *saṃyoga*, for this relation holds only between the substances. Hence, the only possible determining cause of this judgement is the *ghaṭa-svarūpa* itself, conceived as a relation. This is what is known as *svarūpa-sambandha*. Gaṅgeśa also in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* has explained the topic in the abovementioned way.

5. *Pākajotpatti* (production through chemical process) : Vaiśeṣikas hold that when an earthen pot is put on fire, it is impossible for the fire particles to come in contact with each and every part of it unless it is reduced to its constituent ultimate atoms. Hence, the chemical action takes place in the ultimate atoms alone and not in the object when it is intact. Hence, it is called '*pīlupākavāda*', where the word *pīlu* stands for ultimate atoms. Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, assert that an object is naturally porous and *taijasa* (fire) particles can very well enter into it and produce chemical changes both in and out; so that the chemical action takes place in an object as a whole without destroying the object into its constituent *paramāṇus*. This view of the Naiyāyikas is known as '*piṭharapākavāda*'.

6. Duration of *karman* (action) : According to Naiyāyikas, action is sometimes destroyed by the destruction of the substratum and sometimes by the subsequent conjunction. Hence considering the various causes that lead to action, it is clear that an action exists for three or four moments only.

Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, consider that sometimes the duration of an action may extend even over several moments. Thus when a pot is thrown into fire, there is produced an action in the ultimate atoms which had produced the dyads of that pot; then the disjunction between the ultimate atoms producing dyads takes place; then there is the destruction of the conjunction; then the destruction of the dyad followed by the disjunction between the ultimate atoms and *ākāśa*; then there is the destruction of the conjunction existing between *ākāśa* and the ultimate atoms; then there is the subsequent conjunction of the ultimate atoms; and then there is the destruction of the action.

But when the 'disjunction caused by disjunction' (*vibhāgaja vibhāga*) is produced simultaneously with the destruction of the substance then the duration of the action is only six moments.[7]

7. *Hetvābhāsa* (Pseudo-probans); Nyāya believes in five kinds of pseudo-probans, namely, *asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika, prakaraṇasama* and *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* and accordingly believes in the five conditions necessary for a valid *hetu*; namely, subsistence in the subject (*pakaṣasattva*), subsistence in the similar objects (*sapakṣasattva*), absence from the contrary objects (*vipakṣāsattva*), non-existence of the counter opposite (*asatpratipakṣatva*) and being unobstructed (*abādhitatva*).

Vaiśeṣika holds that there are only three pseudo-probantia, namely, *viruddha, asiddha* and *sandigdha*, as is said in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* remembering the recognition of the Śāstrakāra Kaṇāda—*viruddhāsiddhasandigdham aliṅgaṃ kāśyapo 'bravit*; and

accordingly, there are three conditions of a valid *hetu*, namely, subsistence in the subject, subsistence in the similar objects, and absence from the contrary objects. The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, however, innovates another fourth pseudo-probans, namely *anadhyavasita*.

8. *Vega* (velocity) : Velocity is one of the three varieties of the tendency (*saṃskāra*).

Nyāya considers that since the beginning of the discharging of an arrow from the bow up to the hitting of the mark there are several velocities and several actions. That is, the first velocity produced in the arrow is due to actions; that velocity produces another action which, in its turn, produces another velocity and so on till the arrow reaches the mark.

Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, holds that there is only one velocity throughout. In other words, the first action is produced in the arrow by the 'soundless touch' termed as *nodana* which produces velocity and this velocity produces a series of action in succession till the arrow reaches the mark. There is no need in believing in more than one velocity like the series of action in succession; for it will be a case of *gaurava* (cumbrousness) only. The above matter has been discussed in Śaṅkaramiśra's *Vaiśeṣika-upaskāra* (on *VS* 5.1.17) and *Kaṇādarahasya* (p. 132).

9. *Sakhaṇḍopādhi* : The neo-logical school believes in a particular kind of *dharma* (characteristic endowment) called *sakhaṇḍopādhi* as quite distinct from the recognised seven categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. The *sakhaṇḍopādhi* form of *dharma* is to be had in two ways : (i) That *dharma* which is always and necessarily apprehended through something else is called *sakhaṇḍopādhi*. As for example, the *dharmas—pratiyogitā, anuyogitā, ādhāratā, ādheyatā*, etc. are apprehended through *pratiyogitātva, anuyogitātva, ādhāratātva, ādheyatātva* etc. respectively and not alone. Hence, the *dharmas—pratiyogitā* etc. are known as *sakhaṇḍopādhis*. (ii) Again, that *dharma* also, which is the outcome of several things (*padārtha*), is called *sakhaṇḍopādhi*. In the instance, 'the mountain is smoky'; 'because it is fiery', the probans (possessing fire) also belongs to a hot piece of iron where there is no smoke. Hence, the argument is fallacious and is classed under the *sādhāraṇa* type of fallacy. This *sādhāraṇa* is an outcome of several *padārthas*, hence it is a case of *sakhaṇḍopādhi*, and, as such is apprehended through something else. Again, in the instance, 'Sound is non-eternal, as it possesses soundness', there is the fallacy *asādhāraṇa*. This *asādhāraṇatva* also, similarly, is a case of *sakhaṇḍopādhi*. Hence, according to Nyāya this is given a separate place.

Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, thinks that it can be easily included under some of the already recognised seven categories. Thus, *pratiyogitā*, for instance, is nothing but the *pratiyogin* itself. It can be also of the nature of *abhāva* itself. Thus the *pratiyogitā* belonging to the *ghaṭa* (jar) is sometimes of the nature of *ghaṭa* itself, or sometimes of the nature of *ghaṭatva* generality, or sometimes of the form of negation of *ghaṭa*. Similarly, in the case of the *sādhāraṇa* kind of fallacy given above the *dharmasādhāraṇatva* is of the nature of contact. In the case of the *asādhāraṇa* fallacy, the *dharma* is of the nature of the generality soundness. In this way, it is seen that the *sakhaṇḍopādhi* is not a separate entity at all. The Vaiśeṣika commentary *Setu* has (pp. 102-3) cleared the above Vaiśeṣika view.

10. *Vibhāgaja-vibhāga* (Disjunction produced by disjunction) : According to the Vaiśeṣikas disjunction is of three kinds, and 'disjunction produced by disjunction' is one

of them. This variety of disjunction, in its turn, is of two kinds : (i) The disjunction of cause and non-cause due to the disjunction of cause alone; and (ii) The disjunction of effect and non-effect produced by the disjunction of cause and non-cause. The former may be illustrated as the disjunction existing between *kapāla* (half of a pot) and *ākāśa* (not related as cause and effect) due to the disjunction between the two-halves of a pot-*kapālas*—which are its (pot's) cause. The latter may be illustrated as the disjunction of the hand and the tree followed by that of the body and the tree caused by the disjunction of the finger and the tree.

The disjunction in both the cases is, no doubt, brought about by action produced in the *kapāla* and the finger. In the latter case, however, as the action thus produced rests in the finger while the disjunction is in the hand or in the body, it is called a case of *vyadhikaraṇa*, so that this action cannot be the cause of the disjunction existing between the body and the tree. No action can be attributed to a composite unless it inheres in all the constituents of that composite. Hence, it is held that the disjunction of the effect (e.g. hand and body) and the non-effect in the latter instance, are produced by the disjunction of the cause (e.g. finger) and the non-cause (e.g. tree) and not by any action. In this way, the necessity of 'disjunction produced by another disjunction' is established by the Vaiśeṣikas.

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, do not see any necessity in accepting the above view. They hold that the very action which separates the finger from the tree and inheres in the former (e.g. finger) is itself capable of destroying the indirect conjunctions existing between the hand and the tree and also that which exists between the body and the tree.

It should not be held here that if the same action is believed to cause the disjunction of the body from the tree, then there is the danger of its lasting for a longer period or becoming eternal if it is found in any eternal substance; for, an action is always destroyed by the subsequent conjunction which is possible here by the conjunction caused by this very action between the body and *ākāśa.* There is nothing to prevent the action from producing the conjunction after destroying it in connection with something else, just as the same heat-contact which destroys the attributes of an earthly object by the chemical action is also capable of producing the same. On these grounds the necessity of the disjunction caused by another disjunction is rejected by the Naiyāyikas. This Nyāya view is to be found in the *Nyāyamañjarī.*

11. *Dvitva* (Duality) : Vaiśeṣika is of opinion that the qualities duality, triplity (*tritva*) etc. are produced by the *apekṣābuddhi* which is a kind of mental necessity giving rise to the notion of number and which is expressed by the proposition 'this is one', 'this is one' etc. The process of the origin of one of these qualities is described as follows. First, there is the contact of the sense-organ with the object, that is, each of the two pots, for instance; then there is the cognition of the generality of *ekatva* (oneness) (*ekatvasāmānyadhīḥ*); then there is the *apekṣābuddhi* which conveys the thought of *ekatva* in each of the two objects in the favour of 'this is one', 'this is one'; then the quality is produced by the combination of the two separate *ekatvas.*

But Nyāya is of opinion that the *apekṣābuddhi* does not produce the duality etc. but only manifests it.[8]

12. *Ajasaṃyoga* (eternal conjunction) between *vibhus* (ubiquitous objects) : Relation

is of two kinds : one is inherence (*samavāya*), a permanent relation, and the other is *saṃyoga*, an ordinary relation in the form of the combination of two or more separated substances. The former exists between such inseparable parts which are related as (i) substratum or container (*ādhāra*), and contained (*ādheya*), (ii) as effect and cause, and (iii) as non-effect and non-cause. The latter i.e. *saṃyoga*, on the other hand, is possible between such separated pairs of which (i) either one or both possess separate motion (*pṛthaggamana*), as in the case of eternal substances and also of which (ii) either one or both are separately related as container and contained being mutually exclusive, as in the case of non-eternal substances. Amongst the eternal substances, the condition laid down above is possible whether between atomic substances themselves or between one or more atomic and the ubiquitous substances. No third alternative is possible.

As it is essential to have the combination between two or more separated things, eternal conjunction (*aja-saṃyoga*) between two or more ubiquitous forms is not possible. Moreover, as the relation necessitates the presence of the capacity of combining and separating themselves, which, again, indicates that there must be motion either in one or both of the combining substances, the Vaiśeṣikas consider it impossible to hold any relation between the ubiquitous substances.

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, are of opinion that there is some sort of conjunction between the ubiquitous substances also. They adduce the argument that all-pervading substances have undoubtedly got conjunction with finite substances through which they themselves come to possess mutual combination. And this mutual combination is known as *aja-saṃyoga*.

13. Nature of the soul in the state of salvation : It is a well-known fact that there is a difference of opinion as to the presence of bliss in the liberated soul between the two schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

14. *Artha* : Regarding the use of the term *artha*, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika differ between themselves. Nyāya uses the term *artha* in the sense of *gandha* (smell), *rasa* (taste), *rūpa* (colour), *sparśa* (touch) and *śabda* (sound)—which are varieties of qualities (*guṇas*), while Vaiśeṣika understands by it all the *guṇas* as well as *dravyas* and *karmans* (*VS* 8.14). The categories like *sāmānya* (generality), *viśeṣa* (particularity) and *samavāya* (inherence), according to the Vaiśeṣikas, are not included in the scope of this technical designation.

15. Numbers of relation in drawing inference : Vaiśeṣika holds that inference is drawn through one of the five relations, namely, *kārya, kāraṇa, saṃyogi, virodhi* and *samavāyi* (VS 9.18). That is, an inference is drawn sometimes through the *liṅga* (mark) in the form of *kārya*, as for example, from the perception of smoke or light we infer the existence of fire. Sometimes through the *liṅga* in the form of *karaṇa*, as for instance, the inference of sound from the particular type of contact of a stick with a drum by a deaf man. Sometimes, again, through the *liṅga* in the form of *saṃyogi*, as for example, the inference of the cutaneous sense from the perception of the body connected with it. Sometimes, again, inference proceeds from a contradictory or an antagonistic object, as for instance, the inference of the presence of a mongoose hidden behind the bush etc. at the sight of a furious snake. And lastly, inference results from having *samavāyin* as the mark, as for example, the inference of the existence of *tejas* in water from the heat present in water.

Nyāya, on the other hand, thinks that the classification of *sambandhas* as given in the Vaiśeṣika works is entirely useless, for by the use of the single term *sambandhin* all others can be understood.

The very opinion is of Vācaspatimiśra I in his *Tātparyaṭīkā* (under *NS* 1.1.5). However, Vācaspati understood the *VS* (9.18) narrating in the Vaiśeṣika commentary as to be of five kinds of *liṅga*—according to his own interpretation.

16. The generalities of *sukumāratva* (tenderness) and *karkaśatva* (hardness) : Nyāya holds that the generality of tenderness is quite separate from that of hardness. They inhere in conjunction (*saṃyoga*) which itself inheres in earth alone. Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand thinks that they inhere in touch (*sparśa*) and not in the conjunction.

17. Religion : The Naiyāyikas are the devotees of Śiva, while the Vaiśeṣikas are the worshippers of Maheśvara or Paśupati.

18. Organism : Raghunātha Paṇḍita in his *Prameya-ratna-mālā* (p. 21) says that there are two kinds of physical organism : viviparous (*yonija*) and non-viviparous (*ayonija*). The former is further sub-divided into *jarāyuja* and oviparous (*aṇḍaja*). He further adds that the *udbhijja* class of organism which the Vaiśeṣikas include under the non-viviparous is not recognised as on organism at all by the Naiyāyikas.

Dr. Misra after noting the above clearly comments that the above view of Raghunātha Paṇḍita seems to be only a partial view. He shows the evidence in support of his comment : for, Praśastapāda does not include the *udbhijja* class under the non-viviparous. Its being a physical organism is itself denied by Praśastapāda who includes it under the immovable (*sthāvara*) type of *viṣaya*.

19. Dream-cognition : According to Nyāya dream-cognition is both true and false. If it is produced from merits then it is true and if from demerits then it is included under erroneous cognition. But according to Vaiśeṣikas it is always a variety of false knowledge (*avidyā*).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Conception of Matter—according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 38
2. Ibid., pp. 38-50
3. *pramāṇam antareṇa nārthapratipattiḥ. NBh*
4. *pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇaṃ nyāyaḥ. NBh* 1.1.1
5. *PDS*, p. 690 and corresponding portion of *NK*.
6. *Upaskāra* and *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-vivṛti* on *VS* 7.2.28
7. *Padārthamālā*, p. 42
8. *jñāpyate vyañjyate vā. Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 200; *Kaṇādarahasya*, pp. 68-9. Though Dr. Misra puts forward his opinion in the above manner, it appears to be controversial. The *Nyāyakandalī* texts like *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, *Kusumāñjali* and *Kiraṇāvalī* are in favour of production of duality. After describing this in their favour the author then raised a doubt whether the duality is manifested. But in all the texts the source of the view of the manifestation of duality is not noted.
   So Dr. Misra's comment naturally falls flat. On the contrary the Nyāya text like *Kusumāñjali* admits the production of duality. So it can never be said that the Nyāya admitted the manifestation of the same. MM Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa got Dr. Misra's book as a respectful gift from the very author who was also one of his pupils. He noticed this point and gave a note in his own hand, contradicting Dr. Misra's discovery, with the help of the textual reference to the prose of *Kusumāñjali*, 5.5.

THE MĪMĀṀSAKAS AND THE VAIŚEṢIKAS

It is almost certain that the Vaiśeṣikasūtras of Kaṇāda presuppose the Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy. But as no ancient running commentary on the Vaiśeṣikasūtras has come down to us the attitude and mode of criticism of the Vaiśeṣikas towards the Mīmāṃsakas cannot be properly ascertained. In spite of this, we see that the sixth *āhnika* of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra deals with gift, sacrifice, fasting, duties of a brāhmin, merit and demerit which are the common subjects with both the Mīmāṃsā and the Vaiśeṣika systems. Śaṅkaramiśra points out right that *ātmāntaraguṇānām ātmāntare 'kāraṇatvāt* (6.1.5 *Upaskāra*) supports one Jaimini sūtra (3.7.18) *śāstradeśitaṃ phalam anuṣṭhātari*. But the darkness as a separate substance which is a Mīmāṃsā proposition has been contradicted by *VS* (5.2.21) *dravya-guṇa-karma-niṣpatti-vaidharmyād bhā'bhāvas tamaḥ*.

The next available Vaiśeṣika text, Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha,* while discussing on *Saṃskāra, Dharma* and *Smṛti* in the Guṇa section, speaks of duties of the four *āśramins* and some other allied matters—which are favourable to the Mīmāṃsakas. But along with those it started also to contend against the Mīmāṃsā doctrines of *Arthāpatti* and *Abhāva* as the separate varieties of *pramāṇa*.[1]

Among the commentaries on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, Śālikanātha's *Vyākhyāna* is not available to us. So there is no way to know how Śālika treated the Mīmāṃsā theories which are found to have been contradicted in the *Vyomavatī* or *Nyāyakandalī*, in his *Vyākhyāna* when Śālika himself affiliated to the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā with his renowned work *Prakaraṇapañjikā*.

In the *Vyomavatī*, the first available commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, we very much feel the presence of rivalry against the Mīmāṃsā theories. With the refutation of Mīmāṃsā theories of darkness as a separate substance, *Arthāpatti* (presumptive cognition) and *Abhāva* (negation) as additional instruments of valid knowledge, and with the establishment of the theory of Indirect authoritativeness (Parataḥprāmāṇyavāda) as against the theory of Self-authoritativeness (Svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda), the *Vyomavatī* carried out the tirade against the Mīmāṃsakas. In connection with the svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda, nine *kārikās* from Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* have been quoted[2] and with the *Abhāva*, six other *kārikās* from the same work.[3] Apart from the above, the eternity of sound,[4] the effects like earth etc. produced without the effort of any agent,[5] are some of the Mīmāṃsā views cited in the *Vyomavatī*.

We have already said above that Śrīdhara showed great honour to Kumārila. So it is natural for him to take a rather soft line towards the Mīmāṃsakas particularly to him. Śrīdhara addresses him by the terms '*guravaḥ*'[6] (the reverent preceptor) and '*gurubhiḥ*'[7]. In each case Rājaśekhara, the commentator of Śrīdhara, identifies them with Kumārila or the verse quoted with them is found in Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*. Besides, Śavarasvāmin,[8] Prabhākara[9] and sometimes generally Mīmāṃsakas[10], the old (*jarat*) Mīmāṃsakas[11], and Bhāṭṭas[12] have been identified with *eke, anye, kecit* in Śrīdhara's passages. Naracandra identifies the old Mīmāṃsaka (*jaran*-Mīmāṃsaka) with Śavarasvāmin.[13]

Unlike Śrīdhara, Udayana in the *Kiraṇāvalī* is found to have taken a tough stand against the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas. He refutes the Bhāṭṭa theory of salvation,[14] and their view 'After the destruction of a previous dimension another dimension is produced in the same substance'.[15] In course of discussing 'Touch' in the Guṇa section[16] Udayana advocates the Pīlupāka theory and criticises the Mīmāṃsakas to be 'Durdurūdha' (an abusive word to mean atheist) who maintains the existence of the same pot even after inflicted with fire atoms.

Roughly from the time of Udayana the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas were growing to be the chief opponent of the Naiyāyikas as well as the Vaiśeṣikas. That is why we find in *Kaṇādasūtranibandha*, Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra (appearing within a hundred years from Udayana) is found to have criticised the Prābhākaras as many times as the Bhāṭṭas.[17]

Subsequently, it became a rule to refute the Darkness, *Śakti, Sādṛśya* and Svataḥ-pramāṇyavāda of the Mīmāṃsakas in almost all the Vaiśeṣika tract like *Tarkasaṃgraha*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *PDS*, p. 534, 542-3.
2. *Vyomavatī* (II), pp. 166-7.
3. Ibid., pp. 180-1.
4. Ibid., p. 195.
5. Ibid., p. 126.
6. *NK*, p. 584.
7. Ibid., pp. 326, 419.
8. Ibid., pp. 6, 11, 142.
9. Ibid., pp. 42, 232, 423, 451, 529.
10. Ibid., pp. 154, 503, 524, 532, 536.
11. Ibid., p. 219.
12. Ibid., pp. 243, 355, 511, 527.
13. Ibid., p. 519.
14. *Kiraṇāvalī* (BI), p. 49.
15. Ibid., p. 471
16. Ibid., p. 437
17. Prābhākaras : *KN*, pp. 4, 6, 7, 24, 25, 30, 67, 129, 177, 212
    Bhāṭṭas : *KN*, pp. 4, 24, 25, 168, 169, 170, 171, 228, 242, 248

THE VEDĀNTINS AND THE VAIŚEṢIKAS

The Advaita ācārya "Śaṅkara (c. A.D. 788-820) is very much aware of the variety of philosophical views current in his time as well as those relevant to his purpose and which flourished at early periods....... In that work [*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*] also, there are extended criticism of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Buddhist, Jaina and Cārvāka theories."[1] The Vaiśeṣika theory of creation as a result of the congregation of atoms has been the chief target of the Vedāntins as we assess from the discussion in the second section of the second chapter of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. Śaṅkara also contradicts different Vaiśeṣika theories in his different other *Bhāṣya* works. e.g. Vaiśeṣika contradiction to [full dependence on] the scripture is refuted in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* 4.3.22; Pleasure etc. as being the objects of knowledge—contradicted in *Upadeśasāhasrī* 2.16. 51; asatkāryavāda theory is contradicted in *Chāndogyopaniṣad-bhāṣya* 4.2.1; and some others.[2]

Sureśvara criticises the Vaiśeṣikas in his *Vārttika*[3] on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* and refutes the Vaiśeṣika categories in his *Dakṣiṇāmūrtivārttika* alias *Mānasollāsa* (2nd Ullāsa).

Notable is the fact that the Vaiśeṣika ācāryas hardly go to any confrontation with the Vedāntins. Rather some kind of approval for them is seen in the Vaiśeṣika works like *Nyāyakandalī*. In it Śrīdhara approves Maṇḍana's views on four different occasions (*NK*, pp. 513, 598, 617, 620) remaining completely silent about the criticism of the Vaiśeṣika theory of atomism by the Vedāntins. Udayana, being a most successful Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ācārya with extraordinary merit in logic, also appears to be friendly with Vedānta in his *Ātmatattvaviveka* and *Kusumāñjali*. To the Vaiśeṣika ācāryas like Vādivāgīśvara and Śrīvallabha also the Vedānta is not at all a rival system.

But the Vedānta antagonism against the Vaiśeṣika rose to the extreme in the hand of Śrīharṣa and Citsukhācārya. In the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* of Śrīharṣa (c. A.D. 1160) Udayana has been vehemently criticised and in his *Tattvapradīpikā Citsukha* fell on the Vaiśeṣika doctrines as expounded chiefly by Udayana, Śrīvallabha and Vādivāgīśvara. The criticism made by Śrīharṣa and Citsukha against the Vaiśeṣikas practically remained unanswered by the subsequent ācāryas of the Vaiśeṣika systems.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *EIP* (III), p. 19
2. *EIP* (III), pp. 201, 239, 261,284, etc.
3. *EIP* (III), pp. 450, 458, 481, 510

THE SĀṂKHYAS AND THE VAIŚEṢIKAS

It is a well-known fact that the Sāṃkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas stand on two opposite poles as they accept Satkāryavāda (the theory of production of something which is already existent in its causes) and Asatkāryavāda (the theory of production of something completely new) the two contradictory theories respectively. Out of six orthodox systems also, they belong to different camps each other. Only, Sāṃkhya gets Yoga as its kindred system and Vaiśeṣika gets Nyāya. The Sāṃkhya has its announced scheme of twenty-four or twenty-five *tattvas* for its śāstra while the Vaiśeṣika of six or seven *padārthas*. The marked similarity between them as observed by Kauṭilya is that both stress on the inferential arguments (*anvīkṣā*). Kauṭilya stated *Sāṃkhyaṃ yogo lokāyataṃ cety ānvīkṣikī* (*Arthaśāstra*, Vidyāsamuddeśa prakaraṇa). Here *Yoga* must have been used for Vaiśeṣika or Naiyāyika as attested by the Jainas (*Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā*, pp. 122, 125, 306, 571, 574, 581, 677). That the Sāṃkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas are included as the members of the six polemic schools i.e. ṣaṭtarkī is stated by Rājaśekhara (*Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, p. 17). Some discussion on ṣaṭtarkī is found in Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* also.

As both the systems have lost their early literature no specific commitment can therefore be made about their mutual relation in the early period. "However, in early times, as opined by the scholars, the Sāṃkhya appears to coincide with the development of comparable conceptualizations within traditions of early Buddhist thought and early Vaiśeṣika (*EIP*-IV, p. 10). Anyway, Kaṇāda refutes the doctrines at least on three occasions as noted by the commentator Śaṅkaramiśra. First, the Sāṃkhyas infer the existence of *ākāśa*, with the help of the marks 'Egress' and 'Ingress'. These marks have not been accepted by Kaṇāda as true marks. (*Upaskāra* on *VS* 2.1.20-23). Secondly, Kaṇāda refutes the causality of primordial *prakṛti* (*Upaskāra* on *VS* 4.1.1-5). And lastly, he indicates *Jñāna* to be a synonym of *buddhi* and *upalabdhi* while those terms, according to Sāṃkhya, are not synonyms. (*Upaskāra* on *VS* 8.1.1).

The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda admits the terms *buddhi, upalabdhi, jñāna* and *pratyaya* as synonyms. The *Vyomavatī* reveals the purpose of the author here to be a refutation of the Sāṃkhyas who accept those terms conveying separate meanings. Among the commentators of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* like Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara, interest in refuting the Sāṃkhyas is very much felt. The Sāṃkhya theories of *viparyaya* (false knowledge)[1] and of egoistic evolution of the *tattvas*[2] have been attacked by Vyomaśiva. He quotes three verses of the ancient Sāṃkhya authors out of which two have been identified—one being of Āsuri and other of Vindhyavāsin.[3] Śrīdhara refutes the Sāṃkhya theory of Asatkāryavāda[4] and also discovers the attack of Praśasta against the same.[5] A few contending matters of the Sāṃkhya doctrines in the *Kiraṇāvalī* are (i) three terms *buddhi, upalabdhi* and *jñāna* being different from each other carrying technical concept regarding knowledge,[6] (ii) salvation,[7] (iii) eleven sense-orgnas,[8] etc.

"*Yuktidīpikā*, a very authentic text of the Sāṃkhya system maintains a vigorous polemic of external debate with the followers of early Vaiśeṣikas." (*EIP*-IV, p. 10). It asserts that the existence of god as found admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas is basically the

invention of the Pāśupata system of philosophy. (*YD*, p. 88).

It is a very interesting matter to note that a certain Sāṃkhya philosopher named Mādhava has been mentioned by the Buddhist as a 'destroyer of the Sāṃkhya system'.[9] He might have fluorished between A.D. 400 and 500. He introduced a major innovation with respect to the Sāṃkhya theory of *triguṇa*. According to the standard Sāṃkhya view, there is only one primordial materiality, which is *triguṇa*. All objects, therefore, whether 'mental' or 'physical', represent collection of *triguṇa*, and there are five basic 'configuration' of *guṇa* collocation corresponding to objects of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell that can then be apprehended by a particular sense capacity viz, hearing, touching, seeing, tasting and smelling. Mādhava interpreted the three *guṇas* as well as the notion of *prakṛti* as a plurality of primordial materialities in the direction of Vaiśeṣika atomism. According to him, sound-*guṇas*, touch-*guṇas* etc. are heterogeneous atoms within *prakṛti* from the beginning, and therefore, the apprehension of five distinct types of objects becomes fully intelligible. However, it is to say that Mādhava is a sole exception in the history of Indian philosophy who introduced such a radical view in a system.

Vācaspatimiśra (c. A.D. 976) is found to excel in explaining the Sāṃkhya position by refuting different opponent theories. It is not exaggeration to say that Vācaspati's understanding in all the systems of Indian philosophy was at an extraordinary level. So we naturally get much more from him than others. Apart from Satkāryavāda—Asatkāryavāda he contradicts the atomic and time theories of the Vaiśeṣikas. In the commentary on verse Nos. 15-16 of *Sāṃkhyakārikā* Vācaspati argues against the atomism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In the commentary on verse No. 33 time is refuted. According to the Vaiśeṣikas time is one and indivisible. Sāṃkhyas opine however, the divisions of time are nothing more than heuristic distinctions of limiting adjuncts. There is no need to posit a distinct entity called 'Time'.[10]

With Vijñānabhikṣu (c. A.D. 1550-1600), new direction in the interpretation of the old Sāṃkhya is clearly evident. His interest in Sāṃkhya and Yoga may have been occasioned by motives quite different from that of a faithful bhāṣyakāra trying to understand the old Sāṃkhya tradition. In his writing Sāṃkhya and Yoga along with Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā, are all assigned an appropriate place in a larger Vedānta synthesis as made by him.

Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya is a full-length commentary by Vijñānabhikṣu on Sāṃkhyasūtra. In it he tries to answer the Vaiśeṣika as well as Nyāya position in the following way :

1. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika prepare the ground for the discrimination of the soul from the body. The theory is not void of importance. But it is not a final or transcendental philosophy, however, since they take the soul to be an agent.[11]

2. Primordial materiality is the equilibrium of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. These are substances and not qualities in the sense of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, because they admit of conjunction and disjunction and because they possess the properties of lightness, activity and weight respectively.[12]

3. Over and above the twenty-five principles there is no category i.e. *padārtha*. The six categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophers are included in them.[13]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Vyom* (II), pp. 126-28, 130
2. Ibid., (I), pp. 6, 50, 112
3. *Vyom* (II), p. 102
4. *NK* (BORI), pp. 351-3
5. Ibid., p. 577
6. *KV* (BI), p. 510
7. Ibid., p. 46
8. Ibid., p. 530
9. *Dignāga on perception*, pp. 155-8; *PV* (Karṇakagomin), p. 595
10. *EIP* (IV), pp. 308-9
11. Ibid., (IV), p. 377
12. Ibid., (IV), p. 387
13. Ibid., (IV), p. 388

THE BUDDHISTS AND THE VAIŚEṢIKAS

The treatment of Vaiśeṣika materials in the Buddhist philosophical works deserves deeper attention. We believe that the old Buddhist masters according to their own standpoint criticised the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. But they followed the Nyāya views on *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*. And the evidence of *Saptadaśa-yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra* of Ārya Asaṅga can be given in this regard. Serious changes are visible since the time of Dignāga who rejected the Nyāya infra-structure and accepted the Vaiśeṣika one. Dignāga accepted two *pramāṇas*, three characteristics of the *hetu*, three *hetvābhāsas* just like the Vaiśeṣikas. However, the attack on the Vaiśeṣika atomism has already been started in the hand of Vasubandhu the junior. The well-known verse in Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (Viṃśikā, 12) in this regard is :

ṣaṭkena yugapad-yogāt paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṃśatā/
ṣaṇṇām samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakaḥ//

The verse has been referred to by Vyomaśiva (*Vyomavatī*, p. 68) as well as Uddoyotakara (*NV*, p. 484) and started a long refutation to it. Dignāga attacked Kaṇāda's definitions of Perception, Inference and Pseudo-probans and the definition of Example given by some Vaiśeṣika.[1]

Dharmakīrti is found to have been more enthusiastic to refute the Vaiśeṣikas. In the Svārthānumāna chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and auto-commentary thereon he tries to contradict the inference of air (pp. 66-58), the existence of soul (p. 72), generality (pp. 132, 172, 194, 232, 264. *PV* 3.151-154), two types of substance (p. 392) and some others.

Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla are found to walk on the same line i.e. the contradiction of the Vaiśeṣikas. The examination of the six categories in six chapters of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* is a severe attack against the Vaiśeṣikas.

The Vaiśeṣikas in refutation of the Buddhists appear to have solely taken on Dharmakīrti. A number of verses from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* have been referred to in the *Vyomavatī* and *Nyāya-kandalī*. Śrīdhara (the commentator of the *Nyāyakandalī*), however mentions on a single occasion the name of Dharmottara (*NK*, p. 193). Udayana's antagonism was directed against the Buddhists, particularly against Jñānaśrīmitra, one of the chief scholars of Vikramaśīla in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* but refutation of the Buddhists in *Kiraṇāvalī* (BI ed., pp. 520, 530, 534, 559, 577) appears to be of general nature. For the later period it is to be mentioned the Buddhists are not the real opponents of the Vaiśeṣikas as well as other orthodox philosophers in consequence of their (Buddhists') complete rout on account of Mohammadan invasions of their centres of learning.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Vide *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* (GOS), pp. 169-208

THE JAINAS AND THE VAIŚEṢIKAS

The Jaina system, since its early stage occupies a glorious position in adding some new thought and direction in the philosophical field as the Vaiśeṣika does. The Jaina attitude of *anekānta* made them temperate enough to discover truth even in the views of non-Jaina opponents. Vaiśeṣika tenets have been discussed and texts quoted in many Jaina texts. Quite interesting is that some again hold that the Vaiśeṣika originated with Rohagupta who is called Nihnavavādin as well as Trairāśika. During a controversy between Rohagupta and his preceptor Śrīgupta, a series of questions was prepared with regard to the thirty-six varieties of the six categories—*dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *samavāya* of the Vaiśeṣikas. The thirty-six varieties have been shown as nine varieties of *dravya*, seventeen varieties of *guṇa*, five varieties of *karma*, two varieties of *sāmānya*, two varieties of *viśeṣa* and one variety of *samavāya*. Now if we leave aside the four varieties of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* the rest agree in full with the list of sub-varieties of the categories in the Vaiśeṣika sūtra. Rohagupta is said to belong to the Ulūka gotra. He was called Ṣaḍulūka as he explained the philosophy of the six categories. Due to an excessive faith in the infallibility of his own intellect he wrote a treatise on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy which was later on elaborated by others. We point out that no authority except Jinabhadra and his commentators take Rohagupta as the promulgator of the Vaiśeṣika śāstra which has been claimed by some modern scholars. Rohagupta, propounder of the Nihnava theory, must have accepted the Vaiśeṣika views current in his time and his personal elaboration of the same being rejected, he with his innovation went into oblivion.

In the ordinary Jaina view all the ekāntavādas including the Vaiśeṣika one are partially true. The Jaina philosophers never fought shy to accept the views of others when they are not antagonistic to their own doctrine of non-absolutism. It is but natural that the Vaiśeṣika views should make headway in early Jaina texts like the *Dvādaśāranayacakra*. The texts like *Nyāyaviniścaya-vivaraṇa*, however, stands quite against a number of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines.

The Vaiśeṣika literature touches Jaina views very rarely. We however, cannot tell anything about the Jaina materials in the early commentaries between Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda as those have not come down to us. Of the later commentators Vyomaśiva[1] and Śrīdhara[2] are found to have touched the Jainas in only two or three cases.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Vyomavatī* (II), p. 127
2. *NK*, pp. 421, 511, 565

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